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ABSTRACT
MYSTICISM AhV liOClAL blTHlCS 
TH0MA3 Xt-RTOH JKr:.' IN TH ■ LIGHT OF PAUL IIL L IC H 'C  'i-i OLCOY
Thomas Merton (1915-1968), the American Cistercian, 
wrote numerous books and essays on spirituality, including 
both Christian and Eastern forms of mysticism, and such 
social concerns as racial injustice, the war in Vietnam., 
and the depersonalizing tendencies within a technical 
society. From his position of contemplative withdrawal ho 
spoke a prophetic word to the world in which he lived, 
recognising that his monastic, end evantually his eremitic 
life, was not no much a withdrawal from the world as it 
was his own place the world, Ka provides, therefore, 
a living example of the close interrelationship between 
contemplation and action,
Morton understood withdrawal to be a movement away from 
the superficial and falsa attitudes one has of the world 
and of one’s ovsi self. Ivithdraval is, for him, a movement 
away from the shfirp distinction between subject and object, 
and a movement toward the understanding that God is the 
ground of all being and that all contingent beings, rooted 
in Him, ore urdted. Withdrawal is the necessary prelude to 
effective social action, since withdrawal opens one to the
y
truth of man’s solid aid tj in God, who is ultimate Reality, 
and therefore provides the true basis for moral action®
For Merton, moral theology is dependent upon ascetical 
theology* The closer one is to God, the closer one is to 
all of God»a creation*
Paul Tillich, too, saw the necessity for withdrawal, 
for an immediate apprehension of God, and for social action* 
Hence, it la not surprising that Tillich and Merton have 
numerous points of affinity* In fact, Tillich’s theology 
can be interpreted as a theoretical statement of Merton* 8 
experience. Tillich’s use of ontological language, 
especially hi a distinction between essence and 0x3. stance, 
provides a methodical approach to the theology behind 
Merton’s mysticism and social ethic* The purpose for with­
drawal is to allow essence to become known under the 
condition» of existence, and once essence is known •» how­
ever fragmentarily - it enriches existence for all, not 
only for the one who has experienced essentiali nation. 
Hence, even the znyatioism of a hermit has an indirect 
effect on the entire world, and, in the case of Morton 
himself, a direct and explicit effect* Tillich, there­
fore, helps to explain Merton, and Merton’s life-long 
attempt to balance the poles of individuality and par­
ticipation provides an experiential example of Tillich’s 
system*
Robert E* Giannlni
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PREFACE
I first read Thomas Merton very early in my life when 
I came across a copy of T|^ Seven Storey Mountain at the 
home of an uncle. I have been reading him ever since. 
During the 1950s I purchased (in paperback, which was all 
I could afford); many of his volumes on spirituality and a 
number of books of poetry. I regret now that I did not 
buy more. I did my honours thesis at The University of 
the South on his poetry chiefly because I liked the way 
his poems sounded} his ima^y appealed to me. Perhaps, 
though, I liked his poetry because I liked his prose and 
I liked the person who emerged from behind the printed 
word. I continued to read Merton throughout the 1960s, 
both in theological college and when I was in the parish 
ministry. I was delighted to discover his great empathy 
with the struggles of black Americans to declare their 
dignity to their white brothers. I was intrigued wi'tti 
his interest in Zen (although I was not quite sure that I 
understood what he was talking about) and I envied the 
straight-forward way in which he spoke to the situation 
of the war in Vietnam and the possibilities of nuclear 
holocaust.
In 1962 I had the gratifying and singular honour of 
being able to meet Thomas Merton and to spend an hour with 
him, accompanied by five or six other Episcopal theological
students* We had gone to Gethaemani on retreat and hoped 
(without any real expectation of fulfilment) that we would 
have a chance to meet Merton. Not only did we meet him, 
but we were invited to his hermitage, talked with him 
principally about the Roman CathoMc Ohurch’s mind on the 
validity of Anglican orders (it seemed important at the 
time) and even had him autograph books, which he did 
graciously but with a kind of embarrassment. I felt at 
the time (and still do) that Merton was delighted to chat 
seriously with young theological students but signing books 
was not his idea of an important task. Rather, this was a 
part of the superficialities - part of the culture wtiich 
delights in celebrities - which Merton consistently dis­
avowed* Yet, he did sign my copy of A Thomas Merton Reader. 
His graciousness was further evidenced when he answered a 
letter I had written to him asking him to explain the 
meaning of a poem. I have since learned that it is most 
indelicate to ask a poet to explain a poem. Nevertheless 
he answered my letter promptly and specifically* (He said 
that the poem, "Landscape,” was a series of impressions and 
the meaning was vague and pretty much left up to the reader.) 
I was delighted to get his reply and thrilled that someone 
as "famous” as Thomas Merton would take the time to write 
to me. Years have passed and my understanding of Thomas 
Merton’s thought and his personality has matured. The 
fact that he wrote to me is perfectly consistent with the 
kind of person he was. Nevertheless, I am still thrilled*
VI
I have received invaluable help from many sources in 
preparing this study of the relationship between mysticism 
and social ethics in Thomas Merton’s life and work. Without 
the encouragement and supervision of Michael Keeling of 
St. Andrews University, that which is good and worthwhile 
in this thesis would never have emerged. thanks also 
go to the other members of the staff of the Faculty of 
Divinity at St. Andrews, each of whom, in his or her own 
way, added to my knowledge and my life. I am grateful, too, 
to the members of the staff of the Bellarmine College 
Library in Louisville who gave me access to the Merton 
archives, and to the Trustees of the Merton Legacy Trust, 
without whose cooperation no work on Merton could be com­
plete. Brother Patrick Hart of Gethsemani was particularly 
helpful. A word of thanks, too, to all those who made this 
research financially possible.
Finally, a word of thanks, appreciation and love to 
three ladies with whom I have shared this work. JoAon 
and Mhry Margaret, my wife and eldest daughter, have 
shared the joys and pains of creativity ever since the be­
ginning of my research. Gillian joined us at about the mid­
point of this thesis, and although she was too young to 
have any idea of what was going on, nevertheless she ranks 
with her older sister and her "mum" in being one of the 
three special people to whom this work is dedicated.
All unpublished works by Thomas Merton are copywrited by the Merton Legacy Trust.It is with their kind permission that these works are referred to or quoted in this thesis.
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MYSTICISM AND SOCIAL ETHICS 
THOMAS MERTON SEEK IN THE LIGHT OF PAUL TILLICH’S THEOLOGY^
INTRODUCTION
Thomas Merton (1915-1968), the American Cistercian, 
became very well known in the 1950s and 1960s for his 
writings on both spirituality and social concerns* His 
earlier works on the spiritual life were explicitly 
Christian but toward the end of his life he was incorp­
orating a number of insights from Eastern religions into 
his thought* His social concerns, the seeds of which were 
present in even his earliest writings, became particularly 
evident in the 1960s and included racial injustice, the 
cold war, the war in Vietnam, and the depersonalizing 
tendencies within a technological society* Ftom his posi­
tion of contemplative withdrawal he spoke a prophetic word 
to the world in which he lived, recognizing that his monastic 
life, and eventually his eremetic life, was not so much a 
withdrawal from the world as it was his own place 3^ the 
world. He provides, therefore, a living example of the 
close interrelationship between contemplation and action, 
between mysticism and social ethics. It is of considerable 
importance to those interested in ascetical theology as well 
as to those interested in the social ramifications of the 
Christian Gospel, that during the turbulent 1960s in America, 
one of the most astute and profound voices was that, not of 
one who had Immersed himself in the struggles themselves, 
but rather of one who was living in quiet seclusion in the 
hills of Kentucky. Thomas Merton did not march in Selma 
or in Washington. He did not work hand-in-hand with people 
in the urban ghettoes. He did not even devote much time 
to a study of the numerous journals and news magazines
that described the American scene* Rather, he meditated 
and prayed* And from this position of prayer he became in­
creasingly aware of the inner struggles of society and of 
the individuals who comprised that society. It was his 
withdrawal from that society, rather than an immersion in 
it, that provided Merton with insight. Furthermore, his 
withdrawal was not merely negative; he did not simply 
withdraw from the world, but he moved into what he considered 
to be his own personal depths and in those depths, to an 
immediate apprehension of God. It was this apprehension 
of God, which for Merton became possible only in the quiet 
provided by his withdrawal, that led him to his understanding 
of and concern for social justice. It can be argued then, 
that in Thomas Merton the social dimension of mysticism is 
discerned and that in his many writings the theological basis 
of the relationship between contemplative prayer and ethics 
can be found.
However, Thomas Merton was not a systematic theologian.
His numerous writings do not lend themselves to a direct 
understanding of his theology, a theology which is implied 
throughout his work, but is made explicit only occasionally.
He was writing for a wider audience than the trained theologian, 
He wrote for his fellow monks, not all of whom were scholars, 
he wrote for the American public at large, and he wrote for 
those who shared his poetic temperament. Therefore, one 
must discover a means of extricating his theology from these 
many different types of writings if one hopes to discover 
precisely how he saw the relationship between mysticism and
social ethics* It is this relationship that I propose to 
study in this thesis*
In spite of Merton’s lack of a systematic approach in 
his writings, nevertheless, for one to be able to grasp the 
theological implications of his thought, a methodological 
approach is necessary* The system that appears throughout 
this thesis, therefore, is mine and not his.
Since the events of Merton’s life had a direct and 
lasting impact on the development of his thought, it is 
necessary to include a brief biographical sketch. Merton’s 
life, more so than that of almost any other modern religious 
thinker, is an almost exact expression or parable of his 
theology. It would be utterly impossible to understand him 
apart from a knowledge of at least the basic outline of his 
biography. The first chapter of this thesis, therefore, 
is a brief exposition of Merton’s life.
In the second chapter there will be an examination of 
the development of Merton’s thought as seen in a chronological 
study of his writings, with a particular emphasis on his in­
creasing awareness of his own particular responsibility in 
and to the society which, at one point, he thought he had re­
jected. In this way the basic substance of his mystical-ethical 
theology will be disclosed.
In chapters three and four that theological substance 
will be examined systematically. First of all it will be 
examined with the help of the model of withdrawal and return
which Toynbee has described in his A Study of History.^ 
Inasmuch as this motif can be used to describe Merton’s 
life and inasmuch as Merton’s life and his theology were 
so much of one piece, this model is an appropriate one with 
which to analyze his theology. I propose to examine Merton’s 
theological anthropology by examining what he meant by his 
own understanding of withdrawal, to examine his theology 
by studying what he understood to be the nature of that which 
occurs to one in the state of withdrawal, and finally, to 
examine his understanding of the ethical implications of 
theology by looking at the way in which he understood the 
importance of a return from that state of withdrawal. It 
is of importance to note that Merton did not return to 
American society by giving up his monastic life; he re­
mained a monk until the end of his life. For him, return 
me^t the ability to regard the world - and one’s own self - 
from a totally new perspective, a perspective gained during 
the period of withdrawal. Therefore, the imposition of the 
system of withdrawal-experience-return is a suitable, and 
as will be shown, profitable, means of understanding Merton’s 
theology.
Finally, Merton’s theological substance will be exam­
ined by juxtaposing it with the systematic theology of Paul 
Tillich. Mystical elements in Paul Tillich’s theology
^Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History. Vol. Ill (London; Oxford University Press, 1934)> PP* 248ff.
have long been noted. Walter Leibrecht described him as
"a mystical Christian theologian in the classic sense of
the phrase."^ Others might not agree with such a lofty
description, but they would not deny a certain mystical
2element in his theology, one which is absent from most
"The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich," in Religion and Culture; Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich, ed. Walter Leibrecht (London; SOM, 1959)!, P# 19.2e.g. James Luther Adams, Paul Tillich’s Philosophy of Culture^. Science and Religion '(New YorkT Schocken,1970), pp. 32, 91, 94, 235-240; John P. Dourely, Paul Tillich and Bonaventure (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975);Kenneth Hamilton, The System and the Gospel: A Critiqueof Paul Tillich (London; SCM, 1963), pp. I83f7 221f; Walter M. Horton, "Tillich’s Role in Contemporary Theology" in The Theology of Paip. Tillich, eds. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York: Macmillan, 1961), p. 39;Rollo May, Paulus: Reminiscenses of a Friendship (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 57,^87; N.H.G. RobinsonThe Groundwork of Christian Ethics (London:: Collins, 1971), p. 290; Hans Rollmann, "%8ticism and Social Responsibility" in St. Luke’s Journal of Theology 17 (September, 1974), p. 58; Pi Schwanz, "Plotin und Tillich" in Kalros 14 (1972),No. 2, pp. 137-141; Roger L. Shinn, "Paul Tillich as a Contemporary Theologian" in The Intellectual Legacy of Paul Tillich, ed. James R. lyons (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1969), pp. 60f; George F. Thomas, Religious Philosophies of the West (New York; Schribners, 1965), pp. 409, 421f; E.J. Tinsley, "l^sticism" in A Dictionary of Christian Theology, ed. Alan Richardson (Philadelphia; Westminster,1969) , p. 225, and "Parable, Allegory and Mysticism" in Vindications, ed. A. Hanson (London: SCM, 1966), pp. 180,188. Ted Mehta, in The New Theologian (London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), quotes from a conversation he had with Reinhold Niebuhr on Tillich’s mysticism and Neoplatonism, p. 34. It is noteworthy, too, that David Hopper is able to point to Tillich’s early (1912) work (actually his thesis at the University of Halle) Mvstik und Schuldbewusstsein ^  Schellings Philosophischer Entwicklung (since publishedas Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness Schelling’s Philosophical Developm^t (Lewisburg, Pa.; Bucknell University Press,1974), as a key to Tillich’s later theological developments.See Hopper’s Tillich: ^ Theological Portrait (Philadelphia;Uppincott, I96È), chapters IV and V. It is therefore surpris­ing that Georgia Harkness can refer to Tillich appreciatively
of his Protestant contemporaries.^ It is this interest in 
mysticism and the profoundly systematic nature of his theology 
which makes a comparison of Tillich and Merton possible and 
fruitful. Tillich constantly tried to interpret the role of 
mysticism within the total concept of religion without failing 
to notice, at the same time, the dangers inherent within 
mysticism itself. Along with Karl Barth be was able to
in her Mysticipis; Its Meaning and l^eeeage (Nashville;, Abingdon, 1973)j pp. 66, 70, 123, 130, and refer not at all to his HQTstical elements.
^It is pséeisely his interest in and appreciation for mysticism that is one of the chief points of contrast be­tween Tillich and the majority of his contemporary Protestant theologians, most of whom reacted strongly against Schleier- macher’s experiential approach to religion, and therefore to anything that came close to resembling mysticism. In this regard Tillich, along with Rudolf Otto (see The Idea of the Holy (ET:: London:. Oxford University Press, 1932), and Mysticism;: East and West (ET:: London:, Macmillan, 1932#at^ds against the neo-Kantian and Ritschlian schools which interpreted religion primarily in moral terms and were hostile to any form of mysticism or theology of religious experience* (For Tillich’s appreciation of Otto see Theology of Culture (London; Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 193; Systematic Theology. Vol. I (London;: James Nisbit, 1951), pp. 91, 23âfj and Perspectives on 19th ^ d  20th Century Protestant Theology (London; SOM, 1967^ p. 2l6. See W.R. Inge, Christian Mysticism (London; Methuen, 1899), pp. 334- 347 for relevant comments on mysticism by A. Harnack and W; Herrmann, two noteworthy neo-Kantians.) Tillich stands, too, against the modern and vociferous opponents of Schleier- macher’s thought, the school of Protestant theology variously known as neo-orthodox, dialectical theology, or theology of crisis. This places Tillich against some of his most disting­uished contemporaries, namely, Karl Barth and Boil Brunner, as well as Reinhold Niebuhr vfao taught with Tillich for many years at Union Theological Seminary in New York. On Prot­estantism* s rejection of mysticism see E.J. Tinsley’s The Imitation of God in Christ (London: SCM, 1960)^ pp. 14-20;
recognize that mysticism can become a matter of self­
salvation, an operation of works rather than grace.^
Yet he was also quick to point out that a mystical element 
is essential to all religion,^ an element without which 
religion would be severely truncated. Along with Emil 
Brunner he was able to contrast mysticism, "The feeling of 
unity with the absolute"%on the one hand, with the 
"consciousness of opposition"^ between man and God on the 
other hand. But, unlike Brunner, Tillich insisted that 
mysticism and the consciousness of separation from God are 
not irreconcilable opposites but rather constitute two
and Robert Yule, "Article Review:; Recent Writings on Christian Spirituality"' in ^ e  Scottish Journal of Theology 28 (1975)^No. 6, pp. 589-591.
^Barth’s statements in opposition to nystioism are many, e.g. Church Dogmatics (Edinburgh:; T.and T. Clark), I,2 (ETr 1956), pp. 318, 319, 323; III, 4 (ETr 196l)^p.. 563. Of, Tillich’s Systematic Theology. Vol. II (1957), pp. 96f. see below pp. 3%4ff
^e.g. Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill (1963), pp. 257f. See below pp. '324ff.
3kfarsticism and Guilt-Oonsciousness in Schelling’s Philosophical Development, p. 27.
^an expression used by both Tillich (Ibid., p. 27) , and Brunner (The Mediator. ET:; Westminster: Philadelphia,1937), p. 405. For Brunner’s attacks on mysticism see The Mediator as well as his study of Sohleiermacher, Die Mvstik und das Wort (Tubingen: J.G.B. Mohr, 1928).
poles of an essential paradox within the Christian faith.^
Along with Reinhold Niebuhr, Tillich protested against
tendencies within the history of mysticism which drove
2away from concern with concrete, historical reality.
"For although we are in the flesh and under the law and in the cleavage of our existence, we are, at the same time, in the Spirit and in the fulfillment and unity with the ultimate meaning of our life," Shaking of the Foundations (New York; Scribners, 1 9 4 8 p. 135. Tillich also refused to divide religion into the contradictory types of ’mysticism* and ’prophetic religion* as Freidrich Heiler has done in his study. Prayer (ET; Londont Oxford University Press, 1932). In a study of Buber, Tillich wrote, "It is not true that mysticism and prophetic religion contradict each other." Theology of Culture, p. 196* In In Religionsphilosophie (1925) Tillich posited ’sacramental* and ’theocratic* as two opposing religious tendencies and saw mysticism as "the radical, critically conscious form of the sacramental attitude." (ET; "The Philosophy of Religion" in What is Religion? New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 88f, 91. See also The Courage To Be (New Haven, Conn:: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. l^ff. In Systematic Theology. Vol. I,he saw mysticism and prophetic religion (along with a rational element) as constituting the critical, as opposed to the sacramental side of religion (pp. 155ff). But the c&itic&l and the sacramental were not seen to be opposed:: "No prophet could speak in the power of a new revelation, no mystic could contemplate the depth of the divine ground, no meaning could be given over to the appearance of the Christ, if there were not this sacramental- priestly substance." (p. 155) Or, in other words, the critical principle of Protestantism needs the substance of Catholicism. See Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, pp. 259f#See below p. 585, fn. 1#
^e.g. Niebuhr’s The Nature and Destiny of Man. Vol. II (Nisbet: London, 1943)i pp. 12, 94-99# See Tillich: Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 375; T ^  Courage To Be, p. 186: ^rality and Beyond (London: Collins Fontana,1969) p. 10: The Protestant Era (London: Nisbet, 1951), 
p. 39.
But, unlike Niebuhr who saw mysticism as primarily an
attempt at emancipation from the responsibilities inherent
within historical existence, Tillich saw that mysticism in
its most mature manifestations was directed toward history
and not away from it*^ Carl £« Brakxn has written;
"For Tillich there is an ineliminable element of mysticism in every religion. A questionhe often posed to his students was whether’mysticism can be baptized by Ohristianity. *His answer was ’yes’, provided we distinguish between the abstract type of mysticism of Hinduism and the concrete nysticism of Christianity." ^
Therefore, in his desire to find a central place for
mysticism within Christian theology, Tillich stands, if
not in total opposition to his distinguished contemporaries,
3at least on a different plane. From as early as the writing
^see below pp. 554,-566.
^"Paul Tillich and the Classical Christian Tradition" in Tillich’s Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, pp. xxivf*
^Although an opponent of nysticism, Barth can speak about it with respect (especially in his later writings) and see that it cannot be disndssed lightly. See Church Dogmatics IT, 1, p. 104, IT, 2, pp. lOff, IT 3 (2nd half) p. 540, and in a passage which speaks of the Kant-Ritschl repudiation of mysticism, pietism and arything akin to sentimentality, Barth cautions against erring Ty going too far in this direction to the neglect of the Spirit, IT, 2, pp. 795f. Brunner, too, can appreciate certain forms of mystik;.: "Meditation is the spiritual act through which the # r d  which is preached, prayer, and our experience of life are united, in order that they may thus mutually penetrate the soul as a whole. %!Were ’Christian mysticism* nothing more than an emphasis upon the necessity for such meditation there would be nothing against it." % e  Divine
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of his thesis on Sohelling in 1912, to the final volume 
of the Systematic Theology published in 1963, less than 
two years before his death, Tillich was concerned with 
the questions mysticism posed for the theological task. 
Unlike Barth, Brunner and Niebuhr, he was more interested 
in defending mysticism than attacking it, more interested 
in seeing it in correlation with prophetic religion than 
opposed to it. It is because of this interest in mysldcism 
that it is possible to look at Merton’s theology in light 
of the theology of Paul Tillich* Furthermore, since
Imperative. (ET; London;, Lutterworth, 1937), p. 314*No mention has been made of other contemporaries of Tillich, principally Rudolf Bultmann and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Like Barth and Brunner they stood against i^ysticism generally. Bultmann called mysticism "man’s belief in himself...the opposite of belief in God",Essays;, Philosophical and Theological (ET; London;SOM, 1955); p. 19. See also pp. 9, 106 in which he criticizes mysticism for being a-historical. However, see Faith and Understanding - I (ET; London;; SCM,1969), p. 203 in which he says,“regarding St, Paul "*..for Paul, ’in the Spirit* does not mean an ecstatic or mystic state but describes the Christian’s new mode of being, the manner of his historical existence as an existence in the New Age." This passage has certain marks of affinity with the thought of Tillich, especially Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, pp. llSff. Bonhoeffer criticized mystical silence as "the soul secretly chattering away to itself," Ghristology (ET;: London; Collins Fontana, 1971)> p. 27. It is Bonhoeffer who, it may be recalled, has had considerable influence in the so-called "radical" theologian# and their decidedly anti-UQTstical stance.
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Merton was not a systematio writer^ and Tillich was pro­
foundly systematic, such a juxtaposition of theologies 
will prove to he fruitful as well as merely possible.
Over the years Paul Tillich’s theology has received
2considerable attention and criticism; Merton, however,
in spite of a number of detailed and scholarly expositions
of his thought, has not received the same thorough
3theological critiques#. I do not propose to provide 
such a critique in this thesis# 3hat work is left to the 
systematic theologian. Rather, it is ny hope that this 
comparison of Merton and Tillich will not only point the
This point is noted as well by James Thomas Baker in Thomas Merton Social Critic (Lexington, "Syr The University Press of Kentucky, 1971); p# 34, and Jean Le- Clercq, OSBÿ Wio wrote: "He was not concerned with a•definitive work, ’ a scholarly tome, needing no further commentary, but with a number of ’essays, ’ trials, thrusts, breakthroughs moving beyond the fragile present, which others are now trying to consolidate in order to pre­serve the message and increase its life." From the "Introduction" to Merton’s Contemplation in a World of Action (London:.: George Allen and Unwin, 1971) p. xiv.
2Throughout this thesis reference will be made to a number of these studies as it appears appropriate. The major studies, and especially those that have been of particular importance to this thesis will be found on pages 637ff ' of this thesis#
3The major studies of Merton to date are listed on pages 631ff # A number of doctoral dissertations alsoprovide valuable insights into Merton’s thought and these will be acknowledged within the scope of this work. Of all the critical works on Merton, I have found that only Higgins, Kelly and Bailey provide detailed theological expositions of Merton’s theology, but none of these works are of a critical nature; they are all expository. See below pp. 5?6ff on the nature of the critiques of Merton to date.
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way to a modern understanding of the relationship between 
mystioism and Social ethics, but will also provide one 
avenue of approach to a detailed theological critique 
of Thomas Merton, with the implication that the criticisms 
leveled against Tillich can be, with only minor alterations, 
applied to Merton as well#^
The similarities between these two men have been noted 
in various places, but no detailed comparison of their 
respective theologies has yet been made. The American
It is certainly not to be implied that this is the only way in which Merton could be criticized, nor is Paul Tillich the only Protestant theologian with whom Merton could be compared. Merton himself mentions his own appreciation for Barth, Bultmann and Bonhoeffer (see Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander,(Garden City;; Doubleday, 19ëS)j Faith and Violence (Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 196é), and Opening the Bible (London;; George Allen and Unwin, 1972). Merton’s references to Tillich are to be found cliiefly in Faith and Violence, with extended treatment in two articles,"The Catholic and Creativity;: Theology of Creativity" in The American Benedictine Review 11 (i960) pp. 197- 213, and "i^ymbolism - Communication or Communion?" in The Mountain Path (India) 3 (October, 1966), pp. 339- 34$. All these theologians are mentioned by Merton in other places as well. In the Merton Archives at Bellar­mine College, Louisville, Kentucky, there is one extant letter from Merton to Tillich, see below, p. .Iferton could be compared with Barth on the subject of God as pure subjectivity; with Bonhoeffer on their common concern for direct political action; with Bultmaim on their various approaches to Biblical exegesis and their interest in existentialism; and with Brunner (a theologian Merton is not that familiar with) on the contention that when man is in revolt against God he is in revolt against himself as well.
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sociologist of religion, Robert Bellab, mentioned their
common interest in Eastern religions and in this context 1drew a comparison* Raymond Bailey, in his book Thomas
Merton on Mysticism* specifically mentioned that he saw
2"clear affinities" in the thought of the two men* It
is also to be noted that in New Harmony, Indiana, on the
site of Robert Owen*s nineteenth century utopian community,
there is a park named in honour of Paul Tillich and in
which Tillich is buried. On the same grounds there is a
3garden in honour of Thomas Merton. - These are the only two 
persons so honoured in New Harmony. Therefore, this is not 
the first time that the names of these two men have been 
l i n k e d I t  is, however, the first time in which their 
thought has been systematically compared.
Bellah wrote: "Post critical western religion wastherefore ready for a positive response to Asian religions in a way different from any earlier period. Paul Tillich's response to Zen Buddhism late in his life is an example of this. Thomas Merton's final immersion in Buddhism Is an even better one," "The New Religious Consciousness" in The New Republic 171, No. 21 (November,23, 1974), p. 40.
%aymond Bally, Thomas Merton on Mysticism (Garden City: Doubleday, 1975)» p. 220. of pp. 69, 72, 180.
^see R.H. King, "Tillich at New Harmony" in The Christian Century 89 (March 1, 1972^ pp. 252f.
^In his biography of Tillich, Rollo May mentions Merton: "He (Tillich) is aware of his vocation of watching the waves of the ocean and of the human scene, and knows that it requires standing aside from the cares and pressures of life* Hence the Roman Catholic Church, with a wisdom not often appreciated in these days of group-mindedness and other means of huddling together in our anxiety, has required celibacy for those of its clergy, who, like Thomas Merton, need it." Paulas, p. 59#
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For the purposes of this comparison, two definitions
need to be discussed, namely, "mysticism" and "social ethics."
Throughout his writings Thomas Merton used the words
"nysticism," "contemplation," "contemplative prayer" or
such similar phrases, in an unsystematic, interchangeable
way. This, according to Dorn Guthbert Butler, has been common
practise throughout the history of Christian mysticism.^
Merton was never happy with the word "mysticism" or the word
"contemplation." He found them misleading and the cause of 
2much consternation; but he found it impossible not to use 
them. Evelyn Underhill knew from her many years of research
into mysticism, the word itself is "one of the most abused
,4
3words in the English language." Dean Inge felt that it was
employed even more loosely than the word "sooialisml"
Dorn Guthbert Butler, Western Mysticism (London;- Constable, 1922), pp. 2f. On Merton's usage of these terms see John J. Higgins, Thomas Merton on Prayer (Garden City, N.Y.Î Doubleday, 1975), p. 73, fn. e. See also R. Bailey, op.cit.. p. 209. Merton tended to favour "mysticism" in his earliest works (e.g. % e  Ascent ^  Truth. 1951), but often uses "contemplation" to describe the same experience (e.g. Seeds of Contemplation. 1949, and "What is Contempla­tion?.", 1948^7 "Contemplation" tends to be favoured in his later works, but this does not mean that he ceases to use the word "mysticism". It does appear frequently in The New Man (1961).
2e.g. Merton's Preface to New Seeds of Contemplation (New York; New Directions, 196277 pp. ix-xi; The Wisdom ^  the Desert (London:: Sheldon Press, 1961), p. 20; and "The Life that Unifies" in Sisters Today 42 (October, 1970), p. 65-
^Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism (12th edition), (New York; E.P. Dutton, 1961), p. xiv.
^W.R. Inge, op. cit.-. p. 1.
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William James, in his analysis of mystical experience,
refused to give a precise definition of such a complex
phenomenon, but discussed instead various marks of the
experience itself.^ Merton is in good company, then, in
his own unsystematic approach to discussions of this elusive
experience* like James, he most often describes mysticism
in terms of its concrete manifestations rather than in
precise definitions. Nevertheless, he does attempt various
definitions, both simple and elaborate. In Merton's most
concise definition, contemplation is described as "simple
2openness to God at every moment. " A more complex definition 
one which expresses Merton's explicit Ohristocentric emphasis 
is given elaborate formulation in the first chapter of New 
Seeds of Contemplation. A brief summary of this chapter is 
made in the following definitions:
"Contemplation is the awareness and realization, even in some sense experience. of what each Christian obscurely believes; 'It is now no Igi^er I that live but Christ lives in me.'"^
^William James, The Varieties "of Religious Experiences (The Gifford Lectures, 1901-1902), (London; Collins Fontana, I960), pp. 366-413.
^"The Life that Unifies," p. 65*
%ew Seeds of Contemplation, p. 5* (Here, and throughout this thesis underscoring represents italics in the original text. Only where it is specifically noted is underscoring supplied for reasons of emphasis.)
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Mysticism, then, for Merton, is openness to God, awareness, 
realisation and experience of the indwelling of Christ in 
the human person. It is never atheistic, and always 
Christocentric, and although in his discussions of Eastern 
forms of mysticism the Christocentric nature of mysticism 
is often unstated, it will be shown in the following study 
that even in Merton's understanding of Eastern mysticism a 
Christocentric basis is implied. A more detailed examination 
of the meaning of mysticism in the thought of both Merton 
and Tillich will constitute the greater part of this thesis;, 
what has been given here simply serves to point in the 
direction that this study will follow, and eliminates from 
consideration all forms of mystik. theistic or otherwise, or 
mystizismus - psychic, parapsychological, occult or magical - 
that do not coincide with Merton's basic understanding of 
mysticism.
The term "social ethics," like "mysticism," can yield 
a great variety of meanings. Merton's social ethic can be 
described as his concern for social reform, or what Gibson 
Winter has called "the continuing and daily business of man 
in his social existence,"^ specifically, the organizing of 
human communities and the shaping of social policies 
within them.
^Social Ethics: Issues in Ethics and Society,ed. Gibson Winber, (London: SOM, 19^8), p. 8.
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Thus, social ethics incorporates both individual acts 
of charity as well as the drive to alter structures in 
order that conditions which made those charitable acts 
necessary can be alleviated. Merton did not concern himself 
with the broader issue of the ways in which societies 
interact, but was concerned with the ways in which individuals 
act within societies and for the sake of societies.^ He 
could agree, therefore, with the observation, articulated 
by John Macquarrie, that, in a sense, "all ethics are 
social ethics." No ethic is "purely self-regarding."^ The 
word "social" therefore could be eliminated from any 
consideration of Merton's moral theology. It is maintained, 
however, in order to differentiate between ethics within the
^Paul Tillich, however, has attempted to speak to the problem.of how societies interact, although such a definition of social ethics does not constitute a central place in his theology. He does, however, differentiate between the moral principle applied to the individual, whom he sees as having a centred-self, and the community, which lacks a centred-self. Hence he makes a distinction between an individual and a social ethic, the individual ethic dealing with the way in which individuals interact, and social ethics dealing with the way in which societies act and interact. Such a distinction shall not be followed in this thesis. See, Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, pp. 43f, 82-89; Morality and Beyond, pp. 40f; and Love. Power, and Justice (London; Oxford University Press, I960),pp. 91-105.
^"Social Ethics" in A Dictionary of Christian Ethics, ed. John Macquarrie (London; SGM, 19^), p. 324*
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context of community on the one hand, and on the other
hand, the type of individual ethic condemned by Emil
Brunner as being "Wiolly unscriptural, " namely, an ethic
which is soley concerned with the individual's duties
towards God and duties toward himself.^
Since the main interest of this thesis is theological
and not political or sociological, it will be of secondary
interest only to dwell upon the exact content of Merton's
political and social writings. Our primary concern lies
in the very fact that a cloistered, contemplative monk
would make social reform such a central focus of his writings.
Ernst Troeltsch had argued that in the history of Christianity,
mysticism and mystical movements did not lead to social 
2transformation. But in Merton, mysticism did, in fact, 
lead to an ethic of social transformation. The specifics 
of Merton's pronouncements are relatively unimportant 
compared to the fact that these pronouncements came from 
one \riio espoused the contemplative, rather than the active 
life. His interests show that the relationship between
^Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative, pp. 30Sf.
^e.g. Troeltsch, The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches. Vol. II (ET; London; George Allen and Unwin, 1931), pp. 743, 1,011. However Troeltsch does see a social ethic inherent in asceticism, see Vol. I, p. 245#
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mysticism and social ethics is a more far-reaching concern 
than the ancient debate about the relationship between 
contemplation and action. As the study that Merton himself 
made of contemplation and action in St. Bernard clearly 
shows, such a study can often limit itself to either an 
analysis of the differences between contemplative and active 
monastic orders, or it can narrow the meaning of "action" 
to include only those actions within the contemplative 
community necessary for maintaining the material structures 
of the community. In spite of his early studies that 
tended to be of this natwe, this was never Merton's 
primary understanding of how the relationship between 
contemplation and action was to be defined* His concern 
was with the individual contemplative's relationship with 
a greater community than that of his own immediate environment, 
Merton's own interest in monastic life, and of monastic
^"Aetion and Contemplation in St. Bernard" in Collectanea Ordinis Gisterciensium Reformatorium 15 (January and July, 1953), pp. 26-31, 203-216, and 16 (April, 1954), pp. 105-121. These articles were later published in French as Marthe. Marie, et Lazare (Paris; Desclee de Brouwer, 1956)’. See below pp.For a summary of the relationship between action and contemplation see the appendecies by Jordan Aumann, OF, to Aquinas* Summa Theologiae. Vol. 46 (ET; London; ' Eyre and Spottiswoods, 1966), pp. 85-123.
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reform, should be of great importance to modern monasticism. 
For those in the secular world, however, such interests re­
main subservient to a more all-encompassing interest; the 
relationship between contemplation and such issues as 
racial justice, war and peace in a nuclear age, and an 
increasingly dehumanizing technology* Merton's life, and 
the theology found implicitly and explicitly in his many 
writings,^ serves as guide to the possibility of a moral 
theology that is grounded in a modern interpretation of 
prayer* He points to the essential role that ngrgticism 
can play in the attempt to keep the world from submitting 
to that which is less than human. To study Merton's theology 
of mysticism is to be confronted with a summons to action 
as well as a summons to a life of prayer. For him, the 
two could not be separated. Prayer without action was not 
communion with the God who is love, and action without a 
deep apprehension of the ground and source of love was 
inevitably futile and frustrating* He pointed to what he 
considered to be man's only hope in a terrifying age, namely, 
existential communion with God, and in Him, loving union 
with all of His creation.
Unpublished Merton material will be used sparingly and, when used, confined to footnotes. References made to articles which were subsequently published in books will be made, initially to the article, and thereafter, only the reference to the book will be made.
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I. M i  biography of THOMAS MERTON
The Merton Legacy Trust^ has commissioned John Howard 
2Griffin to write the official and definitive biography of 
Thomas Merton. In accordance with the stipulations of 
the Trust, Griffin alone has access to a great number of 
unpublished works by Merton, including personal journals, 
letters, notebooks, lectures, and other material. Many 
of these items will never be published and the public's 
knowledge of their contents will depend on Griffin. Until 
his work is finished any biography of Merton's is incomplete « 
A number of studies of Merton have been published, including 
some works that could be called "biographies," many of
The Merton Legacy Trust was created by Merton himself in 1967 to act as his literary executor and to assure that all copywrites would be in the name of the Abbey of Gethsemani. The tliree trustees are Naomi Burton Stone, who, over the years, had been editor of a number of Merton's works; Mrs. Frank E. 0*Callaghan, III, of Louisville; and James Laughlin of New Directions Books, New York.
^John Howard Griffin, born in 19Z), was a personal friend of Merton and collaborated with him on A Hidden Wholeness; The Visual World of Thomas Merton ^Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1970);, and is most well-known for Black Like Me (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), For a brief biographical sketch see T ^  Asian Journal of Thomas Merton (New York:_ New Directions, 1973), pp. ISOf,
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1which were written by those who knew Merton personally# 
Their value is limited and varied. Personal reminiscences 
of Merton are of considerable worth in our coming to 
understand the man as he was seen by his friends. However, 
the cloistered nature of Merton's life imposed great 
restrictions on the extent that any one person could become 
acquainted with him. Such personal remembrances, other 
than those of his fellow monks, were usually achieved 
tlnrough letters or occasional visits. They are limited by
See especially the essays in Thomas Merton. Monk;A Monastic Tribute, ed. Patrick Hart (New York: Sheed andWard, 1974), all of which were written by monks or nuns who had known Merton personally. See also The Man in the Sycamore Tree : The Good Times and Hard Life of ThomasMerton by Edward Rice (Garden City, N.Y.Doubleday Image, 1970};, written by a friend of Merton from his university days. Articles of a biographical nature include A.M. Allchin, "A.Liberator, A Reconciler," Continuum 7 (Summer, 1969), pp. 363-365; Daniel Berrigan, "Daniel Berrigan on Thomas Merton," The Thomas Merton Life Center News-Letter. April, 1973; Naomi Burton Xstone), "I Shall Miss %omas Merton. " Cistercian Studies 4 (1969), No. 3, pp. 218-225; Ernesto Cardenal, "Copias on the Death of Thomas Merton," in New Directions in Prose and Poetry 25 (New York: New Directions, 1972); Dorothy Day, "ThomasMerton, Trappist:. 1915-1968."' Catholic Worker 34 (December,1968); Basil DePinto, "In Memorium: Thomas Merton, 1915-1968," in ^le Cistercian Spirit; A Symposium in Memory of Thomas Merton (spencer, Mass.: Cistercian Publications,1969), pp. vii-x; James H. Forest, "The Gift of Merton," Commonweal 89 (10 January, 1969), pp. 463-465; Andrews Mann, "Thomas Merton; Man, Mystic, Enigma," Newsletter-Reviewof the R.M. Bucke Society for the Study of Religious Experience, Vol. VI, Nos. 1 and 2, (Spring, 1973), pp. 6-22; John Moffitt, "Thomas Merton: The Last Three Days." TheCatholic World 209 (July, 1969), pp. 160-163;: also in New Theology, No. 7, eds. Marty and Peerman (New York;
Macmillan, 1970), pp. 125-134.
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their lack of an extended view. The accumulation of many 
such accounts, however, can be one source for an understanding 
of the man* There are also the numerous scholarly studies 
of the life and work of Morton, studies which attempt to 
systematize and evaluate his thought, analyze in detail 
particular aspects of his life and work, or assess his 
contribution to religious thought*^ Nteny of these works 
are biographical in their approach, and within the limitations 
that are necessarily imposed by the Merton Legacy TTrust, 
they are of great value in so far as they collate and present 
in a condensed form, all of the material currently available 
with which to construct a "life*"
The primary sources for a biography of Thomas Merton 
are his own published autobiographical writings. The
2most important of these are T ^  Seven Storey Mountain (194-8),
^See below, p. 631ff.
Merton's autobiography was published in Great Britain with the title of Elected Silence (London;: Hollis and Carter, 1949). As a rule, this thesis will use the American title and make references to that book. Evelyn Waugh edited Merton's work for the British reader, and Elected Silence ended up being a severly truncated version of the original. The Seven Storey Mountain (New York; Bar court. Brace, 1948 - all quotations are from the Signet 1952 paperback edition), was finally published in Great Britain in 1975 by the Sheldon Press, London. See Robert Murray Davis, "How Waugh Out Merton," Month. April, 1973, pp. 150-153*
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his autobiography which gives details of the early years
of his life up until his entrance into the monastery;
The Sign of Jonas (1953), a journal that covers the years
1946 to 1952; The Secular Journal of Thomas Merton (1959),
extracts from a journal he kept between October, 1939 and
November, 1941; Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander (1966),
which contains excerpts Arom the journals written between
1956 and the mid-1960s;: and the post-humously published
The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton (1973) which contains
Merton's reflections on the last months of his life* In
addition to these books there are autobiographical
references and allusions in numerous other books and 
1articles* These give us ample information with which to 
construct an accurate and detailed picture of his life*
A more accurate picture, of course, awaits the work of Mr* 
Griffin, but until then the material at our disposal is 
considerable*
1. The First-half8 Pre-monastic
Thomas Merton was born on January 31, 1915, in Brades, 
France* His father, Owen Merton, was a New Zealand artist, 
who had gone to the Pyrenees to paint* His mother, Ruth
^These will be noted as they are used*
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Jenkins, was an American Quaker# When Thomas was only a 
year old the family moved to America to live at the home 
of his maternal grandparents# The next five years of his 
life was spent in Flushing, Long Island, New York.
Owen Merton was an Anglican and had Thomas baptized 
while still in France. However, there was no religious 
instruction given to the young boy. Merton's guess is 
this was primarily due to his mother, who, although occasionally 
attending a Friends' Meetinghouse, had no desire to give her 
children a formal religious education. Merton suggests that 
his mother's intellectual standards were such that she found 
typical religious education to be inferior to the kind of 
perfection she wished for her children. Merton never attended 
church while living in Flushing.^
His father's Anglican faith, which he was to get to 
know rather superficially later in his childhood, made only 
a negative impression. In fact, the first recorded social 
criticism of Merton's has to do with the Church of England.
He saw it as an institution whose cohesive power was neither 
doctrinal unity nor a mystical bond between people, but a 
"stubborn tenacity" to cling to the values of a certain 
social class. In The Seven Storey Mountain he is unable to
2say anything positive about his father's religious heritage.
The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 19# 
^Ibid.. pp. 84, 213.
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Merton's mother died in 1921. She had cancer, and 
rather than have her children (a brother, John Paul, had 
been born in 1918) witness her in her pain, she refused to 
allow them to visit her in her hospital bed. Once his 
mother entered the hospital, Merton never saw her again.
He was six years old*
After his mother's death, Thomas travelled to Bermuda 
with his father. A successful exhibition of paintings gave 
Owen Merton some financial success and he decided to go to 
France to continue painting. Thomas went back to New York 
to live with his grandparents and his younger brother. In 
August of 1925 Thomas joined his father in France, without 
his brother, and was enrolled in school. He spent two years 
in France before moving to England in the summer of 1928. He 
was sent to Oakham, an English public school, where he con­
centrated in French and Latin and developed a dislike for 
Plato, whom he had to read in Greek. Here he received an 
intellectual idea of religion, one based on Descartes'
Cogito ergo sum, phrases such as "the Good, the True, and 
the Beautiful," and a detailed reading of the Book of Idngs. 
He was not very impressed.
^The Seven Storey Mountain, pp. 94ff«
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Owen Merton died of a brain tumor in the fall of 1930. 
The fifteen-year-old Thomas was alone in England. His 
godfather lived in London, and Merton had a high regard 
for him, but his family was in America, For the past ten 
years of his life Merton had been centred around his 
father, even though there were long stretches of time when 
he was separated from him. Other than a few years, he 
rarely lived with his brother. Now, with a small but
sufficient legacy, he was on his own. During the next few
years he was able to use his summer holidays to travel 
back to America to visit his brother and grandparents, 
striking up a shipboard romance along the way, and to 
travel extensively on the European continent. In Rome,
in the summer of 1933, he had his first encounter with
religion in other than an intellectual context. He was 
intrigued with byzantine mosaics in various churches.
An aesthetic sense, probably a gift from his father.
(a gift which later was to become more explicit in Merton 
himself),^ opened up a new way of coming to understand thai 
which bored him when presented in the form of propositions.
He was art director of a campus publication at Columbia University, to which he contributed numerous sketches, some of which are printed in Rice's, The Man in the Sycamore Tree, but the mature artistic talents of Thomas Merton are seen in Griffin's, A Hidden Wholeness which demonstrates his ability with photography and caligraphic abstract art.
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"And now for the first time in my life I began to find out something of Who this Person was that men called Christ* It was obscure, but it was a true knowledge of Him, in same sense, truer than I knew and truer than I would admit. It was in Rome that my conception of Christ was formed.
In the mosaics Merton learned of God, and it was at this 
time that Merton first began to pray;
"And now I think for the first time in my whole life I really began to pray - praying not with my lips and with my intellect and my imagination, but praying out of the very roots of my life and of my being, and praying to the God I had never known, to reach down towards me out of His darkness and to help me to get free of the thousand terrible things that held my will in their slavery."2
His interest in art took him into numerous churches and 
monastaries throughout the continent, and he even discovered 
that he was beginning to go into these places not simply 
to look at works of art, but also to pray.
In 1933 Merton matriculated at Clare College, Cambridge, 
and remained in its "dark, sinister atmosphere" for a year 
doing modern languages. It was not a very good year, and
^The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 135, 
2Ibid.. p. 138.
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the only positive thing that Merton felt occurred to him 
at Cambridge was his introduction to Dante's "poetic 
synthesis of scholastic philosophy and theology." Every­
thing else was negative.^
Merton remained at Cambridge for one academic year.
His godfather suggested rather strongly that he return to 
America and forget about Cambridge, a suggestion that 
Merton readily accepted. He had been chastized by his 
godfather for the kind of life he had been living.
Precisely what this implied is not at all made clear, but 
the confrontation between Merton and his godfather was
unpleasant and the advice given to. the younger man was
2direct and not contradicted. He left England for good in 
November of 1934*
He spent the next years at Columbia University in 
New York. His life there focused around tliree centres, 
all of which help to explain some of the later developments
^Th© Seven Storey Mountain, pp. I46, 152.
^Ibid.. pp. 154f. Edward Rice suggests (but does not try to document or substantiate) that Merton's romantic life had brought certain problems along with it. Op. cit.. pp. 22f. If this had been the case, and had Merton in­cluded details in his autobiography, they may very well have been removed ly the censors who edited his works before they weag-e presented to the publishers* The existence of the censors and Merton's own discretion explain why, in The Seven Storey Mountain, he seems to be "agonizing tediously" over sins which are not at all unusual.(Monica Furlong is perplexed by this in Travelling In (LondonÎ Hodder and Staughton, 1971), P* 95* On the censors see below pp*«\\t@s.
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in his thought. The first of these was his interest in 
his aeademic work: his studies, his extra-ourrioular 
work within the University, and the friends he made at 
this time. Secondly, it was at this time that he developed 
an explicit social consciousness ^ d  became interested in 
Marxism and the Oommunist party. The third focal point 
was his interest in, and conversion to, the Roman Catholic 
Church,
The first of Merton's focal points was the University, 
Among the several people he met at Columbia University who 
profoundly impressed the young Merton was the poet Mark 
van Boren, who was later to write a preface to Selected 
Poems of Thomas Merton (1967) and would remain a friend 
for the rest of his life, "As far as I can see," wrote 
Merton, "î'ferk's sober and sincere intellect, and his manner 
of dealing with his subject with perfect honesty and ob­
jectivity and without evasions, was remotely preparing my 
mind to receive the good seed of scholastic philosophy*"^ 
Merton studied literature with van Boren and it was in 
this field that Merton would concentrate his efforts while 
at Columbia. Other than a short attempt at running cross­
country for the Columbia track team, Merton's interests
The Seven Storey Mountain, p, 172«
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werelitorary* Most of his free time was spent on
the fourth floor of John Jay Hall where various campus
literary publications had their office, Merton did
sketches for these magazines, became art editor of one of
them and, in his senior year, was editor of the university
yearbook. His contributions to the various student
1publications were numerous,
Merton's literary interests centred around VH.lliam
Blake and the thesis for his Master's degree was "Nature
and Art in William Blake," He had become interested in
and excited by scholastic philosophy, chiefly through a
study of Gilson's The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, and
the friendship of a lecturer in philosophy, Daniel Walsh,
who was later to become a priest. It was this philosophical
interest that led him to Maritain's Art and Scholasticism.
which was the book that "untied all the knots" in the 
2thesis.
They are listed in Dell 'Isola Thomas Merton? A Bibliography (New Yorks Farrar, Straus and Gudahy,1956'), pp. 88-93* Others who worked with Merton on these efforts include Robert Lax and Edward Rice, both of whom have made contributions to an understanding of Merton, On Lax, see "A Catch of Anti-Letters," Correspondence between Thomas Merton and Robert Lax, Voyages 11 (Winter-Spring, 1968), Nos, 1 and 2, pp. 44-56. In Merton, Seeds of Destruction. (New York: Farrar, Straus and GirousJ/ p. 264. (Robert Giroux of the mentioned publishing firm was also a Columbia friend.) On Rice, see The Man in The Sycamore Tree,
^The Seven Storey Mountain, p, 240.
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Later he became interested in the poetry of Gerard Manley
Hopkins and had planned to write his doctoral dissertation
on him, Merton was more and more involved in mystical
and Catholic poetry and in the precise and rational
philosophy of the scholastics of the Middle Ages,
In addition to the works that he submitted to the
various student publications at Columbia, Merton \irote a
number of novels during this period. Only one of them is1still extant. Journal of My Escape from the Nazis, a
quasi-autobiographical account of a young man in England
and Europe in the years immediately proceeding the Second
World War, Three finished novels and one half-finished
novel were thrown away when Merton decided to enter the
monastery in 1941* The rest of his writings, including his
2poetry, were sent to Mark van Dor en for safekeeping.
The second focus was Communism, Merton flirted with 
Communism while at Columbia, In the early 1930s he had 
first read the Communist Manifesto and some books about
XPublished post-humously as ^  Argument with the Gestapo (Garden City, N,Y. : Doubleday, 1969)',
oThe Seven Storey Mountain, pp. 403, 441, Merton had tried to get two of these novels published. They were called The Labyrinth and Man in the Sycamore Tree. "So many bad books get printed," he wrote in his journal in 1941, "why can't gg bad books get printed?" The Secular Journal of Thomas Merton (New York; Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959); quoted from the Dell paperback edition,i960, p. 136.
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life in the Soviet Union and had come to believe that 
Soviet Russia was a friend of the arts. Furthermore, he 
saw himself as a part of a crassly materialistic and 
manipulative society:
"I considered the person that I now was, the person that I had been at Cambridge, and that I had made of myself, and I saw clearly enough that I was the product of my times, ny society and my class. I was something that had been spawned by the selfishness and irresponsibility of the materialistic century in wliich I lived.
Capitalism was to blame for everything unpleasant. The
Western world was the epitome of this world Une ss. The
idea of a "classless society" intrigued him. "... there
would be no more poverty, no more wars, no more misery, no
more starvation, no more violence. Everybody would be
2happy* Nobody would be overworked." Furthermore,
Merton was very much impressed by passivism and had a 
profound dislike for the idea of war. He thought that the 
Communists shared this belief, and so, in the ironic setting 
of a Park Avenue apartment, Thomas Merton joined the Young 
Communist League, and took the party name of Frank Swift. 
This flirtation with Communism lasted for a very brief time.
^The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 163* 
p. 165.
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Already he had noticed the Goimnunists becoming increasingly 
militant concerning the Spanish Civil War* At the meeting 
when Merton joined the Communists, one middle-class 
adolescent was tallcing about machine gun positions along 
Park Avenue. Merton left the party quickly;:
"I only went to one meeting of the Young Communist League, in the apartment of one of the students. It was a long discussion as to wliy Comrade So-and-so did not come to any of the meetings. The answer was that his father was too bourgeois to allow it. So after that, I walked out into the empty street, and let the meeting end however it would."-
Merton's concerns for the social, political and economic 
problems of the world were not to find their fulfilment 
within the Communist Party* Nor would they find fulfilment 
anywhere until Merton was able to overcome certain tendencies 
within himself. He could not hope to solve, even partially, 
the selfishness of the %forld if he was not able to overcome 
the selfishness of Thomas Merton.
"The truth is that my inspiration to do something for the good of mankind had been pretty feeble and abstract from the start. I was still interested in doing good for only one person in the world - myself."^
The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 181., 
^Ibid.. p. 182.
35
It was his desire to overcome destructive tendencies within 
himself that led him to seek truth within the Catholic Church.
2he Church became the third focal point for Merton at 
this time. His interest in the Catholic Church had begun 
on his trip to Rome in 1933.^ It was in the Byzantine 
Churches of Rome that he first had begun to pray and to come 
to an understanding of God. The next recorded instance of 
any desire to pray came in 1936 when his grandfather died. 
Without any real sense of the existence of the soul, and
2without any systematic thought, Merton was drawn to pray.
These were the inchoate beginnings of his religious quest. 
Nevertheless it was with a feeling of "disgust and deception" 
that Merton discovered, in February, 1937, that a book he 
was reading had received the "Nihil Obstat" and "Imprimatur" 
of the Catholic Church. The book was Etienne Gilson's 
The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy and he was tempted to 
throw it away. Catholic culture may have been of interest 
to him, but he was afraid of the Catholic Church. He kept 
the book, however, read it, and found that it was to 
revolutionize his entire life. He had discovered an en­
tirely new concept of God. Heretofore he had assumed that
^See above, p. 27.
2The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 195.
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the Catholic idea of God was a "vague and rather super­
stitious hangover from an unscientific age," Faced now 
with the idea of the aseity of God, Merton came to have an 
intellectual understanding of God that he felt was "deep, 
precise, simple and accurate, and what is more, charged 
with implications which (he) could not even begin to 
appreciate.For the first time, Merton understood God 
in terms of being; he understood, for the first time, that 
God can be defined as "Being itself," The result of reading 
Gilson was that now Merton had a profound respect for 
Catholic philosophy and for the Catholic faith. God was 
now becoming an intellectual possibility for him, and faith 
was no longer something he considered to be only for the
uneducated; he could appreciate it as having "a very
3ii
3
2definite meaning and a most cogent necess ty." This
was the beginning of Merton's conversion»
^The Seven Storey Mountain, pp. 207ff
^Ibid.. p. 212.
3"It had taken little more than a year and a half, counting from the time I read Gilson's The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy to bring me up from an 'atheist' - as X considered myself - to one who accepted all the full range and possibilities of religious experience right up to the highest degree of glory." The Seven Storey Mountain, p. Zhlm
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At the same time Merton was reading Gilson, he was 
also reading Aidons Huxley* s Ends and Means, a book which, 
although it had no tiling to do with Catholicism, did excite 
Merton* s interest in prayer, mysticism and asceticism.
In the same way that Gilson showed him the intellectual 
acceptability of a certain concept of Ck>d, Huxley showed 
Merton the intellectual credibility of these particular 
practices. This made Merton turn to the various schools 
of Oriental Mysticism, and it was through a Hindu monk 
that he became familiar with the classics of the mystical 
tradition within the Christian tradition. Expecting that 
he would receive some direction for reading within the 
Eastern scriptures, Merton turned to a man called Bramachari, 
a Hindu who was at Columbia University, Instead, Bramachari 
urged Merton to look into the writings of the West. Merton 
recalls:
"He did not generally put his words inthe form of advice; but the one counsel Jhe did give me is something I will not easily forget; * There are many beautifulmystical books written by the Christians, !You should read St, Augustine's Confessions. iand The Imitation of Christ.' j
"Of course I had heard of both of them; ibut he was speaking as if he took it forgranted that most people in America had |no idea that such books ever existed. He jseemed to feel as if he were in possession jof a truth that would come to mostAmericans as news - as if there was some- jthing in their own cultural heritage that ;
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they had long since forgotten; and he could remind them of it. He re­peated what he had said, not without a certain earnestness:.
"'Yes, you must read those books.
Gilson, Huxley, the Christian classics, and his own 
desire to pray were part of the ingredients of a religious 
conversion. Added to these were his work on the mystical 
poems of William Blake and his increasing interest in Gerard 
Manley Hopkins. All of this was leading Merton closer to 
the Catholic Church. In September, 1938, he made the decision 
to become a Catholic and began taking formal instructions 
at a parish church near the University campus. At the 
same time, in a less precise yet not inarticulate way, he 
was entertaining the thought of becoming a priest. Dan 
Walsh, his friend in the Department of Philosophy, encouraged 
him and helped him to face this desire with honesty; it was 
Walsh, a layman, to whom Merton turned to talk of the priest­
hood. But these thoughts were put aside temporarily.
Merton was baptized as a Roman Catholic in November,
1938. Edward Rice, who was later to write a book about
Merton, was his godfather; most of his other friends were 
2Jewish* He had submitted his thesis for the Masters Degree
^The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 239* 
^Ibid., 268.
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and now was beginning to prepare for his doctoral 
dissertation on Hopkins. The desire to become a priest, 
however, was becoming increasingly stronger. The more 
he became involved in the liturgical life of the church, 
and in the scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages, the 
closer he came to seek a vocation in the priesthood. He 
was attracted, at first, to the Franciscans, and this 
attraction was enhanced by the summers he spent with his 
friends in Olean, Hew York, not far from the campus of 
St. Bonaventure University, a Franciscans institution.
"Yes, I liked the Franciscans. Their life was very simple and informal and the a*b« . mosphere of St. Bonaventure's was pleasant and happy and peaceful. One thing that attracted me to them was a sort of freedom from spiritual restraint, from systons and routine."
He was familiar with the Order of Cistercians at this 
time but had no desire to join them. "The very title 
made me shiver," he wrote, "and so did their commoner 
names The Trappists." Dan Walsh described the Trappist 
life to him: the silence, the farm labour, the fasting
and meager diet, the rising in the very early hours of 
the morning long before daim, the long hours of prayer in 
the chapel.
"Dan saids; 'Do you think you would like that kind of life?'
" 'Oh, no,* I said, 'not a chancel That's not for mei I'd never be able to stand it. It would kill me in a week. Besides, I
AO
have to have meat* I can't get along without meat, I need it for my health**
"'Well,' said Dan, 'it's a good thing you know yourself so well*'
So, Merton decided to join the Franciscans and to forget
the Cistercians* He conferred with the Order and they
suggested that he wait for a year* During that year
Merton taught ühglish composition in the extension
division of Columbia University and wrote book reviews for
a number of Hew York publications, including The Hew York
Times* He practised his new faith with utter seriousness,
attending Mass daily and spending an hour each day performing
the Spiritual Exercises of St, Ignatius of Loyola, During
the Easter holidays of 1940 he went to Cuba, tried to read
the Autobiography of St, Theresa in Spanish, and had what
he considered to be a mystical experience during Mass in 
2a Cuban church.
Merton was eventually turned down by the Franciscans.
He shared with them his doubts about his vocation, doubts 
that were occasioned by a sense of guilt about his past 
life. They saw him as "only a recent convert, not yet 
two years in the Church." He was unsettled, not sure of
^The Seven Storey Mountain, pp. 313, 315, 318.
2The nature of this, and other mystical experiences that Merton records will be discussed later in this paper. See pp. 184-194,
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his vocation, and upset by doubts and uncertainties. At 
the suggestion of a friar, he withdrew his application. 
Merton was terribly upset by this rejection; nevertheless, 
he was determined to live the life of a monk in the world. 
He bought breviaries and determined to try to live as 
close as he could to the monastic ideal.
"There could be no more question of living just like everybody else in the world. There could be no more compromises with the life that tried, at every turn, to feed me poison. I had to turn my back on these things."^
His stated needs ("to get a job teaching in some Catholic 
College where I could live under the same roof as the 
Blessed Sacrament") were met in large part when he was 
offered a job teaching English at St. Bonaventure's 
University near where he and his friends had been spending 
their summer holidays.
Thomas Merton's teaching career at St. Bonaventure's 
lasted less than two years. During that time he was 
almost inducted into the American armed forces, he almost 
moved to Harlem in Hew York City to work among the poor.
^The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 360. 
2 Loc. cit.
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and he was reintroduced to the Trappists, The draft 1hoard had rejected him because of poor teeth and he had
taken the suggestion of Dan Walsh to make a retreat at the
2Cistercian Abbey of Our Lady of Gethseraani in Kentucky,
Evidence in the journal he was keeping at this time shows
an increasing interest in the Trappists, in spite of his
summary rejection of them earlier.^ Returning from Gethsemani
after the Easter holidays of 1941, Merton was convinced that
he needed to pay more attention to the attraction that he
had felt for the Trappist way of life. His trip to Gethsemani
had been nothing but encouraging and positive, and he
filled pages of The Seven Storey Mountain with his initial
impressions and subsequent nostalgia for the monastery in
4the hills of Kentucky# Nevertheless, back at St. Bonaventures's,
1Had he been accepted for the draft, Merton would have served in the medical corps. He had registered as a non-combatant objector. See The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 375*
2In this thesis, as in popular usage, the terms "Trappist" and "Cistercian" are interchangeable. The Trappists were a reform movement within the Cistercian order that began in the abbey at La Trappe, France, in 1662 and later (1892) came to be known as the Order of Cistercians of the Strict Observance. On the history of the Cistercian order and the Trappist reform see: New Catholic Encyclopedia(New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), Vol. 3, pp. 885-889 and Vol.14, pp. 261-264, (including detailed bibliographies). On the history of the Trappists in America see Thomas Merton,The Waters of Siloe (New York, Hareourt Brace, 1949)•
^The Secular Journal of Thomas Merton, p. 137.
^The Seven Storey Mountain, pp. 382ff.
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he had to face one more doubt: his desire to play some
part in the reforming of the social conditions in America,
At the University he met, and was very impressed by,
Baroness Catherine de Hueck, a Russian who had started 
and was maintaining a centre in Harlem called "Friendship 
House." Merton decided to work there during the summer.
Friendship House was made up of a number of renovated 
shops, and maintained a library, recreation rooms and other 
services for the people of Harlem, It was explicitly Catholic, 
His experience there posed a problem; that of a possible 
alternative to the Trappist monastery. Merton approached 
Harlem with a profound sensitivity and had a genuine com­
passion for the people he met there.^ The idea of working 
in a place such as Harlem had a definite appeal. let, it 
was not primary. "If I stayed in the world," he thought,
"my vocation would be first of all to write, second to
teach. Work like that at Friendship House would only come
2after the other two." He returned to St, Bonaventure*s
Eldridge Cleaver was very impressed with Merton's description of Harlem in The Seven Storey Mountain (pp. 413f) « He wrote, "I liked it so much I copied out the heart of it in longhand. Later, after getting out of solitary, I used to keep this passage in mind when delivering Black Muslim lectures to other prisoners...For a while, whenever I felt my self softening, relaxing, I had only to read that passage to become once more a rigid flame of indignation," Soul on Ice (Hew York: Dell Ramparts, 1968), pp. 44f* See below
p. 599.
2The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 422.
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in the autumn with the hope of being able to get things
into perspective. At one point he made up his mind to go
to Harlem and to forget the idea of the cloistered life.
He planned to quit his job at the end of the academic term
1and move to the city. As it turned out, he did quit his 
job at the University, but not to go to Harlem, In his journal 
entry for November 27, 1941, he wrote;
"Today I thinks, should I be going to Harlem, or to the Trappists? Why doesn't this idea of the Trappists leave me?...Would I not be obliged to admit, now, that if there is a choice for me between Harlem and the Trappists, I would not hesitate to take the Trappists?...I would have to renounce more in entering the Trappists, That would be the one place where I would have to give up everything.Also anyone who believes in the Mystical Body of Christ realizes I could do more for the Church and for my brothers in the world, if I were a Trappist at Gethsemani than if I were a staff worker at FriendshipHouse."2
He wrote to the Abbot of Gethsemani asking permission 
to visit the Abbey over Christmas time, implying that he 
wanted to test his vocation. Soon after a positive reply 
was received, Merton also received a summons from his 
Draft Board to be re-examined for military service. The
^The Seven Storey Mountain, pp. 430f.
^The Secular Journal of Thomas Merton, p. 222,
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draft board, however, was vdlling to put off his 
examination for a month, which would give Merton time to 
be accepted as a postulant for the monastery and thereby, 
according to United States law, be exempt from a military 
obligation. On December 10, 1941, Thomas Merton entered 
the monastery of Our Lady of Gethsemani in Kentucky. The 
United States, three days before, had entered the Second 
World War.
2. The Second-halfs Monastic
Merton's entrance into the Abbey of Gethsemani 
marked the half-way point in his life. He was one 
month short of his 27th birthday when he entered the 
monastery; he died one month short of his fifty-fourth. 
Almost exactly half of his life was spent within the 
cloister. It was during this half of his life that 
Merton wrote the numerous books and journals that were 
to have a profound effect upon the religious and social 
situation of the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, ironically, 
these last twenty-seven years contain considerably less 
biographical material than the first twenty-seven. The 
first half of his life is described in detail in The 
Seven Storey Mountain. Although many of the books he 
igrote after his autobiography were of a personal nature.
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most especially his published diaries, their tone was 
different. There were fewer "events" to report. His 
autobiographical writings became notes on meditations, 
which although personal, were "in no way intended as an 
account of spiritual adventures...there was no adventure 
to write about, and if there had been, it would not 
have been confined to paper in any c a s e . T h e  monastic 
life is not a life marked by "events." As one apologist 
for Merton says, "A man becomes a monk not to do things 
but to become someone, and becoming someone is not an­
nounced by superficial eventfulness.On one level, 
therefore, there is not too much to write about concerning 
the second half of Merton's life.^ Nevertheless, things 
did occur, new experiences took place, and new people 
crossed his path. Merton i-zrote about these events, and a 
summary on what he wrote and on what his friends and 
fellow monks have written about him.
^From the Preface to Thoughts in Solitude (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1958). (All quotationsare from the Dell edition, 1961), p. 11.
^Dennis Q. Mclnerny; Thomas Merton; The Man and His Work, p. 6,
^For example, in American Mysticism FTom William James to Zen (New York; Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 65-69, Hal Bridges devotes four pages to the account of the first half of Merton's life and only one paragraph to the 
twenty-seven years of Merton's life in the monastery.
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Thomas Merton was given the name of Prater Louis,
and was to continue to be known by that name within the
monastic community,^ His new life pleased him and he
recognized immediately that he was at home in Gethsemani*
Nevertheless, he also discovered that simply the act of
joining a monastic community does not immediately grant
spiritual wisdom. He took into the monastery the same
problems he had outside the monastery, problems he describes
as "spiritual gluttony, spiritual sensuality, spiritual 
2pride." As an example he relates that, soon after 
arriving at Gethsemani he had spent some time in the 
infirmary and had looked forward to the solitude it was 
to afford him:
"I jumped into bed and opened the Bible at the Canticle of Canticles and devoured three chapters, closing my eyes from time- to-time and waiting, with raffish expectation, for lights, voices, harmonies, savors, unctions, and music of angelic choirs.
"I did not get much of what I was looking for, and was left with the vague disillusion­ment of the old days when I had paid down half a dollar for a bad movie.
^The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 46I. Some journals, for example Cistercian Studies and Monastic Studies, published Merton's articles under the name of Louis Merton or M. Louis Merton (Mary being the formal but rarely used first name of all Tk-appist monks). Brother Patrick Hart, Merton's secretary the last years of his life, says that the monks good-naturedly referred to Merton as "Uncle Louie." (Thomas Merton; Monk, p. 15.) However, the world continued to know him by the name of Thomas, and in this thesis that name will be used*
^The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 464f •
^Loc. cit.
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The spiritual quest was to be more difficult than he had 
expected.
In terms of emotional content, one of the most important 
"events" in these early days of Merton's monastic life was 
the death of his brother in April, 1943# Merton w o  te of 
his last meeting with his brother, and the letter's baptism, 
reception of Holy Communion and departure for the war.
Hot long afterwards Merton received news that his brother 
was missing in action; a few weeks later it was confirmed
that John Paul Merton was dead. The obvious passion of
1 2 this account, and the subsequent poem, indicate how grieved
Merton was at the death of his brother.
He had now outlived his entire family, seeing his 
mother and father die when he was a child, his grandparents 
die when he was in University, and his brother die wlien he 
was still a young man. Merton's accounts show he was 
saddened, but not despairing.. And, his faith in the 
resurrection of Christ gave him hope. let, in the poetic 
account of his grief there is a certain sensitivity to the 
futility of war, a theme which will become fully articulated
^The Seven Storey Mountain, pp. 472ff.
^Ibid.. p. 484# Also in Selected Poems of Thomas Merton (Hew York: New Directions, 19^7), pp. 12f.
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1in many of Merton's later writings.
Daily life in a Trappist monastery is simple, but
certainly not easy. Merton spent the next years working
on the monastery farm, studying for ordination, and witing.
It was not until August of 1947, that Merton made his first
trip back into the "world," the world which, in The Seven
2Storey Mountain, he wanted to reject. Now, almost six 
years later, his attitude had changed:
"We drove into town with Senator Dawson, a neighbor of the monastery, and all the while I wondered how I would react at meeting once again, face to face, the wicked world. I met the world and I found it no longer so wicked after all. Perhaps the things I had resented about the world when I left it were defects of my own that I had projected upon it. Now, on the contrary, I found that every­thing stirred me with a deep and mute sense of compassion. Perhaps some of the people we saw going about the streets were hard and tough - with the naive, animalistic toughness of the Middle West - but I did not stop to observe it because I seemed to have lost an eye for merely exterior detail and to have discovered.
See a sampling of his poetry in the Appendix, see below pp. 6II-615*
2See, for instance, Merton's comment on passing through Cincinnati on his trip to Gethsemani; "...I was passing through all this, and did not desire it, and wanted no part in it, and did not seek to grasp or hold any of it.." The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 3§3.
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instead, a deep sense of respect and love and pity for the souls that such details never fully reveal, I went through the city, realizing for the first time in my life how good are all the people in the world and how much value they have in the sight of God."^
Whereas at one time Merton saw the world as something to 
be avoided, he was now beginning to see it as worthy of 
his love. The fantastic, statical experience that should 
transport one out of the world into a Neo-Platonic heaven 
had not occurred. He was able to take his life, and his 
spiritual quest, with a greater sense of humour and with 
less self-conscious seriousness. In his journal entry for 
December 13, 1948, he wrote;
"What do you think, you dope, after having been a Trappist for seven years? I think, Where did the time go? I caught myself wondering, Have I changed? Not that it matters. I have and I haven't. I'm balder. Somehow I have more of an interior life but I'd have a hard time trying to say how."
1The Sign of Jonas (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1953) All quotations are from the Doubleday Image edition of 1956, pp. 97f.
^Ibid.. p. 143.
51
Other than some amusing aocounts of daily life at 
Gethsemani, there are no special events mentioned in 
Merton's journal until May 26, 1949, the date of his 
ordination to the priesthood. Many pages of the journal 
were dedicated to the importance of his ordination and 
his own existential understanding of the meaning of the 
priesthood, but the actual account of the ordination 
itself is muted and understated. Perhaps, not unlike 
his experience reading the Canticle of Canticles in 
the infirmary, the expected euphoria simply did not occur. 
Or, perhaps, he was unable to relate his feelings on paper. 
Subsequent journal entries speak of his inner awareness of 
the meaning of his priesthood, but the one event, the 
ordination itself, is scErcely mentioned.^
The Sign of Jonas, pp. 167-191. On Merton's reluctance to write about the meaning of the priesthood for the community see F.J. Kelly, Man Before God: Thomas Merton on SocialResponsibility (Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday, 1974), PP* 44- 48. Kelly has examined the contents of all Merton's taped conferences and concludes that not one of the 605 conferences has an explicit treatment of the priesthood. Rice in The Man in the Sycamore Tree, pp. 91-97 has a number of photo­graphs of Merton's ordination service.
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Merton described the year and a half after his 
ordination as a time of ill-health and nervous exhaustion:
"When the simmer of my ordination ended,I found myself face to face with a mystery that was beginning to manifest itself in the depths of my soul and to move me with terror. Do not ask me what it was. I might apologize for it and call it 'suffering.' The word is not adequate because it suggests physical pain. That is not at all what I mean. It is true that something had begun to affect my health; but whatever happened to my health was only, it seems to me, an effect of this unthinkable tiling that had developed in the depths of my being.
This time of "abysmal testing and disintegration" ended 
in December, 1950 and Merton was able, subsequently, to 
describe this time as a kind of dark night of the soul, a 
period of growth, however painful. "I discovered," he 
wrote, "that the essence of a solitary vocation is that 
it is a vocation to fear, to helplessness, to isolation 
in the invisible God."^
His outward life was changing, too. He was beginning 
to teach classes on Patristic theology to the scholastics 
young monks studying for ordination - and on May 21, 1951
^Ibid., p. 226. of* "First and Last Thoughts: AnAuthor's Preface" in A Thomas Merton Reader. Thomas P. McDonnell, ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,1962), p. ix.
%bid.. p. 227.
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he was named Master of Scholastics*^ More and more his 
life was being directed in areas that were contradictory - 
if not at times alien - to the life of monastic solitude* 
On one level his teaching involved, him with increasing in­
tensity in the corporate life of the community, and on 
another level, his writings kept his name before the 
public. However, on a still deeper level, he was more 
clearly coming to recognize the emptiness of an attitude 
of total rejection of the world* Merton had come instead 
to reject any idea of contemptus mundi that implied a 
rigid dualism between spirit and flesh, sacred and secular, 
and the monastery and the world. Such a dualism, he 
believed, had dominated The Seven Storey Mountain:
"When I wrote it I thought I had a very supernatural solution. After nine years in a monastery I see that it was no solution at all. The false solution went like this: the whole world, of which thewar is a characteristic expression, is evil. It had therefore to be first ridiculed, then spat upon, and at last formally rejected with a curse.
1The Sign of Jonas, p. 295. See also Theresa Lentfoehr "The Spiritual Writer" in Thomas Merton. Monk, p. 211. Being named "Master of Scholastics " is another "event" in his monastic career which Merton understates. He makes only brief references to it in The Sign of Jonas and in the prefacr to J, Thomas Merton Reader. The date is supplied by Lentfoehr, loo, cit.
^Ibid.. p. 312.
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Now, in 1951, Thomas Merton saw the monastery no longer 
as a place of escape from the world but rather as his 
place ^  the world. "Coming to the monastery has been 
for me exactly the right kind of withdrawal. It has given 
me perspective. It has taught me how to live."
"..I can do nothing whatever for my own salvation or for the glory of God if I merely withdraw from the mess people are in and make an exhibition of myself and write a big book saying, 'Lookl I m  different I* To do this is to die."^
In June of that year, as if to symbolize his newly articulated
dedication and involvement in the world, Merton became a
citizen of the United States.
Yet, the call to a life of increasing silence, solitude
and prayer caused Merton to be travelling toward his future
2"in the belly of a paradox." In 1955, he had hoped to be 
appointed as keeper of a newly constructed fire-tower in 
a remote forest on the monastic property. This would have 
afforded him the solitude he was seeking; he would, in fact 
become a herndt. At the time, however, the position of 
Novice Master became open and Merton eventually took this
qoffice. He would remain as Novice Master until 19&5.
^Loc. cit.
Prologue to The Sign of Jonas, p. 21.
3A detailed account of this episode is given in James Fox, "The Spiritual Son," in Thomas Merton. Monk, pp. 149-151.
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These ten years would accentuate and develop Merton's 
paradox* On the one hand, it would be during these years 
that Merton would publish the majority of his most explicit 
writings on political, social and economic issues* He 
would find himself deeply impressed and delighted with the 
reforms set in motion by Pope John XXIII, increasingly 
moved by the non-violent approach to political revolution 
advocated by Mahatma Gandhi, and in dialogue with important 
members of the movements for peade and racial justice in 
the United States. On the other hand these would be the 
years in which the eremitical life, with its silence and 
solitude, would become more and more attractive to him, 
culminating in his decision to become a hermit. He would 
discover the existential importance that the desert fathers 
of the ancient church had for him and he would find that 
Oriental religion, philosophy and meditative techniques, 
especially Zen, would become of great interest to him.
During this period Merton's chief activities were 
teaching and writing and giving lectures on Sunday after­
noons to whichever monks chose to attend.^ He made three 
extended trips outside the monastery. These included a
1Many of the Sunday afternoon talks have been recorded and are on file in the Thomas Merton Room of the library at Bellarmine College, Louisville, Kentucky. Some have been published by Electronic Paperbacks, Ghappaqua, New York,
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trip to Coluïûbus, Ohio, to aid in the search for a location 
for a new Trappist community; a trip to St. John's Abbey, 
Gollegeville, Minnesota, to attend a psychological conference 
in 1956; and, in I964, a visit to New York City to meet Dr. 
Dalsetz Suzuki, the Zen scholar.^ There were few trips 
other than these; usually to the doctor or the hospital 
in Louisville, These were not numerous, and, except for 
such exceptions, Merton was cloistered* However, these 
occasional visits to "the world" had more than a utilitarian 
purpose* They provided Merton with opportunities to renew 
his love for the world and the people in it. This had been 
his experience on his first trip back to the world, and the 
experience was to be repeated. One such incident was re­
corded by Merton:
"In Louisville, at the corner of Fourth and Walnut, in the center of the shopping district, I was suddenly overwhelmed with the realization that I loved all those people, that they were mine and I theirs, that we could not be alien to one another even though we were total strangers. It was like waking from a dream of separateness, of spurious self-isolation in a special world, the world of renunciation and supposed holiness. The whole illusion of a separate holy existence is a dream.Not that I question the reality of my vocation, 
or of my monastic life; but the conception of 'separation from the world* that we have in the monastery too easily presents itself
^Thomas Merton* Monk* ed. Patrick Hart, p. 126, footnote.
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as a complete illusion: the illusion thatby making vows we become a different species of being, pseudoangels, 'spiritual men,' men of interior life, what have you..*, This sense of liberation from an illusory difference was such a relief and such a joy that I almost laughed out loud.
This is one explicit occurence in Merton's life which shows 
his continuing conversion to the world. But, in addition 
to taking an occasional trip out into the world, the world 
often came to Gethsemani to visit him. In the early sixties 
a small cottage was built about a mile away from the Abbey 
and Merton would use it for his work, and for holding 
conferences with various groups of people, or on rarer
2occasions, with individuals. These were usually informal 
and unstructured meetings that would last for about one 
hour. In November of 1964, however, Merton arranged a
Goni ectures of a Guilty By-Stander (New York:Doubleday Image, 1968), pp. 156f. Unfortunately the journal entries in this volume are not dated and are not printed in strict chronological order. The similarities to the ex­perience Merton records in The Sign of Jonas, p. 97 (see above pp. 49f ) have been noted by Aldhelm Gameron-Brown,"Zen Master" in Thomas Merton* Monk* pp. I64f. Mark Gibbard thinks that this particular incident marked the moment of Merton's re-conversion to the world. "Thomas Merton- Gontemplative" in Twentieth Century Men of Prayer (London: SGM, 1974), pp. 69-79* It is one intention of this thesis to show that this is not the case, Gibbard is trying too hard to find precise moments of conversion. Merton's interest in and love for the world is evidenced in numerous instances prior to this event, the most obvious of which has been mentioned above ( pp 49f ).
2Daniel Berrigan, the American priest who became very well known for his part in the Peace Movement in the 1960s, recalled that he was moved by various articles that Merton had written about nuclear stockpiling and international
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retreat which was titled "Spiritual Roots of Protest."^ 
Among those present were Daniel and Philip Berrigan and 
James Forest, well known figures in the American anti­
war movement. They found that the cloistered Merton could 
help them to define some of their aims and objectives, and 
help them see the theological basis of their work. Daniel 
Berrigan commented later s: "lÆiile ninety percent of our 
people were tearing themselves apart in the frenzies of 
the sixties, he was telling us what it was all about. In 
a very nice, indirect, non-exhorting way, he was shovjing 
us a way. We are just beginning to see it."
violence. "I wrote him that I found it impossible to live alone with what he was saying. And in a week there was a letter back; 'Come on down and we'll talk about it.*" This was in I96O. "Daniel Berrigan on Thomas Merton", a talk given on January 28, 1973, and quoted in The Thomas Merton Life Center News-Letter. April, 1973, P* 7.
^Some notes from this retreat are published in Thomas Merton on Peace, edited by Gordon Zahn (New York; McCall, 1971), pp. 259f. Another retreat for the staff of The Catholic Worker was held in 1962. See F.J. Kelly,0£. cit.. p. 43.
^"The Eucharist and Survival - Discussion with Dan Berrigan", in Seeds of Liberation, edited by Alistair Kee (London; SGM, 1973), p. 89.
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However, the paradox was not to be denied. Merton 
continued to live with the tension of desiring to be 
involved with the world, on the one hand, and to be in 
seclusion and silence, on the other. The paradox would 
never be resolved. Merton would remain involved with the 
world, but simultaneously would enter further into a life ' 
of solitude. In August, 196$, Merton was granted permission 
to move permanently into the remote cottage, the "hermitage." 
He would continue to give the weekly conference every Sunday 
afternoon, but this would be his only formal contact with 
the community. The last three years of his life were spent 
as a hermit.
Merton's desire for solitude was now being fulfilled, 
and he was delighted with it, ^ but it would not detract 
from his concern for the world. The visitors to the
hermitage were numerous and included a great variety of2people. Among many others were theologians such as Jean 3 4LeGlerq, and Jacques Maritain who visited during these last
1He writes often about the idyllic nature of life in the hermitage* See, for example, "Rain and the Rhinoceros" Raids on the Unspeakable (New York; New Directions, 1966), pR^ 9-23, and "Day of a Stranger" Hudson Review 20 (Summer, 1967), pp. 211-218. See also Therese Lentfoehr, "The Solitary" in Thomas Merton. Monk, pp. 59-77#
pMartin Luther King had an appointment to visit Merton but was killed before he could do so.
^The Man in the Sycamore Tree by Rice, p. I65 (with a 
photograph of Merton and LeGlerq on p. 169) #
^Griffin, A Hidden Wholeness, pp. 101-110 (including 
numerous photographs)•
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tliree years of Merton's life, as did Joan Baez,^ the folk
2singer and war protester, and Thich Nhat Hanh, the
Vietnamese Buddhist monk and poet#
Three years after moving into the hermitage Merton
3made his final trip away from Gethsemani. Jean LeGlerq 
had suggested that Merton be invited to a conference on 
monastic renewal to be held in Bangkok in December, 1968*
The Abbot had approved and Merton was able also to accept 
numerous invitations to speak at various Cistercian 
communities in the East. In September, Merton left Gethsemani.^ 
He visited in California and other places in the western 
United States and, on October 15th, left the United States 
for the Orient. He was to spend time in Calcutta, New
1Rice, o£. cit., p. 122.
^See "Nhat Hanh is Brother" published in Faith and Violence (Notre Dame, Ind.; Notre Dame Press, 1968), pp. 106-108, Also in Thomas Merton on Peace* See also, "life and Contemplation; Reflections on a Buddhist Monk" a tape recording of one of Merton's conferences with his fellow monks, published by Electronic Paperbacks, Ghappaqua, New York, 1972.
3An earlier trip had been made to Cistercian foundations in the western United States in the Spring of 1968.
4For information on this trip see The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton. New York, New Directions, 1973.
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Delhi, the Himalayas, Madras and Ceylon before arriving in 
Bangkok, He met with the Dalai Lama and Ghogyam Trnngpa 
Rimpoche, a Tibetan monk who founded monastic communities 
in the United States and in Scotland. From Bangkok he 
planned to go on to Indonesia, Hong Kong and Japan. On 
December 10, at the Bangkok conference, he delivered a 
lecture entitled "Marxism and Monastic Perspectives,"^
The lecture ended with these words;
"I will conclude on that note. I believe the plan is to have all the questions for this morning's lectures this evening at the panel. So I will disappear.
Thomas Merton was found dead in his room later that after­
noon, electrocuted by a faulty electrical appliance.
The accounts of his death are almost identical in
outline but confusing in so far as the details of his
3death are not clear. The following quotation is Patrick
This lecture is published in The Asian Journal, pp. 326-343, and also was filmed by both an Italian and a Netherland film company,
2The Asian Journal, p. 343* The Nether land film, however, records these words; "Ho I will disappear from view, and you can all have a Coke or whatever..."' (An apt conclusion for the life of a man with tendencies toward ZenI It is as if Merton's last words were a koan.)
^The principle accounts are "Letter to Abbot Flavian Burns" signed by six Trappist delegates to the Bangkok 
conference, December 11, 1968, in Asian Journal, pp. 
344-347, and "Thomas Merton; The Last Three Days" by John Moffitt, who was a participant at the conference.
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Hart's attempt to reconstruct the circumstances of Merton's 
death based on eyewitness accounts and the police and 
medical reports#^
"Thomas Merton returned to his cottage about 1:30 and proceeded to take a shower before retiring for a rest. lAiile bare­foot on the terrazzo floor, he apparently had reached for the large standing fan (either to turn it on or pull it closer to the bed) when he received the full 220 volts of direct current, (This is normal voltage for Bangkok.) He collapsed, and the large fan tumbled over on top of him. When he was discovered about an hour later by two of the monks who shared his cabin, the fan, still running, lay across his body. They could not get into the room at first because the door was bolted from the inside. One of them ran for help, and two of the abbots came immediately. They broke through the upper panel of the door, opened it, and entered. One of the abbots tried to remove the fan at once from the body, but though he wore shoes, he also received a severe electrical shock. Fortunately, someone rushed over to the outlet and pulled the cord from the socket. Later examination revealed de­fective wiring in the fan."
Catholic World 209, July, 1969, pp. I6O-I63, and reprinted in New Theology. No. 7, eds. Martin Marty and Dean Peerman (New York;: MacMillan, 1970), pp. 125-134. A summary of these events has been written by Patrick Hart and included as a "Postscript" to The Asian Journal, pp. 257-259.
^Hart, "Postscript" The Asian Journal, pp. 258f.
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In 19-4^ , in the final pages of The Seven Storey 
Mountain, Thomas Merton had written that he had heard a 
word of God addressed to him, sayings
“Everything that touches you shall burn you, and you will draw your hand away in pain, until you have withdrawn yourself from all things. Then you will be all alone....That you may become the brother of God and _ learn to know the Christ of the burnt men. “
The body of Thomas Merton, a man who had written against 
war, especially the war in Southeast Asia, was flown back 
to the United States from Thailand on an American military 
aircraft. He had died on the anniversary of his entrance 
into the monastery, twenty-seven years before. He had spent 
the last half of his life within the walls of that monastery, 
yet he died on the other side of the world. The paradoxes 
that had been so evident in his life never ceased. In his 
life he sought to speak to the modern, technological world; 
he was killed by a machine of that world. What touched him 
had burnt him. In his life he sought solitude; when he died 
he was alone. His life was spent seeking to make real his 
brotherhood with God; and if he came to know the Christ of 
burnt men, it was because he was one of them.
^The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 505f.
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II. A HISTORY OF m m i S  PÜBLIOATIOHS
1. Development
Patrick Hart has included a clironological bibliography
of Merton*s major publications in Thomas Merton, Monk.^
The intention of this historical survey is neither to
duplicate nor simply to expand Hart * s outline, but rather
to look at the history of Merton's writings from the point
of view of his social concern as it is articulated within
2the milieu of his monastic spirituality.
Merton gained fame with The Seven Storey Mountain.
It was this work that brought Merton's name permanently 
before the reading public. However, the writing career of 
Thomas Merton, the monk, had begun four years earlier with 
the publication of a small book of poetry. Before The Seven 
Storey Mountain was published, Merton published two more 
collections of poems in addition to articles and pamphlets
^Thomas Merton, Monk, pp. 225-228.
%or a survey of Merton's social concern, see Janes Thomas Baker, Thomas Merton Social Critic and F.J. Kelly, Man Before God.
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written principally for the Cistercian Order.^ During
this period Merton also wrote two biographies of saints
from the Trappistine Order, one of which was published
shortly before The Seven Storey Mountain, and the other a
2little over a year later. Mitliin very narrow limits, 
therefore, Merton was known before his autobiography saw 
print. The pamphlets and biographies were soon to be for­
gotten,^ but not the poetry. Many of these poems were to
Before entering the monastery, Merton had published a number of book reviews in The Hew York Herald Tribune.The Hew York Times and elsewhere, A complete list of all of Merton's published work of this period will be found in the Dell 'Isola bibliography, p. 31. This book also lists the published articles of Merton's youth, items, for the most part, from his University days. (See pp. 91-93. The articles and pamphlets of this period often were first published anonymously and include “Guide to Cistercian Life" (194^), “Cistercian Contemplatives" (1948), and “Poetry and the Contemplative Life" in Commonweal 3iXVI, July 4, 1947.) Dell 'Isola has the complete corpus listed in the bibliography. The poetical works are: Thirty Poems (Norfolk, Gonn.s HewDirections, 1944) 5 A Man in the Divided Sea (Hew York: NewDirections, 1946). This volume also contains all the poems published in Thirty Poems; Figures for an Apocalypse (Hew York: New Directions, 1948).
^Exile Ends in Glory; The Life of a Trappistine. Mother II* Berchmans (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1948)7 ^ a t  Are These Hounds?% e  life of a Cistercian Mystic. Saint Lutgard of Aywieres (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1950).
^The biographies were little more than hagiographies in the worst pietistic tradition, and Merton was embarrassed 
by them. See below, pp l?8f.
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be published in Selected Poems and in A Thomas Merton
Reader and were to gain for Merton a reputation for being1a poet of some competence. All of these poems were written 
after Merton's conversion to Roman Catholicism, and most 
of them were written at Gethsemani, Therefore, their 
explicit religious content is not surprising. %ie poems 
often are definitely Catholic and Trappists “After the Night 
Office - Gethsemani Abbey, “ "The Trappist Cemetery - 
Gethsemani,“ “Three Postcards from the Monastery," and 
others with similar titles. Yet in the midst of this 
religious poetry, one also discovers not only the young 
Merton's dislike for the modern, industrialized world, 
but also his intense religious concern for that world. The 
poems of this period are a much better indicator of his 
concern for the world than are the pamphlets he was writing 
at this time, IVhereas the pamphlets are concerned with a 
world-denying sort of asceticism, the poems contain statements 
of Merton's personal involvement with the problems of the 
world which, on one level, he had rejected. He concerns
See Robert Lowell, “The Verses of Thomas Merton," Commonweal XLÎI, June 22, 1945, and the Introduction to Selected Poems, written by Mark van Dor en. Dennis Q, Mclnerny, Professor of English at Bradley University in Indiana, says that Merton “reached a plane of competence from which he produced works whose value ranks him among the best minor American poets of this century." Thomas Merton; The Man and His Work (Spencer, Mass; Cistercian 
Publications, 1974), p. 44*
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himself with the racial injustice that he encountered in 
Harlem:
Daylight has driven iron spikes.Into the flesh of Jesus* hands and feet: Pour flowers of blood have nailed Him to the walls of Harlem.
Across the cages of the keyless aviaries, The lines and wires, the gallows of the broken Id.tes.Crucify, against the fearful light, ^The ragged dresses of the little children.
He concerns himself with war and nationalism:
I'Jhen all the men of war are shot And flags have fallen into dust.Your cross and mine shall tell men still Christ died on each, for both of us.^
He concerns himself with the possibility of a cataclysmic 
apocalypse brought about by nuclear war;
Yonder, by the eastward sea I'fhere aaoke melts in a saucer of extinguished cities,The last men stand, in delegations.Waiting to see the seven-headed business Promised us, from those unpublished deeps;Waiting to see those horns and diadems oAnd hear the seven voices of the final blasphemy.
^"Aubade-Harlem" from A Man in the Divided Sea.
p"For %  Brother" from Thirty Poems. See Appendix p.
3"Landscape: Beast" from Figures for an Anocalypse.The existential concerns of the poems of this book are indicated in the title. Merton*s suggestion about how to face the apocalypse is indicated in the subtitle to the first poem in the book, "Advice to my Friends Robert Lax and Edward Rice, to get away while they still can."
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The pamphlets of this period are not about such issues.
If one knew only the Merton of these early pamphlets, one
would be surprised by the Merton of the 1960s.^ The poetry
of the 194-Os, however, helps us to see that the social and
political concerns of the last decade of his life were always
present, not only in the mind of Merton, but in his published
works as well.
The seeds of his social concern are clearly evident
in the story of his early life as it appeared in The Seven
Storey Mountain, although they were over-shadowed by the
radical nature of his mthdrawal from the world. Those
2who read this best-selling book saw it as the tale of a 
modern young man, totally disillusioned with the world around
1In his pamphlets Merton was writing such things as "It (Contemplation) teaches one to think about God instead of about the world," and "Let those that are great actives and think to girdle the world with their outward works take note that they would bring far more profit to the Church and be far more pleasing to God if they spent even half this time in abiding with God in prayer..." from "What is Contemplation?" (London; Burns and Oates, 1950), pp. 12, 26f, originally published in Notre Dame, Indiana, a few months after the publication of Merton's autobiography (1948).
^"The first printing ran only 8,000 copies; it was picked up by some small book clubs, and began to sell. It received no unusual reviews, no advertising to spealc of, and no heavy promotion. Nevertheless, sales continued. By the time of Merton's ordination, the year follovdng publication, roughly 400,000 copies of the book had been sold, and it still did not appear on the best-seller lists until the publisher com­plained ceaselessly over the omission. It finally ran third behind The White Collar Zoo and a book on canasta." Rice,The Man in the Sycamore Tree, p. 87. See also Naomi Burton,More Than Sentinels (Garden City, N.Y. î Doubleday, 1964), p. 245* Within two years it would be translated into Danish^Dutch, German, Italian and Spanish, and subsequently into French, Czechoslovakian, Portugese, and Japanese.
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him, discovering an alternative to the way of life most 
took for granted. His alternative was one of total renonciation; 
the problems of the world were to be solved by leaving the 
world. Other possible alternatives were rejected: a teaching
career, social work in Harlem, or even membership in the 
Franciscans, an “active" order. Nevertheless, numerous social 
concerns are evident in his story, as are the inchoate be­
ginnings of a contemplative answer to the problems of the 
world.
Excerpts from a diary kept during the years of The 
Seven Storey Mountain were published in 1959^ and these 
passages accentuate the social awareness of the autobiography.
In this diary we are able to discover the "primary sources" 
behind The Seven Storey Mountain. Merton in his twenties 
sounded strikingly similar to the Merton idio wrote in the 
midst of the troubled America of the 1960s. Space permits
^The Secular Journal of Thomas Merton (New York; Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959}•
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only a few examples.
In September 1941, a few months before America entered 
the war and a few months before Merton entered Gethsemani, 
he wrote (somewhat prophetically) i
"The present capitalist system has got certain terrific weaknesses which, if it survives the war at all, wiiich it may, will make inevitable a series of revolutions that will be almost as bad as a German victory and that is clearly not something to die for! Especially since one of the results of these revolutions may be an 'order* something like Nazism or Fascism or the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, but most probably Fascism, in this country*^
He felt that people were opposed to the atrocities of 
Hitler not so much on humanitarian or moral grounds, but 
on grounds that were, in themselves, lacking in morality.
"And if we go into the war, it id.ll be first of all to defend our investments, our business, our money. In certain terms it may be useful to defend all these things, and expedient to protect our business so that everybody may have jobs, but if anybody holds up American business as a shining example of justice, or American politics as a siiining example of honesty and purity, that is really quite a joke!
"And if this is a joke, it is also a bit blasphemous to get up and say that just be­cause Germany started the actual fighting, ultimately Germany is to blame for everything, and God is on the side of England and the
^The Secular Journal of Thomas Merton, p. 209.
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democracies and all enemies of Germany*
“To try to make God the defender of any one side in tliis war is simply to reduce Him to the level of a Nazi, and no greater blasphemy is possible.
The kind of hypocrisy that is seen in simplistic justifications 
for iirar can also be seen in a lack of social involvement 
within the Church. Even before his monastic years, Merton 
was a critic of popular religion;
“But there is one thing certain: those whopretend they love God, and pray to Him, and even receive His Body and Blood sacrificed entirely for them in the Eucharist, and still hate laws which are meant to help feed the poor and clothe the needy and care for the sick, had better look to their consciences, and see whether the reason they hate the law isn't that they themselves fear to,lose some of their profits if such laws go through!“
It would be in the monastery that Merton would search for 
a religious tradition that would have a greater depth than 
the popular piety he saw in the world. As long as religion 
was to be a servant of the success orientation of American 
business, it was inauthentic* The Trappist Order was to 
be the place in viiich to discover real religion; and to be 
really religious meant to become poor, radically poor.
^Ibid. p. 91*2Ibid.. p. 202,
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Half-way measures would not suffice; abstract poverty 
only separates one from true self-giving*^ He was beginning 
to discover, in the monastic tradition, a kind of poverty 
that would be redeeming, a poverty based on detached love* 
Tliis tradition, as exemplified by St, Bernard and St. John 
of the Gross, recognized that self-oriented love drove men 
from God and ftom each other;
“Both saints agree that the love of creatures for the sake of the pleasure they give to ourselves covers the soul with a form or rather a deformity, an unlikeness to God*“^
To manifest the imago Dei, one must become detached from 
one's own desires; “In other words, pure love, disinterested 
love is part of our very nature itself in its integrity*
The imago Dei is caritas* In these early witings Merton's 
idea of poverty of spirit and disinterested love is still 
rather abstract. He speaks of love, but not often of any
^see The Seven Storey Motmtain. p. 406*
^“The Transforming Union in St, Bernard and St. John of the Gross" Collectanea Ordinis Gistercienslum Reformat or ium 10, No. 3, July, 1948, p. 215*
3Ibid. 10, No. 1, January, 1948, p* 111*
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particular, concrete object of that love. He discusses
the three vocations: the active, the contemplative, and
a mixture of the two; and agrees with St. Thomas ^ and 
2St. Bernard that the last is superior to the other two
if it is based on contemplation, but his analysis is still
abstract. He insists that his discussion of these
distinctions is to be set not within the context of the
world, much less that of the Church, but strictly within
the context of the contemplative order itself. He is seeking
to justify the necessity for certain members of the Trappist
order having to do such mundane things as are necessary for
2the maintenance of the structure. It would only be later 
that Merton would expand this thinking to the context of 
the political, economic and social struggles of the world, 
seeing the ground of political action in contemplative 
prayer. In the 194-Os and the early 1950s he was learning 
in theory and in a limited context what would, in time, 
become the spiritual basis for his social etliics. At this 
point in his religious development, contemplation of God
In a somewhat later essay, "Action and Contemplation in St. Bernard" Collectanea 16, No. 2, April, 1954, P* 121, Merton writes: "If Martha has the highest calling, it isonly by reason of her contact with Mary and for the sake of Mary. St. Bernard's teaching fully vindicates the primacy of contemplation."
^Ibid.. 15, No. 1, June, 1953, PP# 27ff.
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in solitude was the reason for and end of all action.
Action served contemplation* He had not yet developed the 
idea that contemplation also serves action. But the idea 
was present. In 1949, Merton published Seeds of Contemplation, 
and although he was to revise it the same year and then 
revise it again much more considerably in 1961 to make it 
more concrete, the beginnings of his understanding of 
contemplation's service of love were already present*^
It is to be noted that he revised this book; he did not 
rewrite it.
“We do not go into the desert to escape people but to learn how to find them:: we do not leave them in order to have nothing more to do with them, but to find out the imy to do them the mostgood.
"If we experience God in contemplation, we experience Him not for ourselves alone but also for others."^
For an analysis of the differences in the various revisions see Donald Grayston, “The Making of a Spiritual Classics Thomas Merton's Seeds of Contemplation and New Seeds of Contemplation“in Studies in Relislon/Sciences Religieuses 3,No. 4 (1973-1974), pp. 339-35^, and “Nova in Novibus; the New Material in Thomas Merton's New Seeds of Contemplation" Cistercian Studies 10 (1975), Nos. 3, 4, pp. 190-206* In these articles Grayston gives a detailed analysis of the differences between Seeds of Contemplation, the revised edition which appeared in December, 1949, and New Seeds of Contemplation (1961).
2Seeds of Contemplation (London:. Hollis and Carter,
1949), p. 58.
^Ibid.. p. 183.
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"The biggest paradox about the Church is that she is at the same time essentially traditional and essentially revolutionary. But that is not as much of a paradox as it seems, because Christian tradition, unlike all others, is a living and perpetual revolution."I
Merton is ready to recognize the finitude of human 
traditions and to recognize that the Church is called to 
spealc prophetically when these traditions become absolutized- 
If he is not yet spealdlng with that Icind of a prophetic and 
critical voice, and not yet addressing concrete situations 
in which human creations have become idols, he is preparing 
himself to do precisely that.
"To those who love money and pleasure and reputation and power this tradition says 'Be poor, go doim into the far end of society, take the last place among men, live with those who are despised, love other men and serve them instead of making them serve you."
Statements that criticize Merton for lacking a particular 
social ethic in this period fail to take such passages as 
these into account. The criticisms are valid in so far as 
they criticize the lack of a pai’ticularly social emphasis; 
but they are not valid in so far as they fail to discern
^Ibid.. p. 83,
^Ibid.. p. 84.
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the ethical ramifications of Merton's thought.^ Even in 
The Waters of Siloe, a popular history of the I’rappist 
order in America, there are indications of Merton's 
social concern, both in a theoretical sense and in a 
practical sense;
"Contemplation and action necessarily have their part in every religious Rule. The two must always go together, because Cliristian perfection is nothing else but the perfection of charity, and that means perfect love of God and of men. This is only one love, specifically the same.It cannot be divided into two."
"One of the strongest criticisms leveled by Giteaux against the Gluniac regime was that it was rooted in social injustice. The Cistercians could not accept the notion of a life of contemplation in which the interior peace and leisure of the contemplative were luxuries purchased by the exploitation of serfs and the taxation of the poor.
A, small book of verse published in 1949, althoi:^h specifically 
religious, has hints of Merton's concern with what \*jas
1Among the critics of Thomas Merton at this stage of his writing was Dorn Aelred Graham# See "Thomas Merton, a Modern Man in Reverse," Atlantic Monthly 191, (January, 1953), pp. 70-74* See also Y.H. Kirkorian, "The Fruits of Mysticism," The New Republic 121 (September, 1949), PP* 17-18#
^The Waters of Siloe (Garden City, N.Y.; Garden CityBooks, 1949J71PP* 2Œxiii, 17.
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happening in the world, but little expression of his 
personal involvement in that world. His message was more 
critical than redemptive. He was offering no advice or 
encouragement to the world, but rather was stating that 
the world needed to be awqkened by criticism. His existential 
and personal involvement with the struggles of the world 
are hardly evident in these poems:.
"Two cities sailed togetherFor many thousand years iAnd now they drift asunder. |The tides of new wars jSweep the sad heavens, |Divide the massed stars, !The black and white universe |The blooming spheres."■ I
0 **
"We who are still alive will g^ring a few green blades From the floor of this valley Though ploughs abhor your metal and your clay. Rather than starve with you in rocks without oasis.We will get up and work your loamUntil some prayer or some lean sentence ^Bleeds like the quickest root they ever cut."
I" A Re sponsor y, 1948" from The Tears of the Blind Lions (New York: New Directions, 1949),reprinted in Selected Poems,pp. 83f. At this time in his life Merton was impressed by St. Augustine's division between the City of God and the City of Man. Merton used the two-cities analogy in many of his writings and wrote an Introduction to a popular edition of The City of God 
(New York: Modern Library, 1950)*
^"Dry Places" from The Tears of the Blind Lions, reprinted in Selected Poems, pp. 8lf.
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Neither is there a specific theology of involvement evident 
in The Ascent to Truth (1951), a theological treatise on 
the mystical theology of St. Jolm of the Gross* The city 
is not the place to know God; those who live in the world 
often lose all hope for an "interior life" and thereby 
risk being cut off from God himself.^ Even the political 
activities of Catherine of Siena are seen simply as re­
lating to the City of God rather than the City of Men*
"Her mysticism was her experience of union with God, in Christ, whose Kingdom is 'not of this, world.' Her politics were simply the working out of God's will, in the temporal affairs of men and above all the Church, in such a way that the greatest possible number of souls should enter the City of God, which is irrevocably opposed to the city of this world because it belongs to an entirely different order."
This dualism between the realm of God's activity and that 
of man's is reflected in his chapter on love. His discussion 
of love is restricted to man's love for God. This is 
obviously within the self-imposed limitations of the book 
itself: it is about union with God. Furthermore, Merton
is writing within the tradition of apophatic nQrsticism - 
the via negativa or the way of unknowing - and he is stressing
The Ascent to Truth (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951)(All references are from a paperback edition: New York:The Viking Press, 1959), p* 4*
^Ibid.. p. 63
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a central point within that tradition, namely, that since
the intellect is incapable of a full comprehension of God,
only love can be the adequate approach to Him. Nevertheless,
even within these limitations, Merton's treatment of love
remains abstract and lacks an exposition of concrete
1expressions of that love. The value of The Ascent to Truth 
as a presentation of the mystical theology of the apophatic 
school can be debated; its value as an indication of that
tradition's impact on the existential needs of man in society
2is minimal.
Thomas Merton defined The Ascent to Truth as a work 
concerned with "the dogmatic essentials of mystical theology..."
3It was to be "objective "in its approach. Yet the work 
of a systematic theologian was not the work Merton enjoyed 
most. The Prologue to The Sign of Jonas (1953) showed his 
misgivings about approaching spirituality from this direction; 
he was publishing his journals in order to describe 
spirituality in more personal and less objective terms.
^Ibid.. pp. 274ff.
^Merton's struggles in iwiting this book are found within the pages of The Sign of Jonas (pp. I29f, 158, 162, 163). See also Therese Lentfoehr, "The Spiritual Writer" in Thomas Merton. Monk, pp. 108f.
The Sign of Jonas, p. l62. From the journal entry dated February 20, 1949.
so
"I have attempted to convey something of a monk's spiritual life and of his thoughts, not in the language of speculation, but in terms of personal experience. This is always a little hazardous, because it means leaving the sure, plain path of an accepted terminology and traveling in byvxays of poetry and intuition. I found in writing The Ascent to Truth that technical language, though it is universal and certain and accepted by theologians, does not reach the average man and does not convey what is most personal and most vital in religious experience."^
The Sign of Jonas is about Merton's own interior life,
and in this sense is not abstract. Although it is not
overtly concerned with the problems of the world it does2reflect a new understanding of contemptus mundi and 
indicates a methodological approach to truth. Merton is 
becoming increasingly existential and experiential. His 
analysis of the spiritual life will begin with experience 
rather than with dogma. This new approach will not be 
evident in the two books that were published immediately 
after this journal; Bread in the Wilderness (1953), about 
the psalms, as aids to contemplation, and The Last of the 
Fathers (1954) on St. Bernard of Clairvaux. However, with 
the publication in 1955 of No Man is ^  Island Merton's
^The Sign of Jonas, p. 18, Of, p. 129* 
^See below pp. 201—240.
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shift in emphasis becomes obvious. In The Ascent to Truth 
he concludes with his thoughts about love; in ^  Man is An 
Island his first chapter is about love. In the former 
book the object of love is God, in the latter the object 
of love is God and man. In the Preface Merton t-jrites;
"Whatever may be said in the following pages rests upon this foundation. Man is divided against God by his o%m selfishness, which divides him against his brother. This di­vision cannot be healed by a love that places itself only on one side of the rift. Love must reach over to both sides and draw them together."^
The vast gulf that had existed in his mind between the
City of God and the City of Man had been bridged. No
longer was he criticizing Gluny alone for a lack of social
consciousness; he was criticizing the modern monasteries
of his own order. Even they, he wrote, "are not free from
2the smell and clatter of the world." The monastery is no 
longer seen as the manifestation of the City of God on 
earth. It, too, is a human institution and has within it 
the same possibilities for distraction and debasement.
The world is in the monastery and the monastery is in the 
world. The love that is engendered within the monastic 
life is a love that is to be shared with the world; 
and if the monk is not aware of this, then the 
monastery is no better than the world which stands in the
% o  Man is An Island (New York: Har court Brace, 1955),quoted from paperback edition (New York: Dell, 1957), p. 18.
2lbid.. p. 118.
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way of love. Merton is now saying that the problem is not 
the "world," some enigmatic entity outside of the self, but 
that the problem is the self.^ Here we can see Merton's 
newly expressed existentialism, in so far as he is beginning 
to write about man and his need for God, rather than about 
God's Being as it is in Itself. This is not new in Merton:
The Seven Storey Mountain and The Sign of Jonas are about 
man's quest for God. The difference is this: now Merton
is writing not only autobiographical works, but also books 
of meditations, from this experiential perspective. Further­
more, when he discusses the relationship between contemplation 
and action, he moves out of the limited context of the
contemplative cloister and expands that context to include 
2the world# St. Francis becomes his example of the life 
in which the fruits of contemplation are most perfectly 
shared with others. In his life Merton sees the concrete 
expression of the contemplative ideal; to be "another 
Christ" in the wholeness of "existential simplicity#
^See especially Ibid.. pp. 2L4ff. See below pp. 201-24,0.
2e.g., see below p. 308, fn. 4- and p. 309, fn. 2.
3Ibid.. p. l6l. Franciscan poverty intrigued Merton at this point, and he was beginning to see it in terms that would eventually become articulated in his explicit social criticisms. For instance, "Take the antithesis between love of self and love of others. As long as there is a question of material things, the two loves are opposed. The more goods I keep for my own enjoyment, the less there are for others. pleasures and comforts are inordinate, they are not only
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Thomas Merton published four books in the next two 
years, one of which was a small monograph for the use of 
the Trappist Order.^ Those that were written for the 
general public were The Living Bread (1956), a series of 
meditations on the Eucharist; The Silent Life (1957), an 
apologetic for the monastic life; and The Strange Islands 
(1957), a collection of poems that were witten mainly in 
1955 and 1956. None of these books is more explicit in its 
social consciousness than was No Man Is An Island, but 
neither are they less so. VJhat is important as far as 
Merton’s understanding of prayer and action is concerned 
is that he is now introducing existential language to dis­
cussions of the sacraments and the monastic life. In the 
context of a treatise on the Holy Eucharist, Merton writes 
about alienation, about the dangers of totalitarianism to 
the spirit of man, and about the world as the place of God’s 
activity. Alienation, as a word to describe man’s condition, 
is becoming increasingly central in Merton's thought. Man 
is estranged from his true self, from his brother and from 
God. Alienation cannot be overcome in one area without it 
also having been overcome in the others. Man cannot become 
one with himself or with God by fleeing from his brother.
taken from another, but they are stolen." pp. I6f.
^Basic Principles of Monastic Spirituality (irappist, Kentucky, Abbey of Our Lady of Gethsemani, 1957).
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He writes, “It is by well-ordered contact, by relatedness 
with others, that we ourselves become mature and responsible 
persons."^ The relationship must be “well-ordered." 
Totalitarianism in Merton’s view, was an example of a dis­
ordered relationship between men that was readily available 
for his use; America in the 1950s saw itself as being involved 
in an ideological struggle with totalitarian communism as 
represented by Soviet Russia. Servile conformity to a mass- 
culture according to Merton denies manldnd the opportun! 
for true relationships, especially so when that society sees 
materialistic ends as absolute. However, when Merton warns 
against totalitarian notions of society, he is not simply 
condemning Soviet communism; his criticisms are also about 
the totalitarian pressures within the American culture.
Love can be destroyed in a totalitarian state, but not only 
under that particular form of government.
"lihat is true of totalitarian states is true to a lesser degree, but true, never­theless, of the great capitalistic democracies in which the same processes take place, more slowly, less systematically, 
but none the less surely, under the
^The Living Bread (New York: Farrar, Straus andCudahy, 195<^ ), p. xiii. See also pp. 33f.
85
pressure of an ever growing materialistic technocracy.
Neither of the two super-powers of the 1950s, which Merton
later was to call Gog and Magog, were immune from a potential
that could destroy eomunity. The monastic life could provide
the world with a model of what community could actually be.
Merton saw that one role of the monk in the modern world was
to point out that "There is all the difference in the world
between a community and a crowd." The Silent life was
written to show those who were living in the midst of the
"ever growing materialistic technocracy" that there was a
2living alternative. But those who choose this alternative 
were not thereby turning their backs on the world. The 
world is still the milieu in which the Word of God has become
1The Living Bread, p. 129* (it is to be remembered that this statement was made in America in the 1950s and within a volume of meditations on the Holy Communion! Later such statements were to be commonplace. Within its own context, however, this statement was a new and daring stance.)
2The Silent Life (New York; Farrar, Straus and Cudahy), 1957 - all quotations are from the paperback edition - (New York; Dell, 1959), pp. 47f. Merton was saying the same thing to his fellow monks in Basic Principles of Monastic Spirituality; "In the night of our technological barbarism, monies must be as trees which exist silently in the dark and by their vital presence purify the air." p. 35*
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flesh, and therefore it is to be accepted:
"...we must begin by learning how to see and respect the visible creation which mirrors the glory and perfections of the invisible God...We must, first of all, see all material things in the light of the mystery of the Incarnation. We must reverence all creation because the Word was made flesh.
Furthermore, the world is the arena in which man and his
brother find each other. The Imowledge and love of God,
which is intimately related to the knowledge and love of
man and all of God's creation, will be truncated if the
world is totally rejected. To reject the world, in the
monastic sense, is not to reject the needs of one's
brother, neither his spiritual nor his physical needs.
If the monk (or anyone) does so his "spiritual life will
2remain stunted and incomplete."
"But the meaning of the monk's flight from the world is precisely to be sought in the fact that the 'world' (in the sense in which it is condemned by Christ) is the society of those who live exclusively for themselves. To leave the 'world' then, is to leave one­self first of all and begin to live for others."3
^Basio Principles, pp. 10, 12* 
^The Living Bread, p. 139*
^The Silent Life, p. 22
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The existential - or experiential - approach that began 
to characterize Merton's style in The Sign of Jonas and in 
No Man Is An Island is carried through in these books. 
Paradoxically however, whereas there is more social concern 
in Merton's prose than there was earlier in his writings, 
there is no noticeable corresponding increase of concern in 
the poems of % e  Strange Islands. ^ These poems are primarily 
of a religious nature, and the principle attitude toward 
the world is one of condemnation.
Thoughts in Solitude (1958)^ is written in the same 
style as earlier books of meditations such as Seeds of 
Contemplation. No Man Is An Island and The Living Bread.
It is a book of loosely connected meditations concerning 
the spiritual life, but not without an implicit social 
concern. Once again this concern is suggested by Merton's 
criticism of totalitarianism and technological materialism, 
but the criticisms themselves remain vague and secondary.
This is not an analysis of particular social or political 
problems from a religious perspective. It is rather an 
attempt to define what for Merton is a necessary step in
^The Strange Islands (New York; New Directions, 1957)•
2Thoughts in Solitude (New York: Farrar, Straus andCudahy, 1958) - all quotations will be from the paperback edition - (New York: Dell, 1961).
the overcoming of any problem, social or personal, namely, 
the withdrawal into solitude.
In an article published in .1959# Merton defined the 
polarity between prayer and social action as he saw it:
"There has always been a tendency for Christian society to pass from an almost exclusive emphasis on the spiritual character of the Christian vocation, to an equally exclusive emphasis on the social and humanistic aspects of that vocation. The fact remains that both points of view are obligatory."^
It has been show that in his earlier writings Merton's 
emphasis has been on the spiritual character of Christian 
life, but certainly not exclusively so. His social concern 
and awareness is evident throughout his writings. In I960, 
however, that which was muted and implicit in his first 
books became articulate and explicit. In Disputed Questions, 
and to a lesser degree in The Wisdom of the Desert and 
Spiritual Direction and Meditation, all published in I960, 
Merton's social criticism becomes explicit. At the same 
time, he begins to write more poignantly and precisely about 
solitude.
^"Christianity and Mass Movements," Gross Currents 9, (Summer, 1959), p. 201.
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Disputed Questions is a book in which Merton deals 
with one basic theme; "the relation of the person to the 
social organization. H e  begins the book with an analysis 
of this relationship in the life of a particular person,
Boris Pasternalc. He sees this novelist, who had considerable 
troubles wth the Russian hierarchy, as a living symbol of 
the struggle a man of integrity necessarily has with an 
impersonal social organization. In this, Pasternak is not 
unique. He can be compared to Gandhi, in that his protest 
was "the protest of life itself, of humanity itself, of love, 
speaking not with theories and programs but simply affirming 
itself and asking to be judged on its own m e r i t s . Here 
for the first time, at least in a widely disseminated work.
Disputed Questions (New York; Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, I960), paperback edition (Toronto: Mentor), p. viii.Certain essays in this book have been published in Great Britain as The Power and Meaning of Love (london: SheldonPress, 1976),
2Ibid., p. 21. Dennis Q,. Mclnerny suggests that Merton saw in Pasternak a model of Merton's o\m struggles: "Themore Merton talks about the difficulties to which Pasternak was subjected as a direct result of the society in which he lived, and the way he bravely held to his beliefs and preserved his integrity despite those difficulties, the more it becomes apparent that Merton felt a deep affinity for Pasternak precisely for these reasons. I thinlc that his meditations on the plight of Pasternak...awoke in Merton a certain feeling of guilt at the fact that the society in which he was living might in many respects be as evil as (Pasternak's society), and yet, unlike (him) he was not protesting against the evil." Op. cit., p. 63.It is to noted that this chapter was originally published 
in essay form the previous year.
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Merton was speaking about specific situations within the 
world. Here, too, in a chapter on Christianity and 
Totalitarianism, Merton spoke of the social imperatives of 
the Christian Gospel as they relate to a restructuring of 
society;.
"Christians are not the only ones in the world who are faced with ttiis need to build a new and better society. Indeed, it must be said to our confusion that we have not even been the first to undertake this most pressing task of our century.
A social dimension is as important as a spiritual one in
the Christian faith. Merton is highly critical of those
who stress only a superficial "spiritual" aspect;
"If we are content mth merely exterior practise of our religion we mil tend to make Christianity another of the mass- movements that cover the face of the earth. Then the Gliristian, rather than a free man, humbled by the consciousness of his responsibility, tends to become another fanatic who allows himself the worst excesses and excuses them easily on the ground that he is 'defending the faith* or * fighting for the Church.* A timely example; the readiness some Christians might have today to accept the idea of an all-out atomic surprise attack on Russia, and their apï>roval of the most drastic and cruel methods in order to 'stamp out communism. '... To be a Christian one must
^Disputed Questions, p. 103.
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love all men, including not only one's own enemies but even those wiio claim to be the 'enemies of God.'"1
This is not abstract or imprecise. At the time tliis was
published there were nutnerous members of the churches in
America who would have been very much in favor of the
actions Merton denounces. The horrors of the American
involvement in Vietnam for instance, occurred with the
explicit approval of many, if not even a majority, of 
2Christians. In this Chapter of Disputed Questions.
Merton is beginning to develop a precise application of 
the Christian ethic of love to a particular social situation, 
that of war and peace.
Disputed Questions also contains essays that emphasize 
the spiritual aspect of Christianity; essays on the monks 
of Mount Athos, a renaissance hermit called Paul Guistiniani, 
and John of the Cross,among others. Most notable, perhaps,
^Ibid.. pp. 109f.
2See R.ÏÏ. Ghanteloup in "Hawks and Doves: .An Analysisof a Catholic Attitude Toward Nuclear War," in Sociological ^alysis 31 (1970), pp. 23-35; G.E. Tygart, "Religiosity and University Student Anti-Vietnam War Attitudes," Sociological Analysis 32 (1971), pp. 120-129,
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is an essay called "Notes for a Philosophy of Solitude." 
Although Merton had witten on the theme of solitude already, 
this particular essay was one that he had trouble getting 
pass the Trappist censors. A similar essay had been 
published in Ihrench and Italian in 1955,^ but the American 
censors were hesitant to allow such an explicit essay on 
solitude to be published. The Cistercian life is cenobitic, 
that is, the monies live together in community. The idea of 
an eremetical life within the Cistercian Order was an idea 
that was received only gradually and reluctantly*^
Solitude, however, was to become a dominant theme in 
Merton's subsequent writings, and the publications of I960 
contain Merton's underlying theological understanding of 
the relationship between solitude and action. The two were 
not seen as exclusive ideals5 rather, for Merton, constructive 
action without solitude is an impossibility. Solitude is 
necessary for one to become fully himself ; and in the midst 
of a world he felt was becoming increasingly impersonal,
Merton called for a society made up of mature and responsible
^See Merton's reference to this in Therese Lentfoehr, in "The Solitary," Thomas Merton. Monk, pp. 71f.
^Loc. cit. Also see below p. 105, fn. 2.
93
persons;
"To build the Kingdom of God is to build a society that is based entirely on freedom and love. It is to build a society which is founded on respect for the individual person, since only persons are capable of love.
The same emphasis can be found in Spiritual Direction and 
Meditation, although m t h  less explicitness. He calls for 
the Ghi'istian's meditations to become grounded in the concrete 
reality of the world around him.
"I would be inclined to say that a nun who has meditated on the Passion of Christ but has not meditated on the extermination camps of Dachau and Auschwitz has not yet fully entered into the experience of Christianity in our time. For Dachau and Auschwitz are two terrible, indeed apocalyptic, presentations of the reality of the Passion renewed in our time."
This sort of concrete meditation, rather than what Merton
called the "comic book school of spirituality" in which
one chats amiably with Jesus, is what he saw as the way
2for a modern Christian to pray. Love can never become 
abstract if it is to remain Christian. In an article
^Disputed Questions, p. 112.
^Spiritual Direction and Meditation (Collegeville, Minn*; The Liturgical Press, I960), pp. 88, 82f.
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published at this time Merton emphasizes that the Christian 
needs to distinguish between real love and a romantic 
distortion of love;
"It is always a romantic evasion to turn from love of people to the love of love itself; to love mankind more than individual men, to love 'brotherhood* and 'unity* more than _ one's brothers, neighbours, and associates."
But before one can love, one needs to enter into solitude. 
According to Merton, solitude aids love rather than distorts 
and corrupts it, for although love requires a concrete ex­
pression in order to avoid becoming an evasion, love also 
requires a person who is fully developed in order to love. 
Only persons can love, and solitude forms the person. This 
idea of solitude is something Merton borrowed from the 
ancient desert fathers of Egypt and Syria. The Wisdom of 
the Desert is a translation of a number of the sayings of 
these desert fathers, and in his introduction, Merton 
explains the importance of the way of life that they 
exemplified. Theirs was a paradoxical message;
"The simple men who lived their lives out to a good old age among the rocks and sands only did so because they had come into the desert to be themselves, their ordinary selves, and to forget a wrld that divided
1"Love and Maturity, " Sponsa Regis 32, No. 2, October,i960, p. 46.
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them from themselves. There can be no other valid reason for seeking solitude or for leaving the world.And thus to leave the world, is, in fact, to help save it in saving oneself....They knew that they were helpless to do any good for others as long as they floundered about in the wreckage. But once they got a foothold on solid ground, things were different. Then they had not only the power but even the obligation to pull the whole world to safety after them,"^
The year I960, therefore, was a year in which Merton was 
stating the paradox with clarity: on the one hand, the
Christian Gospel demands love in the concrete situation, 
and this requires intimate involvement with the world; 
on the other hand, the Gospel's demand for love requires 
a person capable of loving, and that capability is 
impossible if one is consistently exposed, without relief, 
to a world which tries its best to alienate one from 
one's true self. Solitude is necessary if one is not to 
be floundering in the wreckage of the world and thereby 
to participate in its rescue, that is, the building of 
the Kingdom of God.
^The Wisdom of the Desert (London; Sheldon Press,
1974), p. 22f«
96
Thomas Merton published three books of importance in 
1961; The New Man. The Behavior of Titans, and New Seeds 
of Contemplation (a revision of an earlier work) # In 
the first two of these books Merton looks at what he calls 
"Promethean Theology, a theology in which man sees him­
self as forcing grace from God;
"Theology becomes Promethean whenever it assumes that man's supreme perfection is something God wants to prevent him from attaining* But this assumption is in­variably accompanied by the secret con­viction that this spiritual perfection is of and for ourselves. In other words, wherever we find a theology that is Promethean in character, that is to say that conceives salvation as a stealing fire from heaven, we also find an implicit naturalism that sees our sal­vation and perfection in something other than God. himself
Merton finds a Promethean theology in such divergent forms 
as the quest for "spiritual perfection" rather than for 
God, or the idea that salvation depends on one's feelings
This interest in Prometheus as a model for a sub- Christian theological system was first seen in a small pamphlet with a limited printing in 1958; Prometheus; â Meditation (Lexington, Ky.; Margaret I. King Library Press, University of Kentucky). This essay was later published in The Behavior of Titans (New York; New Directions, 1961), and has since been printed in Raids on the Unspeakable (New York; New Directions, 19o6), and A Thomas Merton Reader (New York; Hare our t Brace and World, 1962).
p"The New Man (New York; Farrar, Straus and Cudahy,1961), quotation from the paperback edition (New York; Mentor-Omega, 1963), pp. 26f.
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of being saved* Although he is critical of an idea of 
salvation that centres on man and not on God, Merton ■vjrote 
The New Man from an existential perspective. It is an 
analysis of man's spiritual self and his quest for reality.
He defines contemplation in existential terms: "Contemplation
is at once the existential appreciation of our own 'nothing­
ness' and of the divine reality, perceived by ineffable
2spiritual contact within the depths of our own being."
However, when contemplation becomes Promethean instead of
properly existential, it becomes selfish and without concern
for the other person. There is no possibility of a social
ethic in a Promethean mysticism. "Such a mysticism is
simply an escape from reality: it barricades itself from
3the real and feeds upon itself." On the other hand, 
existential communion with God in contemplation produces 
a new creation in which a social ethic is basic. The new 
man, he who has been made new by the salvific action of 
Christ in the depths of his being, sees no opposition 
between contemplation and action. His action flows from
Merton had originally called this book Ebcistential Communion but the publisher preferred the other title. (From a conversation with Merton's former secretary. Brother Patrick Hart, O.G.S.Û., June, 1973).
^The New Man. p. 15.
hhld., p. 27,
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contemplation, the appreciation of the divine reality 
in the depths of the soul. This is so because the divine 
reality that is encountered is the reality of agapaic love, 
and an encounter with love begets a social ethic. The 
New Man is not a book about particular social problems. 
Rather, it is the formulation, in terminology which is 
expressly existential and theological, of an underlying 
basis for an ethical approach to such problems.
In addition to two essays on Prometheus, The Behavior 
of Titans contains an essay on Herakleitos, the ancient 
Greek philosopher whom Merton sees as one who protests 
for love and against power, and an essay called, "A Signed 
Confession of Crimes Against the State." This is a satirical 
'confession* about the 'crime' of doing nothing but enjoying 
nature. In a world that pushed one to think in terms of 
efficiency and productivity, Merton reserves the right to 
enjoy the world rather than utilize it. He has begun at 
this point to use a gift of satire for expressing his social 
criticism, and will continue to use satire as one form of 
his criticism for the rest of his life.^
On Merton's satire see James York Glimm, "Exile Ends in Satire" Githara 11 (November, 1971), pp. 31-40. This title itself is a satirical play on the title of one of Merton's earliest works. On the theme of doing nothing see Raids on the Unspealcable. pp. 9-23, and Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, pp. 5&.98.
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New Seeds of Gontepiolation is a revision of the work
that was published in 1949* The revision was chiefly by
way of expanding what had been %jritten in the earlier book#
According to Merton, this made it "in many ways a completely
new book. The original Seeds of Contemplation was not
2without social concern, but the new book was much more 
explicit. The revisions can be seen tliroughout the book; 
he added two totally new chapters at the beginning and one 
at the end, as well as mailing a number of additions to 
almost every chapter. For Instance, his; remarks on 
poverty are less abstract. In Seeds of Contemplation 
he writes of the importance of poverty in the contemplative 
life. In New Seeds of Contemplation he makes tliis addition;
"Misery as such, destitution as such, is not the way to contemplative union. I certainly don't.mean that in order to be a saint one has to live in a slum, or that a contemplative monastery has to aim at reproducing the kind of life that is lived in tenements. It is not filth and hunger that make saints, nor even poverty itself, but love of poverty and love of the poor."
Utter destitution is not what he means by "poverty." In
no way is he trying to romanticize the poor. In fact,
^New Seeds of Contemplation (New York: New Directions,1961), p. ix.
^See above, pp. 74-76.
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he continues, "A certain degree of economic security is 
morally necessary to provide a minimum of stability 
without which a life of prayer can hardly be learned,"^ 
In order for one to pray, one needs a stable environment, 
and it is almost completely useless to preach about a 
spiritual life to a society whose atmosphere militates 
against such a life. This theme is most clearly stated 
in the revisions Merton makes to the chapter, "The Root
pof Mar is Fear."'' In New Seeds of Contemplation. Merton 
is quite specific about some ambiguities in the world's 
approach to peace; the original version lacked these 
remarks;
"IVhat is the use of postmarking our mail with exhortations to 'pray for peace' and then spending billions of dollars on atomic submarines, thermonuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles? This,I would think, would certainly be what the New Testament calls 'mocking God' - and mocking Him far more effectively than the atheists do."
"The 'cold war* is simply the normal consequence of oui’ corrupt idea of a peace based on a policy of 'every man for himself in ethics, economics and political life. It is absurd to hope
^Seeds of Contemplation, p. 16?, of New Seeds of Contemplation, pp. 250f.
2Beeds of Contemplation. pp. 70-73; New Seeds of Contemplation, pp. 112-122.
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id peaç€
i r » n  a  ! 1* 1and illusionsI
Merton's analysis of the spiritual sickness which lay 
at the root of war has been amplified with such concrete 
and timely additions. The contemplative cannot allow him­
self to look at the world in terms of a strict Manichaean 
dualism. To do so is .actually to give tacit support to 
the prevailing attitudes of the day, attitudes which Merton 
feels are antithetical to true contemplation. For the 
contemplative to avoid social concern means that he is 
turning his back on his brother and, in addition, he is 
implicitly supporting a structure which will eventually 
destroy the possibility of contemplation itself. To 
acquiesce in the status quo would reduce contemplation
to a "spiritual anaesthesia" maiding it nothing more than 
2an opiate. Therefore, the contemplative has to live with 
the paradox of being at once within the world and not of 
the world ;
"Insensitivity must not be confused with detachment* The contemplative must certainly be detached, but he can never allow himself to become insensible to
^New Seeds of Contemplation* pp. 119, 122. See also Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander (New York: Doubleday,1971), pp. 41, 200.
^Ibid., pp. 12f.
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human values, whether in society, in other men or in himself. If he does so, then his contemplation stands condemned as vitiated in its very root."^
A further example of his increasing concreteness 
occurs in an article Thomas Merton wrote for The Catholic 
Worker that appeared just prior to the publication of 
New Seeds of Contemplation. In it one sees the contemplative 
trying to be sensible to huiaan values in a particular 
situation. The early 1960s in America witnessed the 
building of individual backyard fallout shelters, designed 
to protect life in the event of nuclear war. One moral 
issue that was raised by the advent of these shelters i^ as 
the question of the right to protect one's shelter from 
invasion by desperate neighbours. Merton addressed this 
issue by questioning some basic assumptions about the 
fallout shelter mentality. The whole idea that a "hole 
in the baclqrard" can save one from nuclear holocaust, and 
the kind of mentality that reduces manlcind to "neighbor 
pitted against neighbor with revolvers and shotguns" 
is rejected. Furthermore, he uses this debate to introduce
^New Seeds of Contemplât!on, p. 20.
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the idea of "nonviolent resistance," This idea is one
which Merton will elaborate in later writings. Its first
explicit mention is in the early sixties*^
It should be noted that Merton's interest in Eastern
religions, especially Zen Buddhism, became explicit in
1961. The closing chapter of Mew Seeds of Contemplation
was seen by one critic as verification that Merton is now
2very much under the influence of Zen and two articles
published in that year substantiate this judgement,
3"Wisdom in Emptiness" is a dialogue between Merton and 
the Zen scholar, D.T. Suzuldl, and "Classical Cliinese 
Thought"^ is a studious introduction to the thought of 
Confucius. At the same time, therefore, that Merton was 
witing quite specifically about the problems of society.
"The Shelter Ethic", The Catholic Worker 2B, November, 1961. of "The Machine Gun in the Fallout Shelter," in Thomas Merton on Peace, and Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander. pp. 191f, 194, 258.
2Aldhelm Cameron-Brown, "Zén Master" in Thomas Merton, Monk, p. 166.
^"Wisdom in Emptiness" by Thomas Merton and Daisetz Teitaro Suzuici in New Directions in Prose and Poetry 17, ed. James Laughlin (New York: New Directions,"19^1), pp.65-IOI. Also published in Zen and the Birds of Appetite (New York: New Directions, 1968),
^In Jubilee 8 (January, I96I), pp. 26-32, Also published in Mystics and Zen Masters (New York; Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 196777
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he vjas also turning to the East ifith increased interest.
This must be understood if one is to keep a balanced picture 
of Thomas Merton. Throughout his life the paradox is 
maintained: as he becomes increasingly contemplative,
he becomes increasingly sensitive to the problems of 
society.
The next two years, 1962 and 1963, were years in which 
Merton continued to wite about war and in which he began 
to write also about racial matters. A number of articles 
were published in these areas in addition to two important 
books. Breakttoough to Peace (1962) was edited by Thomas 
Merton and also contained an introductory essay by him. 
Emblems of a Season of Fury (1963) is principally a book of 
poetry, but also contains a significant essay on the cold
^Among the important articles on imr are "Nuclear War and Christian Responsibility," Commonweal 75 (February 9,1962), pp. 509-513, and a response to criticisms of that article, April 20, 1962; "We Have to Make Ourselves Bear'd," Catholic Worker 28 (May, I962), pp. 4-6, (June, 1962), pp. 4-5;:"Spirituality for an Age of Overkill," Continuum 1 (Spring, 1963), pp. 9-12; "Christian Morality and Nuclear War," The Way 19 (June, 1963), pp. 12-22; and an essay in War Within Man. edited by Erich Fromm (Philadelphia; Peace Literature Service of American Friends Service Committee,1963), pp. 44-50. His articles on the racial issue include "Neither Caliban nor Uncle Tom," Liberation 8 (June, 1963), pp. 20-22; "The Negro Revolt." Jubilee 11 (8ep"Wmber, 1963), pp. 39-43, and "Letters to a Ifhite Liberal," also called "Black Revolution," Blacyriars 44 (November, 1963), pp. 464-477 and Blackfriars (December, 1963), pp. 503-516, later published in other places including Seeds of Destruction. Thomas Merton, (New York; Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1964).
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war and its importance to the Third World,
Brealcthrough to Peace contained articles by Herbert 
Butterfield, Norman Cousins, Erich Fromm, Lewis Mumford, 
among others. The Trappist censors were hesitant about 
allowing Merton's name to appear as editor, although it 
eventually did, but did not block the publication of his 
introductory essay. It was one of his most impassioned 
statements yet. No one wanted war, Merton wote, "But 
they wanted a political and economic situation that make 
i-jar inevitable." Members of the Truman administration 
had hoped that the bombing of Japan would bring peace^ 
but "Instead of producing peace, the atom bomb started 
the most fantastic arms race in history," an arms race 
based on "nuclear deterence" which "has proved to be en 
illusion, for the bomb deters no one. It did not prevent 
war in Korea, Indochina, Laos, the Congo. It did not
2prevent the Russian suppression of the Hungarian revolt."
of Original Child Bomb (New York; New Directions,1962), a satirical poem on the American decision to bomb Japan, (also in Thomas Merton on Peace, pp. 3-11.) See also'Conference on Prayer" in Sisters Today 4.I (April,1970)-, p. 455.2Breaktlirough to Peace, ed. Thomas Merton (New York:New Directions, 1962), pp. 8f. For Merton's problems with the Trappist censors on this book and on other witings on war see Gordon Zahn, "Original Child Monk; An Appreciation" in Thomas Merton on Peace (New York: McCall, 1971), pp.ix-xli.
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Fanatics, however, with a perverted idea of patriotism, 
perpetuate the illusion, Merton issued an open call to 
all men to return to sanity;
"We are responsible for the present and for those present actions and attitudes of ours from which future events will develop. It is therefore supremely important that we get a grip on ourselves and determine that we will not relinquish either our reason or our humanity; that we will not despair of ourselves, or of man, or of our capacity to solve our problems; that we will make use of the faculties and resources we still have in abundance, and use them for positive and constructive action in so far as we can. We will resist the fatal inclination to passivity and despair, as well as the fatuous temptation to false optimism and insouciance which condition us equally well to accept disaster. In a word we will behave as .men, and, if. Gliristian, then as members of Christ."^
Religious people have no recourse to "the ivory tower of 
private spirituality...such a decision would be immoral."2 
It would, in effect, be supporting the status quo, which 
itself was a horrid illusion. All men, especially those 
in the Church, have a duty to make definite changes in the
Breakthrough to Peace, p. 10. In the Introduction to New Seeds of G ont emplation. p. xi, Merton wrote that his message was "not addressed primarily to Catholics." Now, his message is not even primarily to Christians or even to those of any religious persuasion, but to all who will listen.
^Ibid.. p. 11.
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prevalent socio-political structure and attitude<
"It is therefore vitally important to create a general climate of rationality, and to preserve a broad, tolerant, watchful and humanist outlook on the whole of life, precisely in order that rash and absurd assumptions may not have too free a circulation in our society.
Emblems of a Season of Fury contains an essay called
2"A Letter to Pablo Antonis Guadra Concerning Giants."
In this essay, Merton weaves two major social concerns; 
on the one hand, his horror of the absurd cold war between 
the United States and Russia (which he refers to in the 
biblical l^guage of Magog and Gog), and on the other hand, 
the arrogant stance that the Western white man has taken 
toiifard the stranger whom he encounters, in this ease 
particularly, in Central and South American natives;
"Let me be quite succinct; the greatest sin of the European-Rtissian-American complex which we call 'the West* (and this sin has spread its o;m way to China), is not only greed and cruelty,
^Ibid., p. 13.
^Emblems of a Season of Fury. (New York; New Directions, 1963), pp. 7O-89. Guadra, a poet and intellectual, was editor of La Prensa of Managua, Nicaragua.
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not only moral dishonesty and infidelity to truth, but above all its unmitigated arrogance toward the rest of the human race."1
The heart of the problem is the idolization of one's ovm 
self and of one's o\m group. The Westerner believes 
that he, and he alone, is of importance. The Christian 
has come to believe that he, and he alone, can speak the 
voice of Christ. It is this arrogance that Merton believes 
is destroying the world. The great lesson of the Apostolic 
Age was that God is in all men, not just in the Jew. But 
later ages of Christians forgot that lesson. They ardently 
spoke of Christ and for Clirist,
"But they had omitted to listen to the voice of Christ in the unfamiliar accents of the Indian, as Clement had listened for it in the Fre-Socratics. And now, today, we have a Christianity of Magog."
"God speaks," Merton continues, "and God is to be heard,
not only on Sinai, not only in my own heart, but in the
voice of the stranger....if we cannot see him unexpectedly
in the stranger and the alien, we will not understand him
2even in the Church,"
^Ibid.. p. 78. 
^Ibid., pp. 80, 82,
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Merton seems to be addressing criticisms to the Church 
and to the Western world rather than addressing Gaudra and 
his Latin American brothers. However, the criticisms of 
the West contain within them a message for others. His 
primary word to the people of the Third World is a hope 
that they will profit from the mistalces of "Gog and Magog."
"To the whole third world I would say that there is one lesson to be learned from the present situation, one lesson of the greatest urgency; be unlike the giants, Gog and Magog. Mark what they do and act differently."^
In the midst of these witings on war and race Thomas 
Merton was not neglecting to n^rite in his usual "religious"
genre. For those who felt that Merton was becoming somewhat 
2too radical, there were a number of articles on religious 
themes,^ and one major book, Life and Holiness.
^Emblems of a Season of Fury, p. 86.
^See, for example, the letter in reaction to "Nuclear War and Christian Responsibility," entitled "Nuclear War and Christian Responsibility; An Exchange of Views," Commonweal 76 (April 20, 1962), pp. 84-85.
%or instance, "Christ, the Way," Sponsa Regis 33 (January, 1962), pp. 144-153; "Christian Freedom and Monastic Formation," American Benedictine Review 13 (September, 1962), pp. 289-313, and "Examination of Con­science and 'Gonversatio Morum'" Collectanea Ordinis Gisterciensium Reformatorum 25 ( 1963),"pp.^355-369•
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Although it does not have the passion of the essays just 
quoted, it is not lacking in a very definite call to Christian 
action.^ To reject the world is not to reject other people 
or the creative achievements of man, but rather it is "to 
reject the perverted standards which make men misuse and 
spoil a good creation,"^ The life of faith cannot be 
separated from the needs of the world. The Christian's 
spiritual life "will inevitably be affected by his attitude 
toward such problems as nuclear war, the race question, the 
growth of new nations, and the whole crucial struggle 
between the communist and noncommunist worlds." Furthermore, 
"It is a duty of charity and of justice for every Christian 
to take an active concern in trying to improve man's 
condition in the world." The problems that man faces in 
the world, that is poverty, social upheaval, and the threat 
of nuclear war" are not just political or economic problems; 
they are symptoms of a spiritual siclmess so universal and 
so deep-rooted that it threatens the very existence of the
^In the Introduction Merton calls the book "a medi­tation on some fundamental themes appropriate to the active life." Life and Holiness (New York; Herder and Herder, 1963), quoted from the paperback edition (London; Geoffrey Chapman, 1963), p. vii.
2Life and Holiness, p. 100.
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human race. Even in his specifically religious books
one encounters Merton's plea that a false dualism between
the sacred and the secular be overcome. The "nice defenders 
2of the faith" no longer could possibly look to Thomas 
Merton as the champion of a life that was purely spiritual 
to the neglect of radical social involvement. In actuality, 
Merton never could have been their champion. From his 
earliest writings there is evidence of his strong social 
concern. Disputed Questions made it quite clear that social 
concerns and spiritual ones were aspects of the same reality. 
If any reader missed the point, Life and Holiness would 
make it again, m t h  equal clarity and force. One could 
ignore Merton's articles and one could ignore Breakthrough 
to Peace and read only Merton's "spiritual" works, but the 
message would be inescapable; Thomas Merton was calling 
men and women to be willing to risk all for the sake of
3their brothers.
^Ibid.. pp. 122, 117, 138f.
phrase Merton used in a letter to Dora Jean LeClerq quoted by the latter in his Introduction to Contemplation in a World of Action (London; Allen and Unwin, 1971), p. xii.
^The impact of the encyclicals of John XXIII, especially Mater et magistra. are evident in Life and Holiness. See pp. 121ff.
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Seeds of Destruction was the only book that Merton 
published in 1964. It is a collection of essays and 
excerpts from letters, most of which had appeared earlier 
in various journals. Included here were the "Letters 
to a I-Jbite Liberal" published the year before, and now 
exposed to a wider readership. There is also a section 
on "The Christian in the Diaspora," a commentary on 
Karl Rahner that provides a new approach to Merton's 
understanding of the form that Christian apologetics 
needs to take in the latter-half of the twentieth 
century. A tribute is paid to Gandhi as both a prophet 
of non-violence and an example of a life based on the 
law of Christ. The "Letters in a Time of Crisis" deal 
with a multitude of subjects ranging from the explicitly 
religious (on Julian of Normch) to the explicitly 
secular (a letter to the Negro novelist, James Baldwin.)^ 
Seeds of Destruction was a succinct demonstration of 
the complexity of Merton's interests. The reader was 
confronted by his interest in racial injustice, in non­
violence and the issues of war and peace, in the spiritual 
importance of the East, and in the means of Christian
^Miereas today "Black" is a term that is preferred to "Negro," Merton used the latter term, and in this 
thesis his usage is followed.
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witness* It was, however, the essays on racial matters 
that received the most attention, for Merton’s approach 
to these problems was displeasing to the liberal as 
well as to the conservative,^ It is an indictment of 
impure motivations on the part of the white American 
liberal who wishes to give aid to the Negro. Merton 
felt that the white man, liberal or not, was unable to 
recognize the actual roots of the racial problem, Negro 
non-violence is seen as a means of opening the eyes of 
the white man to the gravity of his own sin;
“The purpose of non-violent protest, in its deepest and most spiritual dimensions is then to awaken the conscience of the 
white man to the awful reality of his in­justice and of his sin, so that he will be able to see that the Negro problan is really a l&ite problem; that the cancer
Conservative here does not mean conservative in a classical sense, but in the sense in which that word has taken on a particularly American connotation which is described by Paul Tillich* Conservatism in America, he says, “has to do with the individualism of the capitalistic society,,,Thus it can happen that the term ‘conservative* can be used for simple facist movements, like the John Birch Society.,.These move­ments have nothing to do with conservatism. They are based on the mass culture of the present and wish to exclude all liberal elements...for the salce of maintaining the rule of the upper classes in a capitalistic society." Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology (London; SGM, 1967), 
p. ^5.
lU
of injustice and hate which is eating white society and is only partly manifested in racial segregation, is rooted in the heart of the white man himself7 ^
The non-violent protest of Martin Luther King, which 
Merton identifies closely with the approach of Gandhi, 
is seen as a particular occurrence in history in which 
both the Negro and the white man can find salvation.
It is a new kairos, a moment in which white America 
could hear and receive a “message of salvation," How­
ever, the moment might pass; if white society does 
not heed the message of non-violent protest, the result 
could be catastrophic.
"The conspicuous failure of the law to provide adequate protection or redress for Negroes subject to violent attack by Whites is having one very serious effect; it is causing Negroes to lose confidence in the efficacy of non­violence as a political tactic,,,. Unfortunately, not all Negroes can appreciate the Christian foundation of non-violent action as it is practised by the followers of Dr. King,"^
If the just demands of the Negro are not met "The 
merciful kairos of truth will turn into the dark hour
Seeds of Destruction (New York: Farrar, Strausand Giroux, I964), pp. 45f. See also Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, pp. 31f,
^Ibid., pp. 64, 52f.
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of destruction and hate." The Negro would become a 
black Samson who "pulls the pillars of white society- 
crashing down upon himself and his oppressor."^ The 
white liberal, cautions Merton, is terribly naive.
He fails to take seriously the Negro's message that 
white society is sick, and is content with incorporating 
the Negro into a society which he refuses to examine.
The Negro is calling the white man to recognize his 
own malaise, and the white liberal has very little to 
offer.
Thomas Merton also touched on the issue of war
in Seeds of Destruction, most especially in the long
essay, "The Christian in World Crisis; Reflections
2on the Moral Climate of the 1960s." Increasingly his 
comments include references to non-violent action and 
resistance, pacifism, and theories of "just war," 
themes which will continue to be developed throughout 
the remainder of Merton's life. The cessation of war
^Ibid.. pp. 69f.
2Ibid.. pp. 93-163. In this essay Merton comments at some length on another of John XXIII's encyclicals,Pacem in Terris; "Pope John's optimism was really some­thing new in Christian thought because he expressed the unequivocal hope that a world of ordinary men, a world in which many men were not Christians or even believers in God, might still be a world of peace if men would deal with one another on the basis of their God-given reason and with respect for their inalienable human rights. Note that Pacem in terris is the first encyclical in which the language of human rights has been so clearly espoused." pp. 120f.
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is not a sufficient goal for a nation's defensive 
strategy. The means used for defending one's nation 
are signs which point to the quality of the way of 
life being defended. Merton xjas trying to call 
America to an examination of its corporate spiritual 
life. The American insistence on seeing foreign policy 
in cold war terms of black and white, good and evil, 
democracy and totalitarianism blinded the nation to 
the necessity of improving the quality of its institu­
tions and its public morality, "If our affluent society 
ever breaks d ow and the facade is taken away, " he 
%'jrote to the wife of a statesman, "what are we going 
to have left2"^ As long as the American public were 
uncritically determined to defend the American way of
life, and determined to use any possible means to do 
2so, then there is the danger that we either blow the 
world up, or "that we may someday float without 
realizing it into a nice tight fascist society. The 
attitude of Auer lea's cold war mentality would, in
^Seeds of Destruction, p. 251.
2In 1964, when this book was published, Barry Goldwater made the statement that extremism in the defense of liberty is a virtue. Goldwater was the Republican candidate for President.
%bid.. p. 251.
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Merton's view, lead inevitably to a disastrous con­
clusion. The Christian has a particular vocation in 
this situation, a vocation that is not at all easy:
"No one is encoui’aged to be clear-sighted, because conscience can make cowards, by diluting the strong conviction that our side is fully right and the other side is fully wrong. Yet the Christian responsi­bility is not to one side or to the other in the power struggle: it is to God andtruth, and to the whole of mankind. "
Therefore the Christian is going to have to take a
lonely stance. He td.ll be considered as dangerous and
subversive by all who see reality in terms of a rigid
dualism of good and evil. But such a stance, for Merton,
is necessary for two reasons: it is necessary first of
all if we are to be true to God, and secondly, if we are
2to be true to man.
Thomas Merton continued to t-jrite about the issues
3of war and race during 1965, but only one book of his 
touched directly on these subjects. That was Gandhi
4bid.. p. 96.
^It is to be recalled that it was in 1964 that Merton conducted the retreat on "The Spiritual Roots of Protest" with the Berrigans and others. See above.
3For instance: "Religion and Race in the UnitedStates," New Blackfriars 46 (January, 1965), pp. 216- 225, reprinted in Faith and Violence (Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 1966); "A Enemy of the State" in Pax Bulletin (London: May, 1965), pp. 3-5,also reprinted in Faith and Violence and in Thomas
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on Non-violence. a collection of sayings • from the 
ivritings of the Hindu leader with an introduction by 
Merton, Another book was also a collection of aphorisms 
from an Eastern giant, Chuang Tzu, who w o  te in China 
in the fourth and third centuries B.C*^ The only other 
book published that year was a collection of essays
2chiefly on liturgical matters: Seasons of Celebration,
Merton on Peace. He also contributed an introduction to Philip Berrigan's No More Strangers (New York: Macmillan, 1965)*
1The Way of Chuang Tzu (New York: New Directions,1965), a book of which Merton wrote, "I have enjoyed writing this book more than any other I can remember," British paperback edition, (London: Allen and Um/in,1970), pp, 9f* -Another work on Eastern religion published at this time is the essay, "%sticism and 2en Masters," Chinese Culture 6 (March, I965), pp,1-18, (Later published in Mystics and Zen Masters (New York; Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 196717
2Seasons of Celebration (New York; Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965). Merton published numerous articles in 1965 that were strictly of a religious nature in­cluding "Reflections on Some Recent Studies of St. Anselm," Monastic Studies 3, (1965), pp. 221-234? "Contemplation and Pteuraenism," Season 3 (Fall, 1965), pp, 133-142, and "Contemplative life in the Modern World," The Mountain Path (India), (October, 1965), pp. 223-227, and reprinted in Faith and Violence.
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In addition to these publications, certain earlier
works of Merton’s were being translated into Japanese
and Korean, and Merton was witing special prefaces
1to these new editions. In these prefaces Merton had 
an opportunity to summarize the development of his 
thought for a new audience. Here one can find some 
of the most precise and succinct statements of Merton’s 
paradox: silence and solitude living in creative
tension with outspoken social criticism. For instance, 
in the Preface to the Japanese edition of The Seven 
Storey Mountain, he w o  te:
"I make monastic silence a protest against the lies of politicians, propagandists and agitators, and when I spealc it is to deny that my faith and my Church can ever seriously be aligned with these forces of injustice and destruction,"2
Merton obviously wanted the Japanese to hear this 
message, not only as an apologetic for Christianity, 
but also for the inherent value of that message for
Preface to the Japanese edition of Seeds of Contemplation (Kanso no tane), (Kyoto; Veritas,1965) 3 Pi'eface to the Japanese edition of Seven Storey Mountain, (Nanae no yama), (Tokyo: ToyoPublishing7 19^ 5)? Preface to the Korean edition of Life and Holiness (Hyeondaeineui sinang saenghwal), (Seoul; Kaetoric Ghulpansa, 196$),
2From the manuscript in the Bellarmine College Collection.
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Japanese sooiety. Merton was developing a considerable
love for the East; Zen Buddhism, especially, was having
a continuing attraction for him. On the one hand he
was beginning to try to discover points of affinity
between Zen and the apopjiatic tradition of Ghrisitan 
1mysticism. On the other hand his oxm life was be­
coming more and more Zen-like in attitude. He felt a 
close bond of unity m t h  those who lived a Zen existence.
The insights that he had received from Zen, plus 
his long-standing attraction to the solitary life, 
reached a culmination in 196$ when Merton retired to 
the hermitage. Many of his witings take on a Zen-like 
quality; personal, poetic meditations of present reality, 
celebrating meaninglessness and a total absence of 
utilitarianism. For instance, "Rain and the Rhinoceros" 
published first in 196$ and later in 1966 in Raids 
on the Unspeakable, is a personal meditation which, 
on the one hand, celebrates the "Gratuity" and the
See "Mystics and Zen Masters," in t^vstics and Zen Masters, especially pp. 40-42, in which Merton describes a "Trinitarian structure" in the thought of an early Zen master, Hui Neng (Seventh Century, A.D.), a structure Merton feels is akin to "all that is most characteristic of the highest forms of Christian con­templation. "
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"meaninglessness" of natm’e, and on the other hand, 
recognizes the rnmhlings of the Rhinoceros in the 
distance. (The imagery is Ionesco’s.)
"The rain has stopped. The afternoon sun slants through the pine trees: andhow those useless needles smell in the clean airI A dandelion, long out of season, has pushed itself into bloom between the smashed leaves of last summer’s day lilies. The valley resounds ifith the totally uninformative talk of creeks and wild water. The quails begin their sweet whistling in the wet bushes, and so is the delight I take in it. There is nothing I would rather hear, not because it is a better noise than other noises, but because it is the voice of the present moment, the present festival. Yet even here the earth shaJces. Over at Fort Knox the Rhinoceros is having fun."^
Merton’s solitude was increasing his appreciation 
for Zen, and at the same time was enforcing his new 
understanding of the Augustinian split between the 
City of God and the City of Man. If such symbols were 
to be used they were no longer to be interpreted in 
the strict dualistic sense of Merton’s earliest writings. 
Solitude taught Merton that evil is to be finally 
located not in an abstract "city" but in the heart of 
the individual man. To leave the city and go out into
"Rain and the Rhinoceros," in Raids on the Unspeakable (New York; New Directions, 1966), p. 23, Originally published in Holiday 37, May, 196$.
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desert is the means to confront evil rather than to 
escape it. Then the power of evil is seen "not in the 
city, but in ourselves."^
Raids on the Unspealcable t-Tas one of two books of
2 —collected essays published by Merton in 1966. it 
contains literary criticism, prose poems, parapluases 
of a medieval Moslem Sufi mystic, and advice to modern 
poets and artists on the relationship of art and politics. 
Here can be seen Merton’s wide range of interests in 
a single volurae. And here, too, can be seen a continuing 
affirmation of Merton’s understanding of the intimate 
relationship between contemplation and poetic, artistic 
endeavors, on the one hand, and social action and politics, 
on the other. Understanding himself as a poet and artist 
as we 13. as a contemplative,'^Merton addresses the artistic
^Ibid.. p. 19.
2The other was Redeeming the Times (London; Burns and Oates, 1966), most of which was published in America in Seeds of Destruction or subsequently in Faith and Violence.
3In 1947 Merton published an article called "Poetry and the Contemplative Life," Commonweal, XLVI. (July 4> 1947), which was also published in Figures for an Apocalypse# This was revised in 1958 with the title, "Poetry and Contemplation; A Reappraisal," Commonweal 69, (October 24, 1956), and also published in Selected Poems and A Thomas Merton Reader.
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conanunity as well as the religious community. In the 
same way that the contemplative camot separate himself 
from the concerns of the world, neither can the artist. 
The artist is not a preacher. He should preach nothing; 
"His art should speak its own truth." let, at the same 
time, the artist "does live in a world where politics 
are decisive" and he is thereby "indirectly committed 
to seek some political solution to problems that endanger 
the freedom of man." The temptation is to seek to join 
a particular movement, but there is a danger in this. 
Merton is very skeptical aboui political or social 
programmes. They all, he says, "seek to manipulate or 
coerce the artist in one way or another." Therefore, 
the artist, like the monk, must stand apart, and be 
willing to criticize all formr of governemnt or social 
systems, and to stand "in complete solidarity with those 
who are fighting for rights and freedom against inertia, 
hypocrisy and coercions e.g. the Negroes in the United 
States."^
^"Answers on Art and Freedom," in Raids on the Unspeakable, p. 171, originally published in The Lugano Review 1 (19o5)# This essay consists of replies to questions asked by readers of Eco Contemporaneo. a Buenos Aires magazine.
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Also included in this volume was "A Devout 
Meditation in Memory of Adolf Eichmann" in which Merton 
wonders about that sanity of a world which judges 
Eicfamann to be perfectly sane, and considers pacifists 
to be a little crazy;
"I am beginning to realize that ’sanity* is no longer a value or an end in itself. The * sanity* of modern man is about as useful to him as the huge bulk and muscles of the dinosaur. If he were a little less sane, a little more aware of his absurdities and contradictions, perhaps there might be a possibility of his survival. But if he is sane, too sane...perhaps we must ssy that in a society like ours the worst insanity is to be totally without anxiety, totally *sane.**’
This was to become one of Merton’s most often quoted
1pieces of social criticism."
"A Devout Meditation in Memory of Adolf Eichmann," in Raids on the Unspeakable, p. 49# This essay was first published in New DirectionaLlS. and subsequently saw print in magazines as diverse as The Catholic Digest 31 (November, 1^6), Ramparts 5 (October, 1966), and Peace News (London; May 19, 196?). Edward Rice reports that Lenny Bruce, the late nightclub comedian often ended his act by reading this piece in a German accent. See Rice, The Man in the Sycamore Tree; The Good Time and Hard Life of Thomas Iferton. p. 122. See also Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, pp. 285ff*
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The only other book to appear in 1966 was 
Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander.^ a collection of 
notes from private journals Merton kept between 1956 
and 1965* This was not to be a sequel to The Sign 
of Jonas, his earlier monastic journal, which gave the 
reader an intimate picture of the monastic milieu in 
which Merton was living and thinking. Rather, Conjectures 
of a Guilty Bystander is "a personal version of the 
world in the 1960s." Merton described his book this way:
"Maybe the best way to characterize this book is to say that it consists of a series of sketches and meditations, some poetic, and literary, others his­torical and even theological, fitted together in a spontaneous, informal philosophical scheme in such a way that they react upon each other.The total result is a personal and monastic meditation, a testimony of Christian reflection in the mid- twentieth century, a confrontation of twentieth century questions in the light of a monastic commitment, which inevitably makes one something of a ’bystander.*"2
Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander (Garden City, N.Ï», Doubleday, I966J. Parts of this journal first appeared in other places; "Barth’s Dream," in Motive 25 (March, 1965), and Sewanee Review 73 (Winter, 1965), and "The Night Spirit and the Dawn Air," in New Black­friars 46 (September, 1965)•
%bid.. pp. 5f.
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In these musings and notes one is able to see how Merton 
responds to the world from which he has separated him­
self. The themes that have been in the forefront of 
almost all of his writings since Disputed Questions are 
seen here in preliminary, inchoate and unsystematic 
meditations. Here is, so to speak, the "raw material" 
of Merton’s major writings of the sixties. Yet, quite 
often, the raw material has a vibrancy and poignancy 
that far surpasses the finished product, and the un­
hesitatingly personal quality of these writings gives 
the reader a deeper insight into the processes of 
Merton’s mind than one is able to discern in more 
systematic writings. (For example, Merton compares 
the monastery with the General Electric plant in 
Louisville. VJhich, he asks, is the most serious, the 
most "religious" institution? His conclusion is that 
the religious seriousness of the monastery cannot 
compare to that of General Electric; "It may in fact 
occur to many, including the monks, to doubt the monastery 
and what it represents. Who doubts G.E.?")^
In the aftermath of Vatican II, Roman Catholicism 
in America demonstrated these two extremes: at the one
pole there were the advocates for total reform within
^Ibid.. p. 232.
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the Church and the world, and at the other pole, 
there were those who wished the Church to maintain 
its uninterupted continuity with its past allowing 
for no appreciable changes in that tradition.
Merton’s continuing paradox, that is the tension 
between the traditions of monastic spirituality and 
social involvement, is seen in how he tried to balance 
these conservative and progressive elements within 
himself. He wanted to side with neither extreme. 
Progressives often seem "hasty, irresponsible, in 
many ways quite frivolous" and conservatives often 
betray a "chilling malice and meanness." Merton looked 
to Pope John XXIII as a model of "a progressive with 
a deep respect and love for tradition." Merton wanted 
to follow him in maintaining "a very clear and marked 
continuity with the past" and yet be "completely open" 
to the needs of the modern world.^ He looked upon the 
’’new radicalism" of the sixties with a mixture of hope 
and fear;
"There is a new generation and a new spirit here, and perhaps it will turn out to have been much more serious and much more effective than anything I can remember from my own youth, I think this new radicalism may be the decisive force and hope of the sixties - or it may simply be the catalyst that will bring
^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, pp. 312f.
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on our transformation into something very disagreeable and stupid*.."^
This new wave could become a liberating manifestation
of the Spirit of God or it could become demonized -
a political circus. Contemplation and solitude are
what Merton saw as necessary to keep political dissent
honest. Political action requires a free and open
response on the part of individuals. Cheap words and
"programs that grow on every tree" will change little.
Merton had an innate distrust of mass-movements*
"...the more massive a movement is, the more it is
doctored and manipulated. The more it tends to be
a mass lie, a front." What is called for is simpler,
more individual, less self-conscious, and less
publicized acts and gestures. "Genuine dissent," he
wrote, "must always keep a human measure. It must be
2free and spontaneous." Contemplation is the means 
of achieving this necessary freedom and spontaneity.
^Ibid.. p. 172.
^Ibid., pp. I62f. Compare this to an article published that same year in wliich Merton questions protests against the war in Vietnam; "la the current protest making any real headway in re-educating us, in giving us a new attitude towards war? Or is it simply an outlet for the indignation, the frustration and the anxiety of those who see that the war is irrational, but fear they can do nothing to stop it?" ’Peace and Protest," Continuum 3 (Winter, 1966), later published in Faith and Violence, p. 43.
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It is in contemplation that one can come to an 
encounter with the roots of one’s being and the source 
of one’s own freedom* Here one can encounter the Christ 
in himself and in others* Without such an encounter, 
political action becomes a counter-productive frenzy, 
which destroys one’s own inner capacity for peace.
Without the contemplative experience, the reformer 
tries to reform the world without first having experienced 
his own metanoia. In short, nothing will really be 
changed.^ Contemplation and solitude were, for Merton, 
not individualistic or selfish pursuits; they were seen 
as essential to a viable social reformation.
In addition to the three books published in 1966,
Merton also published numerous articles on specifically
religious concerns, both Christian and Eastern, as well
as articles on the problems of life in the modern world.
Many of these writings were to appear in book form in
the next two years, the last years of Merton’s life,
and would become known to the wider circle of readers 
2at that time. His writings on Eastern religions
^Con.ieotures of a Guilty Bystander. p. 86.
2Articles which have not yet been published in book form include "A Buyer’s Market for Love," Aye Maria 104 December 24, 1966)), pp. 7-10, 27; : "Love and Solitude," (the Preface to the Japanese edition of Thoughts in Solitude). The Critic 25 (October-November, 1966), pp. 30-37; "Monastic Vocation and Modern Thought," Monastic Studies 4 (1966), pp. 17-54; "8y%bolism: Communication or Communion?’* The Mountain Path 3 (India), (October,1966), pp. 339-348; "Saint Anselm and His Argument,"
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appeared in Mystics and Zen Masters (1967) and Zen 
and the Birds of Appetite (1968), and his witings on 
explicitly social issues were published in Faith and 
Violence (1968).^
An interview mth Thomas Merton that was conducted 
and published in 1967 supplements the understanding of 
his social concern that can be discovered in his essays. 
Merton talked about the ideas of Marshall McLulian and 
Harvey Cox, ("I haven't read The Secular City, and 
may conceivably not do so until ten years from now, 
when no one else is reading it. In a word, I don't 
get too excited about climbing on every bandwagon...")^ 
and a number of other topics of interest in that year.
He also addressed himself to the problems of war and 
nationalism;
"We are living in a world that is radically different from that of the late Middle Ages and Renaissance. But if we fail to see the fact we will, in
American Benedictine Review 17 (June, 1966), pp. 238-262; "Symbolism; Communication or Communion?", The Mountain Path 3 (India) (October, 1966), pp. 339-348.
^Some of these essays a.ppeared post-humously in Thomas Merton on Peace. This book and another book of collected essays which appeared after Merton's death (Contemplation in a World of Action), will be treated later in this chapter. ' .
^"An Interview vdth Thomas Merton," Thomas P. McDonnell, Motive 28 (October, 1976), p. 34*
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all good faith, continue to believe that we have; imperative reasons for killing each other off and escalating wars until we obtain complete surrender of every eneny on our own unconditional terms. We will do this just so long as we continue to believe that the nation-state is the center of everything and can take its own interests as absolute..."1
When asked about Vietnwn,Merton replied:
"It seems to me that the most tragic thing about it is the escalating moral insensibility; the incapacity of so many people to understand that the useless killing of Vietnamese non- combatants, women and children, is not only real but even criminal."^
Merton did not claim to be a political or sociological 
expert. His interest in the racial struggles and the 
political problems of America were those of a "bystander," 
one whose detached vantage point offered him a perspective 
that was lost to those involved in the midst of the 
struggles themselves. His own vocation as a monk was to 
gain a holistic perspective. By a withdrawal from
hbld.. p. 38.
2Loc cit. For Merton’s views on Vietnam see also "The Church in World Crisis," Katallagete (Summer, 1967), pp. 30-36, Faith and Violence, pp. 46, 91ff, 109, 121f, 166, and Thomas Merton on Peace, pp. 65, 252, 264ff•
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concentration on any one particular problem, the monk 
could be in a unique position to "give more thought to 
the interests of all...to stand back from parochial 
and partisan concerns,...to get a better view of the 
whole problen and mystery of man. His statements 
in the 1967 interview reflect this broad understanding 
of his own role as a prophet. He attempted to speak 
to the underlying moral questions involved in the con­
crete events of his day. The particular facts about 
military, economic and political realities were secondary 
to him, if even that. He was unable, in the monastery,
to have the wealth of information that others had. To
2him, however, this was an advantage. He had a pro­
found distrust for mass communications and the informa­
tion that was shared by the media. The events reported 
were often "pseudo-events" and the facts reported 
tended to obscure issues rather than clarify them.
Merton hoped that contemplation would be able to help 
free one from the cacaphony of confusing and contra­
dictory "facts" so that a picture of the whole would
^"Events and Pseudo Events," in Faith and Violence, p. 14-6. Originally in Katallagete (Summer, 1966).
2Others saw this as a disadvantage. See below
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emerge. Zen, he discovered, was helpful in this pursuit, 
In the interview he said that he didn’t think that Zen 
and Christianity were antithetical, but that Zen "is 
already radically present in Christianity itself."
"Zen Masters are pointii^ where you need to look. They are pointing not at some secret answer: they are pointing at you.And you realize that the you they are pointing at is not there as a visible object to yourself* That’s the beginning. A curious dialogue is then possible, but not a dialogue about ideas. I have no Zen ideas. There are none to be had."*
Mystics and Zen Masters contained numerous articles 
and essays on the relationship between Zen, Christianity, 
and the needs of man in the modern world. The book is 
a collection of various essays, and therefore does not 
present a systematic approach to this interrelationship. 
Neither does a second book of articles on Zen, Zen and 
the Birds of Appetite, which was published in 1968.^ 
However, a careful reading of the essays in both books 
will reveal some basic tenets of Merton’s thought.
Merton was trying to defend a mystical religious view­
point in a world that was, at that time, highly critical 
of and skeptical of anything mystical. This was a
"An Interview with Thomas Merton," pp. 38f.
^Various essays from both of these books have been published in Great Britain as Thomas Merton on Zen (London: Sheldon Press, 1976).
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modem battle in a very old war. The Ritschlian spirit
had dominated much of Western Christian thought.
Catholic as well as Protestant. The tradition of
Christian mysticism was seen as a deviation rather than
an integral and essential part of Christian experience.
Such anti-nystical feelings were principally to be
blamed, thought Merton, on Descartes.^ The radical
split between subject and object in the Cartesian ,
understanding of reality was the beginning of the modern
world view, a view that saw reality in its parts rather
than as a whole. This view point drove man to think
of the other as "object" and eventually the person is
seen as "object" and finally God is seen as "object"
as well. Zen, according to Merton, could help to free
man from this Cartesian consciousness, a consciousness
that led to alienation. Zen could help call Christianity
back to an awareness of that which it already possessed
in its rich mystical and theological tradition; a
metaphysical or ontological intuition of Being. Zen
was particularly well-suited for this task, for it was
not alien to the West or to Christianity, and furthermore,
2it "does not preach sermons."
^See below pp. 270f.
2"An Interview with Thomas Merton," p. 39*
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"It is nondoctrinal, concrete, direct, existential, and seeks above all to come to grips with life itself, not with ideas about life, still less with party plat­forms in politics, religion, science or anything else."l
Merton did not hesitate to include Christian and Eastern 
interests in a single volume. As far as he was concerned, 
they were all part of a greater whole, one complementing 
and aiding the other. Therefore, in Mystics and Zen 
Masters, there are articles on a wide variety of related 
topics; the English mystics of the fourteenth century, 
the nystical tradition of Russian Orthodoxy, the Jesuits 
in China, Protestant î4D.nasticlsm, the Shaker movement in 
America, and a number of articles on Zen, Chinese thought, 
and Buddhist imnasticism. There is also an essay called 
"The Other Side of Despair: Notes on Christian Existential­
ism," in which Merton wrote of the points of affinity
between existentialism, Zen, and apophatio Christian 
2mysticism. The Cartesian cleavage between subject and
"The New Consciousness," Zen and the Birds of Appetite. (New York; New Directions, 1968), p. 32.This essay was originally entitled, "The Self of Modern Man and the New Christian Consciousness," and appeared in R.M. Bucke Memorial Society’s Newsletter-Review 2 (Montreal: April, 1967).2"The Other Side of Despair: Notes on ChristianExistentialism," in Mystics and Zen Masters (New York: Dell, 1967), pp. 258, 301. Originally published in The Critic 24 (October-November, 1965). For a further understanding of Merton's existentialism see his Albert Camus' ’The Plague’ : Introduction and Commentary.Religious Dimensions in Literature Series (New York: Seabury, 1968).
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object could be overcome, thought Merton, by a theology 
that was, at once, existential and inearnational, and 
also enhanced by Zen* Such a theology would lead to a 
"definite social concern" and "authentic respect and 
love for the human person,"^ thus providing an alternative 
to the chaotic world of the technological society, "a 
nihilist city of pandemonium, built on hybris and
pdestined for cataclysm." Merton was not against 
technology as such, but against the mental attitude 
that sacrifices ends to means and sees efficiency as 
more important than morality.
"We must first of all distinguish between the true scientific humanism of science itself and the anti-hxamanism of science in the service of totalism, plutocracy and realpolitik....The Church therefore must not only enter into conversation with modern science, and learn to cooperate with the scientist and technician in building a better world, but she must also enable the scientist and technician to retain a certain spiritual freedom and independence from the power structures which offer them such tempting rewards."^
^Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 273*
2"Gan We Survive Nihilism?" Saturday Review 50 
(April 15, 1967), p. 19.
^"The Church in World Crisis," Katallagete (Summer, 196?), p. 36.
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Contemplation, either as found within the Christian 
tradition or as learned from the 2ten Masters, was, 
for Merton, the means to achieve the new consciousness 
required to move from a limited understanding of the 
modern situation to a deeper and more profound realiza­
tion of the spiritual malaise that contributed to the 
many problems of the 1960s. Man could not begin to 
search for, and accept, grace, until he recognized the 
need for it. Merton’s social criticism was his attempt 
to awaken his fellow man to his own disease and aliena­
tion. The racial situation, the threat of nuclear war, 
and the perils of directionless technological advances 
provided him with the occasions for his message. Merton, 
by this time, was no longer calling all men to a life 
of contemplation, but was asking men to hear what the 
contemplative had to say from his own peculiar and 
unique point. The contemplative could point to the 
roots of the malaise, and the Christian contemplative 
could point as well to the solutions
"No humanism has retained the respect for man in his personal and existential actuality to the same extent as Christian humanism. The center of Christian humanism is the idea that God is love, not infinite power. Being love, God has given himself without reservation to man so that he has become man. Henceforth by reason of the incarnation, the love which is also the infinite creative 
secret of God in his hidden mystery becomes manifest and active tbroxi^ h man, in man’s world....It is man, in
13S
Christ, who has the mission of not only making himself human but of becoming divine by the gift of the Spirit of love. This is not an abstract or contemplative operation only. Love is measured by its activity a M  its transforioing power.
Therefore, Merton’s interest in Zen and other 
aspects of Eastern thought and practise, his interest 
and commitment to the Christian heritage, and his social 
criticism were all part of the same reality. They were 
not separate interests in a complex mind, but were 
different aspects of one central concern: love as
a concrete and existential reality.
Faith and Violence is a collection of essays on
race, war, non-violence, and the "Death of God" theology*
Rather than echo what a number of religious leaders
were saying about the Vietnamese war, either for or
against, Merton hoped to challenge the idea that "might
makes right," or "the i^th that all biological species
in their struggle for survival must follow a law of 
2aggression..." Taking this stance allied Merton with 
those who were against the war, such as the Berrigan
^"Christian Humanism," Spiritual Life 13 (Winter, 
1967), pp. 229f.
2"Vietnam - an Overwhelming Atrocity," in Faith and Violence, p. 93. Originally published in The Catholic Worker 3A (March. 1968);, On the nature of aggression see also, "Is Man a Gorilla with a Gun?", Faith and Violence, pp. 96-105»
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brothers, and separated him from Christians who saw 
the war as "a sad and heavy obligation imposed by 
the mandate of love" (a Catholic Bishop) or a "spiritual 
war between good and evil" (Billy Graham), or "ny 
country right or wrongI" (Cardinal Spellman)Never­
theless, in so far as he did not advocate the burning 
of draft cards and the use of violent methods by war 
protesters, he separated himself from the left as well 
as the right. Philosophically he was one with the 
protesters, but he feared that the means that they were 
using were still a part of that kind of mentality that 
led to violence and war. If he was at odds with the
radicals, it was because he did not see them as being 2radical enough. The essays in this book, most of 
which were written during the years Merton was living 
in total solitude in the hermitage, are an excellent 
indication that his increased solitude was in no way 
an escape from involvement with the world. Furthermore, 
they indicate the far-reaching breadth of his criticism;
^Qpoted by Merton, Ibid.. p. 91, and in "Peace and Protest," Faith and Violence, p. 40*
2See, for instance "Peace and Protest.” Faith and Violence, pp. 40-46. "Peace and Protests A Statement," in Thomas Merton on Peace, pp. 67-69, and "Note for Ave Maria." in Thomas Merton on Peace, pp. 231-233.
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no human institution, not even the peace movement to 
which Merton contributed much, could stand beyond the 
possibility of the criticism developed from the con­
templative stance.^
The year of 1967 saw a reissue of Merton’s Selected 
Poems, and in 1968 Merton published the first book of 
new poetry since Emblems of a Season of Fury. This 
was Cables to the Ace, subtitled "Familiar Liturgies
of Misunderstanding." Although the value of this book
2as poetry is debatable, it has numerous references, 
often subtle and disguised, to social and political 
issues. However, unlike his earlier poetry, in which 
the social ramifications were pronounced and often more 
clearly articulated than in his prose. Gables to the Ace 
has a message that is difficult to hear. Its prophetic 
impact on America of the late sixties would not equal
^Many of the essays in Faith and Violence have already been mentioned in this survey of Merton’s thought, (see above pp. 117, 128. 131, 132).Although this book is one of the oest collections of Merton’s thought, it would be superflous to give it an extended treatment at this point.
2See, for instance, James York Gliam, "Exile Ends in Satires Thp^s Merton’s Cables to the Ace." Cithara 11 (November, 1971), pp. 31-40, and Dennis Q. Mclnerny, Thomas Mertons The Man and His Work (Spencer, Mass.; Cistercian Publications, 1974.).
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the impact of his numerous essays. Although there are
references to an impersonal technical society, and often
surprising and subtle mention of particular manifestations
of that society,^ the message would be clear only to
those whose ears were tuned to this unconventional style
of poetry. The same is true for % e  Geography of
Lograire. a long poem published the year after Merton’s
death. This poem suffers in that it has been published
without benefit of the author’s final revisions and
editing. What changes, if any, Merton would have made
is a useless matter of conjecture. Its principle
contribution to an understanding of his social concern
is his mention of the problems of the American Indian
and references to his fascination with the "Cargo cults"2of Melanesia. As it stands, however, whatever social
^or example, Merton mimics a popular American tobacco advertisement of the day; (Gables to the Ace.New York; New Directions, 1968), p. 40*"I will get up and go to Marble country Where deadly smokes grow out of moderate heatAnd all the cowboys look for fortunate slogans Among horses’ asses."
^The Geography of Lograire (New York; New Directions, 1969), pp. 131ff, 91ff, On the Indian situation see also "Ishi; A Meditation." Catholic Worker 33 (March, 1967), pp. 5-6, republished in Thomas Merton on Peace, pp. 248- 253; and "The Shoshoneans," Catholic Worker 33 (June, 1967), pp. 5-6. Moreover, see "The Sacred City," Catholic Worker 34 (January, 1968), pp. 4-6. Merton has a yet unpublished
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value the poem may have is difficult to grasp at first 
reading* The chaotic style of the poem obscures rather 
than communicates, and therefore, for the purpose of 
analysis of the relationship between mystical prayer 
and social ethics in the over-all thought of Thomas 
Merton, The Geography Lograire. along with Cables 
to the Ace, will have a minimal importance.^
essay on "Cargo Theology," see Rice The Man in the Sycamore Tree, pp. 148-150, and the notes of Therese Lentfoehr in The Geography of Lograire. pp. 147-149.
^This thesis does not pretend to be a study of poetic technique or poetic merit, and therefore there may be some poetic value in these books which will neither be discussed or debated in these pages. Nevertheless, this writer is in agreement with Mclnerny who wrote that, if Merton’s intention was to "pass judgment upon the fragmented and disjointed nature of our age" (as held by Thomas Landes in "Monastic Life and the Secular City" in the Sewanee Review 77, Summer, 1969), p. 534) by reflecting this condition in a deliberate fragmentation of language, the decision was a poor one. Mclnenery continues, "One does not intimidate or dispel linguistic chaos by yet more linguistic chaos...To write about confusion confusedly only compounds the confusion, and that was what Merton was doing by his anti-poetry." (Mclnerny, Op.Git, pp. 43f. One example of the minimal impact of these two books of poetry is that neither of them are quoted in a revised edition of A Thomas Merton Reader (Garden City, N.y.: Doubleday Image, 1974). For an appreciation of these books see George Kilcourse: Incarnation as the Integrating Principle in Thomas Merton’s Poetry and Spirituality (Ann Arbor. ^&ch. ; University Microfilms, 19747, pp. 366ff.
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A number of Thomas Merton’s writings have been 
published since his death in December, 1968* Some 
of these appeared immediately after his death and 
had probably already been submitted for publication 
by Merton himself.^ Others, however, cannot be 
accurately dated* They were published by the authority 
of the Merton Legacy Trust from the vast collection 
of Merton’s unpublished collected essays, and some 
of them are difficult, if not impossible, to date*
This does not limit their worth, except in so far as 
they are used to try to indicate development in Merton’s 
thought. The general trend of Merton’s development in 
this chronological picture of his concern for the 
relationship of contemplation and action would not be 
complete however without some reference to those post­
humously published works.
Readers in I969 were able to discover in the works 
of Merton published that year further articulation of 
his understanding of the role of the contemplative in 
the modern world. In a note published in the magazine 
of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
These include "As Man to Man," Cistercian Studies 4, No. 1 (1969), PP# 90-94. "Creative Silence." The Baptist Student 48 (February, 1969), pp. 18-22; "Terror and the Absurds Violence and Non-Violence in Albert Camus," Motive 29 (February, 1969), pp. 5-15.
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he reiterated, the nature of this roles
"The task of the solitary and hermit is to realise in himself in a very special way a universal conscience, and to inject it, insofar as he can, into the communal consciousness."
The contemplative, especially the kind of con­
templative that Merton himself tried to be, had the 
role of using his solitude to think holistically.
This same theme was repeated in Contemplative Prayer, 
also published in 1969. This book was originally 
intended for a monastic audience, whereas the Center 
for the Study of Democratic Institutions is certainly 
secular. Nevertheless, Merton is consistent. What 
he said to the monk was the same thing he said to the 
intellectual community:
"This is an age that, by its very nature as a time of crisis, of revolution, of struggle, calls for the special searching and questioning which are the work of the monk in his meditation and prayer. For the monk searches not only his own heart; he plunges deep into the heart of that world of which he remains a part although he seems to have ’left* it. in reality the monk abandons the world only in order
l"The Monk as Marginal Man," The Center Magazine 2 (January, 1969), p. 33.
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to listen more intently to the deepest and most neglected voices  ^that proceed from its inner depth*"
This book, since it is written for the monastic
community, contains a more historical and theological
description of the relationship between contemplation
and action than is found in the works that Merton
published primarily for the non-monastic reader* He
gives an account of the history of this tension within
the Christian tradition, especially concentrating on
the Benedictine heritage, an account that is similar
to the kind of thing he was doing in the earlier part
2of his career as a monastic writer* Now, however, 
he is more straight-forwardly stating that there is 
no cleavage between the two* Recognizing the communal 
nature of the Church as a body made up of members whose 
vocations, talents and skills differ widely but all 
contribute to the whole, Merton is able to say that 
"there is no contradiction between action and contempla­
tion when Christian apostolic activity is raised to
3the level of pure charity*" In other words, Merton
Contemplative Prayer (London; Barton, Longman and Todd, 1973), p. 25* Originally published as Ihe Climate of Monastic Prayer (Spencer, Mass*;Cistercian Publications, 1969)*
oIbid.. pp* $8-81. See above pp. 73f,
I^bid.. p. 143.
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assures his monastic brothers and sisters that not
everyone in the Church has to be a contemplative nor
does everyone have to take part in the
apostolic activities of the Church, as long as both
the activist and the contemplative recognize each other
as a part of the same body, sharing and giving life to
each other* IVhen this occurs, and the Church can live
as an organic unity, then contemplation and action are
resolved* "On that level," Merton continued, "action
and contemplation are fused into one entity by the
love of God and of our brother in Christ." Still,
however, Merton emphasizes the primacy of contemplation.
Without the spirit of contemplation in the Church,
he warns, "Christian action can never really reach this
high level. But in no way can the monk ignore the
world, and the actions of the Church in the world,
while living his contemplative vocation. "Prayer does
not blind us to the world," he wrote, "but it transforms
our vision of the world, and makes us see it, all men,
2and all the history of mankind, in the light of God."
Contemplative Prayer. although it is the last of 
Merton’s works on prayer that has been published to 
date, is not necessarily the last word Merton had to
^Loc* Cit.
%bid*. p. 139.
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say on the subject. There is still unpublished 
material, some of which is of considerable length,^ 
which would help us to get a more complete picture of 
Merton’s more mature understandings. It would be an 
error to try to fit this book into a developmental 
survey of his writings. Nevertheless, it is a valuable 
work, and although we cannot give it its precise 
chronological position in the history of Merton’s 
thought, it cannot be ignored.
The year 1969 saw the publication of The Geography 
of Lograire and also Argument With the Gestapo, a 
novel. This was one of the novels Merton had written 
before entering Gethsemani. It had originally been
In the files of the Merton Collection at Bellarmine College is a typescript of over 150 pages entitled The Inner Experience ; Notes on Contemplation. In a conver­sation with this writer. Brother Patrick Hart said that this was very possibly to have been Merton’s magnum OPUS. Merton left for the Orient without having written more than the first draft, however, and specified in his will that the book was definitely not to be published under axiy circumstances. Merton’s wishes, unfortunately, must be honoured. However, scholars are allowed access to this book and, with certain stipulations made by the Merton Legacy Trust, may quote from it in part. Wherever quotations appear from The Inner Experience in this thesis, they appear with the kind permission of the Merton Legacy Trust. The date of this book is a matter of debate. Patrick Hart thinks that Merton began it in the early sixties. (Raymond Bailey relies very heavily on The Inner E^erienoe in his book Thomas Merton on Mysticism.)
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entitled Journal of My Escape From the Nazis. The 
publication of tliis novel, which contains autobiographical 
material from Merton’s years in England and on the 
continent, showed not only a glimpse of the early 
literary talents of Merton, but also some early 
manifestations of some themes which would dominate his 
later thought. The following passage indicates, among 
other things, the kind of thinking which would later 
attract him to Zen;
"But when you ask me to tell my real name by means of passports, and live my life in terms of total allegiance to human systems, I can only answer you in a set of equivocal jokes, by which I am all but helpless to tell you that I don’t understand what you are talking about.
IgE Argument with the Gestapo (Garden City, N.Y.; Doubleday, 19o9), p. 157. Compare this passage with the following quotation from "Day of a Stranger,"Hudson Review 20 (Summer, 1967), p. 213 (later included in the revised edition of ^ Thomas Merton Reader. 1974).
Why live in the woods?- Well, you have to live somewhere.- Do you get lonely?- Yes, sometimes.- Are you mad at people?- No.- Are you mad at the monastery?- No.- What do you think about the future of monasticism?- Nothing. I don’t think about it.~ Is it true that your bad back is due to Yoga?- No.- Is it true that you are practising Zenin secret?- Pardon me, I don’t speak English."
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"You think you can identify a man by giving his date of birth and his address, his height, his eyes* colour, even his fingerprints. Such information will help you put the right tag on his body if you should run across his body somewhere full of bullets, but it doesn’t say anything about the man himself. Men become objects and not persons. Now you complain because there is a war, but war is the proper state for a world in wliich men are a series of numbered bodies. War is the state that now perfectly fits your philosophy of life; you deserve the war for believing the things you believe. In so far as I tend to believe those same things and act according to such lies, I am a part of the complex of responsibilities for the war too. But if you want to Identify me, ask me not where I live, or what I like to eat, or how I comb my hair, but ask me what I think I am living for, in de­tail, and ask me what I tliink is keeping me from living fully for the things I want to live for. Between these two answers you can determine the identity of any person. The better answer he has, the more of a person he is."^
The cynicism of Merton in 1941 subsided in time, 
but some basic understandings would remain and become 
clarified and refined as Merton matured. In this 
passage one can discover statements of Merton’s 
understanding of the nature of personhood and the 
nature of the world. Here one can see the early 
articulation of that which becomes more and more 
pronounced in Merton’s writings; the spiritual vacuum
^My Argument with the Gestapo, pp. I60f.
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in the understanding the world has of itself, and the 
responsibility for the evil in the world that belongs 
to all those who espouse that philosophy, either ex­
plicitly in their overt actions, or implicitly by 
acquiescence to the world’s demands*
One book and numerous articles appeared in 1970.
The book was called Opening the Bible, a long essay 
that was originally to be published as a bridge between 
the Old and the New Testament in an edition of the Bible 
being published by Time-Life.^ It is an excellent 
example of Merton's existentialism. In his earlier
writings he spoke highly of the allegorical and typological
2approach to Scripture. Moreover, this particular 
exigetical method, so popular in the early Church, is 
not evident in Opening the Bible. Merton has progressed 
from Origen and Augustine to Barth, Bultmann and Bon- 
hoeffer, all of whom he quotes extensively. And, in 
addition to the Protestant theologians, Merton refers 
to various non-Christian traditions to help him explain 
the meaning of the Bible. He compares the Judeo-Christian
The Time-life Bible never materialized. See the explanation given in The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton (New York: New Directions, 1973),p. 189.
2See, for instance. Bread in the Wilderness, pp.27-38.
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Scriptures to the Upanishads. to the writings of the
Taoists and Gonfucians in China, and to the Zen tradition.^
Furthermore, he brings in such secular works as the
films of Pasolini, the psychology of Erich Fromm, and
2novels of William Faulkner. In the opening pages of
this book he immediately warns his reader against dualism.
The Bible, he says, is not to be seen in terms of a
separation between the sacred and the secular, rather
"the message of the Bible is precisely a message of
unity and reconciliation, an . all-embracing and positive
revelation from which nothing real is excluded and
in which all receives its full due and its ultimate 
3meaning." All of man’s experience, and all articulations 
of those experiences, can be instruments of God’s 
revelation. The aim of Opening the Bible is to speak 
of the unique word that is spoken to man in the experiences 
recorded in the Bible. The Bible raises "the fundamental 
question of identity." It asks us to examine who we are 
and what we are to do;
^See especially Opening the Bible (London; Unwin,1972), pp. 50-53.
2On Pasolini see Ibid.. pp. 29-33; on Fromm, pp. 35-37, on Faulkner, pp. 42-49.
I^bid.. p. 4.
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"When you ask; ’What is this book?* you find that you are also implicitly being asked: ’VJho is this that readsit?’ If we ask for informationabout the meaning of life, it answers by asking us when we intend to start living.
These questions of man’s identity are answered by the 
Bible in an existential manner. Rather than pointing 
to abstract and theoretical answers, the Bible points 
to events. The central message is the unique claim 
that in the kairotic event of Jesus Christ, the inner 
truth of humanity is revealed and a new relationship 
of man with man is established in which men no longer 
live for themselves but for others.^ Central to the 
Bible, in Merton’s understanding, is the relationship 
between the experience of God and social responsibility. 
The meaning of "person" is revealed not in a theory but 
in a person. And because the central event of the Bible 
is the coming of a person, the meaning of the Bible is 
to be found "not in the message about Christ but in 
an encounter with Christ," a surrendering to the Christ 
so that we live no longer according to an "ego-fantasy
^Opening the Bible, pp. 17, 20,
^Ibid.. pp. 73f. See below pp. 439f.
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but by the Spirit of Christ speaking out of the inmost 
ground of our being in our encounter with our brother."^ 
One finds in Opening the Bible a picture of Merton 
that is consistent with the writings of his later life* 
The ecumenical dimension of his thought is evident in 
the way he accepts secular and non-Christian traditions 
and the social dimension is seen in his insistence on 
the moral imperatives of the encounter with the person 
of Christ.
Beginning in 1970 there began to appear a number
of articles that were edited versions of tape-recorded
talks that had been given by Merton during his life
time* A series of such articles appeared in a journal
2called Sisters Today. These had been talks given by
^Ibid.. p. 70.
2These particular articles, which form a unity and ai’e therefore mentioned together, are called:"This is God’s Work," "The Life that Unifies," "Prayer, Personalism, and the Spirit," "Building Community on God’s Love," "Community, Politics, and Contemplation," "Prayer, Tradition and Experience," "Contemplation in a World of Action," and "Prayer and Conscience." They appeared in Sisters Today 42, between August, 1970 and April, 1971, and were edited by Naomi Burton Stone, one of the trustees of Merton’s estate. Since that time a number of other articles have been published based on tape-recorded conferences and lectures. These in­clude "A Life Free from Care," Cistercian Studies 5 (1970),No. 3, pp. 217-226; "The Faces Tertullian and St. Cyprian on Virgins," Cistercian Studies 6 (1971), No. 4, pp. 334-342; "Guerric of Igny’s Easter Sermons," Cistercian Studies 7 (1972), No* 1, pp. 85-95; and "The Ascetic Life, Experience of God and Freedom,"
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Thomas Merton in September, 1968 to sisters at a house 
in Alaska, Their primary concern is monastic prayer, 
but interwoven with the discussion on prayer are various 
references to social ethics. Here, as in Contemplative 
Prayer, Merton is addressing his message to a specifically 
contemplative and cloistered audience, introducing that 
audience to the more anthropological aspects of prayer. 
Merton’s starting point was not so much God, but rather, 
he began with the person who prays:
’’Prayer and identity go together. Who is it that prays? What is our concept of ourselves or our non­concept of ourselves praying? Who do we feel ourselves to be when we pray?"l
This existential approach to prayer was evident in 
Merton’s early writings, beginning with The Sign of 
Jonas and reaching its most concise expression in The 
New Man. It characterizes the talks Merton gave to 
the sisters in 1968, and is also characteristic of most 
of the talks that have been published since his death. 
In brief, it is an acknowledgement of the via negative.
Cistercian Studies 9 (1974), No. 1, pp. 55-65. More such essays can be expected in the future. In addition, twelve hours of conference have been published on Cassette tapes by Electronic Paperbacks of Chappaqua, New York.
^"Prayer and Conscience,’’ Sisters Today 42 (April, 1971), p. 409.
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the belief that man has no direct knowledge of God 
as He exists in Himself, that he can only know God 
indirectly and that therefore, the way to God is not through 
speculation or abstraction, but through a recognition of 
Him as the ground of one’s being. For Merton, prayer 
is the means for the person to discover not only God but 
also the true self# "It is in prayer," he told the 
sisters, "that we are truly and fully ourselves"^ and 
in being fully ourselves we are free to know and love 
our brother and to know and love God. Without knowing 
our true selves, it is impossible either to love our 
brothers or to know God. Contemplation serves these ends.
This existential approach to the monastic vocation 
is reiterated in the collection of essays on monastic 
life which were published in Contemplation in a World 
of Action in 1971. On the one hand, the Christian is 
not to be concerned with abstractions but with the 
concrete situations:
"The great problem of our time is not to formulate clear answers to neat theoretical questions but to tackle the self-destructive alienation of man in a society dedicated in theory
^"Community, Politics, and Contemplation," Sisters Today 4-2 (January, 1971), p. 245.
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to human values and in practice to the pursuit of power for its own sake#"^
On the other hand, Merton said in a taped conference,
the religious and theological dimension cannot be
overlooked. "We are learning more and more that the
denial of God is really the denial of man* Yet, on
the other hand, the affirmation of God is the true
affirmation of man," Nevertheless, the concrete
situation always predominates. Merton continued,
"Monks ought to be able to reassure the modern world
that in the struggle between thought and existence we
are on the side of existence, not on the side of 
2abstraction." Toward the end of his life, therefore, 
Merton was teaching that the Transcendent was to be 
discovered as the Imminent, and the discovery of the 
transcendent God incarnated in the world led to a 
particular ethical stance. The way in which one acts, 
depends on how one apprehends the ground of all reality.
"Is the World a Problem?" in Contemplation in a World of Action (London; George Allen and Unwin, 1971), p. 153. Originally this essay was in Commonweal 84 (June 3, 1966).
^"Ib the Contemplative Life Finished?" in Contem­plation in a World of Action, pp. 331f, originally a taped conference published in Monastic Studies 7 (1969)•
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and that the primary purpose for the contemplative 
life is to discover the Absolute and the Eternal at 
the ground of one’s being* Again, without knowing 
our true selves, love is truncated;
"He who attempts to act and do things for others or for the world without deepening his own self-understanding, freedom, integrity and capacity to love, will not have anything to give others. He will communicate to them nothing but the contagion of his own obsessions, his aggressiveness, his ego-centered ambitions, his delusions about ends and means, his doctrinaire prejudices and ideas.
There are only a few references to specific social,
economic, or political situations in Contemplation in
a World of Action, yet the book contains the core of
Merton’s most mature understanding of the relationship
between contemplative prayer and social action. Never
does he seek a pragmatic excuse for the practise of
contemplation. It is never to be seen as a utilitarian
measure, it should not be defended "in terms of action 
2and efficacy." Nevertheless, without the discovery
"Contemplation in a World of Action," in Contemplation in a World of Action, p. I64.
Zibid.. p. 158.
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of the true reality of the ground of our being, all 
action becomes activism, a shallow, and ultimately 
ineffective, exercise. Without the contemplative 
element, all attempts at love eventually fail because 
the eternal ground and source of love has not been 
allowed to become known.
Another collection of essays published in 1971 
was Thomas Merton on Peace. Many of these essays had 
already been included in Faith and Violence and other 
earlier books by Merton, and some have already been 
quoted in this chapter.^ There are, however, numerous 
essays that appear here for the first time, having 
hitherto been unpublished or privately circulated among 
friends. Here one can find further verification of 
Merton’s contribution to the discussions on war and 
peace that took place in American society in the 1960s. 
Such previously unpublished works included "Target 
Equals City," in which Merton argues against the 
applicability of traditional just war theories in an 
age in which nuclear weapons will inevitably destroy 
non-combatants; "Danish Non-violent Resistance to 
Hitler," in which he shows a concrete example of non­
violent resistance to evil, (Non-violence, for Merton,
^See above pp. 58, 60, 117, 130, 131, 139, 141,
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could never be a passive acquiescence to existing 
evil); and various incidental writings; his statement 
upon being awarded the Pax Medal in 1963, notes from 
the Retreat on "The Spiritual Roots of Violence," 
and his Prayer for Peace wliich was delivered to the 
United States Congress in 1962.^
The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton is the last 
of Merton's books to be published to date. Others, 
either previously unpublished material or collections 
of writings that have appeared in scattered places,
pwill be published in the future. The Asian Journal 
of Thomas Merton required considerable editing. The 
journal notations were taken from three different hand­
written notebooks (a photograph of a representative 
page demonstrates both Merton's handwriting and the 
difficult job the editors had in deciphering it!); a 
public notebook, a private journal (#ich is not to be 
published but was used for points of clarification).
Thomas Merton on Peace is valuable as well for the long and detailed introduction by Gordon C. Zahn; "Original Child Monk; An Appreciation," pp. ix-xli.
^These forthcoming publications include Merton's Collected Poems, which has been accepted for publication by New Direction; Collected Essays on the American Indian and A Vow of Conversation, his monastic journal from I964 to 196b, both of which have not yet been sent to a publisher. The official biography of Merton, by John Howard Griffen (to be published by Houghton-Mifflin) is expected shortly; see above pp. 21, 24. Certain reissues of early works have,
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and a small spiral notebook that Merton obviously* kept 
in his coat pocket and used for quick notations. In 
addition to these journal entries, this volume also 
contains various letters, transcriptions of lectures 
and conferences, including his final lecture, "Mrxism 
and Monastic Perspectives," and other incidental 
writings. The editors' supplementary material is also 
of great value. There are copious notes, a glossary 
of Eastern words and concepts, and various writings 
about Merton, particularly about the circumstances of 
his death, and numerous photographs. The journal 
material itself, although not directly related to 
Merton's understanding of prayer and ethics, is quite 
helpful in explaining his personal involvement with 
the religious traditions of the East, his quest for 
solitude, and his understanding of the role of Christian 
monasticism in the modern world. Here one is able to 
see Thomas Merton in the last months of his life; his 
hopes, concerns and interests. It is a very personal 
journal, and therefore, very helpful in so far as it 
provides a portrait of this complex man. Merton, in 
the months before his death, continued to show his great
however, been published, especially in Great Britain, since The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton.
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openness to the world in the midst of his liberation 
from it. On the day of his death he lectured his 
fellow monks on the social consequences of the monastic 
life;
"The monk belongs to the world, but the world belongs to him insofar as he has dedicated himself totally to liberation from it in order to liberate it. You can't just immerse yourself in the world and get carried away with it.That is no salvation. If you want to pull a drowning man out of the water, you have to have some support yourself. Supposing somebody is drowning and you are standing on a rock, you can do it; or supposing you can support yourself by swimming, you can do it. There is nothing gained by simply jumping in the water and drowning with him."^
The support Merton sought was solitude and silence. 
The monastic life provided him with this support. In 
solitude and silence he found himself open to God in 
the depths of his being, and open as well to God in 
the depths of all beings. In November, 1968, high above 
Darjeeling, Merton wrote;
"The sun is high at the zenith. Clear soft sound of a temple bell far down in the valley. Voices of children near
"Marxism and Monastic Perspectives," in The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton (New York: New Directions,1973), p. 341. cf The Wisdom of the Desert, pp. 23f, and see above pp. 94f.
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the cottages above me on the mountainside. The sun is warm. Everything falls into place. Nothing is to be decided...There is nothing to be judged."^
"The monk," he said on the day of his death, "knows
the score.♦.he has come to experience the ground of
his own being in such a way that he knows the secret of
liberation and can somehow or other communicate this 
2to others." Merton communicated this liberation in 
numerous ways, not least important of which was his 
social criticism, and certainly not least of all was 
his vision that, at the deepest level of existence, 
"everything falls into place."
2. Assessment
Various stresses and emphasis in Thomas Merton’s 
approach to the contemplative vocation can be discerned 
in a survey of the history of his publications. Shifts 
can be seen in numerous areas, among which are the manner 
in which he addresses the question of the relationship
^The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton, p. 151.
^"Marxism and Monastic Perspectives," in The AsianJournal of Thomas Merton, p. 333.
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between contemplation and action; his quest for 
certitude; his approach to other religions; his concern 
for the inner workings of spirituality and his subsequent 
concern for social ramifications of spirituality; and 
his theological method. The changes in Merton's 
approach to these and other areas of concern raise 
certain questions about his life, and these questions 
can be reduced to one: was there one Merton or many
Mertons?
A brief examination of certain shifts in his thought 
indicate the enormity of the question. For, as many 
have noted, there is a remarkable difference between 
the kind, of things Merton was wi’iting in the 194-Os 
and the things he was writing in the decade before his 
death.
The first important difference is in the way in 
which Merton changed in his approach to the relationship 
between contemplation and action. As has been mentioned, 
to be concerned about this relationship is not necessarily 
to be concerned about the relationship between contemplative 
prayer and social ethics. The word "action" can be used 
to denote something that falls far short of involvement 
with the struggles of society. As has been shown, in 
his earlier writings, Thomas Merton often writes of 
contemplation and action in a limited sense. Action is 
seen as related to contemplation in a negative way.
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It is the necessary concomitant to contemplation. The 
contemplative monk needs to have an environment in 
which he can practice contemplation, and such an 
environment requires a certain activity in order to 
produce and maintain it. Action is secondary to con­
templation; it serves contemplation. This emphasis can 
be found in some, although not all, of Merton's earlier 
discussions of contemplation and action.^ At the same 
time, even inchoately in some of his earliest writings 
on monastic spirituality, Merton demonstrated a more 
far-reaching understanding of contemplation and action. 
Action is seen as the result of contemplation. It is 
the end result of the contemplative experience.^ In 
his later writings this is Merton's exclusive emphasis#
He does continue to write about the needs of the 
monastic community, but he no longer limits any discussion 
of contemplation and action to life as it is lived simply 
within that community.
Another shift in Merton's thinking can be seen 
in his quest for certitude. For instance, in the 1940s 
Merton was quite sure of the efficacy of his newly chosen
See in particular, The Ascent to Truth, and the series of articles called "Action and Contemplation in St. Bernard." See above pp. 73f.
2see above pp. 74fj of for some examples of this understanding in Seeds of Contemplation (1949)•
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way of life. The monastery was the true centre of
the world, and the monk had a true understanding of life;
"If you receive a letter or see a document signed by someone who puts the letters 0,G,R. or O.G.S.R, after his name, you can tell yourself that he is someone who has found the meaning of life,"l
In his later writings Merton had developed in 
such a way as to be less sure of himself. In 1967 he 
wrote;
"I do not know if I have found answers. When I first became a monk, yes, I was more sure of 'answers.* But as I grow older in the monastic life and advance further into solitude, I become aware that I have only begun to seek the questions. And what are the questions? Can man make sense out of his existence? Gan man honestly give his life meaning merely by adopting a certain set of explanations which pretend to tell him why the world began and where it will end, why there is evil and what is necessary for a good life?...I have been summoned to explore a desert area of man's heart in which explanations no longer suffice, and in which one learns that only experience counts.
The Waters of Siloe (1949), (New York; Doubleday Image), 1963 edition, p. 21. Elena Malits sees this as an example of Merton's early arrogance. See Journey into the Unknown; Thomas Merton's Continuing Conversion (Ann Arbor, Mich.; University Microfilms, 1974j, PP* 281, 283.
p. 92.^
"As Man to Man, " Cistercian Studies 4 (1969),
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In his later life, Merton was able to entertain doubt.
In order to overcome "conventional and superstitious 
surrogates that have taken the place of faith" he found 
it necessary to see that "faith sometimes mysteriously 
takes on the aspect of d o u b t , T h e  certainty of 
Merton's earliest writings was replaced by a faith 
that was less sure of itself, one in which certainty 
was no longer seen as a positive indication of loiow- 
ledge of God, but as a delusion; "If in resisting 
doubt," he wrote in his journal, "we convince ourselves 
that we truly 'know God' we have lost touch with reality. 
For the solitary, the only certitude was one which was 
found in darkness and unknowing; "the presence of 
God in the midst of uncertainty and nothingness, as
the only reality but as a reality wliich cannot be
3'placed' or identified." Only by accepting doub 
the way of unknowing can one "know the score."
^"Apologies to an Unbeliever," in Faith and Violence, p. 213. Originally in Harpers Magazine. November, 1966.
^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander. p. 293.
3Disputed Questions, p. 202. On Doubt, see also Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 45, Contemplative Prayer, p. 9<o, and New Seeds of Contemplation, pp. 105, 
134.
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Thomas Merton's approach to other religions
changed in his twenty-seven years as a monk. Monica
Furlong felt that in his early days as a monk, Merton
"wore an aggressive Catholicism like a glaring birthmark."
For the early Merton, she wrote, "All that is Catholic1is good. All else is evil..." In later life, however, 
Merton changed. His vision expanded to one which included 
not only the rest of Christianity, but the non-Christian 
religions and even secular humanism as well. This shift 
can be seen in the ways in which Merton introduced Seeds 
of Contemplation in 1949 and New Seeds of Contemplation 
twelve years later. In the first book Merton wrote;
"Many of the things said in this book could be said much better by somebody else, and have been said better already by the saints. The author has tried to say them in the language of the men of our time and he insists that it is his most earnest wish to be understood in all his statements, in the light of Catholic doctrine. If there is anything in these pages that cannot be reconciled with the teaching of the Church, it is to be considered as automatically deleted."
A considerable shift is evident in the Preface to New 
Seeds of Contemplation. He does not deny his Catholicism, 
but tempers his adherence to the teachings of the Church
Travelling In (London; Hodder and Stoughton, 
1971), pp. 94f.
2Seeds of Contemplation (revised edition), pp, <yf.
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and expands the intended audience for the book:
"It is not addressed primarily to Catholics, though it should be clear that the author has tried, in every case, to explain difficult matters in language that accords with Catholic theology."1
A certain doctrinaire rigidity is lacking in the latter 
statement. In I96I, Merton continued to use Catholic 
theological language, but inasmuch as he i-jas open to 
new positions and a new audience, he did not feel that 
he had to adhere to any strict Catholic dogmatic 
position. He continued;
"There are very many religious people who have no need for a book like this, because theirs is a different kind of spirituality. If to them this book is without meaning, they should not feel concerned. On the other hand, there are perhaps people without formal religious affiliations who will find in these pages something that appeals to them.
The strict Catholicism was abated. This ecumenical 
openness characterized much of the work of Thomas Merton
^New Seeds of Contemplation. p. xi.
2Loc. Cit. It should be noted that Merton \ja.s sharing in the same spirit that motivated Pope John XXIII and Vatican II but that the seeds of Merton's openness proceed both Pope John's elevation and the advent of the Vatican Council.
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in the 1960s and reached its epitome in his trip to 
the East in 1968. His eoum&nioity and openness can 
be found on every page of The Asian Journal of Thomas 
Merton. The Thomas Merton who wrote so openly about 
Tibetian Buddhism wrote with considerably different 
style than the Merton who wrote The Seven Storey Mountain.
Henri Nouwen calls attention to the difference 
between the tone of two of Merton's published journals. 
According to Houwen,^ The Sign of Jonas is an intro­
spective monologue, whereas Conjectures of a Guilty 
Bystander is concerned instead with what is in the world. 
The chapter titles of The Sign of Jonas are personal: 
"Solemn Profession," Death of an Abbot," "To the Altar 
of God." Those of Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander 
are, among others: "Barth's Dream," and "Truth and
Violence; An Interesting Era." Both books are journals; 
both are autobiographical. But even within the context of 
autobiographical writings, Merton has moved from a 
concern with himself to a concern for the world in 
which he lives.
1Pray to Live; Thomas Merton; A Contemplative Critic (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides, 1972), translatedfrom the Dutch by David Schlauer. See page 40.
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Finally, a comparison of Merton's theological style 
is indicative of changes in his approach to religion.
Merton did not write very much explicit theology, as 
such, and most of his theological writings are essays 
hidden in various journals of greater or lesser obscurity. 
Nevertheless, he did publish two books that were par­
ticularly theological as opposed to being more meditative 
or prophetic. These two books show an enormous difference 
in approach. In The Ascent to Truth (1951), Merton is 
a scholastic. He assumes a "certain pattern of development" 
which is imposed upon mankind by nature. This a priori 
pattern has the follovdng essential elements:
"First, and most important of all; I must adapt myself to objective reality, Second, this adaptation is achieved by work of my highest spiritual faculties - intelligence and will. Third, it demands expression then my whole being, commanded by my will, produces actions which, by their moral vitality and fruitfulness, show that I am living in harmony with the true order of things."^
In The New Man (I96I) Merton shifts from a concern 
mth understanding objective reality to an existential 
stance. He moves from "the pui'e objective concept of 
"being" to an exposition of contemplation which
^The Ascent to Truth, p. 9.
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"comprehends God not as a separate object but as the 
Reality within our own reality, the Being within our 
own being.Merton transcends the subject-object 
dichotomy in his theological method. God is not to 
be discovered in objective truth but in subjective 
and existential encounter*.
In the witings of Thomas Merton, the concern 
for the place of action within a contemplative com­
munity was replaced by a concern for prophetic action 
in the world. The religious certainty that Merton 
expressed in his early writings was replaced by a 
faith that includes doubt. The rigid Catholicism of 
the 1940s is replaced by the broad ecumenism of the 
1960s. The introspection of The Sign of Jonas is 
super^yeded by an openness to the problems of the 
world* Scholasticism is replaced by existentialism.
It is no wonder that Monica Furlong asked the question, 
"l&at happened to Thomas Merton?"^ Are there two 
Mertons, an early Merton and a late one? Or \ias there 
one Merton, a thinker who grew and matured? In other 
words, does an examination of his writings
^The New Man. pp. 16, 18.
^Travelling In. p. 94# Furlong's dilemma is echoed in an article by A.M. Allchin; "Solitude and Communion in the life of Thomas Merton," Christian 2 
(VMtsun, 1974), No. 1, pp. 81-90.
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show that Merton made some radical and thorough 
changes in his thought, or did he develop certain 
ideas and allow them to mature? Or is there a third 
position, one which allows for both change and development?
Gases have been presented for both extremes. James
Thomas Baker saw a radical change in Merton's thought.
He wrote that Merton had changed "dramatically," and
although he refuses to give a precise point that marked
the change, he can still speak of an "early Merton"
and a "late Merton." Merton's emphasis, he wrote,
"had shifted decidedly from the other-worldly to the
this-worldly."^ Daniel Berrigan, too, was struck by
the decided change in Merton's writings. He wrote
that, although he had lost interest in Thomas Merton
in the late 1940a, he resumed a correspondence with
him in the early 1960s because of the kind of things
2Merton was writing for The Catholic Worker.
A number of Merton's readers have tried to pinpoint 
a moment, or at least a period, that marked the dividing 
line between the early Merton and the late Merton.
^James Thomas Baker, Thomas Merton Social Critic (Lexington, Ky.s The University Press of Kentucky, 
1971), pp. 27f.2Daniel Berrigan; "Daniel Berrigan on Thomas Merton," The Thomas Merton Life Center Newsletter. April, 1973. See above p. 57, fn. 2.
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Mark Gibbard sees it as the Lousiville shopping-centre
experience that is told in Conjectures of a Guilty
Bystander.^  James Glimm sees the Introduction to
Thoughts in Solitude as the beginning of Merton's 
2social criticism* Dennis Q* Mclnerny sees its beginning
3in No Man is an Island* Merton's friend, Daniel Walsh, 
sees The New Man as the turning p o i n t E l e n a  Malits
5sees Disputed Questions as pivAtql, and Donald Grayston, 
in a careful analysis of two editions of Seeds of 
Pontemplation and the subsequent New Seeds of Contemplation. 
concludes that the new material in the latter is definitely 
new, and not simply a shift in tone "which could be 
explained by the gradual increase in knowledge and in­
sight which could reasonably be expected to take place 
in a 'spiritual' writer over a dozen years in the
^See above, pp. $6f.
^James York Glimm, "Exile Ends in Satire; ühomas Merton's Cables to the Ace," page 32.
%.Q. Mclnerny, Thomas Merton the Man and His Work, p. 26.
^As reported in F.J. Kelly's Man Before God, p. 18.
^Elena Malits ' Journey into the Unknown; Thomas Merton's Continuing Conversion, p. 22.
....
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fifties and sixties.Perhaps the most extreme of 
all positions is taken by Robert J. Vbight, who claims 
that there is a marked difference between Merton the 
poet and Merton the priest, one stressing individuality, 
the other stressing collectivity. Voight sees Merton 
struggling continuously to reconcile these two selves, 
succeeding only in his "mature years" to achieve a
2sort of harmony, with the poet in Merton predominating.
Not all critics of Merton are willing to make any 
strict division between Merton as poet and priest, or 
early Merton and late Merton. Even those who do attempt
Donald Grayston; "The Making of a Spiritual Classic; Thomas Merton's Seeds of Contemplation and New Seeds of Contemplation." p. 351.
^Robert J. Voight; Thomas Merton: A DifferentDrummer (Liguori, Mo.; Ligvucri Publications, 1972), p. 94* Ihis writer agrees with George Kilcourse tho criticized Voight for being extremely simplistic, "Voight*s conclusion that the poet took precedence at the expense of Merton's priesthood is preposterous ....Certainly Voight's work lacks maturity and any sensitivity to Merton’s continuous effort to live the two vocations." See Kilcourse; Incarnation as the Integrating Principle in Thomas Merton's Poetry and Spirituality (Ann Arbor, Mich. ; Uni ver s 1 ty Mi or ofilms, 1974), p* 30. Another critic who sees a definite "early" and "late" Merton is Tolbert McCarroll, in "A Quiet Life; The Contemporary Spiritual Significance of Fr. Louis Merton," Cistercian Studies 8 (1973), pp. 108-209.
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to discover a turning point in his writings, are often
those who also stress that Merton developed rather than
changed. The simple fact that so many "tm'ning points"
can be discerned is fair warning against any attempt
to make Merton's writings fall into a pattern of rigid
consistency. Mclnerny, for the sake of analysis, divides
Merton's attitudes into two, a "this-worldly" and an
"other-worldly" attitude, but insists that it would be
wrong to think of this division "as something rigid
and uncompromising."^ Elena Malits' entire thesis is
that Merton's life was a continuing conversion and that
turning points are only indicative of a continuing
process, a process that included religious, moral, and
intellectual conversions. Jean Leôlercqsees not
"two men - for few personalities have been as well
2integrated as his - but two spheres of activity."
Other critics stand at the other extreme and 
stress the continuity of Merton's thought rather than 
changes. John J. Higgins, for instance, writes:
"After an extensive reading of Merton's works as well as several conversations with some of the monks who lived with
Mclnerny, p. 59*
2"The Evolving Monk," Thomas Merton; Monk, p. 95; and also in his Introduction to Contemplation in a World of Action, p. xi.
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Merton at the Abbey of Gethsemani, the present witer feels that there is really no noticeable tension, no contradiction, no radical change in Merton's thinking or writing."!
Higgins sees that in Merton there is, instead of change,
2"a gradual unfolding." Gordon Zahn in his lengthy 
Introduction to Thomas Merton on Peace, agrees with 
Higgins, when he writes of the unity of Merton's work:
"The consistency of his concerns outweighs the slight differences in emphasis or attitude one might uncover over the course of time. ...All of Merton's writings, whether specifically focused on spirituality and mysticism, on liturgy and the monastic life, or on pressing social issues and problems, are of a piece."3
Other critics have pointed to the early instances 
of some of Merton's later concerns. John-Eudes 
Bamberger, for instance, sees Merton's first explicit
John J, Higgins, Merton's Theology of Prayer (spencer, Mass.: Cistercian Publications, 1971),p. xvii. (Also published by Doubleday as Thomas Merton on Prayer.)
2 Ibid., . p. xix. Higgins reviewed Baker's Thomas Merton Social Critic and criticized it for its tendency to divide Merton into an early and late period. See The Americetn Ecclesiastical Review 166, (April, 1972), pp. 282f.
3"Original Child Monk; An Appreciation," in Thomas Merton on Peace. p. xi.
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social criticisms in The Seven Storey Mountain.^
while both Chalmers MacCormick and Edward Rice trace
Merton's interest in Zen to the 1930s when he read
2Huxley's Ends and Means. It has been one of the primary 
concerns of this paper's section on the development of 
Merton's thought to indicate precisely this continuity 
between the mature thought of Thomas Merton and the 
seeds of that thought in his early life. Edward Rice 
agrees when he writes, "...what was to come in the 
1960s was not an aberration but the entire point of 
his life as a layman and especially as a Trappist.
This "evolving development" of Merton's thought and 
writings is the thesis of Frederic Joseph Kelly's 
book Man Before God, in which he argues that "Thomas 
Merton, the social commentator, was the externalization
"The Monk," in Thomas Merton; Monk, p. 44»
2Chalmers MacCormick, "The Zen Catholicism of Thomas Merton," Journal of Ecumenical Studies 9 (Fall, 1972), p. 805; and Rice, The Man in the Sycamore Tree; The Good Time and Hard Life of Thomas Merton, p. 13# MacGormicliâtes Merton's reading of Huxley as 1937, Rice as 1935# In The Seven Storey Mountain. Merton himself gives the date as 1937 (p# 223). This is an indication of the hurriedness and lack of pre­cision in Rice's otherwise fascinating and delightful biography. As "an entertainment" (Rice's description), his book has merit, as aid to scholars, it is not very dependable.
3Rice, Op. Git., p. 108.
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of Father Louis, a man of deep religious experience." 
Kelly summarizes the focus of those who prefer to 
understand Merton as a man of continuity rather than 
one of contrasts;
"It is true to say that there was no 'earlier Merton* or 'later Merton.' The circumstances and contexts of his life changed; his writings on some topics took on a new emphasis and urgency, but in his mature years he never repudiated the fundmaental ideas of the past."!
Nevertheless, it is necessary to notice that Merton
did, in fact, repudiate certain elements of his past.
Whether or not he repudiated anything 'fundamental'
2is a matter of conjecture, but in his later life he 
made numerous references to various aspects of his 
earlier life that he no longer saw as salutory. For 
instance, he repudiated the early biographies of
^Kelly, Man Before God, pp. 259, 262.
2Daniel Berrigan felt that Merton might possibly have been reputing his decision to become a monk when he quotes Merton as saying, in a private conver­sation, "If I had to do it over again I would never become a monk, but now that I'm here they'll never get me out." See Berrigan, "Daniel Berrigan on Thomas Merton," p. 6.
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saints that were m ’itten and published in his early 
career*^ More importantly, he repudiated an image 
that he inadvertently created for himself vdth the 
publication of The Seven Storey Mountain, and in so far 
as he repudiated the image, he came close to repudiating 
the book itself. In the essay called, "Is the World 
a Problem?" he defended a monk's role as one concerned 
for the world, but to do this he first had to explain 
himself:
"Due to a book I wrote thirty years ago, I have myself become a sort of stereotype of the world-denying contemplative - the man who spui’ned New York, spat on Chicago, and tro(,:iAed on Louisville, heading for the woods with Thoreau in one pocket,
See Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander. p. 150 in which Merton refers to some "absurd" biographies which "thank God" never got published: see also AThomas Merton Reader, in which he says of his life that "At first the writing...was very bad.", p. ix.An apology for Merton is found in Lentfoehr, "The Spiritual Writer," in Thomas Merton Monk, in which she explains how Merton wrote those books under the vow of obedience and that they were published without his having the opportunity to make corrections. In an unpublished manuscript which has often been quoted Thomas Merton made an evaluation of his books up to and including Mystics and Zen Masters. Only two books rated his most deprecatory remarks. Exile Ends in Glory was the only book he rated "bad," and Irfhat Are These Wounds ranked "awful." See "Father Louis* own Evaluation of His Books," Collected Essays Vol. 1, p. 15. This is an unpublished collection, one copy of which exists at Bellarmine College Library, the other at the Abbey of Gethsemani.
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John of the Cross in another, and holding the Bible open at the Apocalypse. This personal stereotype is probably my own fault, and it is something I have tried to demolish on occasion."!
There are references, even in The Seven Storey Mountain 
itself, to an identity crisis within Merton.^ He 
knew that he was moving from one understanding of his 
life to another. "I have become very different from 
what I used to be," he wrote in his journal in 1951, 
"The man who began this journal is dead, just as the 
man who finished The Seven Storey Mountain...was dead." 
The writing of his autobiography, he wrote, was 
necessary for him to get certain things off his mind 
"for good," so he could forget them and move on.^
In 1967, in an interview, Merton was asked about his 
early and most famous work. He responded in a way 
that is consistent with what he had written in his 
journal sixteen years earlier;
"Yes, I'll accept The Seven Storey Mountain as a point of departure, and I'll be glad if we can depart
^"Is the World a Problem?" in Contemplation in a World of Action, pp. 143f. Originally in Commonweal
84l j 5 e3 ,"l95^ !  ---------
2See The Seven Storey Mountain, pp. 490ff*
^The Sign of Jonas, p. 317.
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from it and keep moving. I left the book behind many years ago. Certainly, it was a book I had to write, and it says a great deal of what I have to say; but if 1 had to write it over again, it would be handled in a very different idiom...! was still dealing in a crude theology that I had learned as a novices a cleeui-cut division between the natural and the super­natural, God and the world, sacred and secular, with boundary lines that were supposed to be quite evident...life is not as simple as it once looked in The Seven Storey Mountain. Unfortunately, the book was a best-seller, and has become a kind of edifying legend or something. That is a dreadful fate. I am doing my best to live it down."
When The Seven Storey Mountain was translated into 
Japanese in 1966, Merton provided a Preface in which 
he wrote about changes in his understanding of his 
own life;
"Certainly I have never for a moment thought of changing the definitive decisions taken in the course of my life...if anything the decision to 
renounce and depart from modern secular society, a decision repeated and reaffirmed many times, has finally become irrevocable. Yet the
^"An Interview with Thomas Merton," Thomas P.McDonnell, pp. 32f.
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attitude and the assumptions behind tiiis decision have perhaps changed in many ways*"!
This is not an out-right repudiation at all. 
Nevertheless, in so far as Merton was concerned, the 
attitudes and assumptions of his earliest writings were 
his no longer, and could only be understood as parts of 
an on-going process of growth and development# Perhaps 
it is not wise to divide Merton into an "early Merton" 
and a "later Merton," but Merton himself seems to do 
just that. Yet he makes no rigid lines of demarcation.
pHe does not attempt to classify his works into periods, 
except for his introductory remarks in A Thomas Merton 
Reader, but the division is only in order to show the 
congru!ty between what he was writing and the various 
stages of his monastic career. He is considerably less
Preface to the Japanese edition of The Seven Storey Mountain, in the Bellarmine College Library collection. Some of these changes, Merton continues, are his having learned "to look back into that world with a greater compassion, seeing those in it not as alien to oyself, not as peculiar and deluded strangers, but as identified with nyself. In breaking from ' their world* I have strangely not broken from them." 
oAlthough, as has been mentioned (p. 179 ) he did evaluate his works. The Seven Storey Mountain received his highest ranking, "Better," along with such works as The Sign of Jonas. New Seeds of Contemplation. Seeds of Destruction. The Way of Ghuang Tzu. Raids on the Unspeakable, and Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander.(His highest acolade 'best* he gave to no book.) The two biographies of saints ranked lowest. Also ranked low, though not as low as the biographies, were The Living
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concerned with these issues than are his critics.
He simply recognizes that all tluroughout his life he
had matured, changed, and developed, but such recognition
does not include a sense of depreciation of his earlier
values. The many years of monastic life, his solitude
1and his "contact with other solitudes," and his contacts
necessitated by his careers as writer and teacher,
provided new perspectives, raised new questions and
brought new understandings. There were changes;
comparisons of his earlier and later works make the
changes obvious. But the seeds of those changes were
present in the early Merton, The mature Merton of the
1960s can be found hidden and implied in the youthful
Merton of the 1930s and 1940s, In some cases it might
2be of value to divide Merton into many parts, but 
this can be done with safety only if one is ready to 
recognize an over-all consistency in the man and his 
thought. The changes that did occur were indications, 
not so much of a change in who Thomas Merton really was,
Bread and Seasons of Celebration. The Ascent to Truth and Life and Holiness were "fair."
^Mew Seeds of Contemplation, p. x.
^or example, see the work of Donald Grayston, quoted above, p. 74, fn. IS, Glenn Hinson, "Merton's Many Faces," Religion in Life 42 (Summer, 1973), pp, 153-167; Alice Mayhew, "Merton Against Himself," Commonweal 91 (October 17, 1969), pp, 70-74*
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but changes in his o\m ability to recognize and 
express his inner self and his understanding of that 
self and its Ground.
3. Was Thomas Merton a Mystic?
Merton wrote very little about his o\m spiritual 
or mystical experiences. There are some who conclude 
that Merton himself was not a lAYstic. Mnda Parsons, 
for instance, wites, "In my opinion Merton was not 
a iiystic, but a man of genius who was a profound, 
contemplative philosopher and Christian humanist."
She feels that there is too little evidence about any 
of Merton's personal experiences to warrant calling 
him a mystic rather, than a "contemporary philosopher 
and Civil Rights leader.
Merton does, however, describe certain experiences 
which could be considered as mystical. Tifo of these 
occur before he had entered Gethsemani. The first 
occurred shortly after the death of his father. He
Linda Parsons, "Comments on Mann's Article about Merton," Hewsletter-Review 6, The R.M. Bucke Memorial 
Society (Spring, 1973)7 P* ^3*
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described it in the following manner;
"I was in my room. It was night.The light was on. Suddenly it seemed to me that Father, who had now been dead more than a year, was there with me. The sense of his presence was as vivid and as real and as startling as if he had touched my arm or spoken to me. The whole thing passed in a flash, but in that flash, instantly,I was overwhelmed with a sudden and profound insight into the misery and corruption of my own soul, and 1 was pierced deeply with a light that made me realize something of the condition I was in, and I was filled with horror at what I saw, and my whole being rose up in revolt against what was within me, and my soul desired escape and liberation and freedom from all this with an intensity and an urgency unlike anything I had ever known before. And now I think for the first time in ^ my whole life I really began to pray..."
The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 138. Raymond Prince, M.D., the editor of the R.M. Bucke Memorial Society Newsletter-Review. does not accept this as a mystical experience "in the strict sense." He explains, "It lacks the sense of oneness and timelessness that we usually require of an experience to designate it as mystical," "Editorial," Newsletter-Review 6 (spring, 1973), p. 2. Nevertheless, this experience, like all "mystical" experiences, is open to different interpre­tations. It does, in fact, satisfy the criteria set forth by William James in his Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 367f, i.e. it is ineffable (Merton says that he cannot explain it), noetic, or in James* words a "state of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect," transient, and there is a state of passivity "as if his own will were in abeyance." It can be argued, therefore, against Prince, that this is a record of a genuine "mystical" experience.
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The second of Merton*s pre-monastic mystical 
experiences occurred in Cuba, He was attending 
Mass in a Havana church, and a new awareness of "what 
had just taken place at the altar" came upon him;
"But what a thing it was, this awareness; it was so intangible, and yet it struck me like a thunder-clap. It was a light that was so bright that it had no relation to any visible light and so profound and so intimate that it seemed like a neutralization of every lesser experience,
"And yet the thing that struck me most of all was that this light was in a certain sense "ordinary" - it was a light (and this most of all was what took my breath away) that was offered to all, to everybody, and there was nothing fancy or strange about it. It was the light of faith deepened and reduced to an extreme and sudden obviousness.
"It was as if I had been suddenly illumina­ted by being blinded by the manifestation of God's presence,
"It lasted only a moment: but it left abreathless joy and a clean peace and happiness that stayed for hours and it. was something I have never forgotten."
Merton's third major recorded "mystical" experience 
was that which occurred at a street corner' in Louis­
ville, Kentuclcy, an experience which liberated Merton
The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 341f • This ex­perience is also recorded in The Secular Journal of Thomas Merton, pp. 71f. It, like his first experience, satisfies James' criteria, especially in so far as James wrote that although mystical states are transient "some memory of
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from a false duality and provided him with "such a 
relief and such a joy that (he) almost laughed out 
loud."^
Finally, Merton records an experience during his 
Asian journey, when he was before some statues of the 
Buddha in Oeylon. He writes that;
"Looking at these figures I was suddenly, almost forcibly, jerked clean out of the habitual, half-tied vision of things, and an inner clearness, clarity, as if exploding from the rocks themselves, be­came evident aind obvious..#! don't know when in my life I have ever had such a sense of beauty and spiritual validity running together in one aesthetic illumination...I dohtknow what else remains but I have now seen and have pierced through the surface and have ggot beyond the shadow and the disguise."
their content always remains, and a profound sense of their importance." (Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 368.) Such is the case with this experience,
^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, pp. l$6f. See above, pp. 56'f. The description of this experience is brief and therefore makes it difficult to classify as "mystical" according to the criteria of James or that of any other. The fact that it did have a profound effect on Merton is not enough to characterize it as any kind of special occurrence. Nevertheless, it is included here because of its profound and lasting effect on Merton, and additionally, to show the singular absence of de­tailed accounts of personal experiences in Merton's spiritual writings.
235.^The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton, pp. 233, 234,
188
These, then, are Merton* s recorded **mystical’‘ 
experiences. It is of interest to note that non© of 
them occurred within the cloister of the Abbey of 
Gethsemani, Two occurred prior to Merton's admission 
to the monastery, one occurred in the heart of a 
large city, and one in Ceylon. Furthermore, except 
for the two youthful experiences, Merton rarely writes 
in any detail about his inner spiritual experiences. 
One could very well question whether or not the 
Louisville or Ceylon experience was "mystical,"
Linda Parsons has some justification for her claim.^ 
However, two observations militate again^Par sons. 
First of all, as we shall see Merton consistently 
wrote about the ineffableness of mystical experience 
and cautioned against taking the psychological effects 
of the experience as ends in themselves; and secondly, 
seen in the light of his monastic milieu (which for 
some reason Ms. Parsons does not wish to do) Merton
But only in so far as she regards the lack of evidence for categorizing Merton as a mystic. Her own categorization as "philosopher" is quite debatable in itself. Her own standards of evidence can be used against her. Furthermore, she does not define "mystic," or "mysticism."
2She writes approvingly, "Yale University has a course on Merton; A Contemporary Philosopher. They hardly mention that he was a Catholic priest and monk," Op, Git., p. 23.
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certainly does have an existential rather than a purely 
intellectual and abstract involvement with mysticism 
and the mystical experience*
The consistency in the way in which Merton discussed 
the nature of the i^ystical experience itself is evident 
when one makes a comparison of one of his earliest and 
one; of his latest works. Throughout his life he remained 
highly skeptical of any experience which could possibly 
be explained psychologically. Furthermore, he recognized 
that the purpose of the experience itself was to point 
to a reality beyond the experience, and that a great 
danger in the mystical life occurs when one becomes 
so involved in delightful experiences that one fails 
to recognize the reality to which the experience leads.
In The Ascent to Truth he wrote that "it is false to 
make mysticism consist essentially in visions." False 
mysticism, he continued, "turns us away from our true 
end and seeks the enjoyment of flattering and glorious 
experiences rather than the perfect gift of our whole 
being to God alone.Twenty years later he was writing 
essentially the same things
"It becomes overwhelmingly important for us to become detached from our everyday conception of ourselves as potential
^The Ascent to Truth, p. 72.
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subjects for special and unique experiences, or as candidates for realization, attainment and fulfill­ment# In other words, this means that a spiritual guide worth his salt will conduct a ruthless campaign against all forms of delusion arising out of spiritual ambition and self- complacency which aim to establish the ego in spiritual glory. That is why St. John of the Cross is so hostile to visions, ecstasies and all forms of 'special experience.' That is why the Zen Masters say; 'If you meet the Buddha, kill him.
Therefore, it is not at all surprising that Merton
would write very little about his own mystical experiences.
They were, to him, not important in themselves, and
dangerous if taken to be important. We have already
noticed how Merton spoke hardly at all about his own
priesthood; in the same way he rarely spoke about his
own spiritual experiences. Furthermore, both in his
early and his later life, Merton wrote about the basic
"incommunicability of the highest form of religious 
2experience." "The personal experience of the mystic," 
he wrote toward the end of his life, "remains inaccessible 
to us and can only be evaluated indirectly through
"Transcendent Experience," originally in the Newsletter-Review of the R.M. Bucke Memorial Society 1 (September, 1966), and quoted in Zen and the Birds of Appetite, pp. ?6f.
2The Secular Journal of Thomas Merton, p. 120, entry dated November 29, 1940*
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texts and other testimonials*"^ Merton, accordingly,
2wrote little about such experiences.
Merton did write about contemplation and about 
his own life as a monk. If there could be a case made 
for a lack of evidence about actual mystical experiences 
in his life, an even stronger case can be made for his
"A Christian Looks at Zen," in Zen the Birds of Appetite, pp. 43f. This was first published as the Preface to John C.H. lAi's Tj^ Golden Age of Zen {Committee on the Compilation of the Chinese Library, 1967).
2F.J. Kelly notes this when he writes, "Merton wrote much about contemplation, he wrote practically nothing about his own contemplation," and again, after discussing Merton's very rare mention of his own experiences, "After these early attempts at description of religious experiences, Merton rarely talked about his own experiences. His own religious experiences would have to be inferred from his many writings on prayer and canonical religious life." Op. Cit.. pp.62, 114* (See also J.H. Griffin, A Hidden T/holeness. pp. 2, 10.) In his silence Merton is in good company according to one student of Cistercian history. In an article which touches on the accounts of religious experience in two prominent Cistercian Fathers (Bernard of Clair vainc and Aelred of Rievaulx), Charles Dumont, himself a Cistercian, writes, "In comparison with other spiritual authors the Cistercians are reserved.", "Experience in the Cistercian Discipline," Cistercian Studies 10 (197$), p. 134. Certainly not all mystics within the Christian tradition are as explicit as are St. Theresa, Julian of Norwich and Henry Suso in describing their personal mystical experiences. E. Allison Peers observed that one of Merton's mentors,St. John of the Cross, rarely wrote about his own experiences (in Spirit of Flame : A Study of St. John of the Cross (London; SCM, 1943), pp. 100-102).Merton, therefore, can be said to be one with his Cistercian brothers and other contemplatives in main­taining a discreet silence.
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concern for:, and involvement in, the contemplative m y  
of life. There is an abundance of evidence in his 
writings to show that he was passionately interested 
in all forms of man's spiritual life. His was never 
an abstract interest. He joined a contemplative order 
precisely in order to be able to contemplate. He 
became a hermit precisely in order to have more and 
deeper solitude in which to contemplate. He studied 
the mystical traditions of both the East and the West 
in order to have an intellectual as well as an 
experiential grasp of this kind of life.
Because Merton kept his inner life private, it 
is impossible to make a final statement about whether 
or not he could be called a mystic. What we know of 
his own spiritual experiences must be inferred. However, 
as great an authority on mystical experiences as 
Dr. D.T. Suzuki, the Zen scholar, believed that Merton 
did, in fact, know what he was talking about and was 
one of the few Westerners who had truly understood the. 
Zen experience. Considering the experiential nature 
of Zen, Suzuki could only have meant that Merton 
had an experiential and not simply an intellectual 
understanding of Zen. In other words, although Merton 
did not write specifically about having experiences 
similar to those described by Zen Masters, one can 
infer that he did, in fact have such experiences in
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some degree or another.^
Therefore, the assumption of this thesis is that 
Merton was a mystic, and not simply one who wrote 
abstract, mystical theology. His mystical theology,
See Suzuki's statement quoted by Christmas Humphreys in his Introduction to Merton's "The Zen Revival," and quoted in full below,, p. 600, Others who have inferred that Merton was a mystic are Edward Rice, Dennis Q. Mclnerny and Andrew Mann, Rice wrote, "In the light of what happened to Merton in his meeting with the Tibetian monks in India, and their reception of him, it is obvious - to me (and I cannot document it, of course) - that they accepted him as one who had passed beyond ordinary experience, that is, Merton apparently had already had, at least once and if not frequently, 'direct and pure experience on a metaphysical level, liberated from verbal formulas and linguistic conceptions,' The interior evidence, "The 'feel' of his later writings on Zen indicate this, without its being said in so many words." The Man in the Sycamore Trees The Good Times and Hard Life of Thomas Merton, pp. 131f.Mclnerny in the thesis which was to form the basis for his book on Merton came to the conclusion that Merton was, in fact, one who had had mystical experiences. See Thomas Merton and Society; A Study of the Man and His Thought Against the Background of Oontemoorary American Culture (Ann Arbor; University Microfilms,
1969), pp. 229ff*Andrew Mann, who was a monk at Gethsemani, writes: "Yes, Merton was a mystic in the traditional Roman Catholic sense of one receiving special gifts. For although we never saw him levitated, or bleeding from hands or feet - except when he cut himself at work - his confessor maintains that he experienced what are commonly defined as mystical phenomena." "Thomas Merton: Man, Mystic,Enigma," in Newsletter-Review 6 of the R.M. Bucke Memorial Society (Spring, 1973), p. 21. Unfortunately,Mann does not document his source, a point which Parsons (Op. Git.) correctly criticizes. See also R.G. Zaehner's comment that Thomas Merton "seems to me to be the most remarkable mystic of our times.", in The Catholic Church and World Religions (London; Burns and Oates, 1964),p. 18.
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which will be expounded in the following chapter, is 
not simply a speculative theology; Merton's theology 
was the product of the entirety of his life, his 
solitude as well as his functions in the community 
and in the world, his prayer as well as his thought, 
his contemplation as well as his action. Intellectual 
speculation - either philosophical or historical - 
did not overwhelm the experiential nature of his theology, 
nor did his experience suffer the loss of clear and 
disciplined reflection and thought. In Merton one 
discovers both a modern mystic, and a modern mystical 
theologian.
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III. MYSTICISM AND SOCIAL ETHICS IN THOMAS MERTON'S THEOLOGY
1. Withdrawal and Return as a Model
In A Study of History. Arnold Toynbee devised a 
model which is capable of providing a precise and 
accurate means of structuring an analysis of both the 
life and thought of Thomas Merton. Toynbee holds that 
social change is brought about by creative personalities 
or by creative minority groups and, in trying to show 
how these can be vehicles for social change, he 
analyzes the movement of withdrawal and return evidenced 
in these persons or groups. This model is particularly 
appropriate for a study of the interrelationship between 
mysticism and social ethics in Thomas Merton, Not 
only has Merton's life clearly evidenced this pattern 
but, furthermore, he was aware of what he was doing and 
was able to provide a rationale for that movement in 
his own life. Therefore, Toynbee's model is an excellent 
one for an understanding of Merton, and, conversely, 
Merton is an excellent exemplar of Toynbee's model; 
both because his life so visibly demonstrated the 
withdrawal-return motif, and because he was aware of 
that movement in himself and was able to articulate 
his understanding of it.
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Toynbee first describes this movement in terms 
of its manifestation within man's psyche or spirit; 
later it is described in so far as it relates to the 
interactions between individuals* It is a movement 
which involves, in Toynbee's words,
..a disengagement end temporary withdrawal of the creative personality from his social milieu, and his subse­quent return to the same milieu trans­figured: in a new capacity and with newpowers* The disengagement and withdrawal make it possible for the personality to realize individual potentialities which ’ might have remained in abeyance if the individual in whom they were immanent had not been released for a moment from his social toils and trammels."
Toynbee sees this movement as a part of all social 
change, and not simply as a movement that occurs for 
the salce of the individual and his self-actualization. 
He continues;
"The withdrawal is an opportunity, and perhaps a necessary condition, for the anchorites transfiguration; but, by the same token, this trans­figuration can have no purpose, and perhaps even no meaning, except as a prelude to the return of the trans­figured personality into the social milieu out of which he has originally 
come...The return is the essence of the whole movement, as well as its final cause.
Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History. Vol. Ill (London; Oxford University Press, 1934), P* 248. Toynbee indicates that he is dependent on H. Bergson's Les Deux
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This model can be described as having three 
phases; first, the act of disengagement; second, the 
period of withdrawal; and third, the act of return.
Its adequacy for the analyses of Thomas Merton's 
understanding of mysticism and social ethics is based 
on the following four points.
First, Toynbee's model is an accurate description 
of Thomas Merton, It has already been demonstrated 
how Merton disengaged himself from his social milieu 
and how he subsequently returned to the same milieu 
"transfigured; in a new capacity and with new powers." 
Merton returned to the milieu of American society, but 
in the capacity of the monastic and contemplative 
observer. His return did not mean repudiation of his 
Catholicism or his monastic life. It did mean that 
he addressed the same situations with which he was 
concerned before his act of disengagement, but he 
addressed them now from a new position and with new 
powers, the powers gained from years of his monastic
Sources de la Morale et ^  la Religion (Paris; Alcan, 1932), and J.C. Smut's Holism and Evolution (London; MacMillan, 1927) for these ideas. John MacMurray used a similar model to examine the meaning of the personal in Persons in Relation (London; Faber and Faber, 1961), ch. 4. See also Sr. Benedicta Ward's Introduction to The Prayers and Meditations of St. Anselm (Harmonds- worth; Penguin, 1973), pp.$1-56 in which she analyzes? a similar pattern in St, Anselm.
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experiences. The contents of Merton's writings 
makes it possible to examine all three phases of 
the movements how he understood the act of disengage­
ment, what he saw as the essence of the period of 
withdrawal, and the way in which he understood the 
necessity for the subsequent return.
Second, Toynbee uses his own model to describe 
the forces of change within civilizations. l^ Jhether 
or not Thomas Merton was the kind of creative 
personality Toynbee describes is a question that will 
not be possible to answer except by the test of 
history. Nevertheless, in so far as he was associated 
with the Peace Movement and the Civil Rights Movement 
in America in the 1960s, Merton was a member of a 
minority that sought social change as its primary 
goal. He was a mystic in the midst of this particular 
minority group. Since Toynbee's model is used to 
describe such forces of social change, it is not mis­
using his model to apply it to Merton.
Third, the model is adequate for a study of Merton 
because Toynbee uses his own model to describe and 
account for various religious figures. He sees the 
motif of wi thdrawal-and-r e turn as a reoccurring one 
in the life of Jesus: the flight into Egypt, the
withdrawal into the wilderness, the Transfiguration, 
the descent into the tomb, and finally, the Ascension, 
with the expectation of a final return. Toynbee
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continues with an examination of the motif as it 
appears in such religious personalities as St. Paul,
St. Benedict, Saint Gregory the Great, Saint Ignatius 
Loyola, The Buddha, David, Muhammad, and others. It 
is not out of place, therefore, to examine this 
same motif as it appears in a modern religious figure, 
using it as a model for the analyses of the relationship 
between the ngrstical experience and social action.
Fourth, and finally, the model is adequate in 
that Thomas Merton himself used a similar model to 
describe monastic life.^ The model Merton uses is 
that of "Disintegration, existential moratorium, and 
reintegration on a higher, universal level,which 
is derived from the Iranian psychiatrist, A. Reza 
Arasteh.^ The similarity between Arasteh's model 
and that of Toynbee can be seen in the following 
statuent of Arasteh:
"Experientially, those who seek rebirth in the trans-cultural state adopt an existential mechanism which begins with
See "Final Integration: Toward a 'MonasticTherapy,»" Monastic Studies 6 (I968), and reprinted in Contemplation in a World of Action, pp. 205-217.
%bid.. p. 214.
oA. Reza Aresteh, Final Integration in the Adult Personality (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 196$).
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detachment from their previous state, followed by a quest, anxiety, a vague awareness of the new state, and in­crease of anxiety and love for that state, effort, devotion, trust, and hope in identifying with it. There then occurs rebirth in a universal state, directly and indirectly, leading to insight into an inner evolution of life and finally union with this inner process."^
Merton sees this as an adequate description of the 
monastic life, and hence, as an implicit description 
of his own life. Therefore, the use of Toynbee's 
model, which is a less psychological and less technically 
worded version of the process described by Arasteh, 
is an adequate one for the study of Thomas Merton.
The following pages will examine the theological 
basis for the relationship between mysticism and social 
ethics in the life and thought of Thomas Merton. This 
analysis will be structured on Toynbee's model of 
wi thdr awal-and-r e turn, and will thereby consist of 
three sections. First of all, there will be an examina­
tion of the process of withdrawal, an analysis primarily 
of Merton's understanding of personhood, and therefore 
a study of his anthropology. Secondly, there will be 
an examination of the period of experience, an analysis 
of his understanding of that which happens in the state
^Ibid.. p. 153.
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of withdrawal, which therefore is a study of Merton’s 
theology. Finally, there will be an examination of 
the process of return, an analysis of the social 
implications of the entire movement, and therefore a 
study of ethics.
The division into three sections is for the purpose 
of analysis only. The spiritual life of man, if under­
stood as transcending and incorporating all the 
dimensions of human activity, cannot be compartmentalized. 
The three stages of this study are to be understood 
as parts of a continuing, dynamic process, and are not 
to be understood as descriptions of static phenomena 
with clear and rigid points of demarcation. For Merton 
personally, the mode of withdrawal was solitude and 
silence, the mode of the experiential stage was prayer 
and liturgy, and the mode of return was his writing, 
especially his writings that were concerned with explicit 
ethical problems. Obviously, in his life, each one 
of these modes intertwined with the others, each being 
parts of a greater wholes life itself. This must be 
remembered at all steps in the following analysis.
2. Withdrawal; Merton’s Anthropology
For Thomas Merton withdrawal meant withdrawal 
from the world. This is clearly seen not only in his 
writings, but in his life itself. By entering the Abbey
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of Gethsemani, he explicitly and purposefully made an 
act of withdrawal from the world. VJhat constituted an 
act of withdrawal in Merton's thought can be examined 
first from a rejection point of view. Merton is 
specific about what withdrawal is not. In spite of 
some of his early attitudes, and in spite of some 
language with a Manichean flavour, Merton was not 
calling for a withdrawal from the needs of other men. 
Some of the passages in The Seven Storey Mountain, 
as well as in other early works, tended to see with­
drawal as such a flight. But these passages are not 
many,^ and Merton spent most of his twenty-seven years 
of withdrawal from the world assuring that world that 
he was neither turning his back on it nor denying its 
validity and its needs. He made numerous explicit 
criticisms of the language he used in his earlier
writings and the type of withdrawal that they seemed 
2to advocate. Withdrawal is not, and can never be, 
a withdrawal from the dictates of love* It can never 
be a cover for escapism or irresponsibility and in­
sensitivities. It can never cloak laziness. In the
^See, for instance. The Seven Storey Mountain, pp. 313, 396ff, 382f; "What is Contemplation?" p. 12; The "Introduction" to The City of God; The Waters of 
Siloe. p. 332; Thoughts in Solitude. p. 18.
2See above, pp. 53f.
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situation in which the world was to find itself in 
the middle of the twentieth century, wrote Merton, 
certain kinds of withdrawal were not possible options 
for the Christian;
"In such a situation it is no longer permissible for Christians seriously and honestly to devote themselves to a spirituality of evasion, a cult of other worldliness that refuses to take account of the inescapable impli­cation of all men in the problems and responsibilities of the nuclear age.No matter what may be the alleged motive for this abdication, it cannot be acceptable to God, and it cannot there­fore contribute to Christian holiness. Indifference and callousness can no longer mask as 'recollection,' and cowardly withdrawal may not allege the excuse that it is a sacrifice and an act of worship. Passivity is no longer to be counted as 'faith* or 'abandon­ment. ' Lack of interest in the desperate fate of man is a sign of culpable insensitivity, a deplorable incapacity to loveî It cannot in any sense claim to be Christian. It is not even genuinely human.
Withdrawal into solitude is positive; it has its
own special work: a "deepening of awareness" for the 
2world. The monk does not withdraw into solitude simply 
for his own benefit, but for the benefit of others.
His solitude is never to be an escape, but on the contrary
^Life and Holiness, p. 136.
2Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 19.
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the monastery or the hermitage should become the monk's
place in the world. Merton refused to "reproach"
those who remain in the world, nor did he "repudiate
the world in a purely negative fashion.Rather,
the perspective he was to gain from his solitude was
to be his response to the world and his gift to the
world. The only Justification for a life of deliberate
solitude is the conviction that it will help the
individual not only to love God but also to love
other persons. To go into solitude merely to get
away from others will lead neither to peace nor to
truth. Whenever Merton saw expressions of religion,
either corporate or private, become escapist, he was
critical, calling such escapism "immoral," "apostacy,"
and "blasphenQT." To ignore the great issues upon which
the very survival of humanity depends and to concentrate
"on the relatively minor problems of the religious- 
2minded minority" was not only apostacy but suicide.
^"As Man to Man," p. 92.
2Faith and Violence, p. $6. One such "relatively minor" concern, according to Merton, was glossolalia. In his Journal he wrote, "Curious that in the United States, particularly the South, at the height of the struggle for Civil Rights, the (Protestant) churches were swept with a wave of glossolalia...a convenient resort to immediate inspiration rather than the 
difficult and humiliating business of hearing and obeying the Word of God in the need of one's fellow man." Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander. p. 125. cf "War and the Crisis of Language," in Thomas Merton on Peace. pp. 234-247.
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It was not an option for serious and dedicated Christians.
Withdrawal from the world, in Merton's thought, 
avoided being escapism because he saw it not as a with­
drawal from the real needs of the world but rather as 
a withdrawal from a particular understanding of the 
world, an understanding based on superficial and false 
attitudes. The world from which he withdrew was not 
the world of men, but the world as understood by 
certain "myths" that men had created. Therefore, it 
can be said that Merton differentiated between a true 
world and a false world and that his idea of withdrawal 
was a withdrawal only from the false world. At the 
same time, however, Merton repudiated any dualistio or 
Manichean interpretation of the world, any clear 
distinction between the sacred and the secular. In 
his earlier writings he was more comfortable with the 
"two cities" language of St. Augustine but as he matured 
he relied on this language less and less. The Church 
and the world interpenetrated, and although Augustinian 
dualism could be used for the sake of clarification, 
it was not to be used if it might lead to an understanding 
that two distinct worlds were ontological realities.^
See "The Church in World Crisis," Katallagete. Summer, 1967, p. 30; "The Death of God and the End of History," in Faith and Violence, pp. 244f; Life and Holiness, p. 61 and Opening the Bible, p. 3f* Merton does, indeed, use the analogy of the two cities in the
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let he insists that the world can be known in a true 
sense and in a false sense.
A great deal depends on what one means by "the
world," and how one understands it. For instance,
Merton was quick to criticize leaders of the church
who spoke of "the world" while failing to clearly
define what they meant by "the world." All too often,
Merton felt, clergymen denounce the world only in the
sense of the world that has not paid attention to them
or to their message,^ and accept the world when the
world accepts them. It is a temptation to accept the
world, whatever its distortions may be, if it "offers
us a prestige which we believe to be essential for the
2dissemination of the Gospel." This type of world- 
acceptance, although not unique to the American church, 
is an acute problem in that Church. In America, Merton 
wrote somewhat facetiously, "The message of the priest 
who drives an Oldsmobile is surely more credible than 
that of one who rides the busl"^ Such a priest.
unpublished The Inner Experience, especially pp. 49f, however, Merton did not want this book published until he had opportunities to work on it at more length. Ifeether or not he would have modified the use of this analogy would have to be conjecture.
^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 348.
^Loc. Git.
3Loc. Git.
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Merton feared, would make customary tirades against 
the "flesh" but seldom attack the world which makes 
his affluence possible. If the world quit paying 
attention to him, and he lost his expensive car, then 
he might renounce the world. To Merton, this is not 
at all what is meant by the New Testament understanding 
of rejection of the world. "The world, in the triad 
world“flesh-devil," he wrote, "represents greed for 
wealth and prestige"^ among other things. The priest 
who attacks the world because his own wealth and 
prestige have been denied is a man who does not truly 
understand that he is a slave of the world he condemns. 
He does not understand the New Testament idea of 
contemptus mundi. A clear definition of that which 
one is denouncing is necessary. Merton insisted that 
it has never been Christian to reject the world in the 
sense of the cosmos created by God or as the locus for 
the Incarnation, or as that which is sanctified by the 
"presence and action of the Mystical Christ.
The world from which Merton withdrew, and to which 
he speaks critically, is the superficial, empirical 
world which sees itself as an autonomous, closed system.
1Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander. p. 348. 
^Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 114#
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It is the world that rests upon appearances, upon 
(in the commercial world in which Merton lived) 
advertising and public relations. It is the world 
which had constructed its o\m myths; the myth of 
unlimited progress, the myth of the omnipotence of 
science, the myth of naturalism and materialism, the 
myth and culture of quantification. It is tliis world 
that Merton rejects. He does not call for a withdrawal 
from the needs of others or from union id.th other 
persons, but he calls for idLthdravial from a world which 
says that the appearance of union is, in fact, 
union, and that the propaganda issuing from 
the advertising industry and from the news media 
is, in fact, truth. His is a call to withdraw from 
a world of irrational compulsions and a world which 
makes irrational compulsions the basis for its economy. 
His is a call for withdrawal from a world "constituted 
by the illusions, the myths, the prejudices, and all 
the mental fictions I'dth which man torments himself 
and from which Christ cajne to deliver h i m . T h e  
"worldliness" he decries is that of the mythology of 
a technological culture with its "ever-changing, complex, 
and fictitious orthodoxy in taste, in politics, in cult, 
in belief, in theology and what-not, cultivation of 
the ability to redefine one's identity day-by-day in
^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander. p. 324,
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concert with the self-definition of society."^ 
It is the world of self-concern and greed;
"The world is the unquiet city of those who live for themselves and are there­fore divided against one another in a struggle that cannot end, for it will go on eternally in hell. It is the city of those who are fighting for possession of limited things and for the monopoly of goods and pleasures that cannot be shared with all."^
It is this understanding of the world that Merton 
rejects, because it is this understanding of the world 
that is driving men mad. The world he rejects is the 
world that refuses to know the "living God',* the God 
whose one commandment is to love. The "world" is the
body of those who hate hatred which stems from
attachment to "narrow illusions and petty desires.
This world is inauthentic and ultimately unreal. 
It is "a complete and systematic sham" and those who 
base their lives upon it are only pretending to be 
a l i v e T o  withdraw from it is to call it a sham.
^Ibid.. p. 284.
2Seeds of Contemplation, p. 5 7.
^The New Man. pp. 108f; cf. Seasons of Celebration, p. 125.
"^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander. p. 339-
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To withdraw is to make "the decision to disagree 
completely with those who imagine that the call to 
diversion and self-deception is the voice of truth 
and who can summon the full authority of their own 
prejudice to prove it."^
However, to withdraw from the world in this sense 
is not simply a matter of joining a monastery or be­
coming a hermit. This kind of a world, which is not 
so much a place as it is an attitude, can be found 
everywhere. It is not the world that is evil, but 
certain processes that are within it, processes which 
tend "to stamp out" the light of God in the world,^
There is no place in the world which is immune to such
3processes, not even the monastery Itself. The monastery 
can be ruled by the same kind of greed, competition, 
self-interest, triumphalism and commercialism that is 
found outside the monastery.^ Only by withdrawing from
^Disputed Questions, p. 183.
^"This is God's Work," Sisters Today (August- September, 1970), Vol. 42, No. 1, p. $.
3No Man is an Island, p. 118.
^Edward Rice mentions Merton's humorous but nonetheless real criticisms of his own monastery's cheese production. See Man in the Sycamore Tree, p. 157. There is also a subtle reference to the Gethsemani pre­occupation with cheese in "Conscience of a Christian Monk" in the tape recorded conference Life and Contem­plation (Electronic Paperbacks; Chappaqua, New York).
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the "world" in this sense, wherever it may be found,
Gan one begin to Imow the world in another sense, 
the sense in which we can and should be reconciled 
to the world, the sense in which the world is the 
locus of God's creation and redemptive activity.
Merton, however, usually reserves the term "the world" 
for the dehumanized surface. % e n  Merton speaks of 
the world he makes clear that he "focuses on the sham, 
the unreality, the alienation, the forced systematiza­
tion of life, and not on the human reality that is 
alienated and suppressed."^ Biat one discovers when 
he successfully withdraws from this superficial world 
is something that is more than the world : "it is the
spirit and likeness of God in men."^ As he is critical 
of inadequate ideas of withdrawal, he is critical also 
of theologians who call the Church to turn to the world 
without first malcing clear what it is that they mean
^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 257.
^Loc. Git.: cf. Zen and the Birds of Appetite, in which Merton argues that Nirvana does not entail flight from the world but a real understanding of the value that is in the world, pp. 87f.
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when they use the term " w o r l d W e  are not to be 
reconciled to the world in its unredeemed and sinful 
state* We are not to adjust ourselves to its shams 
and illusions. However, those theologians who talk 
about reconciliation with the world, often do not make 
this clear. For Merton, the world is the locus of 
God's activity but not in its sinful and superficial 
aspect. God is present in the world, but He is hidden 
as well. We are called, therefore, to reject reconcilia­
tion to the superficial world, for to be reconciled to 
an illusion can in no.way lead to an awareness of God. 
The illusion must be rejected:
"Where 'the world* means in fact 'military power,' 'wealth,' 'greed,' then the Christian remains against it. When the world means those who are concretely victims of the demonic abstractions (and even the rich and mighty are their victims too) then the Christian must be for it and with it. "2
Only by withdrawing from the world in the first sense 
and accepting the world in the second, can one hope
See in particular, "Orthodoxy and the World," Monastic Studies 4 (Advent, 1966); pp. 105-115, fi­re view article of two books of Alexander Schmemann; and, "A Life Free From Care," Cistercian Studies 5 (1970), No. 2, pp. 217-226. Merton does not make clear which theologians he means*.
^Faith and Violence, p. 256.
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to penetrate behind the surface distortions of the 
world and discover it as it really is, the sacrament 
of God's presence.
Merton's suggestion that one withdraw from the 
world without withdrawing from the needs of others 
and from the companionship of others raises the simple 
question of how this can be possible. Merton's own 
answer to this question begins with the recognition 
that one discovers the world by first looking to himself. 
The world is a "problem, " he w o  te, in so far as the 
person is a problem to himself.
"As long as I imagine that the world is something to be 'escaped' in a monastery - that wearing a special costume and following a quaint observance takes me 'out of this world,' I am dedicating my life to an illusion."!
The world is not some entity "out there" that one 
must renounce. The way to renounce the false world 
and to discover and accept the true world for oneself 
is to recognize that one discovers the world and contends 
with the world within himself. Merton's most precise 
statement of this discovery of the world within the 
self is contained in his journal:
^Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 1A5-
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"As usual, one comes back to the old question: what do you mean by 'theworld' anyway? In this, I don't think an abstract answer makes too much sense. My concrete answer is: what did I leavewhen I entered the monastery? As far as I can see, what I abandoned when I 'left the world' and came to the monastery was the understanding of myself that I had developed in the context of civil society - my identifi­cation with what appeared to me to be its aims. Certainly, in the concrete, 'the world' did not mean for me either riches (I was poor) or a life of luxury, certainly not the ambition to get somewhere in business or in anything else except writing. But it did mean a certain set of servitudes that I could no longer accept - servitudes to certain standards of value which to me were idiotic and repugnant and still are."!
Therefore, for Merton to give up the world meant 
the giving up of a particular understanding of himself, 
his identification with the aims of the world, and the 
servitude which was a direct result of that identifica­
tion. No one can escape the world merely by fleeing 
the city and entering into solitude. If one tries to 
renounce the world in this way he will only find that 
he has taken the world with him into his solitude. 
Nothing positive vfill have been accomplished. To be 
able to renounce what is false, superficial and dis­
torted in the world, one must first renounce what is
^Gon.lectures of a Guilty Bystander. p. 47.
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false, superficial and distorted in the self. Having 
done this, one is free to turn withdrawal into love, 
for the contemptus mundi will be a deep appreciation 
for the world as it really is, that is as the locus 
of the Incarnation.
In the same way that he sets up a distinction 
between the world in a false sense and the world in a 
true sense, Merton differentiates between a false 
self, often called the "individual," and the true self, 
often called the "person."^ In order to withdraw 
from the false world one must withdraw from the
It is to be noted that Merton is not unique in using the terms "individual" and "person" to describe aspects of the self. These terms are used by numerous writers in the development of the Gliristian doctrine of man. In a subsequent chapter it will be shown how Merton's use of the terms is related to Tillich's usage. Fui’thermore, in the same way that Merton spoke of the difference between a false world and a true world, he did not wish to speak of the false self and the true self in any dualistic or Manichean way. In commenting on St. Augustine's distinction between the superior and inferior soul in Book XII of De Trinitate. Merton under­stands St. Augustine to mean that there is one soul which acts in two ways (No Man Is Ac Island, pp. 2L4f*.) His own understanding of the true and false self is similar. Of. "Poetry and the Contemplative Life," in Figures for an Apocalypse « p. 103, and A Thomas Merton Reader, p. 444* Merton will also refer to the false self as "ego" or as "flesh" but explains that ego is not meant in its psychological sense (2en and the Birds of Appetite, pp. 77f) and "flesh" is not to be equated with the body nor is "soul" to be equated with the "whole self." (New Seeds of Contemplation. pp. 26f), e.g. "The whole man is 'flesh' if his body and his selfish passions dominate the soul. The whole man is spirit if his soul is subject to the Spirit of Christ and his body is subject to his soul." Basic Principles of Monastic Spirituality, p. 18.
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false self, and conversely, in order for one to 
recognize and accept the world in its true sense, one 
must allow the true self to emerge from behind the 
facade of the false self. The true self will not 
emerge, however, as long as one mistakes a part of the 
self for the whole, that is as long as one thinks of 
the entirety of the self as coextensive with that part 
of the self which is known or which is theoretically 
knowable. The self is more than the ego, super-ego 
and id, it is more than simply the sum of the conscious 
and the subconscious mind, it is more than the unity of 
body and mind and spirit. The self is more than that 
which can be analyzed.
Implicit in Merton's thought is a two-stage process 
for the emergence of the true self. In order for the 
true self to emerge one must first of all recognize the 
existence of the false self, and secondly, renounce the 
false self.: This process amounts to an uncovering - 
a stripping away - so that the true self, which is a 
hidden reality, can be seen. In the first stage, a 
process involving three phases is implied. First of
Gf. "The flesh includes not only sensuality and licentiousness, but even worldly conformism, and actions based on human respect or social preoccupa­tion," Life and Holiness, p. 85*
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all one must recognize that there is a true and a 
false self, or in other words, one must recognize that 
the self can be described according to its true or 
false aspects. Secondly, having recognized that 
there is a false way and a true way of being a self, 
one must be able to describe the characteristics of 
the false self, and subsequently, to recognize 
characteristics of the true self. Thirdly, one must 
acknowledge that living according to the false self 
stands in the way of the emergence of the true self.
The first phase of this process is the aclmowledge- 
ment that what we normally think of as the "self" is 
not the true self, the person in his deepest dimension. 
Such an acknowledgement is necessary, Merton thought, 
since "before we can realize who we really are, we 
must become conscious of the fact that the person we 
think we are, here and now, is at best an imposter 
and stranger."^ As long as we assume that our conscious 
minds are the highest indication of our humanity, as 
long as we assume that our own estimates of our worth 
and our own estimates of the validity of what we do 
are paramount, or as long as we assume that our own 
admiration for what we thinlc are our primary abilities 
and values is indicative of our essential self, we will
^The New Man, p. 73.
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live a superficial and ultimately false existence.
Such an understanding of our "self" will get in the 
way of real personal growth. Any growth that occurs 
will be simply an expansion of that which does not 
need expansion, Merton was writing at a time when the 
words, "be yourself" had become a cliche on the lips 
of a great number of people, especially the young, 
who felt (often correctly) that society had helped 
alienate them from themselves, Merton was in deep 
sympathy with these people, but warned them that all 
too often "being yourself" ended up being the impersona­
tion of a shadow,^ To be oneself was futile if all 
one actually did was to reinforce the false self and 
never to awaken the true self.
Next, one must recognize the characteristics of 
the false self. The basic characteristic is a strict 
subjectivity that makes a rigid distinction between 
that which is "I" and that which is "not-I." Merton 
believed that "True quietude and purity of heart are 
impossible where this division of the "I" (considered 
as right and good) and the "not-I" (considered as 
threatening) governs our conduct and our decisions.
^"Day of a Stranger," p. 211.
2Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 281.
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This split between subject and object is attacked 
by Merton throughout his many and varied writings.
It destroys the possibility of personhood. To live 
in such a division is to be an individual, not a 
person. It is an alienated existence, one in which 
separation and division reign over unity and fellow­
ship.
"I have what you have not, I am what you are not, I have taken what you have failed to take and I have seized what you could never get. Therefore you suffer and I am happy, you are despised and I am praised, you die and I live; you are nothing and I am something, and I am all the more some­thing because you are nothing. And thus I spend my life admiring the distance between you and me; at times this even helps me to forget the other men who have what I have notand who have taken what I have notand who have taken what I was tooslow to take and who have seized whatwas beyond my reach, who are praised as I cannot be praised and who live on my death..,"!
This is Merton's description of the alienated individual, 
or the false self. The true self is not like this.
In other words, Merton believed that although man might 
live according to a strict division between "I" and 
"not-I" this was not authentic life. The individual
^Seeds of Contemplation. p. 39* On the subject- object split and Cartesian philosophy see below pp. 
270f.
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is man as a self-conoerned being, the man who, like 
Adam Smith, thinks that harmony can be achieved through 
"enlightened self-interest," But to live according to 
enlightened self-interest is to live inauthentically, 
"We are not individuals," he told a meeting of nuns,
"we are persons, and a person is defined by a relation­
ship with others,"^ In another context he wrote:
"Personalism and individualism must not be confused. Personalism gives priority to the person and not the individual self. To give priority to the person means respecting the unique and inalienable value of the other person, as well as one's own, for a respect that is centered only on one's own individual self to the exclusion of others proves itself to be fradulent.
Individual subjectivity leads to selfishness, and 
selfishness is the inevitable result of the subject- 
object split and is the characteristic quality of the 
false self. All other descriptions of the false self
^"Prayer and Conscience, " Sisters Today A.2 (April, 1971), pp. 411f.
^The Way of Chuang Tzu, p. 17. Gf. "Contemplation and Ecumanism," Seasons 3 (Fall, I965), p. 142, and "Prayer, Personalism and the Spirit," Sisters Today 42 (November, 1970), p. 133. Merton finds support for this emphasis in the thought of such different philosophers as the Japanese, Eitaro Nishida (1870?-1945) end Gabriel Marcel; see Zen and the Birds of Appetite, pp. 69, 82.In some places in his earlier writings Merton writes as if the true self can be found by separating oneself from others, but these scattered quotations are not
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can be included in the idea of selfishness. Secondary
characteristics of the false self stem from this one
basic characteristic. Accordingly, the cult of "success"
in American society is "pure illusion,as is the
concern for "adjusting" to the norms and pressures of 
2society. All such activities are based on selfishness, 
and selfishness is pride, and pride is sin, and sin
is separation from the really real.
"Pride and selfishness then react upon one another in a vicious circle, each one greatly enlarging the other's capacity to destroy our life. In a sense, pride is simply a form of supreme and absolute subjectivity. It sees all things from the viewpoint of a limited, individual self that is constituted as the center of the universe. Now every­body knows that subjectively we see and feel as if we were at the center of things,..Pride however comes and elevates this subjective feeling into metaphysical absolute."3
indicative of the main thrust of his thought. See for instance, ^  Man Is An Island, p. 12; and The Sign of Jonas, p. 246. On the other hand, see Tto Living Bread. pp. xiii, 149, for explicit statements of the necessity for the discovery of reality through interrelatedness 
with others.
^New Seeds of Contemplation, p. 281.
^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, pp. 264f.
^The New Man. p. 64.
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What "the world" saw as strength and rugged 
individualism, Merton saw as illusion and weakness.
He understood that the greatest problem facing the 
Church in the modern world was not "scientific 
atheism" but "the despair and languor of a depersonalized 
man incapable of authenticity." He called upon Marx, 
Freud, Kierkegaard and T.S. Eliot, among others, for 
support of this understanding.^ In a society that 
stresses individuality rather than personality, or 
enlightened self-interest rather than a selfless 
concern for others, the true selfhood of man will 
manifest itself only with the greatest difficulty.
A spirit of servile conformity and acquiesence to the 
demands of a society based on such principles will 
prevent man from finding and actualizing his true 
and deepest self, because the true and deepest self 
of man is actualized through concern for others 
rather than tlirough self-concern. The person, rather 
than the individual, fulfills himself, "not by closing 
himself within the narrow confines of his own individual
interests and those of his family, but by his openness 
2to other men." The false self, therefore, is characterj 
by selfishness, pride, and a guarded and closed relation-
^Gontemplation in a World of Action, pp. 33ff« 
^Seeds of Destruction, p. 163*
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ship with others. The true self is characterized by 
concern for others, humility, and an openness and freedom 
in relationship with others. The false self sees itself 
as separate from others, the true self sees itself as 
united with others.
The third and final phase of the process of the 
recognition of the difference between the true self 
and the false self is the acknowledgement that the 
false self inhibits the emergence of the true self.
For Merton it is a matter of either-or. If the false 
self is dominant, then the true self cannot emerge.
"The person must be rescued from the individual." ^ 
Accordingly, Merton writes of the emergence of the true 
self in language which is explicitly religious - language 
which indicates the either-or nature of the relationship 
between the false self and the true self. Hell is the 
perpetual alienation from the true self.^ One must be
saved from such a hell. The discovery of the true self 
is "salvation."^ It is "rebirth."^ One is called to
^New Seeds of Contemplation, p. 38.
^Ibid.. fn. p. 7; of Seeds of Destruction, p. 25,
% o  Man Is An Island. p. 14.
^"Rebirth and the New Man in Christianity" (un­published), p. 5.
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decision; to decide for or against the true self. Our 
first task is to be truly human, he said in an interview, 
"l#ien one comes into existence as a human being, then 
prior to every other obligation is the obligation to 
be what one is: a human b e i n g , W e  cannot cheat our­
selves of our humanity. Anything that inhibits us from 
our primary vocation to be persons must be avoided. In 
order for us to be true, we cannot be false.
The first stage of self-realization, that is, 
the emergence of the true self, has required three 
phases; recognizing the existence of the false self, 
describing its characteristics, and acimowledging its 
destructive power. The second stage of self-realization 
is a purgative stage; the abandoning of the false self. 
Having recognized the false self and its destructiveness, 
one must renounce it, or deny it, or withdraw from it.
For the true self to live, the false self must die. We 
must not simply recognize that the false self stands in 
the way of the true self; if we wish to be truly human 
we must sacrifice the false self so that the true self 
is not to atrophy. Recognition of the negativities of 
of the false self is not enough, more is needed: an
existential act, or series of actions, of turning away
"An Interview with Thomas Merton," Thomas P. Me Donnell, p. 35* Gf. Contemplation in a World of Action.p. 81.
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from the false self. Having been awakened to the
difference between the true self and the false self,
man is capable of choosing between the two and is thereby
capable of the necessary act or acts of negation of the
false self. The only way for man to separate the false
and the true self is to abandon the false.
This act of abandonment is predicated on the Gospel
injunction that in order to save one's life one must
1be willing to lose it. Merton writes that "this
discovery of ourselves is always a losing of ourselves -
2a death and resurrection." VJhat is lost, of course, 
is the false self. When one makes an act of self­
emptying "the self that vanishes from this emptiness 
is the superficial, false, social self, the image made 
up of the prejudices, the whimsey, the posturing, the 
Pharisaic self-concern and the pseudo-dedication."^
In order for man to be truly himself, he must discover 
some way to overcome the false self. For Merton, the 
monastery, and the solitude that it was able to provide 
him, was the way toward such self-abandonment. The 
dissolution of the false self is no easy procedure,
^For example, No Man Is An Island, p. 79; Contempla­tion in a World of Action, p. 340#
2No Man Is An Island, p. 15.
^Disputed Questions, p. 206.>
226
and Merton describes no simple "method" that can be 
followed* His method was the monastic life, with all 
its asceticism, discipline and obedience*
"Cistercian asceticism, and indeed all the asceticism of the monastic Fathers, is simply the recovery of our true self ...effected by stripping away all that is alien and foreign to our true selves - shedding the 'double garment* of hypoori&fy and illusion by which we try to conceal the truth of our misery from ourselves, our brethren and from God."!
Although he did not recommend the monastic life 
to all, he emphatically stated that all men are in need 
of such personal stripping away of the false self. For 
alienated man it is the only way to the recovery of his 
true identity. In response to an essay by Eric Fromm 
on the psychological causes of war, Merton wrote:
"It would seem that we ought to pay a gread deal more attention than we do to the traditional spiritual and contemplative wisdoms which prescribe
The Silent Life, p. 32. Of. The Inner Experience, p. 2: "One of the strange laws of the contemplativelife is that in it you do not sit down and solve problems: you bear with them until they somehow solve themselves.Or until life itself solves them for you. Usually the solution consists in a discovery that they only existed in so far as they were inseparably connected with your own illusory exterior self. The solution of most such problems comes with the dissolution of this false self."
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disciplines (in the deepest sense of •discipleships') to help man transcend his empirical self and find his "true self" in an emptiness that is completely •awake* because completely free of useless reflection,"!
Hence, all persons ought to recognize and overcome the
false self, and find the appropriate discipline that
2will help them do so. For Thomas Merton himself, the
appropriate discipline was the monastic life, and
eventually the eremitical life. He discovered that
the monastery and the hermitage did not, in fact, foster
a life of self-centredness but rather, provided one
with the opportunity to enter into the desert, the place
of purgation, "The desert strips our hearts bare," he
wrote in concert with t\o other monks, "It strips us of
3our pretensions and alibis..." In such an environment
Har Within Man. ed. B?ich Fromm (Philadelphia;Peace literature Service of American Friends Service Committee, 19^3), p. 48. Also in Faith and Violence, pp. 113f. Fromm agreed with Merton. He wrote, "I want to stress briefly how much I agree with Thomas Merton's emphasis on 'the overwhelming and almost totally neglected importance of exploring this spiritual un­conscious of man. ' I believe that any real change in man depends on this discovery of one's self and of exploring the depths of \iiat he calls one's 'spiritual unconscious.*" War Within Man. p. 55.
^Merton did not believe that the use of drugs is an appropriate means of self-discovery. See below
^"contemplatives and the Crisis of Faith," by J.B. Forion, Andre Louf and Louis Merton, Cistercian Studies 2 (1967), No. 4, p. 271#
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it is possible to be provided with the necessary 
discipline and simplicity of life in order to make 
this possible. For Merton, the act of self-purgation 
is both active and passive. One makes a decisive and 
responsible act by entering into a particular discipline. 
He, for instance, chose the Cistercian life in 1941> 
and chose the eremetical life in 1965. However, his 
language indicates that he believed that the stripping 
away of illusions is something that happens to someone, 
not simply something that someone , effects by his own 
efforts. Such a mixture of active and passive approaches 
to self-abandonment can be seen in this passage;
"The monk does not come into the desert to reinforce his own ego-image, but to be delivered from it. After all, this worship of the self is the last and most difficult of idolatries to detect and get rid of. The monk knows this, and therefore he determines to take the proper means to destroy instead of re­inforcing the image. For this purpose he renounces his o\in will in order to be taught and guided by another, even though he may live alone."!
Self-renunciation, then, is something that happens 
to the monlc (he is "delivered from" the ego-image, and 
is taught and guided by others) and something that the
^Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 285.
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monk himself effects (he takes "the proper means to
destroy" the ego-image*)^ "Renunciation" is a word
that contains within it both the active and the passive
elements. To renounce is to make a conscious and
responsible decision, but it is a decision to foogo
certain areas of experience. For Thomas Merton, the
act of renunciation is always for the purpose of allowing
something to happen, that is, renunciation of the false
self (effected by the renunciation of the will in the
passage just quoted) is for the purpose of the emergence
of the true self. It is not simply a negative movement.
Detachment is from ourselves, not from other persons
2or from material things. Furthermore detachment from 
ourselves is for the purpose of discovery of ourselves.
In order to save one's life one must lose one's life.
The positive element of renunciation or detach­
ment is stressed in Merton's discussions of the process 
of self-abandonment. The process does not lead to 
self-hate, but rather to the ability to love ourselves
oin a totally new way."^  It is self-realization, not
Gf. John H. Griffin, A Hidden Vjholenesss "In the 'tremendous action' of contemplation, Merton held that it was not so much what you did that counted, but what you allowed to be done to yourself." p. 4»
2e.g. New Seeds of Contemplation, p. 21.
3e.g. Thoughts in Solitude, p. 52.
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self-alienation*^ It is for the sake of "fullness, 
"perfection,"^ "spiritual freedom,and "true5creativity." Self-renunciation is, therefore, never
a matter of the destruction of the person, the true
self. Rather it is the necessary means for the
discovery of the true self. The self-annihilation
of the ego is so that the New Man can be raised from
the dead;^ so that a new self-discovery can be made
"on an entirely different plane from a mere psychological
discovery, a paradoxical new identity that is found
7only in a loss of self."
For Merton, therefore, the process of withdrawal 
that is effected through a stripping away of the 
empirical ego, is not a purely negative phenomenon.
^e.g. Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 53.
2Disputed Questions, p. 192.
^Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 273.
^The New Man. p. 107, Cf. No Man Is An Island, p. 136.
"The Catholic and Creativity; Theology of Creativity," The Americ^ Benedictine Review 9 (September-December,"1960), Nos. 3-4, p. 211. Gf.A Thomas Merton Reader. p. 530*.
^e.g. Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 179*
?Ibid.. p. 340.
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It is radically positive. It may be painful; in 
most cases it certainly is. Hence, there is a negative 
element. However, if this negative element dominates 
an act of self-abandonment, that abandonment in itself 
is false and futile. Merton discussed such inadequate 
ideas of renunciation in one of his journals;
"False humility and the illusory ideal of self-annihilation, I distinguish this quite clearly from the real an­nihilation of the mystics, which is another matter. But a contrived 'annihilation* simply sets up one figment against another and has them cancel each other out. The 'self' sits by, smugly watching the operation and indeed directing it, and is not annihilated at all. On the contrary, this is a sure way of avoiding annihilation. Such 'humility' becomes a last refuge in which the self remains impregnable."!
Pious, self-centred acts of self-depreciation certainly 
have found expression in the history of Christian
2monasticism. Merton knew this from his oim experience.
The monk, he discovered, had to go beyond superficialities 
in his discipline in order to get beyond the superficial 
self. "Spiritual egotism" never can give birth to the 
New Man. The process of withdrawal was, for him, "not
^Gon.iectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 281.
^See above, p. 47.
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the destruction of personality but the dissipation 
of an illusion." And, "the discovery of the New Man," 
was for him, "the realization of what was there all 
along, at least as a radical possibility, by reason 
of the fact that man is the image of God.
Having examined Merton's understanding and description
of the false self, it is now necessary to examine his
understanding of the true self that is hidden under the
superficialities of the empirical ego. The Christian
doctrine of the image of God in man was his fundamental
vehicle for the description of the true self. This
doctrine is based on certain biblical passages, especially
Genesis 1: 26-27; 5: 1-3; and 9: 5-6,^ and Merton's
understanding of it follows the classical Catholic
interpretation of these texts, an interpretation that
can be traced to Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria and
Augustine and that is found explicitly in the teachings
of those Cistercian Fathers who formed the basis of the
3theological tradition that he inherited. In its
^2en and the Birds of Appetite, p. 118.
^See also, in the Apocrypha, Wisdom 2;23 and Ecclesiasticus 17:3; and in the New Testament, I Corinthians 9:7 and James 3:9.
3See Etienne Gilson, The Mystical Theology of St. Bernard (London; Sheed and Ward, 194-0), and Amedee Rallier, The Monastic Theology of Aelred of Rievaulx (shannon; Irish University Press, 1969), esp. pp. 3- 24. On Image and Likeness in the Eastern Orthodox
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most simple form this interpretation states that man 
was created in the image of God and still retains 
that image although it is weakened, hidden, and man 
does not live according to it. Following Ireneaus, 
this is explained by making a distinction between 
the "image" and the "likeness" of God. Both words
tradition see Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (London; James Clark, 1957), pp. 114-134 and In the Image and Likeness of God (London: Mowbrays, 1975), esp. pp. 125-139• The relationship between Eastern theology and early Cistercian thought can be seen in two articles published in Cistercian Studies 9 (1974), No. 4, pp. 389-398. These are Patrick Ryan's "Gregory of Kyssa's Treatise On the Making of Man, " and Anne Saword's "Note on William of St.Thierry's Use of Gregory of Nyssa's Treatise On the Making of Man," in which she shows William's extensive use, some­times almost verbatim, of Gregory. For a history of the Christian understanding of this doctrine see David Cairns, The Image of God in Man (revised edition), (London: Collins Fontana, 197377 &ud Emil Brunner,Man in Revolt (ET; London; Lutterworth, 1939), esp. pp. 82-113 and 499-515* Both of these works favour Reformation interpretations. A more Roman Catholic emphasis can be found in Jean Kirchmeyer, "Greique Eglise; L'Image et la Ressemblance," in Dictiomiaire de Spiritualité! Vol. 6, eds., M. Viller et al (Paris; Beauchesne, I967), pp. 814-822, and Paul Latnarche et al, "Image et Ressemblance," in Dictionnaire de Spiritualité: Vol. 7 (1970), pp. 1401-1472. On the Image of God in Merton see Higgins, Thomas Merton on Prayer, pp. 31ff, 138-140.
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are accorded separate definitions and functions.^
The fall, or original sin, did not obliterate the
image of God in man, although it did weaken it.
Rather, man who is created in the image of God, has
fallen from the likeness of God. He is still in the
image of God, but that image has been distorted by 
2"unlikeness."
The image of God in man is described by Merton 
as man's freedom and capacity to aspire to God. The 
image is not a static representation of something in 
the divine essence, but is a "dynamic tendency"
3toward God, who is love. Following St, Bernard,
This is based on an interpretation of Genesis 1:26, an interpretation which was rejected by the Reformers. See Cairns, Op. Cit., p. 28; "We must reject the view of Irenaeus who, in his exegesis of Genesis 1:26 made a distinction between tzelem and demuth. image and likeness.. .l-Zhat we have here is a Hebrew parallelism, or as Eichrodt thinks, the second term defines more closely than the first what is meant. 'In God's image, that is to say, in his likeness.'" See W. Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament. Vol. II (ET: London: SGM, 1967), pp.
122-131.
^The Silent Life, pp. 25f, 29, and The New Man. 
pp. 41f, 69.
^The New Man. p. 74* Merton quotes Aquinas:"The image of God is seen in the soul in so far as the soul is carried, or is able to be carried, towards God." (Summa Theologies. I, Q. 93, a. 8). Cf. Disputed Questions, p. xi.
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Merton held that even fallen man retains his "innate 
capacity and ‘need* for divine union."
"The human soul is still the image of God, and no matter how far it travels away from Him into the regions of un­reality, it never becomes so completely unreal that its original destiny can cease to torment it with a need to re­turn to itself in God, and become, once again, real.
Since God is love, this capacity for union with
Him is, a capacity for love. "To say that I am made
in the image of God," he wrote early in his life as
a monk, "is to say that love is the reason for my
2existence...Love is uqt true identity." However, to 
define man's true identity, his true self, as love, 
is not to malce a static equation. Love, by definition, 
is dynamic. It is a response to a va3.ue that encounters 
the person. It is not a substance but is movement and 
freedom, "It is the lucid and ardent response of the 
whole man to a value that is revealed to him as perfect, 
appropriate and urgent in the providential prospect of
^Ibid., p. 69. See St. Bernards Sermons on The Song of Songs. Sermon 82.
^Seeds of Contemplation. p. 46.
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his own life*"^ The image of God in man, therefore,
is the capacity to actualize love. The likeness of
God in man is the actualization itself. Man has in
his basic structure "an openness, a capacity, a
possibility, a freedom" for love, and this is the
image of God "because God himself is pure freedom and 
2pure love."
All men share in this image,^ and the image can 
be known by rational conjecture. But such an intellectual 
understanding of the imago Dei is not sufficient for 
man to have a "real experience of (his) own identity, 
for the imago is never simply a matter of the intellect 
but is primarily a matter of will. Therefore, even 
though all men share in the image of God, not all 
share in the "likeness." All men have the capacity 
for love and the yearning for divine union, however
^Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 22.
2"Introductioii* to The Monastic Theology of Aelred of Rievaulx, p. ix.
^The New Man, pp. 74, 80, Merton quotes Gregory of Nyssa as his patristic support; "The v/hole of human nature, from the first man to the last, is but one image of Him Who is."
^Ibld.. p. 74.
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implicitly it may be understood and articulated. But
the "likeness" is seen only where there is a complete
and faithful correspondence between the image and its1actualization in existence. Merton wrote,
"The image of God in man - the openness to love, the capacity for total consent to God himself and in others - remains indestructible. But it can be buried in and imprisoned under selfishness. The image of God in man is not destroyed by sin but utterly disfigured by it. To be exact, the image of God in man be­comes self-contradictory when its open­ness closes in upon itself, when it ceases to be a capacity for love and becomes simply an appetite for domina­tion or possession; when it ceases to give and seeks only to get. In such a case, man becomes his own god and instead of loving others he uses them for his own purposes - to gratify his own narcissism as we would say today."
The image needs to be freed from its imprisonment to 
selfish tendencies, to the false self. The "image" 
is not the true self. The true self is man as he
exists as both the image and likeness of God; it is
3real only when it is actualized in existence.
^Ibid.. p. 42.
o"Introduction" to The Monastic Theology ofAelred of Rievaulx. p. x.
^2en and the Birds of Appetite, p). 128. Gf. "The Transforming Union in St. Bernard and St. John of the Gross," p. 211.
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Therefore, there is an element of ii^ stery associated
with the true self. The "image" of God exists in
man as a potentiality and as a capacity and can be
described as such, but unless and until the true self
is actualized and "image" and "likeness" are made one,
its reality remains a mystery that is impossible to
1define or describe.
"The *true man* has no title. He is in the body and yet you don*t see him and he almost never speaks. In fact he has to be beaten into speaking, because if he simply goes along on the habitual level of life he is never awake, he might as well not be there at all."^
The true self is the self that can be described 
as "no-self" or as the transcendent Self,^ but best 
remains undescribed. Merton can say that when one
^The Ghristological implications of this under­standing of the true person will follow. See below pp. 276-287, 4.37-4.58.
2"Lactantius," Cistercian Studies 7 (1972), No. 4- p. 252. This is said as well in Merton*s unpublished The Inner Experience; "The inner s.eJf is not a part of our being...it is our entire substantial reality itself, on its highest and most personal and most existential level...The inner self is as secret as God and, like Him, it evades every concept that tries to hold of it with full possession...It is not a » thing.*" p. 6.
3Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 71.
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lives according to this true self he is in "direct
contact with the ground of reality"^ but this is not
to describe the "true self" as much as it is a description
of what life can be like when lived at this level,
Merton prefers to follow the example of the Zen Masters
2and maintain silence in the face of the mystery. We 
cannot recognize this inner reality, it is that which
3we can only be.
The entire process of withdrawal is to be able to 
allow for the emergence of the true self, for the 
'likeness" of God to be restored. Merton does speak of 
the "annihilation" of the self, following not only the
KBuddhists but John of the Gross, Meister Eck^ art, and 
the Desert Fathers as well; but the self that is 
annihilated is never the deep, inner "true" self, but 
rather is the superficial, empirical self which inhibits 
the emergence of the true self
^Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 283.
2See, for example. Mystics and- Zen Masters, pp. 22-30, 17; A Thomas Merton Reader. p. 510, and "An Interview with Thomas Merton" (McDonnell), p. 38.
%aids on the Unspeakable, p. 15.
^"And this return to God as the Ground of all existence is only possible by detachment and *death* in the exterior self, so that the inner self, purified and renewed, can fulfil its function as image of the Divine l"rinity." The Inner Experience, p. 35. "He is not really a man, then, ...(As St.John of the Gross
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For Merton himself, Cistercian austerity and
asceticism was a necessary, although not sufficient,
means to this end, a "means of putting off the *old
man* corrupted by sin, and renewing the image of God*.,
1by perfect likeness to Christ in Charity."
3* Experience: Merton's Theology
"The human person," wrote Merton, "is a free being
created with capacities that can only be fulfilled by
2the vision of an unknown God." The person will 
remain at the level of the superficial self if the 
movement into the depths of the self fails to take 
this teleological aspect into account. Without a 
theistic dimension, the stripping away of the false 
self is never complete. Merton considers man in
would say) until his humanity has been Annihilated. * ", "The Transforming Union in St. Bernard anda St. John of the Cross," p. 211. See also, on Eckert, Zen and the Birds of Appetite, pp. 9f, and on the Desert Fathers, Wisdom of €Ee he sert, p. 8. On "annihilation" in the Russian mystics see "Prayer, Personalism, and the Spirit," in Sisters Today, and Mystics and Zen Masters, pp. 178-187.
^The Silent Life, p. 88. Of. Zen Birdsof Appetite, p. 128. See above, p. 226.
^Seasons of Celebration, p. 213.
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light of this supernatural vocation and not simply
as he exists in his natural state.^ The vocation to
the vision of God is a part of man’s essence. Therefore,
as man discovers God he discovers himself as well, and
conversly, self-knowledge is the beginning of the
2ascent (or descent) to God. There is more than the 
awareness that one is created in the image of. God; it 
is the apprehension of God Himself. God is discovered 
within "in much the same way as we discover the un­
suspected depths of our own deep selfSelf-discovery, 
if it is authentic, is also a discovery of God; and 
the discovery of God opens up to the person the depths
The New Man. p. 70. Merton, at this point, is thoroughly Augustinian. See Frederick Gopleston, S.J.,A History of Philosophy. Vol. II (London; Burns, Oates ^ d  Washbourne, 1950),p. 49; "(The Augustinian attitude) contemplates always man ^  ^  man in the concrete, for ^  facto man has only one final end, a supernaturalend, and, as far as actual existence is concerned, thereis but man fallen and redeemed: there never has been,is not, and never will be a purely ‘natural man' without a super-natural vocation and end." Cf., Ibid. p. 243.Gf. Confessions. I, 1. i.
2The Waters of Silence. p. 19*
^The Living Bread, p. 91# Of. T M  Inner Experience,p. 11; "In Ghris3\tanity the inner self is simply a stepping stone to an awareness of God."
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of his own reality. If we oppose God we oppose our
own deepest selves, if we have a true awareness of him,
we have a true awareness of ourselves. In order to
find God, therefore, we must also find ourselves, for
"if I penetrate to the depths of my ovm existence and
ray own present reality, the indefinable ‘am* that is
myself in its deepest roots, then through this deep
center I pass into the infinite ‘I am* which is the
2very Name of the Almighty." Therefore, the entire 
process of withdrawal has a deeper goal than the 
discovery of the true self; its goal is the discovery 
of God, the source of truth.
Gf. Contemplation in a World of Action, pp. I60f, TlH Man, p. 42. Although Merton was Thoraistic in the sense that he saw the possibility of discovering God through reflection on data available to the senses, at this point he is in the Augustinian tradition, the tradition which looks for God in the depths of the soul, Gf. Confessions. VII, 10; X, 20,, Gopleston, Git., p. 69: Merton is fond of stating the Augustinianmaxim that God is nearer to us than we are to ourselves, See below, p, 363,
2Thoughts ^  Solitude, p. 86, Gf. ^  Inner Experience, p. 11. "...our being somehow communicatesdirectly with the being of God...If we enter into ourselves, find our true self, and then pass ‘beyond* the inner *1,* we sail forth into the immense darloiess in which we confront the *I AM* of the Almighty." See also T ^  New Man, pp. 32, 44.
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This is not to say that man first finds himself 
and then, after the true self has been made known, 
he begins to find God. Man discovers God and his 
true self simultaneously. Nevertheless, even though 
Merton usually speaks as if, in fact, the movement is 
a process that descends first into the depths of the 
self and then through that self to God, he never 
hesitates to proclaim that God is the initiator of 
the process. As far as man's existential encounter 
is concerned, he may very well first experience a 
self-awakening before he experiences an apprehension 
of the divine, but ultimately this was made possible 
by the action of God. "Grace," wrote Merton, "is 
given us for the precise purpose of enabling us to 
discover and actualize our deepest and truest self. 
Without Grace we will never Imow ourselves as we 
really are and we will never know God. Grace is 
God's action within us. The nature of the search for 
God is the realization that God and the self have 
already discovered each other, or in Merton's words, 
"we seek Him successfully when we realize that we 
cannot find Him unless He shows Himself to us, and 
yet at the same time that He would not have inspired
^The New Man. p. 32,
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us to seek Him unless we had already found Him.
Merton defined grace in terms of the reconciliation
of man and God. Grace stands in opposition to what
2Merton has called "Promethean theology": the
understanding, often subtly stated, that man and God 
are opposed to one another and that man has to struggle 
to achieve perfection, freedom, love, and union with 
God. Such a theology, which Merton understood as 
actually a description of man at odds with himself 
rather than with God, has no need of grace. It 
assumes a cleavage that is bridged by man's strivings. 
Grace, on the other hand, is used to describe a situation 
in which the separation between man and God is over­
come by God Himself. Union with God is a gift of God, 
and as such it cannot be produced through meditative 
techniques, asceticism or any other kind of spiritual 
discipline. Any Promethean element is discarded. 
Discipline has its function, but it is a matter of 
preparation only; it in no way produces union with God.^
^Thoughts in Solitude, p. 64. Also, Bread in the Wilderness, p. 11; ^  Man Is An Island, p. 224.
^See above, pp. 96f.
3See Contemplation in a World of Action, pp. 161f;The Waters of Siloe. p. 20; "Contemplation and Ecumenism," p. 133; Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 203; Seeds of Con­templation. p. 32; and Silence in Heaven, p. 20.
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Its only function is the overcoming of the superficialities 
of the false self. One may be able to overcome those 
superficialities, and may very possibly descent into 
the depths of the self, but without grace such a descend 
will never reveal the ultimate truth of the person, for 
the ultimate truth of the person participates in the 
ultimate Truth which is God. Man cannot reach God 
by his own efforts. Merton insists that the good news of 
the Gliristian message is that God is already dwelling in 
the depths of man, and hence, human efforts are not 
necessary. Opposition between man and God has been 
overcome without any effort on the part of man. Grace 
means that there is no ultimate opposition:
"Grace is not a strange, magic substance which is subtly filtered into our souls to act as a kind of spiritual penicillin. Grace is unity, oneness within ourselves, oneness with God. Grace is the peace of friendship with God...Grace means that there is no opposition between man and God, and that man is able to be sufficiently united with himself to live without op­position to God. Grace is friendship with God. And more - it is sonship."^
God’s action, therefore, is the cause of the two­
fold descent; the descent to the depths of the true 
self and the descent (or ascent) to God Himself. Self-
^The Hew Man, p. 31.
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discovery and the discovery of God is all part of the 
same process, a process which Merton calls by a number 
of names; mysticism, mystical prayer, mystical con­
templation, contemplation, infused contemplation, con­
templative prayer. These words, often used inter­
changeably^ describe the experience that a person 
undergoes when, having stripped away the false self 
tlirough whatever means are appropriate and necessary, 
he encounters the truth of himself as he is encountered 
by God. It is the experience of an "immediate sense
of what it means to W "  for God is present in the very 
2act of being.
"Contemplation is the sudden intuitive penetration of what really IS. It is the unexpected leap of the spirit of man into the existential luminosity of Reality Itself, not merely by the metaphysical intuition of being, but by the transcendent fulfilment of an _ existential communion with Him VJho IS."
It is "the direct and pure experience of reality in 
its ultimate root,"'^ the awareness of the reality of
^See above, p. I4.
2Gonjectm-es of a Guilty Bystander, pp. 220f.
^The New Man. pp. 15f; Gf. "Contemplation and Ecumenism," p. 133.
^Eaith and Violence, p. 215.
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1the source of being and truth and life. It is the 
"participation of our soul and all of its faculties 
in the life, knowledge, and love of God Himself, 
and since it is a participatory knowledge of God, it 
can also be described in terms of union with God.^
Merton recognized and appreciated the incommunicable 
nature of the mystical experience. The knowledge of 
God in the depths of the self is beyond Intelligibility 
and beyond adequate means of expression. Nevertheless, 
the mystic does not have to remain silent about his 
experience* Although he realizes that anything he 
might say about an experience which is ineffable will 
be less than adequate, he realizes that words can 
serve a useful function. St. John of the Gross was 
well aware of the inadequacies of theological language, 
but according to Merton, he "did not conclude that 
therefore the theological language of revelation should
See New Seeds of Contemplation. p. 1; of."Poetry and Contemplation: A Reappraisal" in A ThomasMerton Reader, p. 438.
^The Ascent to Truth, p. 16. Gf. Ibid., p. 62. "Community, Politics and Contemplation," p. 245;"Poetry and Contemplation: A Reappraisal," in A ThomasMerton Reader. p. 441* In The Inner Experience. p. 72, Merton wrote; "Contemplation is a supernatural love and knowledge of God, simple and obscure, infused by him into the summit of the soul, giving it a direct and experimental contact with him,"
3The concept of "union with God" will be discussed below; pp. 2?0ff, 337ff.
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be completely revolutionized."^ Neither did Iferton;
"The personal and direct grasp of sacred realities by each individual soul is an incommunicable experience.The mystical vision cannot be passed on from father to son. But the aptitude for that vision may be in­herited... It needs to be brought to life by the proper signs and symbols."
"Words," he m-ote, can become "sacred s i g n s . A s  
inadequate as it may be, language has a necessary 
place in the sharing of religious experience. The 
experience itself is beyond sharing but language, which 
in Merton’s case meant theological or poetic language, 
"can make known to other men the unsearchable mystery"^ 
found in the encounter with God. It can open up to 
others the possibilities and the potentialities for 
mystical experience. Therefore, within the contemplative 
community there is a vocation that calls for speech.
^Faith and Violence. p. 271.
^The New Man. p. 56. 
p. 55.
"Poetry and Contemplation: A Reappraisal,"in A Thomas Merton Reader. p. 449. Other references in Merton’s writings to the ineffableness of the mystical experience include, The Secular Journal, p. 120; The Sign of Jonas, p. 55; Seasons of Celebration, pp. 20f; Merton's Preface to William Johnston's The Mvaticism of the Cloud of Uhlmowing (New York; Desclee, 1967), p. x; Zen and the Birds of Appetite, pp. 39, 42f.
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Although Merton never referred to himself as a mystical 
theologian, he accepted the vocation of one who speaks 
about the mystical experience.
It has been made clear that Merton understood 
mysticism in terms of an experience of God. %sticism, 
for him, is theistic. However, before we undertake 
an examination of Merton's understanding of theistic 
nysticism, it must be noted that he was able to appreciate 
and speak to the forms of mysticism, for the most part 
within the oriental religions, that made no explicit 
reference to a divine entity or concept.^ His interest 
in Zen Buddhism is well-known and is expressed in a 
number of his books and articles, especially his later 
work. 80 , too, is his interest in the classics of 
Chinese religious traditions, especially those of 
Taoism. He admitted that it was "no easy task" to 
find a common ground between Eastern and Christian 
forms of mysticism but that the difficulties should 
not prevent a thdtough and appreciative dialogue from 
occurring. It was his understanding that Christianity 
and the form of mystical awareness discovered in Zen
^Gf. his earlier rejection of this possibility in The Ascent to Truth, p. 63.-
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were complementary.^ The former had a particular 
message to impart whereas the latter was concerned with 
the pure state of awareness# Zen is not a matter of 
a message or a kerâ:faa# its purpose is the awakening 
of a deep ontological awareness in the ground of the
pbeing of the one awakened, Christianity, on the
other hand, is primarily concerned with revelation.
In it "the objective doctrine retains priority both
3in time and in emminence." Therefore, there is a 
great difference in the intention and the direction 
of these two traditions, but this difference does not 
at all invalidate the complementary nature of the 
relationship that could and should exist between them. 
The supernatural Kerygma of Christianity and the 
metaphysical intuition of the ground of being of Zen 
"are far from being incompatible. One may be said 
to prepare the way for the o t h e r . A s  long as one
Zen and the Birds of Appetite, pp. 41, 47. The question of whether or not Zen can properly be called mystical is by-passed by Merton, but referred to in Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 207.
^Ibid.. p. 48.
^Ibid., p. 45.
4lbid.. p. 47.
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is able to differentiate between doctrine and experience, 
one can see how Christianity and Zen can co-exist.
Merton explained:
"...I believe that Zen has much to say not only to a Christian but also to a modern man. It is nondoctrinal, concrete, direct, existential, and seeks above all to come to grips with life itself, not with ideas about life, still less with party platforms in politics, religion, science, or anything else."^
"It is therefore possible to say that both Christians and Buddhists can equally well practise Zen? Yes, if by Zen we mean precisely the quest for direct and pure experience on a metaphysical level, liberated from verbal formulas and linguistic preconceptions. On the theological level the question becomes more complex."
Christianity begins with revelation, but it would 
be far too simplistic to reduce the Christian revelation 
to theological and doctrinal sta.tements. The revelation 
to which the Christian tradition witnesses is the 
revelation of God Himself, communicated to us in words 
and symbols, but always beyond those words and symbols. 
Therefore, the Christian vjould do well to avoid "obsession 
with doctrinal formrulas" and remember that the heart of
I^bid.. p. 32.
^Ibid.. p. 204.
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Christianity is "a living experience of unity in 
Christ which far transcends all conceptual formulations*"^ 
If the Christian experience is reduced to the intellectual 
acceptance of certain doctrines, then the Christian 
tradition will be reduced to a "world view, at times 
a religious philosophy and little more, sustained by 
a more or less elaborate cult, by a moral discipline 
and a strict code of Law*"^ As long as the Christian 
remembers this experiential side of his tradition, a 
dialogue with Zen will be productive, Zen could well 
provide a methodology which would enhance the life of 
the Christian,
At the same time, Merton wanted to avoid a "loose 
and irresponsible syncretism" that tried to unite all 
religions in so far as they "meet at the top," making 
all theological and philosophical differences irrelevant. 
Such a synthesis has never been adequately demonstrated 
to exist, Merton argued, in spite of what he considered 
to be the brilliant ways in which it has been promoted- 
On the one hand, it fails to take into account the 
importance of the doctrinal differences, differences 
which cannot be easily dispensed with. Doctrines are
^Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 39< 
^Ibid.. p. 40.
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more important than something "that a mystic could 
throw off like a suit of clothing" and the experience 
itself may be in some way modified by the beliefs 
held by the mystic as he underwent his experiences.
On the other hand, "the personal experience of the 
mystic remains inaccessible to us and can only be 
evaluated indirectly through texts and other testimonials." 
It is never easy, therefore, to assume that what a 
Christian mystic, and a Sufi, and a Zen Master experience 
is really "the same thing.
Along with his warnings to those who would wish
to syncretize all theological and experiential differences,
Merton also issued warnings to those who refused to
acknowledge the revelation of God outside of the Christian
tradition* "God is in no way limited in His gifts,"
he wrote, and consequently "there can be no absolutely
solid grounds for denying the possibility of supernatural
(private) revelation and of supernatural mystical
graces to individuals, no matter where they may be
or what may be their religious tradition, provided that
othey sincerely seek God and His truth." Whereas a rash 
syncretism is to be avoided, nonetheless genuine dialogue 
and ecumenism requires communication and sharing, the
^ibid.. pp. 43f.
2Mystics and Zen Masters, p* 207.
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the seeking of "the inner and ultimate spiritual 
’ground* wMch underlies all articulated differences.'.'^  
The clarification of various points of theological 
language (such as the meaning of the idea of 'personality*
pboth human and divine), as i#ll as a sharing of ex­
perience and discipline, are areas in which Merton 
felt the Christian and the Eastern contemplative could 
engage in fruitful dialogue. In the realm of mystical 
experience there is no single set of standards: the
3great rule of mysticism is that there are no rules. 
Contemplation is open to all.^ It is neither the 
possession of one religious tradition nor the possession 
of an elite group within all religions. No examination
^Ibid.. p. 204.
^Ibid., p. 210.
^Ibid.. p. 148# The context for this statement is a criticism of David Knowles' judgment of the English mystics, which Merton believed was too narrowly focused on the standards of apophaticism as found in the tradition of Dionysius the Atcopagite. See David Knowles, The English Mystical Tradition (London; Burns and Oates,1961).
^See Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 209; "Poetry and the Contemplative Life," p. 95;'"Is Mysticism Normal?", p. 95# Merton often said that he had more in common with many non-Christian contemplatives than he had with traditional Christians. On this see, among others. Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 209, Faith and Violence, p. 219, and "A Conference on Prayer," p. 450f.
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of Merton’s explicitly theistic and explicitly 
Cliristian mysticism can fail to take into account the 
breadth and width of his interest in the universality 
of the mystical experience on the one hand, and on the 
other, the quest for the discovery of that which 
underlies the experiences.
There are forms of mysticism, however, which 
Merton labels as false. He warns against, and in 
effect attacks as inauthentic, any form of mysticism 
which becomes centred in the empirical, subjective ego, 
that which he calls the "false self." The temptation 
to self-centred mysticism is present in all forms of 
mysticism, whether they are intended to be theistic or 
not. Merton Can see and analyze this temptation in 
various forms of mysticism but most definitely id.thin 
his own monastic tradition and the life of prayer which 
it engenders;
"Most serious and good monks, idealists, desire to make of their lives a work of art according to an approved pattern.This brings with it an instinct to to study themselves, to shape their lives, to remodel themselves, to tune and re-tune all their inner dispositions - and this results in full-time meditation and contemplation of themselves."^
^Contemplative Prayer. p. 47*
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Merton continues immediately to mention why this is 
a danger: concentration on the self can blind one
to the presence of God:
"They may unfortunately find this so delightful and absorbing that they lose all interest in the invisible and unpredictable action of grace.In a word, they seek to build their own security, to avoid the risk and dread implied by submission to the unknown mystery of God's will,"^
Contemplation becomes little more than a "psychological 
t r i c k , a  "cult of the self" rather than a "cult of 
God. For a Christian monk this is antithetical to 
his vocation, which is to come in contact with God.
It is also antithetical to Zen, in which the focus is 
"the Self which is the Void...that is to say precisely 
not the ego s e l f M e r t o n  believed that it was basic 
to all forms of mysticism i-dth which he was familiar, 
i.e. Zen, Sufisiû, and Christian mysticism, "to radically 
and unconditionally question the ego which appears to 
be the subject of the transcendent experience, and thus
^Loc. cit.
^No Man Is An Island, p. 219.
^Gontemplation in a World of Action, p. 376. 
^2en and the Birds of Appetite, p. 74.
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of course to radically question the whole nature of 
the experience itself precisely as 'experience.•
Any mysticism which centred upon the individual, or 
the individualistic enjoyment of experience, or upon 
"the individual self experienced as without limitation" 
was a "pseudo-mysticism."
Merton criticizes pseudo-mysticism under the
various forms which he found it to tajce, for instance,
under what he calls "Promethean mysticism," exploit
or manipulative forms of prayer, and quietism. He
criticizes "Promethean mysticism" in which God is
regarded as an "object" or as a "thing" which is foreign
to oneself and with whom union is possible only if
one is willing to pay a particular price. This form
of mysticism misrepresents not only the nature of God
and of grace, but the nature of the self as well. The
self is seen as an operative subject, one who brings
3about the eventual union with the divine. He criticizes 
any form of nysticism or prayer which tends to become 
exploitive or which attempts to manipulate God by making 
"deals.Whenever prayer becomes exploited for purposes
^Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 73f.
2"Symbolism; Communication or Communion?" p. 347.
3e.g. The New Man. pp. 23ff; New Seeds of Con­templation. pp. I82f.
^Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 334*
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wMch are beneath its dignity as a matter of orientation
to God it becomes "strictly impure."^ He criticizes
any form of mystic!an which tends to become a means of
escape from involvement in or responsibility for the
world, and therefore he criticizes that form of nysticism
which has been called "qni.etism." Merton sees quietism
as an anti-incarnational heresy "which encloses a man
within himself in an entirely selfish solitude which
2excludes not only other men but even God Himself," 
Contemplation, although it includes silence and stillness, 
can never be the total cessation of all activity. The 
"blacking out" of all sensible realities and the entering 
into a total solitude result in the mystic’s being alone 
not with God but only with his oi-m ego, "He is not 
in the presence of the Transcendent One, but of an idol;
3his own complacent identity." Promethean, manipulative, 
or quietistic forms of pseudo-mysticism are not sub­
divisions of mysticism which Merton clearly and explicitly
Contemplative Prayer, p. 143. Of. The Inner Experience, p. 58s "The contemplative’s only safeguard is humility and self-forgetfulness and the renunciation of all desire to exploit the experience for any purpose whatever." On a concept of God and prayer based on a strict cause-effect relationship, see Contemplation in a World of Action, pp. I59f. Gf. Ibid.. pp. 102f, 3347
^"What is Contemplation?", p. 27; also The Inner Experience, p. 95
^Contemplative Prayer. p. 113. On Merton’s under-
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defines. Rather they are for him modes in which 
the selfish element that is a possibility and a 
temptation in all forms of mysticism can find concrete 
expression.
It is the self-orientation itself wliich is at the 
heart of Merton’s criticisms. VJhenever the self becomes 
the telos of the mystical experience it is a false 
mysticism. The true telos. God, has become secondary 
to the self, and whenever God who is ultimate Truth 
becomes penultimate at best, truth is sacrificed and 
falsity reigns. Throughout his life as .a commentator 
on iiystical experience, Merton insisted on being in­
cluded among those who warn against seeking spiritual
standing of quietism, see also Disputed Questions, p. 214; The Ascent to Truth, pp. 66ff, 199f; "Love and Maturity, ’’ p. 46. On the quietism of Molinos see Bread in the Wilderness, pp. 17f. For his appreciation of Fenelon, one writer who has often been accused of quietism, (chiefly because of his relationship with Madame Guyon), see "Reflections on the Character and Genius of Fenelon," in Fenelon Letters (London: Harvill Press, I964), pp.9-30. On quietism within the Christian tradition see Underhill, Op. Cit., especially pp. 321-327; Heiler, Op. Git., pp. 220-224; T.K. Connolly, "Quietism" in the New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 12, pp. 26-28, and Inge, Op. Git., pp. 231-245,
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experiences as goals in themselves.^ Spiritual or
mystical "experiences," enhanced feelings and emotions,
and ecstasies and visions are treated by Merton as
areas of contemplative life liiich must be approached
with utmost caution. If they are not so treated, the
result is not contemplation in its true sense, but
2rather, "consecrated narcissism," a Idnd of concentration 
on the superficial ego that, by its very nature, pre­
cludes any genuine experience of the divine. Spiritual 
experience, sought as an object and as an end in itself, 
is an idol.^ Strong emotions should not be mistaken
^or instance, Merton cites St. Benedict, St.Jolin of the Cross, St. Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysius the Arcopagite as well as the Zen Masters as warning against trusting in visions. "According to the language of the Christian apophatic theologians, in the tradition of Saint Gregory of Nyssa and the Pseudo-Dionysius, if you have a vision in which you think you see God clearly, you have not seen God." Ascent to Truth, p.68. On John of the Cross see Ascent to Truth, pp.6?f, 148, 201f and Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p.77 in which he refers to John of the Cross as well as the Zen maxim, "If you meet the Buddha, kill him."Of. Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 35* On St. Benedict see Basic Principles of Monastic Spirituality, p. 6#
2Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 213.
3e.g. "Symbolism; Communication or Communion?", p. 347. Cf., Life and Holiness, p. 97, "The Trans­forming Union in St. Bernard and St. John of the Cross," p. 31, and The Inner Experience, p. 100; "Once spiritual experience becomes objectified, it turns into an idol."
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for the voice of God^ and the value of meditations
2cannot be judged according to "how we feel." Feelings, 
visions, and similar spiritual experiences either do 
not count, or, at best, are a "dangerous form of success"
3in the life of mystical prayer. The danger lies in 
so far as the contemplative will often mistake the 
"nice warm feeling" that has been brought about by a 
particular ascetic or meditative discipline with the 
action of God and therefore fall into the error of 
self-justification, self-righteousness, and self- 
salvation.^ This becomes a problem not only for the 
individual mystic who has mistaken his ovm feelings 
for the reality of God, but for the world as well, 
since the self-righteousness that can be generated 
by a self-seeking form of mysticism can wreck havoc 
with the lives of others, both in terms of the spiritual 
development and their society. A mystic who relies 
totally on his ovm subjectivity can be a very dangerous 
person. According to Merton, such a persons
1Love and Maturity," p. 47*
2Contemplative Prayer, p. 40.
^Spiritual Direction and Meditation, p. 57. 
"^Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 116,
262
"•••identifies the will of God with anything that malces him feel, within his own heart, a big, warm, sweet interior glow. The sweeter and the warmer the feeling is the more he is convinced of his own infallibility. And if the sheer force of his oim self-confidence communicates itself to other people and gives them the impression that he is really a saint, such a man can wreck a whole city or a religious order or even a nation. The world is covered with scars that have been lift in its flesh by visionaries like these,"!
Therefore, time and time again, Merton warns against 
seeking spiritual experiences as either ends in them­
selves or even as important constituents of mystical
prayer. At best they can serve as signs, at worst they
oconfirm the superficial self in its oi-m illusions.
In some of his earlier writings Merton spoke about the 
gradual steps and degrees of mystical prayer as they
1 Seeds of Contemplation, p. 118. (The intensity of Merton’s fear of false mysticism in this passage is somewhat abated in the next paragraph in which he wrote, "However, very often these people are nothing more than harmless bores.")
2Warnings against self-centred mysticism are very numerous in the Merton corpus. See for example; Sign of Jonas, p. 54; The Silent Life, p. 102; Thoughts in Solitude, p. 118; New Seeds of Contemplation. p. 234, 245-247; Contemplative Prayer. p. 54; Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 237. See especially. New Seeds of Contemplât!on, Chapter 2, pp. 6-13, called "Itot Contemplation is Not;" Ascent to Truth, pp. 84f, and Chapter IV, pp. 59-73, called "False Mysticism."
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have been traditionally outlined by mystical theologians, 
especially since the \jritings of St, John of the Crossj^ 
nevertheless, he -warned, concern about the degrees of 
prayer leads to constant self-analysis and the contempla­
tive would do better to refrain from such analysis# It
2becomes too self-centred#
Merton*s concern for false spirituality was 
primarily focused on the contemplative practices 
within the monastic life. Tvro other areas in which 
he spoke critically about this problem were the drug 
culture that became wide-spread in America in the 1960s, 
and the attempts of the churches to present Christianity 
as an alternative to drugs, what Merton called religion 
as a "happiness cult."
The hope that psychedelic drugs could serve as 
a short cut to mystical awareness was a prevalent one 
in America in the 1960s. Timothy Leary had written 
about LSD with a catching enthusiasm, similar to the 
enthusiasm with which Aldous Huxley had spoken of the
1See No Man Is An Island, pp. 62ff, and the argu­ments of {Üie Ascent to Truth and Seeds of Contemplation#
^e#g#. No Man Is An Island, p# 217; "Poetry and the Contemplative Life," in Figures for an Apocalypse, p# 108; Seeds of Destruction, p. 286; and Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 31#
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1effects of mescalin, Merton, on the other hand, felt
that the use of drugs led only to a pseudo-mysticism,
one in which the user was never taken beyond the
superficial self but delighted, instead, in an illusory
feeling of self-transcendence. On one level, drug
usage was a matter of the seeking of an experience for
its o\m salce, enabling one "to *turn on* with a minimum
2of delay and inconvenience," On another level he saw 
drug induced mysticism as being "a substitute for 
metaphysical and mystical self-transcendence...perhaps
3also a substitute for love. However, the advent of 
the cult of psychedelic drugs had a message for modern 
contemplatives as far as Merton was concerned:
Timothy Leary, The Politics of Ecstasy (New York: Putnam, 1968), Aldous Huxley, The Doors of Perception and Heaven and Hell, published in one volume (Harmonds- worth; Penguin, 1959). See also Alan W. Watts, The Joyous Cosmology (New Yorks Pantheon, 1962).
2Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 11$.
^Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 28. See also "Symbolism; Communication or Communion?", p. 347; Merton's Introduction to William Johnston's The Mysticism of the Cloud of Unlmowing; and, The Inner Experience, pp. 22, 101. Merton is in agreement, in principle, with R.C. Zaehner's research into the mysticism of the drug culture. See Mysticism: Sacredand Profane (London: Oxford University Press, 1961),and Drugs, Magic and Makebelieve (London: Collins,1972)". Others who reject drugs as a means toward a religious enlightenment include Georgia Harkness (Op. Cit.. pp. I6I-I64) and Hal Bridges who, in American Mysticism, not only provides his o%m under­standing (pp. 120-l/p2) but also includes a statement
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"Whatever one may think of psychedelic drugs, as a sociological fact they clearly indicate that the desire for inner ex­perience is not something burled in the medieval past. The fact that the Beatles took LSD and then went to an Indian monlc and guru for guidance, then dropped LSD when he told them to, and practiced meditation under his instruction, is certainly salutary for so-called con­templative monks.
The drug culture, although it led to a false and super­
ficial mysticism, did indicate a desire for mystical 
experience, and this desire was a sign to the classical 
mystic and contemplative, (i.e., for Merton, the 
contemplative monk) to offer his own experience to help 
meet this need. The monk could offer first his mode 
of discipline (although Merton warned that the problem 
inherent in the use of psychedelics is shared by all 
forms of ascetic disciplines), second the theistic 
and Cliristocentric telos of mysticism, and third, the 
warning about the dangers of seeking mystical experience 
as a "turn-on";
by Swarai Prabhavananda denying the religious authenticity of a drug-induced experience, (pp. 151- 
153).
1Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 107; Cf., p. 161; The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton, p. 144f and "The Monk as a Marginal Mfein," Center Magazine 2 (January, 1969), Wo. 1, p. 33.
% ontemplation in a World of Action, p. 11$.
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needs to be made clear, however, is that contemplation is not a deepening of experience only, but a radical change in one's way of being and living, and the essence of this change is precisely a liberation from dependence on external means to external ends. Of course one may say that an opening of the 'doors of perception* is not entirely 'external' and yet it is a satisfaction for which one may develop a habitual need and on which one may become dependent. True contemplation delivers one from all such forms of dependence. In that sense it seems to me that a contemplative life that depends on the use of drugs is essentially different from one which implies complete liberation from all dependence on anything but freedom and divine grace. I realize that these few remarks do not answer the real question - but they express a doubt in my own mind.
To offer Christocentric contemplation is the task 
of the monk. The Christian Church at large, however, 
was failing in its vocation to meet the spiritual needs 
made evident by the popularity of drugs. Drugs promise 
instant contemplation. They promise the ability to be 
a mystic without having to make any sacrifices. Merton 
however, does not blame this situation simply on those 
involved in the drug culture. Official religion has
^Faith and Violence, p. 217.
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contributed.to this confusion.
"It has after all been the claim of official religion - more or less in all the Churches - that religion would act as a happiness pill, would help people to solve their problems, would make life easier and more jolly, and so on. If religion is enthusiastically advertised as a happiness pill, and then a real happiness pill comes along, then I see no justification for religious people complaining that the public likes the competitor's product better. After all, it is cheaper and more effective.
The Church's "happiness pill" alternative to drug-
usage is no better than the drug culture itself. By
offering religion as a competitor with drugs, the
Church trivializes the Gospel. Religion as a "happiness
pill" is a false idea of religion, in the same way that
2a self-centred mysticism is a false idea of mysticism.
Merton's purpose in warning against self-orientation 
in mystical experience is, on the one hand, a negative 
form of his insistance that true mysticism is an awareness
Loc. Git. Cf. "The Ascetic Life, Experience of God and Freedom," Cistercian Studies IX (1974), Wo. 1,pp. 60f,
2See also, "An Interview with Thomas Merton," p. 39; Seeds of Destruction, p. 244; Wew Seeds of Contemplation, pp. I86f. It should be noted that Sydney Ahlstrom in A Religious History of the American People (Wew Haven, Conn.; Yale University Press, 1972), discusses Merton in a chapter called "Harmonial Religion Since the Later Nineteenth Century." He views Merton positively against one who was a very popular adherent of religion as a "happiness pill," Norman Vincent Peale, p. 1,035. On
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of God, and on the other hand, an acknowledgement that
when the mystic is concentrating upon himself as the
subject of an experience, he will be unable to go
beyond the subject-object means of experiencing
reality, a movement that Merton understood as essential
in true mysticism.
The God-centredness of the mystical experience
was of primary importance to Merton, In the contemplative
life, he wrote, the most important thing "is not to live
for contemplation but to live for God. The concern
of the contemplative should be not so much with the
experience of God or with the gifts of God, but simply 
2with God Himself. This is implied in every warning 
Merton made against selfishness in contemplative prayer. 
However, to seek to discover God in the Dgrgtical 
experience is not a matter of a particular subject 
experiencing a particular object. The subject-object 
scheme keeps a knowledge of God purely on the level of 
the intellect. But intellectual cognition of God is 
limited. It is limited in that God's infinity transcends
the "death of God" as a "necessary iconoclastic protest" against this sort of false religion see Faith and Violence,pp. 193, 208.
^The Sign of Jonas, p. 38.
2e.g. Spiritual Direction and Meditation, p. 34*
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utterly the fiiiitude of the human intellect. Man 
cannot attain to God as He is in Himself by his oim 
intellectual or moral or spiritual efforts. The 
mystical awareness of God, which is always the effect 
of grace, hopes to transcend this limitation and pro­
vide a knowledge of God that is not simply intellectual 
but participatory. It is a Imowledge of God through 
love, or tlirough union. Yet for such a knowledge of 
God to be realised, not only must God not be understood 
as an object, but neither must the self;
"The Imowledge of which we are capable is simply a Imowledge about him. It points to him in analogies which we must transcend in order to reach him.But we must transcend ourselves as well as our analogies, and in seeking to Imow him we must forget the farailiar subject- object relationship which characterizes our ordinary acts of knovâng."^
In speaking to a group of nuns Merton made the same
point: "I want to malce it quite clear that the whole
essence of contemplative prayer is that the division
between subject and object disappears. You do not look
at God as an object and you do not look at yourself as 
oan object." Hence, Merton's warnings against self-
^Gontemplative Prayer. p. 103. 
2"The Life that Unifies," p. 65.
270
orientation also serves as a reminder to turn away
from the dichotomy of subject and object. If God is
to be experienced as something other than an entity
among entities, the self too must cease to regard
itself as a subject that has particular experiences*^
For Merton, in this context, the type of epistemology
implied in Descartes' Gogito is a curse laid on the 
2life of prayer* "We are plagued today with the 
heritage of that Cartesian self-awareness, which assumed 
that the empirical ego is the starting point of an in-
3fallible intellectual progress to truth and spirit*.."
VIhen the empirical ego is the starting point of know­
ledge or when one "finds his basic intuition in the 
reflexive self-awareness of the individual thinking 
subject, standing, as it were, outside of and apart from 
other objects of knowledge"^ the resultant cognition
e.g. Faith and Violence, pp. 81f. In Opening the Bible. p. 71, Merton quotes Erich Fromm on the necessity to transcend the subject-object scheme. Cf., The Inner Experience, p. 148; "The contemplative is not one who directs a magic spiritual intuition upon other objects, but one who, being perfectly unified in himself, and recollected in the center of his own humility, enters into contact v/ith reality by an immediacy that forgets the division between subject and object."
^Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 113.
3Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 26.
'^Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 67.
A
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is but a "ohill glow" or an "arid lightthat leads 
only to alienation. In spealcing of modern man "in 
so far as he is still Cartesian" Merton says that;
"The more he is able to develop his consciousness as a subject over against objects, the more he can understand things in their relations to him and to one another, the more he can manipulate these objects for his own interest, but also, at the same time, the more he tends to isolate himself in his own subjective prison, to become a detached observer cut off from everything else in a kind of impenetrable alienated and transparent bubble which contains all reality in the form of purely subjective experience.
As long as one continues to thinlc according to the 
subject-object structure,God too is seen as an object 
standing outside the subjective self. But Merton 
cannot define God in this way. For him, God is not
"Reflections on the Character and Genius of Fenelon," in Selected Letters of Fenelon (London;Harvill Press, 1964), p., 18.
2Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 22; Other attacks by Merton upon Descartes and the Cartesian consciousness can be found in New Seeds of Contemplation. p. 8; "Nothing could be more alien to contemplation than the cogito ergo sum of Descartes...This is the declaration of an alienated being," and also "As î^fen to Man," Cistercian Studies 4 (1969), p. 94? The Ascent to Truth, p. 38; Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander. pp. 264, 285; Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 211; The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 96; Zen and the Birds of Appetite! 
pp. 15, 68. Also, see above, pp. 2l8ff.
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Ian object, God is the "Absolute Ground of Being"
and beyond that the Godhead is the "Urgrund" and is
2realized from "within." He cannot be Imoim according 
to the subject-object scheme of laioid.ng for God transcends 
that scheme itself. He is knoim by loving participation;
"The unitive Imowledge of God in love is not a knowledge of an object by a subject, but a far different and transcendent kind of knowledge in which the created 'self* which we are seems to disappear in God and to know M m  alone•"5
The self undergoes an "apparent destruction" in order 
to Imow God, but what is destroyed is the superficial 
self, not the person. The superficial self cannot 
know God except as a matter of the intellect, it is 
incapable of transcendent union wi.th God, the Absolute 
Ground of Being;
"The person in fact is rooted in that absolute Ground and not in the phenomenal contingency of egohood. Hence if the
e.g. No Man Is An Island, p. 69; Faith and Violence, pp. Blf. "St. Anselm and His Argument," The American Benedictine Review 17 (June, 1966), p. 241.
2Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 71. See below,
PP* 366f.
3Contemplative Prayer, p. 94-*
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person were to attempt to go 'outside' this metaphysical ground in order to experience himself as being and acting, or observe himself as an object function­ing among other objects, the unitive wisdom experience would become impossible, because now the person is split in two - hence the paradox that as soon as there is "someone there" to have a transcendent experience, 'the experience* is falsified and indeed becomes impossible."^
It is not only impossible, it is absurd as well, to 
try to grasp God as an object which can be intellectually 
known by our minds, and thereby made a possible object 
for our manipulation. "In a word," Merton wote,
"God is invisibly present to the ground of our being; 
our belief and love attain to him, but he remains hidden 
from the arrogant gaze of our investigating mind..."^
All the mind can do is know about God, and this knowledge 
is only by way of very limited analogies. To Imow God 
personally, one must live on a different level than 
that level which is assumed by the superficial self.
One must be purged of that self and the attitudes it 
cherishes, in order to plunge to the depths of the 
true self, the self which is grounded in God and not 
in egohood. Only then, when the self is no longer
1
Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 78. Of. "The Ascetic Life, Experience of God and Freedom,"p. 64.
2Contemplative Prayer, p. IO3.
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viewed by itself as subject, and God as an object 
outside the subjective self, can the person be united 
to God in love.
Hence, to speak of "self transcendence" is to speak 
in a metaphor. Statements occuring in mystical witings, 
especially Christian ones, about the complete annihilation 
of the ego "have always to be taken with serious 
qualification,"^ What is annihilated is not the person 
in his true centre, but rather an ego-consciousness 
that in actuality hides instead of reveals the true person.
For Merton, the true person, the one who is the 
subject of transcendent consciousness, is not "the 
ego as isolated and contingent, but the person as 
•found* and 'actualized* in union with Christ....the 
identity of the mystic is never purely and simply the 
mere empirical ego - still less the neurotic and 
narcissistic self - but the 'person' who is indentified 
with Christ, one with Christ."^ The Ghristological 
element in Merton's mysticism is central;
"All that has been said so fai’ about man being made in the image and likeness of God and therefore being made for union with God is incomplete and indeed remains
^Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 74* 
%bid.. p. 75.
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meaningless for a Christian until we see it in its proper orientation - to the Person of the Incarnate Word, Jesus Christ, The whole theology of the Redemption, of man's supernatural vocation as a son of God, is summed up by St, Paul in his parallel between Adam and Christ; Adam the first man, the natural head of the human race and Christ the new Adam, the spiritual head of regenerated and spiritualized humanity."!
Merton's Christology is, in effect, a commentary on 
this passage.
2Merton focuses on two figures: Adam and Christ.
When he uses the name Adam, he is refering not simply 
to the figure in the Genesis narratives, but to all men.
The New Man, p. 79. Earlier in his life, in vjriting about the theological insights of John of the Cross, Merton stressed the centrality of Christology for Christian mysticism: "God's revelation of Himselfto the world in His Incarnate Word forms the heart and substance of all Christian mystical contemplation. This is just as true of Saint John of the Cross as it is of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, of Saint Bonaventure, or any of the mystics who are esteemed for their special devotion to the Humanity of Christ." The Ascent to Truth, p. 131.
^In this section of The New Man, Merton utilizes the hermenutical method Imovm as "typology." Merton also stresses this method in Bread and the Wilderness, pp. 29ff, 51ff. See also T W  Living Bread, p.(On The Problem of Typology as a Hermenutical Method, see G.W.H. Lampe, Essays on Typology (London; SOM, 1957), and J, Barr, Old and New in Interpretation (London; SCM, 1966), especially pp. 103-148) .
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Adaih is the natural man,^ He is man as created in the 
image of God but "fallen" in so far as that image is 
not made îoiovm in existence but remains hidden and un- 
Imoim. When he uses the word Glirist, he refers to one
pPerson of the Godhead.’' Christ is the eternal saving 
and redeeming action of God as Imow in existence.^ 
Although the Christ is present within the entire created 
order, He is know chiefly and primarily in His 
Incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth.^ Merton, therefore, 
used the word Christ to refer, on the one hand, to Jesus,
and on the other hand, to "the whole economy of Re
u:
6
5demption" which flows from the Incarnation. Christ
is God as He is know in existence.
Jesus is the Christ because in him God became 
know in existence. The image of God which is distorted 
in natural man was reestablished with the likeness of
^The Mew Man, pp. SOf.
% n  Merton's Trinitarian theology see The Mew Man, p. 102f and Contemplation in a World of Action, pp. 177ff.
3The Mew Man, p. 102, Contemplation in a World of Action, pp. 177f.
"^The New Man, p. 81.
^The Ascent to Truth, p. 312.
% o  Man Is An Island, pp. 184, 209*
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God and thereby the uncreated image of God was made 
manifest in time and space. Hence Jesus Christ is 
the perfect image of God as well as "the perfect 
likeness of His own divine Image," and because of this 
unity "He is in fact identified m.th the image, 
cc^substantial with the Father."^ In Him the infinity 
of God and the concreteness of man are one. In Him 
the superficial ego was sacrificed so that the true 
person could become an existential reality. In so far 
as Jesus is different from other men, he is different 
not because of any sort of docetic denial of humanity, 
but because in him his true humanity found its actual 
Ground. His difference was in that he was "not
Opersonalized by the individuation of human nature."
The centre of his personhood was not in his ego but 
in God. He is the one who was able, on the Cross, 
to allow the true nature of his personhood to be com­
pletely and perfectly revealed. He is the new Adam, 
the new Man, and as such, Jesus becomes for all men
The New Man, p. 84. Cf. The Living Bread. p.37, and The Inner Experience, p. 38: "In Him, we seea Man in every respect identical with ourselves as far as His nature is concerned, thinking and feeling and acting according to our nature, and yet at the very same time living on a completely transcendent and divine level of consciousness and of being for His consciousness and His being are the consciousness and being of God Himself."
^The New Man, p. 83.
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"not only a divine and ontological exemplar of our
own spiritual being, but He presents to us also a1created exemplar of spiritual perfection." He shows
us what we really are and what we can really do. The
Cross of Christ, however, is not simply a challenge
and an inspiration but it is also "a power, a source
2of life and strength." In so far as he is an exemplar,
Jesus Christ is also more than exemplar: he is also
3mediator and saviour. The union between God and man 
that is reestablished in Him is reestablished in all 
men as well; "By His Spirit He Himself becomes the 
principle of new life and new actions which are truly 
and literally His life and His actions as well as our 
o w n . O n  the Cross he not only reveals to us the 
ontological ground of our being and the existential 
demands of the moral imperative, but by the very fact 
of his revelatory action he has given to us as well 
the means by which we too can be reunited with that 
ground and by which we too can share in the fulfilment
^Ibid., p. 84*
2Basic Principles of Monastic Spirituality, p.14. Gf. "Seeking our Redeemer," Sponsa Regis 28 (February, 1957), p. 14/,..
3The New Man, p. 81.
% o  Man Is An Island « p. 183. Merton refers here to Galatians 2;20.
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of morality. He is the source of grace by which
existential communion with God is effected in our
own souls.^
Jesus is the source of grace as well as the
exemplar in so far as we share in his humani.ty in
the same way in which we share in the humanity of
2Adam. "All men were united in Adam," w o  te Merton, 
meaning that all manlcind shares in the superficialities 
of the "false self." At the same time, since Jesus 
was fully human, all share in his humanity as well. 
However, his humanity is that of the new Adam, the 
humanity that is reestablished "in the state of union 
with God which had once been the privilege of Adam.
In Jesus the reunion of man and God has taken place, 
and this reunion reveals to us that all men are "from 
the very moment we come into existence...potential 
representations of Christ simply because we possess 
the human nature which was created by Him and was 
assumed by Him in the Incarnation, saved by Him on the
^The New Man, p. 84.
^Ibid.. p. 80. Merton cites Sts. Bernard and Gregory of Nyssa on this point.
^Ibid., p. 81.
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1Cross and glorified by Him in His Ascension."
Simply by the fact of our humanity which is created
in the image of God, we are "potentially united with
the Word of God l-Jho was to come and take human nature 
2to Himself." The reunion with God is already implicit 
in our humanity;
"And this is possible only because we are all one with Christ, we are all in Christ by virtue of our humanity, by the very fact that we are made in the image of God, and possess that human nature which the Word of God took to Himself.
Merton differentiates between our natural and our 
supernatural union with God, the former based on our 
sharing in the humanity of Adam, the latter based on 
our sharing in the humanity of Jesus Christ.^ In both 
cases we are in union with God Himself, The difference 
is that of awareness. In the supernatural union made
^Loc. Git.
^Ibid., p. 82. Gf. Seasons of Celebration, p. 95* 
^Loc. Cit.
^Ibid.. p. 84. Merton cites Ruysbroek as' the one who developed the Augustinian doctrine of image and likeness to its conclusion and outlines his theories in what follows. See Ruysbroek, Adornment of Spiritual Marriage. Sparkling Stone, Book of Supreme Truth, ed., E. Underbill (London: J.M. Dent, I9I6), especiallypp. 125ff and 155. I am indebted to Sister Anne Saward of Chimay, Belgium, for these references.
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Imown in Jesus Christ "no longer is the divine Image 
present within us as unrecognized and unknown. We 
become aware of his presence. We plunge by supernatural 
understanding and love into the abyss of his light 
and b e i n g , T h a t  which has been present in our depths 
all along is now made visible; that which has been 
implicit is made explicit. "We do not have to travel 
far to find Him. He is id.thin us."^ As Merton explained;
"You cannot be vdthout God. It's impossible, it's just simply impossible. The only thing is that we don't see it...
"And that people are transparent, and that the humanity of God is transparent in people...There is humanness, humanness, mannes8 in God, which is manifested by every human being; not only by the fact that he is a creature of God but by the fact that he is redeemed in Christ...But this doesn't become apparent as long as we try to love the world for its oiai sake.
In Jesus Christ, God becomes transparent in man. In 
Him, He who is within us as the ground of our being, 
is now made visible, and because we are able now to
^The New Man, p. 87# Of. Bread in the Wilderness, pp. 73-77.
^Seasons of Celebration, p. 68. Cf. Ibid.. p. 70; Spiritual Direction and Meditation, p. 96*
2"A Life Free From Care," Cistercian Studies V (1970), pp. 222, 223. This article is a post-humously published transcription of a tape-recorded lecture.
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become aware of the union with God in our ground, we
begin to live as new creatures* We are born anew.
Human life undergoes a radical reorientation,^
Heretofore man m s  unaware of that which was implicit
in his very being; new he is aware. Heretofore the
natural union with God, being unrecognized, did not
contribute to man's virtuousness ("except in a very
imperfect way") or his happiness; now this can be
changed. Heretofore the natural union, because it
was unknoim, did nothing "to reduce the distance of
our exile from Him and his paradise"; now the distance is
bridged. Heretofore our natural union contributed
2little to union among men; now our supernatural union 
with God in Christ means that the history of the world 
has achieved an entirely new orientation which malces 
possible the reconciliation of men with one another.^
In Christ all creation, and especially mankind, is united 
in a whole new economy of God's redemption.^ In the
^The New Man. p. 89#
^"Hence the terrible truth that a mankind which belongs to Christ without perhaps knowing it, or without being able to really evaluate the meaning of so astonishing a mystery, is spiritually alienated from Him and is tearing itself to pieces." Seasons of Celebration, pp. 95f.
^The New Man, pp. 88f*
^Ibid.. p. 89.
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same way that we are all in Adam, we are all, as well, 
in the New Adam.^ Salvation comes through the recognition 
and realisation of that which has been given to us 
from all eternity. That apprehension is made possible 
through the recognition of Jesus as the Christ and 
the realization through our identification with his 
death and resurrection that we share a common humanity 
with him, a humanity that is at one m t h  God. Cliristian 
mysticism is, therefore, not a matter of self-intro­
spection,. Rather, it is the discovery that the ground 
of our being is revealed to us not in the intricacies 
of our own individual egos, but in the Christ who is 
in all. For Merton, mere ego analysis will never reveal 
the true person. "The discovery of ourselves in God, 
and of God in ourselves, by a charity that also finds
other men in God with ourselves is, therefore, not the
2discovery of ourselves but of Christ."
■ pp. 82, 93, 95, 96.
% o  Man Is An Island, p. 15. Of. Disputed Questions.and Seasons of Celebrations, pp. 134, 156'. Gf'.' "Rebirthand the New Man in Christianity," (unpublished) but which forms the basis of the Preface to the Japanese edition of The New Man. "To be born again is not to become some­body else, but to become ourselves...To be born again is to be born beyond egoism, beyond selfishness, beyond individuality in Christ." pp. 5? 7. See also The Inner Experience; "The Christian life is a return to the Father, the Source, the Ground of all existence, through the Son, the Splendor and the Image of the Father, in the Holy Spirit, the love of the Father and the Son. And
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The discovery of Christ as the true centre of
our beings is why Merton stresses that the Incarnation
and the Gross are at the heart of all Christian mysticism.^
It is the Gospel of Christ that makes false mysticism 
2impossible, that keeps one from becoming centred in
the individual ego. Methods of meditation, ascetical
techniques and cultic observances are all secondary.
"We have a man who, mysteriously, is God. He does not
expound to us a way. He Himself, eternal and divine,
3is 'the way,"' To discover Jesus as the Christ is 
to discover Christ at the ground of all humanity and 
hence as our own ground. Such a discovery entails the 
awareness that our ego-consciousness is precisely not 
that ground. But in a mysticism based on the Incarnation 
such a "self annihilation" is never negative. Rather,
this return is only possible by detachment and 'death* in the exterior self, so that the inner self, purified and renewed, can fulfil its function as image of the Divine ïTinity..,As a result of this union of God and Man in the one Person of Christ it was possible for everyman to be united to God in his own person, as a true son of God, not by nature but by adoption."
1See above, pp. 274f. Also, "Contemplation and Ecumenism," p. 141, and Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 212,
^The Living Bread, p. 105.
^The New Man. p. 101. Cf. Contemplative Prayer. p. 115, and Faith and Violence. p. 223.
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it is the victory of the new man. It is the beginning 
of man living in union with God, living that is, 
according to his true being - living as the Christ:
"So it is that we ourselves are 'the Second Adam' because we ourselves are Adam, we ourselves are Christ, and that we are all dwelling in one another, by virtue of the unity of the divine image reformed by grace.. .We are in the world as Ghrist-bearers and temples of the Holy Spirit, because our souls are filled with His grace...This, then, gives us a beginning of awareness of who we are. It is an awareness that is necessary for us to play our full part in the plan of God."1
This understanding of the Christ, the second 
Person of the Trinity, as the ground of our being 
allows Merton to follow a particular tradition in
Christian mystical theology in spealcing explicitly
2in terms of deification or "divinisation." Merton 
uses this language often, at the same time insisting
^ïbid., p. 96.
2This tradition is particularly strong in Eastern Orthodoxy. See Lossky. The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (London; James Clarke, 1957), especially Chapter V. Merton was familiar i&th this book (see "Prayer, Personalism, and the Spirit," Sisters Today 42, November, 1970, pp. 130ff) but his understanding of this concept came from his familiarity with the Fathers. He cites, for instance, Leo (Bread in the Wilderness, p. 83), Bernard ("Action and Contemplation in St. Bernard," p. 210), Athanasius (The Inner Experience, p. 36), and the Rhenish mystics ("Rebirth and the New Man in Christianity," p. 9).
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that although man never ceases to be himself^ and 
that God and man are and remain "metaphysically 
distinct," in mystical union in Christ man and Godpare "practically and experientially 'one Spirit.'"
3To be divinised is to become other Christs, and 
to become other Christs is to allow Him who dwells 
in human depths to become transparent. Hence Merton 
can say that man's vocation is to become divine; "It 
is man, in Christ, who has the mission of not only 
malcing himself human but of becoming divine by the 
gift of the Spirit of love."'^  To be divinised, there­
fore, is the same thing as to be humanized. It is to 
become fully human by the recognition and the making 
existentially real of the divine Ground of Being. The
^Gf. Bread in the Wilderness, p. 76; Seasons of Celebration, p. 126.
2Preface to The Mysticism of the Cloud of Unknowing (william Johnston, S.J.), p. ix. In this context Merton cites I Corinthians 6:l6; cf. The Ascent to Truth,p. 281.
^Gf. Bread in the Wilderness, pp. 79, 80; The Living Bread, p. 101; The New Man, p. 119; No Man Is An Island, pp. 139, 175; Seasons of Celebration, p. 54; The Silent Life, p. 23; "A Life Free From Care," 
p. 219.
^"Christian Humanism," Spiritual Life 13, (1967), p. 230. Of. The New Man, p. 46; Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 19; "The Catholic and Creativity," p. 210; "The Transforming Union in St. Bernard and St. John of the Cross," p. 211. These citations in no way exhaust the references Merton made to divinisation. See below 
pp. 473ff.
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divinization of man is, for Merton, nothing other 
than man living according to his true being, which is 
grounded in Christ. In Christ man and God are united. 
Therefore, divinization and humanization are existentially 
identical.
The existential ax^areness and communion with the 
Ground of Being is not an intellectual cognition of 
the essence of a mystery. The mystery remains 
mysterious. The knowledge that one may have of his 
inner ground is a "Imowing by unlmovdng,"^ It is 
an awareness of the divine, which although infinitely 
close to man, is also infinitely distant. Such Imowledge 
is not propositions! in character, and wherever it is 
spoken of in terms that £ire more applicable to pro- 
positional knowledge, those terms are always analogical 
and as such are never fully adequate to encompass 
or reveal the divine mystery. Therefore, although 
Merton was able to describe the salvific action of 
Christ as that of making us avjare of what is already 
ours by the eternal graciousness of God, he is also
Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 171, et. al. Gf. The Inner Experience, p. 69; "In 'unknow­ing' the gap between our spirit as subject and God as object is finally closed, and in the embrace of mystical love we know that we and Ho are one."
288
an exponent of the apophatic tradition.^
"This 'apophatic* tradition concerns itself with the; most fundamental datum of all faith - and one which is too often forgotten: the God who hasrevealed Himself to us in His Word has revealed Himself as unknown in His intimate essence, for He is beyond all merely human vision,,.The heart of the Christian mystical experience is that it experiences the ineffable reality of what is beyond experience. It 'knows' the presence of God, not in clear vision but as 'uhlmoxm, ',... It goes beyond words and ideas and attains to God Himself...Relinquishing
See above p, 247. See also Redeeming the Times (London: Burns and Oates, 1966), pp. 25f: "After all,it is no new thing to say that God as he is in himself is unknown to us and indeed unlmowable to any created intelligence. The tradition of apophatic ('non-apparent') theology goes back beyond Pseudo-Dionysius and the Gappodocian Fathers of the fourth century who long ago taught that if we say 'God is,' indicating that in him is the fullness of all that we can conceive of as Being, we must complete it also by saying 'God is not' to indicate that the fullness of his Being is far beyond anything that we can conceive of as existing (since all existents we laiow are limited and circumscribed by their existence). However, we must remember that this tradition of mystical negation always co-exists, in Christianity, with a tradition of symbolic theology in which positive symbols and analogies of theological teaching are accepted for what they are; true but imperfect approximations which lead us gradually toward that which cannot properly be expressed in human language,,.Religious formulas and symbols, articles ofjfaith, creeds, are not intended to prove anything. They are expressions of what has been revealed. They are not themselves the whole of revelation," (Cf. Faith and Violence, pp. 269-271), On the apophatic tradition see also, on John of the Cross, Disputed Questions, p. 212fj Ascent to Truth, p, 89; on Aquinas, Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p, 293; on Eckhart, Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 63; in the Zen philosophy of Hitaro Nishida (1870-1945), Ibid., p, 89.
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every attempt to grasp God in limited human concepts, the contemplative's act of submission and faith attains to His presence as the ground of being itself.•.Here obviously we enter a realm of apparent contradictions which elude clear explanation, so that the contemplative prefers not to talk about it at all. Indeed, in the past, serious mistakes have been made and deadly confusions have arisen from inadequate attempts to explain the mystery.
Merton himself did not choose the option of never 
talking about it at all, nor did he attempt to translate 
the experience of mysticism into precise and distinct 
theological language. He recognized the impossibility 
of such a task. The mystical experience was, for him, 
too 'existential' for an objective analysis. Its 
existentialism resided in that the reality comprehended 
in the mystical experience was "not under clear objective 
forms, but in darkness, vdthout form and without figure, 
apprehended only in the intimacy of the most personal 
and incommunicable experience,"^ The Christian mystical
172.
2
^Contemplation in a World of Action, pp. 171f,
The Hew Man. pp. 139f. See below pp. 353-357.
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experience was, for Merton, "a living theological
experience of the presence of God in the world and
1in manldlnd through the mystery of Christ." It was 
not the recognition of a system of truths about God.
God reveals Himself to man in the mystical experience; 
he does not reveal propositions about Himself. But 
this self-revelation never negates the essential 
mystery of God as He is in Himself. Man finds his 
salvation in the revelation of God as dwelling in 
the Ground of our Being, but the essence of God remains 
beyond man* s cognition. All man can do is stand in 
awe before the mystery that he has discovered deep 
within him,self•
4. Returns Merton's Ethics
It has been shovjn how Thomas Merton based his 
understanding of the mystical experience on the doctrine 
of the Incarnation. He understood that as we recognize 
our true selves and the true selves of all men in the 
ground of being, we discover God's self-manifestation
1Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 40,
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in terms of concrete human existence*^ In other 
words, we discover Christ, the second Person of the 
Trinity, who has been made knoim to history perfectly 
and définitivly in Jesus. This understanding of Clirist's 
Incarnation is the bridge between Merton's understanding 
of God and his understanding of ethics* It is the 
Incarnation that synthesizes mysticism and social ethics, 
contemplation and action, faith and wrks. His under­
standing of the doctrine of the Incarnation forced 
Merton to state the necessity of treating all men as 
Christ and the necessity of seeking Christ in all men:
"Since the Word was made Flesh, God is in man. God is in all men. All men are to be seen and treated as Christ. Failure to do this, the Lord tells us, involves condemnation for disloyalty to the most fLUidamental of revealed truths. 'I %ms thirsty and you gave me not to drinlc. I was hungry and you gave me not to eat...*(Matthew 25:4-2) This could be extended in every possible sense: and is meant tobe extended, all over the entire area of human needs, not only for bread, for work, for liberty, for health, but also for love, for acceptance, for fellowship and under­standing."^
Again and again in his writings Merton stressed 
that all men are Christ. He refused to limit this 
sharing in Christ to those who were expressedly Christian,
^See above, pp.276-287,
2Emblems of a Season of Fury, p. 79.
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although he often referred to the Christian and to the 
Church as being Christ,^ Rather, he extended the 
definition of the word "Clirist" to include, at least 
potentially, all men:
"I must learn that my fellow Jnan, just as he is, whether he is my friend or my enemy, my brother or a stranger from the other side of the world, whether he be wise or foolish, no matter what may be his limitations,'is Christ.'"2
"For in becoming man, God became not only Jesus Glirist but also potentially every man and woman that ever existed.In Christ, God became not only this man but also, in a broader and more mystical sense, yet no less truly, 'every man.'... If we believe in the Incarnation of the Son of God, there should be no one on earth in whom we are not prepared to see, in mystery, the presence of Christ."3
With this broad understanding of the Incarnation and 
the meaning of Christ, Merton can therefore state 
that the Incarnation is the heart and ground of all 
true humanism,^ Because of the Incarnation no man
^e.g.. The Ascent to Truth, p. 260; The Living Bread, pp. 4, 80; Disputed Questions, p. 119.
2Disputed Questions, p. 124.
%ew Seeds of Contemplation, pp. 294f, 296; cf. Seasons of Celebration, p. 95.
^e.g., "Giiristian Humanism," p. 226; of. Life and Holiness, p. 131.
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who has been grasped by this mystery in the depths
of his being can ever be indifferent to the fate of
any other person,^ even those who are unjust or who
are enemies. Human nature, which is identical in all
men, "was assumed by the Logos in the Incarnation"
and Christ died for all men "in order to live for all 
2men." Those who explicitly call themselves by the 
name of Christ are the bearers of a humanism which 
Merton felt to be the only humanism that was grounded 
in the truth that can unite man to man and man to God:
"No humanism has retained the respect for man in his personal and existential actuality to the same extent as Christian humanism. The center of Christian humanism is the idea that God is love, not infinite power. Being love, God has given himself id.thout reservation to man in that he became man. Henceforth, by reason of the incarnation, the love which is also the infinite creative secret of God in his hidden mystery becomes manifest and active through man, in mmi's world."
VJhat we do to one another, we do to Christ.'^  Therefore,
the Christian is deeply and ultimately concerned with
^"The Challenge of Responsibility," Saturday Review 4.8 (February 13, 1965), pp. 28-30.
^Thomas Merton on Peace, p. 112.
^"Christian Humanism," p. 229*
^e.g. Seasons of Celebration, p. 99. Merton says almost precisely the same thing in respect to the American racial problem in Seeds of Destruction, pp. l6f, 126f.
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the way in which he actualizes his relationship to
his brother. But the Christian is not primarily
concerned with ethical perfection but is concerned,
primarily, with the "new being" in Glirist. Morality
will necessarily fail unless it is proceeded by union
with God in Christ. One cannot gather figs from 1thistles. However, when man is born again in Glirist, 
morality is fulfiled;
"For after Glirist has heen born in our hearts. He reaches out to Himself in the heart of our brother by the love of His own Spirit. Binding Himself as He is in us, with Himself, as he is in our brother. He restores us, in that same Holy Spirit, to the embrace of the heavenly Father."
In Christ, we are one with each other, one within 
ourselves, and one with God. Humanism, or personalism, 
in the Christian context is therefore, a discovery of 
one's inmost self, and the inmost self of one's 
neighbor (which for Merton meant everyone in the world) 
as grounded in Christ.-'^
^"Ghi’ist the Way," p. 146.
2Seasons of Celebration, p. 105. 
^Ibid., p. 22.
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"Therefore when you and I become what we are really meant to be, we will discover not only that we love one another perfectly but that we are the same Mystical Person, and that we are both living in Christ and Christ in us, and we are all One Christ.
This could be put another way. When the ground 
of a person's being is revealed to him he becomes aware 
that the ground of his being is no different from the 
ground of all that is. The same ground grounds every­
thing. Therefore, one discovers the world by discovering 
his deepest self, because in discovering the ground of one's 
self, one discovers, at the same time, the ground of all 
reality. This ground "is not a visible objective and 
determined structure \flth fixed laws and demands. It 
is a living and self-creating mystery of which I am
pa part, to which I am myself my oim unique door*"''
Therefore, when one discovers the world in his own ground, 
he is no longer able to remain alienated from it. He 
does not renounce the alienated and false self in order 
to escape from and remain separate from the world; he 
does so in order to find his true self reconciled i-dth 
the world as it exists in Christ - in its ground. By 
discovering his o\m true self, he finds the world's
^Beeds of Contemplation, p. 48.
2contemplation in a World of Action, p. 155.
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true "self" as well:
"If the deepest ground of my being is love, then in that very love itself and nowhere else mil I find myself, and the world, and my brother and Christ,It is not a question of either-or but of all-in-one. It is not a matter of exclusivism and 'purity* but of whole­ness, wholeheartedness, unity and Meister Eckhart * s Gleichheit (equality) which finds the same ground of love in everything."^
"Clirist the Lord is the Word Who has assumed our 
nature, which is one in all of us."^ The Image of 
God is the same in all,"^  This, for Merton, was the 
basis of all ethical speculation. Contemplative 
prayer or mystical experience, if it is an authentic 
descent to the deepest level of one's being, awakens 
man to his ethical responsibility. It does this first 
by ai^akening the person to the truth of his connatural!ty 
with all beings, and secondly, by allowing him to 
experience that the Ground in î>Jhom all are one is love.
Ethics, for Merton, "must be based on an experience 
or realization of connatural!ty with our brother."^ 
Merton believed that there could be no natural law
^Ibid., pp. 15$f.
2Seeds of Destruction, pp. 256f.
^See above, pp. 232ff. See also The New Man, pp. 8$f.
^Seeds of Destruction, p. 257.
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without this kind of realization, and that it is
this realization that forms the basis of the Mosaic
law, the gospel ethic and the ettiical implications
within most ancient religions*^ This unity between
beings is prior to any existential separation. We
do not discover a new unity when we are confronted with
the Ground of Being; we discover an older unity, "My
dear brothers," Merton addressed a gathering of monks
in Calcutta shortly before he died, "we are already
one. But we imagine that we are not. And what we have
to recover is our original unity. VJhat we have to
2be is what we are."'' He believed that there is a 
basic solidarity of all humanity, but that because 
men are separated from the Ground of their Being, 
they are unaware of this solidarity and that therefore 
their relationship to their brother is not properly 
understood. Until persons are able to see the truth 
of their oim depths, they are unable to live in 
solidarity with others.
"The original solidarity of man, on which our perfect happiness and ful­filment depend, was destroyed by sin
^e.g.. Seeds of Destruction, p. 257; The of Ghuang Tzu, p. 27.
^The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton, p. 308,
298
and man cannot find peace and unity within himself, or in society, until he is reconciled to God in Christ."^
Merton understood contemplation's task as malting 
this solidarity explicit by assisting the individual 
in becoming open to and ai-jare of his o\m Ground so 
that not only ifill he come to know himself as he 
really is, but also so that he may come to know others 
as they really are and come to know the Ground that
unites his inner self with the inner reality of all
2 3creatures. Me are all "one Man." No person is
complete and self-sufficient in himself.^ All find
their identity in Christ "in l-Jhom we complete one
another...."
"kfhen we reach that perfection of love which is the contemplation of God in His glory, our inalienable personalities, while remaining eternally distinct, mil nevertheless combine into one Person so that each one of us will find
1Basic Principles of Monastic Spirituality, p. 15.
Q"e.g., "Concerning the Collection in the Bellarmine College Library," p. 14; Spiritual Direction and Meditation, pp. 66f.
3Bread in the Wilderness, p. 94-
^e.g., Seasons of Celebration, p. 229; Seeds of Contemplation. pp. 41f«
299
himself in all the others; and God will be the life and reality of all. "3-
According to Merton, therefore, one task of contemplative 
prayer is the awakening of the person to the awareness 
of the solidarity of all creation.^
But contemplation has a further task. At the same 
time that it ai^ akens the person to the fact of his 
solidarity with his brother, it awakens him to the 
loving quality of that relationship. It is not enough 
to have an intellectual cognition of the unity of all 
in the ground of being, but any intellectual cognition 
is only valid in so far as it gives rise to a volitional 
dimension. One cannot be said truly to know of the 
solidarity if one refuses to give expression to it 
in actual, concrete relationships. Herein lies the 
paradox of Merton's understanding of the Christian 
mystical life; "a man cannot enter into the deepest 
center of himself and pass through that center into 
God, unless he is able to pass entirely out of himself 
and empty himself and give himself to other people in
^Seeds of Contemplation, p. 53. Note that Merton called one of his books Man Is An Island.
%erton related this insight directly to the racial problems he witnessed in American society and to the war in Vietnam. See below pp. 537ff.
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the purity of a selfless love,"^ The ground of being
in which one finds the basis of his solidarity with
the other is love. The Image of God which is discovered
in that ground is the image of the God who is love.
"To say that I am made in the image of God is to say
that love is the reason for my existences for God is
2love. Love is my true identity." Thereby it is 
futile for man to attempt to seek his true identity 
outside of a relationship of love to his fellow man.
Only by loving can one hope to discover his true self; 
conversely, when one fails to be involved in loving 
relationships with others self-discovery is inhibited. 
The person who descends to the depths of his true self 
discovers in those depths a command to love. The true 
person cannot be separated from this imperative. The 
command to love is "the deepest law of our nature, not 
something extraneous and alien to our nature. Our
3nature itself inclines us to love, and to love freely." 
This command is "not a demand for this or that work, 
it is a word of life, a creative word, making man into
^Seeds of Contemplation, p. 47.
^Ibid., p. 46.
Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander. p. 121. Cf. No Man Is An Island, p. 234, and The Newp. 108.
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a new being, making his society into a new creation."^
It frees man to be able to love and to be able to create 
a true society, because it operates at the deepest level 
of human reality. Love, as it is practised by the 
false self living under the domination of the ego, 
creates superficial relationships and tenuous societies. 
True and creative social structures cannot be built upon 
a level of relationship that is only superficial. True 
society is only possible when true persons enter into 
communion with each other, for only true persons are 
capable of loving freely. "To build the Kingdom of 
God is to build a society that is based entirely on 
freedom and love. It is to build a society which is 
founded on respect for the individual person, since 
only persons are capable of love."^ Contemplation, 
which is the drive to Reality, makes true love possible, 
for in contemplation the understanding of relationships 
which heretofore was based upon a strict distinction 
between subject and object, is overcome and the lover 
recognizes the beloved as his "other self."
^Disputed Questions, p. 122. 
^Ibld., p. 142.
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"Love means an interior and spiritual identification with one's brother, so that he is not regarded as an 'object' to 'which' one 'does good.'...Love talces one’s neighbour as one's other self, and loves him with all the immense humility and discretion and reserve and reverence without which no one can presume to enter into the sanctuary of another's subjectivity. From such love all authoritarian brutality, all exploitation, domineering and condescension must necessarily be absent,..Love demands a complete inner transformation - for without this we cannot possibly come to identiiy ourselves with our brother.We have to become, in some sense, the person we love.
Contemplation therefore, is a paradox. One must 
enter into solitude in order to become free from the 
illusions which characterize ego-centred existence; 
but in freeing man, contemplative solitude both awakens 
him to the imperative of love and makes it possible 
for him to love. Only with free persons is true 
coimiiunication and true communion possible, and a 
person is free only if he is able to become one with
' Wisdom of the Desert, p. 18. Cf. Thoughts in Solitude, p. 160; Disputed Questions, p. 207; The Living Bread, p. 141; The Inner Experience, p. 22; "Solitude is necessary for spiritual freedom. But once that freedom is acquired, it demands to be put to work in the service of a love in which there is no longer subjection or slavery."
^e.g., Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 26?.
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the source of all freedom. Withdrawal without a 
subsequent return is an imperfect spirituality, yet 
an attempt to build a new society without having first 
undergone a vjithdrawal is no better. Social ethics 
depend on a prior withdrawal into contemplative prayer.
Therefore, it can be stated that Merton's under­
standing of withdrawal did not mean a disdain for 
the world and a rejection of its needs. His understanding 
included an idea of contemptus mundl only in so far 
as the world could be found within the individual. One 
was called to withdraw from the imrld by withdrawing 
from certain sets of illusions, superficial understandings 
and trivial concerns as they occur within the self.
This, more often than not, necessitated some kind of 
i-nlthdrawal from the actual physical world. Without 
the silence and the solitude provided by such a retreat 
into the desert, Merton believed, withdrawal from the 
false self would be difficult if not impossible. Never­
theless, withdrawal from the false self was a step toward
As an example of this, Thomas Merton organized a retreat in November, 1964, on the "Spiritual Roots of Protest," (see above, p. 5?f )• His notes for the retreat include the following: "What we are seekingis not the formulation of a program, but a deepening of roots. Roots in the 'ground* of all being, in God, through His word." Thomas Merton on Peace, pp. 259f*
304
the recovery of the true self, and consequently, ifith- 
drawal from the world was a step toward a recovery of 
the world according to its true nature, that is, as 
it is in its redeemed state. As has been said, for 
Merton any withdravjal from the world which did not 
include as its goal a subsequent return to the world 
was a mi8talc en notion of withdrawal. "The contemplative 
life, " he w o  te, "is not, and cannot be, a mere with­
drawal, a pure negation, a turning of one's back on 
the world with its sufferings, its crimes, its con­
fusions and its errors."^ Merton could not accept a 
concept of contemplation which would allow one to retire 
into "an ivory tower of private spirituality," and 
abandon the rest of the world to run its ovm course.
He regarded any such attempt as being both illusory 
and iraraoral; illusory in that no one is ever able to 
extract himself totally from society, immoral in that 
it would be a rejection of the world which Christ loved 
and came to redeem, a refusal to share with Christ 
in that redemption. Withdrawal is never solely for 
the good of the one who withdraws. It is for the 
good of the world. Withdrawal is for the purpose of 
return. As early as the mid-1950s Merton wrote, "We
^Seeds of Destruction, p. xiil, 
2Brealcthrough to Peace, p. 11.
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must return from the desert like Jesus or St. Joiin,
with our capacity for feeling expanded and deepened,
strengthened against the appeals of falsity, warned
1against temptation, great, noble and pure," Earlier 
still he was examining the relationship between con­
templation and action as seen in the Fathers of the 
2Church* Never did he see contemplation as a with­
drawal from the real. To x-dthdraw is to seek truth, 
and truth is discovered in concrete existence, not in 
a realm of ideal essences. Truth can be discovered 
through a process of withdraxml from the superficialities 
of the self and the xmr].d, but it cannot be discovered 
by a rejection of the concrete reality of the self and 
the xforld. Withdrawal, experience, and return are 
but different movements within an ongoing process* It 
is the process as a xfhole that leads to ultimate truth*
The absence of one of the movements within the process 
frustrates the discovery of that truth. To those whose 
lives in the busy world that xms America in the 1950s 
and 1960s blinded them to the necessity for xdthdrawal, 
Merton preached a xford that stressed silence and solitude.
^Thoughts in Solitude, p. 28.
^e.g., "Action and Contemplation in St. Bernard." See also his chapters on Gregory the Great and Bernard in Contemplative Prayer. pp. 6O-69.
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However, to those who failed to see the supreme 
importance of involvement in the struggles of the 
world xfhether they were apathetic monks or apathetic 
churchmen in the secular world, Merton preached a 
word that stressed return and social action, 
"Christianity cannot reject history," he v/rote;
"It cannot be a denial of time. Christianity is centered on an historical event which has changed the meaning of history. The freedom of the Christian contemplative is not freedom from time, but freedom in time. It is the freedom to go out and meet God in the inscrutable mystery of His will here and now, in this precise moment in which He asks man's cooperation in shaping the course of history according to the demands of divine truth, mercy and fidelity,"1
The process of withdrawal and return aims at 
ointegration, and man is unable to be integrated 
xvithin himself if relationships with other persons 
and mth the events of history are excluded.^ A
1Seeds of Destruction, p. xiv. See below pp. 577ff, for an exposition of Merton's ideas of history.
2See above, p. 199 for references to Merton's essay, "Final Integration; Toward a Monastic Therapy."
3e.g.. Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 111.
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mysticism which does not turn outward and remains en­
closed within itself is an escape from reality,^ and 
for Merton this was antithetical to all that he 
understood Christian spirituality to be. Contemplation 
is seen in a dialectical relationship xnLth action. 
Merton repudiated any "crude divisions" betxfeen
the txfo that might have appeared in his earlier 
2writings. He saw that within the monastic life there
was both a contemplative and a prophetic element, and
that any dilemma betxfeen the tx-ro or any dilemma betxfeen
the mystical life and the moral life xms resolved in
the discovery of God as revealed in the mystery of the 
3Incarnation.
e.g., The Nexf Man, p. 27. Cf., The Inner Experience, pp. 22, 143f; "Mere xfithdraxfal, xdLthout return to freedom in action, xiTOuld lead to a static and death-like inertia of the spirit in which theinner self xfould not av/aken at all Contemplationmust not be confused x-rith abstraction. A contempla­tive life is not to be lived by permanent xfithdravral within one's oxai mind...the true contemplative is not less interested than others in normal life, not less concerned ^dth what goes on in the xforld, but more interested, more concerned."
^"Poetry and Contemplation: A Reappraisal," inA Thomas Merton Reader. p. 437.
^e.g.. Contemplation in a World of Action, p.199; The Sign of Jonas, p. 273.
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"There has alx-rays been a tendency for Giiristian society to pass from an almost exclusive emphasis on the spiritual character of the Christian vocation, to an equally exclusive emphasis on the social and. humanistic aspects of that vocation. The fact remains that both points of view are obligatory.
2In Christ the opposition between the two vanishes. 
Both are revealed as "two aspects of the same love of
3God." Merton differentiated between the tifo not 
according to their essential nature, but according to 
their function. "Action is charity looking outx-jard to 
other men," he -wrote, "and contemplation is charity 
draxm inv/ard to its ox-m divine source. Action is the 
stream, and contemplation is the spring."^ In so far 
as it is the source of action, contemplation has a 
primacy. Activity, if it is to be redemptive, is born 
of contemplation and resembles it.^ Nevertheless, the
1"Christianity and Mass Movements," in Gross Currents 9 (Summer, 1959)> p. 201.
^e.g.. The Nevr Man. p. 51.
^Seeds of Contemplation, p. 115.
"^Nq Man Is An Island, p. 84.
^e.g.. Seeds of Contemplation, p. 115; Faithand Violence. p. 222.
309
essential primacy is neither to contemplation in itself
or action in itself; charity is always primacy.^
The highest vocation is neither the contemplative nor
the active, but one in which "the fruits of contemplation
2are shared with others." To leave the world is not 
to abandon the world, but to help save it. One can only 
help to save the world if he is not himself in bondage 
to the malaise from which the xjorld suffers. Therefore 
withdrawal has a special work which is important to 
the world. Its work is to deepen awareness, including 
awareness of the x^orld's needs. "True solitude," 
x^ rote Merton, "is deeply axzare of the x-/orld's needs.
It does not hold the world at arm's length."^ It 
enables man, by giving him a vision of the world as 
it is redeemed in Christ, to have a redemptive social 
ethic.^ Far from blinding the contemplative to the
^"Action and Contemplation in St. Bernard,"p. 210.
Man ^  An Island, p. 161. In this stance Merton claims the support of St. Thomas Aquinas (s. T. 2a 2ae Q. 182), (See also The ,Seven Storey Mountain, p. 497), and St. Francis of Assisi as a "perfect embodiment" of this ideal,
3Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 19*
^e.g.. Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 179#
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needs of the world, contemplative prayer does the 
opposite. It transforms his vision of the world, 
enabling him to see the world, all its inhabitants 
and its history in the light of God.^ It enables 
man to be free from the powers which distort the 
true nature of the world, and by being free, to be 
able to save it, Merton found the Desert Fathers of 
fourth century Egypt to be an inspiration and a model 
for him; he interprets their withdrawal as an attempt 
to save the world through their search for reality.^ 
This same theme is found in the chapter "Solitude Is 
Not Separation," in New Seeds of Contemplation in which 
he stresses that the only justification for a life of 
solitude is the conviction that it will enable one to 
learn to love both God and other persons. For Merton, 
solitude yas both a necessary and a sufficient cause 
of true love and concern;
"Without a certain element of solitude there can be no compassion because when a man is lost in the wheels of a social machine he is no longer aware 
of human needs as a matter of personal responsibility. One can escape from
^Contemplative Prayer, p. 139.
^e.g.. The Wisdom of the Desert, p. 23. See above, pp. 94f.
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men by plunging into the midst of a crowd!
Solitude, therefore, was the source of a social ethic
in so far as solitude provided the locus for one's
experiencing and reflecting upon the presence of Christ
at the ground of one's being. But as has been stated,
solitude without a subsequent return was not true solitude.
Any monasticism based on such solitude, that is, based
on an understanding of x-dthdrawal that did not consider
some form of return as a correlative of the act of
vdthdrax-jal, was regarded by Merton as being founded
not so much in Christ as in Plato. Merton xms critical
2of Platonism wherever it implied a rigid dualism, 
and he saw Christian spirituality as a means of recognizing 
that any dualism between the sacred and secular realms 
is not of an essential nature. No longer, he felt, was 
it possible to build a contemplative life on the premises 
with which the middle ages built monasticism. "The whole 
world viexf of medieval civilization was structured on the
^New Seeds of Contemplation, p. $3*p~e.g., Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 133, and Seeds of Destruction, p. 313. Also, "This is God's Work," Sisters Today 4-2, p. 6. Merton relates in his autobiography how he did not like Plato xfhen he was in school (The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 95), and x^ras also upset by Plato's rejection of poets from his ideal Republic. (Raids on the Unspeakable.p. 161).
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ideas of eternity and divine transcendence. Secular 
life itself was understood in this framework of un­
worldliness." The monlc had had a role within society. 
Their renunciation of the world "paradoxically gave 
them a key place in the world of their time, and their 
asceticism, their mystical life, xmre understood to be 
an essential contribution to a religious culture in 
which everyone participated."^ But this is no longer 
the world view in which the contemplative life finds 
itself. Today the contemplative *s role is necessarily 
different. No longer can he contribute to the xforld 
simply through his asceticism, but he must now show 
an openness to the world, an openness which is "demanded 
by the realization that the xforld of today, in which 
man's whole future for good or for evil now rests in 
his o\m hands, is for all men the place of God's epiphany
pas Judge and as Savior, as the Lord of History." He
Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 134# Merton added that the "Cistercians of northern England in the twelfth century played somewhat the same role in their society as General Motors plays in American society today." Merton bases this understanding on the Cistercian x-jool trade as xmll as their asceticism! On the place of the monk in medieval society see the Sxmmary in R.W. Southern's Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages (Harmondsxforth: Penguin,
1970), pp. 214-299.
^Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 136.
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call show this openness to the world only if he is not 
totally immersed in the world's o\m illusions. How 
the openness is manifested is not Merton's point. He 
does not think it necessary for Cistercians, for instance, 
to begin preaching missions.^ The contemplative *s 
return may be much less direct; it may simply be a 
matter of sharing with others "their privilege of 
silence, worship and meditation, their ability to 
listen more deeply and more penetratingly to the Word 
of God, their understanding of sacrifice, their inner 
vision."^ But even in a simple, non-direct manner, 
there must be some form of return.
Merton spoke of the malaise of the world in
3terms of "alienation. " He could not see how there 
could be a redemptive humanism in an alienated society
^Ibid.. p. 137.
%bid.. p. 137f.
^"The term alienation is used of a human being who is systematically kept, or who allows himself to be kept, in a social situation in which he exists purely and simply for somebody else." Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 71. Alienation is a psychological state in which "the 'center' of identity is experienced to some extent not in oneself but in the other." Ibid.. p. 60. Of. pp. 78f, 238, 350; "Christian Humanism," pp. 225, 227; "This is God's Work," pp. 3f; Faith and Violence, p. Thomas Merton on Peace, p. 222,
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mthout a divine dimension,^ since unless one was 
able to transcend the illusions that ifere inherent 
in an alienated society, one would never be able to 
save that society. The source of alienation is 
technology (although Merton admitted that a superficial 
practise of religion can have an alienating effect);
"There is alienation among us, and there is still more among the Marxists, In either case it is due not to religion or pseudo-religion. It is due to technology and to the moral collapse of a materialist world. And, yes, when ideologies try to spirit this alienation off into thin air, then ideologies aggravate the problem."*
Moral evil is not, for Merton, caused by a belief 
in God, but by alienation from Him. Only when the 
belief in God posits Him as sometiiing totally foreign 
to man and not as "closer to us than we are to our­
selves" that religion can be a source of alienation. 
"The moral evil in the world is due to man's alienation 
from the deepest truth, from the springs of spiritual
3life within Mmself, to his alienation from God."
^e.g.. Disputed Questions, p. xi; Emblems of a Season of Fury, p. 88.
^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 60; of. Contemplation in a World of Action, pp. 153, 331.
^Thomas Merton on Peace, p. 222.
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Merton understood the contemplative life as one of, 
if not the only means, of extricating humankind from 
its alienated state and restoring persons and society 
to a state of unity, harmony and integrity. In a 
world that is in a state of alienation, the contemplative 
answer was personalism. This is what Merton saw as 
the vocation of monasticism (which can be interpreted 
as the vocation of those who willingly enter into an 
explicit process of mthdrawal-experience-and return) 
in today's world;
"The monastic life today stands over against the world with a mission to affirm not only the message of salvation but also those most basic human values which the world most desperately needs to regain; personal integrity, inner peace, authenticity, identity, inner depth, spiritual joy, the capacity to love, the capacity to enjoy God's creationand give thanks Our first task isto be fully human, and to enable the youth of our time to find themselves and develop as men and as sons of God* There is no need for a community of religious robots without minds, without hearts, without ideas and mthout faces.It is this mindless alienation that characterizes 'the world' and life in the world. Monastic spirituality today must be a personalistic and Christian humanism that seeks and saves man's intimate truth, his personal identity, in order to consecrate it entirely to God.wl
^Contemplation in a World of Action, pp. 8lf.
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To withdraw from the world, therefore, means "not 
the rejection of a reality, hut the unmasking of an 
illusion." The monk assumed, according to Merton's 
understanding of the monastic vocation, full responsi­
bility for the world and for his own individual person- 
hood for only by assuming such responsibility can the 
monk, or anyone else, be said to be living for God. 
Alienation occurs not whenever a person withdravrs from 
the illusions of the world and the ego, but on the 
contrary, alienation occurs whenever a person does 
not withdraw from those illusions. As long as! he 
is living at the level of the superficial self which 
is grounded in its o^m ego-consciousness, the person 
is alienated from his inner ground and from all other 
persons and existants. As soon as one is able to 
discover his inner ground, he id.ll discover, as well, 
the inner ground of all others, and thereby be free 
to be reconciled. Only at the level of the deepest 
ground of being is such reconciliation possible.
In order for there to be a society that is based 
on truth there must be love, but in order for there to 
be love there must be "a communion between persons," 
and in order for there to be such a communion, there
^Ibid., p. I54,
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must first be "interiority and d e p t h . A t  the
same time, in order for there to be love, there must
be concrete and existential manifestations of that love.
Love must be acted. But action that is not a response
to the God of Love in l-Jhom all reality is grounded,
2results in a useless frenzy. On the one hand, Merton 
addressed Americans who had acquiesced to the irierent 
injustices and inequalities within their society, 
calling them to recognize the moral Imperative that 
was coextensive with a belief in the Incarnation.
On the other hand, he was addressing those who, 
especially in the 1960s, were passionately involved 
in social change and revolution, calling them to seek 
the spiritual roots of their protest. He spoke these 
correlative messages at both the beginning and the end 
of his career. In the opening pages of one of his 
earliest books he proclaimed;
^Disputed Questions, p. 118. Of.Solitude, p. 13.
^On the frenzy of "activism" (as opposed to "Christian action"), see Ho Man Is An Island, p. 133; Thomas Merton on Peace, p. 15; Raids on the Unspealcable, p. 60; Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, pp. 86, 195f; Life and Holiness, p. ix; Mystics and 2en Masters, pp. 222,278; Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 112;"Action and Contemplation in St. Bernard," p. 110; "Conference on Prayer," p. 449f; "Love and Solitude," p. 36; "Wiat is Contemplation?", pp. 26f. Also see below, pp. 570f.
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"The only thing that can save the world from complete moral collapse is a spiritual revolution. Christianity, by its very nature, demands such a revolution. If Christians would all live up to what they profess to be­lieve, the revolution would happen. The desire for unworldliness, detach­ment, and union with God is the most fundamental expression of this revolutionary spirit. The one thing that remains is for Christians to affirm their Christianity by that full and unequivocal rejection of the world which their Baptismal vocation demands of them. This mil certainly not incapacitate them for social action in the world, since it is the one essential condition for a really fruitful Christian apostolate."^
In one of his last books, he proclaimed essentially 
the same message;
"Without contemplation and interior prayer the Church cannot fulfill her mission to transform and save manlcind. Without contemplation, she mil be reduced to being the servant of cynical and worldly powers, no matter how hard her faitliful may protest that they are fighting for the Kingdom of God.
"Without true, deep contemplative aspirations, without a total love for God and an uncompromising thirst for his truth, religion tends in the end to become an opiate.
^The Ascent to Truth, p. 3.
^Contemplative Prayer, p. 144*
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There can be no social ethic in a society which 
lacks a contemplative dimension, for contemplation, 
by bringing man into an immediate contact with the 
Ground of all Being, awakens him to the truth of him­
self, his brother, his world, and ultimately, to God 
who is Truth, In other words, contemplation makes 
a person sane. The problems of society cannot be 
solved other than by individual persons who have re­
gained their basic sanity. "If the citizens are sane,
1the city will be sane." Merton's word to the wrld 
was a call for both individual and corporate sanity;
"It is certainly true that I have written about more than just the contemplative life. I have articulately resisted attempts to have myself classified as an 'inspirational witer.' But if I have written about interracial justice, or thermonuclear weapons, it is because these issues are terribly relevant to one great truth; that man is called to live as a son of God. Man must respond to this call to live in peace with all his brothers in the One Christ."2
Thomas Merton lived life at the extreme. His 
mode of withdrawal took the form of a cloistered, 
silent monasticism and finally the solitude of a
^The Ascent to Truth, p. 7.
2"Concerning the Collection in the Bellarmine College Library," p. 15.
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hermitage. His mode of experience was in the tradition 
of Eckliart and St, John of the Cross, and had affinities 
with the Eastern mystical traditions, particularly with 
Zen. His return marked him in the forefront of Cliristian 
social action in the America of the 1960s, along with 
Martin Luther King, the Berrigan brothers, and Dorothy 
Day. This chapter has been an attempt to draw out 
of his many writings an implicit understanding, or 
theology, of social action. That theology is based 
on a xd-thdrawal from the superficialities and trivialities 
within the world and the self in order for one to 
experience his essential unity with God and subsequently 
to share an active love with his brother based on the 
unity that all share at the deepest level of being. 
However, as i-jas said at the beginning of this chapter, 
T-dthdrawal~experience-and return are to be seen as 
parts of an ongoing process that only makes sense when 
seen as a whole. At the same time, any one of those 
activities can be isolated from the others, and in 
actual practise often are. Withdrax-jal from the unreal 
is necessary for an experience of the real and the 
experience of the real is necessary for a transforma­
tion of the unreal so that it may be redeemed, changed, 
and made real. One need not necessarily live each one 
of these stages as vividly as Merton lived them. One 
individual may live more at one end of the spectrum 
than at the other. Merton's understanding of the Church
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led him to emphasize that "no one Christian has to
realize in himself all the truths and all the mysteries
of the Christian faith...xfhat one cannot do, another
does for h i m . H o t  all persons are called to live
the monastic life and not all people are called to
live the life of active service. In the Biblical
typology that was used by St. Bernard and subsequently 
2by Merton, not every one is a Mai-tha and not every 
one is a Mary. Both vocations are valid. But a rigid 
division between the activism of Martha and the 
contemplation of Mary is a false division; it is 
only apparent and its unity is found through love.
In the community of those who have been made aware, 
by the Incarnation of the Christ in Jesus, of the 
love that unites all its members, the contemplative 
and the activist share their individual vocations in 
order to fulfill a coimoh mission; the redemption of 
the xforld and each individual person in the world.
\bid., p. 14.
^e.g., "Action and Contemplation in St, Bernard,"and Contemplation in a World of Action, pp. 373f.
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IV. Tlffi MYSTICAL THEOLOGY OF THOMAS MERTON COMPARED 
WITH THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH,
In this chapter there xn.ll be an evaluation of 
Thomas Merton's thought in so far as it is either 
directly or indirectly concerned xrith the relationship 
betX'jeen mysticism and social ethics. This evaluation 
xfill be by the ■way of a comparison of Merton's theology 
xfith certain features of Paul Tillich's theological 
system. First, as an introduction, there will be an 
examination of the ways in which these txfo men agree 
or disagree in their understandings of the basic 
nature of mysticism. Then there will be an examination 
of a nximber of points in Merton's thought, points 
which focus on the doctrine of God, the doctrine of 
man, Christolegy, the doctrine of atonement, and 
ethics. The chapter xjill conclude by shov/ing hoxf 
Merton and Tillich define the explicit relationship 
between mystical prayer and social concern. In all 
sections of this chapter the same method will be used. 
First there xjill be a sujmnary, in as much detail as is 
necessary, of Paul Tillich's xmderstanding of the 
particular topic under consideration. Second, Merton's 
xmderstanding of that topic xd.ll be reviewed. Since 
the major portion of this thesis to this point has
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been an exposition of Merton's life and thought, this 
step may at times be rather brief and certainly not 
as detailed as the corresponding treatment of Tillich's 
point of view. Therefore, this examination of Merton's 
thought will necessarily involve references to earlier 
chapters of this xmrk so that, xfherever possible, 
repetition can be avoided. Finally, points of agreement 
or disagreement between the two thinkers tvill be 
discussed. The intention of this comparison is not 
to defend or attack either Tillich or Merton, nor to 
indicate one to be the more adequate Christian thinker 
than the other (which xmuld be impossible - in this 
sense the txjo men are not comparable, one being a 
Protestant systematic theologian and the other an 
unsystematic but articulate Roman Catholic monk). The 
explicit intention is to discover where and how these 
"Wo men, seen in a mutual relationship, can help the 
Church discover or rediscover an approach to the 
interdependence, of ascetical and moral theology. An 
implicit intention is to indicate hot-/ it is possible 
to apply criticisms of Tillich's theology to that of 
Merton, and conversely, how Merton's life and thought 
can contribute to a réévaluation of the contribution 
that Tillich made in this particular area.
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Introduction; Mysticism and Depth
In 1929, long before Tillich's theology had 
been fully systematized and developed, he wrote,
"The controversy over mysticism can be settled in 
principle if we distinguish between mysticism as a 
technique and mysticism as a form of grace. This 
early statement remains as a key to understanding Tillich's 
approach to mysticism. In so far as mysticism is a 
technique, Tillich vias one xd.th his contemporaries 
in rejecting it. But, unlike most Protestants,
Tillich VB.S not only able to understand mysticism 
as a form of grace, but as such he was able to accept 
it avidly, for he understood it as the experience of 
the immediate presence of the divine xjithout which 
there would be no religion at all. Mysticism can 
be a distortion, a futile attempt at self-salvation.
But mysticism can also be the existential element in 
religion, the experience in which one participates 
in the immediacy of the divine, the experience of 
being grasped by the divine Spirit.
1 "Protestantism as a Critical and Creative Principle," in Political Expectation, ed. James Luther Adams (New York: Harper and Row, 1971),p. 26.
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Mysticism as a technique is rejected because it 
fails to take with seriousness the fact of what 
Tillich considers to be man's existential estrange­
ment, Having fallen from essence into existence, 
man is estranged from the ground of his being. There 
is a gulf between man and God, a gulf between the 
finite and He who transcends both finitude and 
infinity. Finite man can never hope to be able to 
bridge that gulf by his own efforts, Tillich 
continuously stressed that "in relation to God, God 
alone can act and...no human claim, especially no 
religious claim, no intellectual or moral or devotional 
'work* can reunite us with h i m , I f  the gulf is to 
be bridged, the initiative must be God's, Tillich's 
Lutheranism makes him insist on the principle of 
"justification by grace," that is, man's salvation 
occurs through the action of God and not through the 
action of man, wherever mysticism tries to reach a 
reunion with God through bodily and mental exercises 
it is an attempt at "self-salvation" and therefore is 
impossible, Tillich recognized that "much Eastern and 
parts of Western mysticism do have this character,"^
1Systematic Theology, Vol. Ill, p. 238, 
^Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 96.
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and he was critical. The "Protestant principle," 
which Tillich defined as "the ultimate criterion of 
all religious and all spiritual experiences,"^ and 
which states, in its simplest form "that in relation 
to God everything is done by G o d , w a s  a principle
3which could not be violated.
At the same time Tillich was able to see that not 
all forms of mysticism violated the Protestant principle. 
The classical tradition of Gliristian mysticism, he 
insisted, was as strong as Protestantism in denying 
the possibility of self-salvation. To dismiss mysticism 
out of hand as being simply a form of self-salvation 
is a lamentable error. On one level it exposes the 
ignorance of the one who is rejecting mysticism, "If 
theologians paid more attention to the limits seen by 
the mystics themselves," Tillich w o te, "they would 
have to give a more positive evaluation of this great 
t r a d i t i o n , On a deeper level, the rejection of
^The Protestant Era (London; Nisbet, 1951), p, xxiv,
2Systematic Theology, Vol. Ill, p. 144#
^Tillich does not provide a precise definition of the Protestant principle although it permeates his entire system. See, for instance, in addition to what has been quoted above. The Protestant Era, p, xxix and The New Being, (New York; Scribners, 1955), Chapter 18*
Theology, Vol. II, p, 97.
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mysticism is lamentable because it rejects what should 
be an essential element of all religion. Without 
the mystical element, religion itself is truncated, 
Tillich defined this essential element when he wrote;
"'Mystical* is, first of all, a category which characterizes the divine as being present in experience. In this sense, the mystical is the heart of every religion as religion, A religion which cannot say 'God himself is present' becomes a system of moral or doctrinal rules which are not religious, even if they are derived from originally revelatory sources. Mysticism, or the 'felt presence of God,' is a category essential to the nature of religion and_ has nothing to do with self-salvation,"
In no way does this violate the Protestant Principle 
for Tillich, Without diminishing his insistance on 
that principle, he csin accept mysticism whenever it 
can be shown to be an expression of the experience of 
being grasped by the Spirit of God, In the state of 
existence man is estranged from God, who is the ground 
of being, or Being-itself, but since Being-itself 
participates in individual beings, the estrangement
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 96. Of., l-Jhat is Religion?, pp. 90f. It should be noted that Tillich is \d.lling to accept the term "religion" in contrast to a number of theologians within the "neo-orthodox" tradition. See "The Conquest of the Concept of Religion in the Hiilosophy of Religion," (1919)> in %at is Religion?; also. Systematic Theology, Vol. Ill, pp. llOf.
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is not ultimate separation. Reunion between man and 
God is possible. It is possible only through the 
grace of God, but it is possible, and when it occurs, 
it can be experienced. Mysticism is the experiential 
element in religion. It is the experience in which 
one participates in the immediacy of the divine 
presence.
"The main concept of mysticism is immediacy; immediate participation in the divine Ground by elevation into unity with itj transcending all finite symbols of the divine, leaving the sacramental activities far behind and sinking cult and myth into the experienced abyss of the Ultimate."^
This participation in the divine Ground, or reunion 
of man and God, occurs within the limits of human 
finitude and estrangement and is, therefore, "fragmentary, 
anticipatory and threatened by the ambiguities of
preligion,"" but it is nonetheless authentic and 
integral to true religion.
Tillich uses the word "ecstatic" to refer to 
the mystical experience of God. It is a word that 
he finds etymologically significant, stemming from
^Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (New York: Columbia University Press,
1963), p. 91f.
^Gvstematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 257.
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ek and stasis, which he interprets as a "standing 
outside one's s e l f H e  does not use the word 
ecstasy to mean over-excitement or exuberance or 
anything that has the connotation of irrationality 
or nonsense. Ecstasy is self-transcendence and as 
such it leads, however fragmentarily, to the personal 
loiowledge of the unconditioned in the midst of the 
conditioned.
"Religion tries to surpass the given reality in order to approach the un­conditional. The means for achieving this is rapture and ecstasy. IVherever we transcend the limits of our own being, moving toward union with another one, something like ecstasy...occurs* Ecstasy is the act of breaking through the fixed form of our own being. In this sense of the term we must say;Only through ecstasy can the ultimate power of being be experienced in ourselves, in things and persons, and in historical situations.
Only in the ecstatic or mystical moment is man able 
to have an immediate and experiential and participatory 
knowledge of the divine Ground. Therefore, for 
Tillich, mysticism is of the essence of religion.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 124, 
^The Protestant Era, p. 89*
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The unconditional, or the Ground of Being, is 
revealed to man in the ecstatic moment. But this 
revelation does not occur in anyway that either 
contradicts or overpowers the given realities in 
which man exists. Revelation, for Tillich, "is a 
special and extraordinary manifestation which removes 
the veil from something hidden in a special and 
extraordinary way," This hiddenness, he explains, 
is often called "mystery" but by "mystery" Tillich 
does not mean something that is simply puzzling or 
not yet understood by technical reason. Mystery has 
a deeper meaning; it is "something wMch would lose 
its very nature if it lost its mysterious character."
The reality of the mysterious can be experienced, and 
our relationship to the mysterious can be known. 
Nevertheless, such knowledge of the mystery is not 
at all analogous to the loiowledge of a thing id.thin 
the subject-object structure of reality, "%stery 
characterizes a dimension which 'proceeds' the subject- 
object relationship...whatever is essentially mysterious 
cannot lose its mysteriousness even when it is 
revealed." Revelation, therefore, is not the revealing 
of information about reality. It does not include 
loiowledge about nature or history or about "hidden 
things." Rather "revelation is the manifestation of 
that which concerns us ultimately., .the ground of our 
being...Only that mystery which is of ultimate concern
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for us appears in revelation,"^
Ecstasy, or mysticism, is the receiving of 
revelation. It is the subjective aspect of revelation 
which has an interdependent relationship with the 
objective aspect of revelation, which Tillich calls 
"miracle," No miracle is a miracle, for Tillich, 
vdthout its having been received by man. The mystical 
element of religion represents the receiving aspect 
of revelation. The movement is circular. The spirit 
of man is grasped by the divine Spirit, and in being 
grasped, discovers the presence of the "mystery" 
id.thin ordinary experience. Neither the mysterious 
character of the mystery nor the ordinary character 
of existential reality are destroyed in revelation. 
Ecstasy is "...the experience of the holy as transcend­
ing ordinary experience without removing it."^
In mystical ecstasy man stands outside of hiiTi- 
self, and in this state of self-transcendence, he is 
able to plunge to the depths of his being and discover 
in those depths the Ground of all being, wMch is God.
Systematic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 120, 121, 123. In this sense, to Icnow revelation is to know by "unlmowing". See below, p. 350, fn. 2.
^Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 8.
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Xlaerever man seeks a loiowledge of God that is concrete 
rather than abstract, a loiowledge in which man is 
able to loiow through participation, man is within the 
realm of the nystical. Tillich refuses to limit the 
use of the word “mystical" to those forms of mysticism 
in which the Protestant Principle is distorted or is 
in danger of being distorted. To reject the idea of 
mysticism because of such a limitation is to create a 
religious vacuum which will be filled one way or 
another, either tlirough a rejection of Gliristianity 
in favour of various Eastern religions or in an 
acceptance of pietistic forms of Christianity which 
accept the possibility of ecstasy, even though in 
distorted forms. But the vacuum will be filled, for 
whenever mysticism is rejected an essential element 
of religion is rejected, namely, the immediacy of 
the experience of God,
Tifo points can now be made to show a basic 
similarity between Tillich and Merton in their under­
standing of mysticism as the subjective aspect of 
revelation. The first point is that Thomas Merton 
agrees with and exemplifies Tillich's Protestant 
principle. The second is that, whereas Merton often 
speaks of mysticism as a form of "union" and Tillich 
speaks of it more often in terms of "immediacy" or 
"felt presence," their two approaches are nevertheless 
far from being in opposition and are, in fact, mutually
333
inclusive,
Merton is in full agreement with Tillich in
regard to the distortions of mysticism under the
norm of the Protestant Principle. This principle
also permeates Merton's writings, and it can be
argued that it is as much a part of Merton's approach
to the relationship between man and God as it was
a part of Tillich's. It could only be a "protestant"
principle in a very broad sense of the word, a sense
which Tillich himself accepts when he defines
Protestantism as a "prophetic spirit" that "mil
operate through Catholicism as well as tlirough
orthodoxy.The Protestant Principle is very evident
in the Catholicism of Merton, In his early (1951)
study of mystical contemplation. The Ascent to Truth,
he warns against a "false mysticism" which "ascribes
to a human nature the power and the right to acquire
supernatural illuminations by the effort of our own 
2intelligence.In its place is "true contemplation" 
which is the gift of God:
"True contemplation is, then, the experience of a union that is so purely and perfectly supernatural
^The Protestant Era, p. 233,
^The Ascent to TTuth, p. 16.
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that no created nature could possibly bring it about* Indeed, no spirit less than the Spirit of God can possibly produce even a plausible , imitation of true nystical union."
The "Protestant Principle" can clearly be seen in 
this passage in spite of the fact that Merton uses 
terminology idiich Tillich would not have used. Tillich 
would have refused to use a word like "supernatural, " 
nor would he have wanted to leave the possible impression 
that the Spirit of God was an existent, albeit an 
infinite one. Nevertheless, in spite of these 
theological differences it can be seen that even in 
his earliest writings on mysticism Thomas Merton 
affirmed the Protestant Principle, being aware of the 
pitfall that Tillich consistently warned against.
This is so, too, in writings from all periods 
of Merton's life. It can be seen in such other early 
writings as "Is Mysticism Normal?" and Seeds of 
Contemplation in which he writes:
"If, like the mystics of the Orient, you succeed in emptying your mind of every thought and every desire, you may indeed withdraw into the center of yourself and concentrate everything within you upon
^Seeds of Contemplation* pp. 31f«
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the imaginary point where your life springs out of God: yet you will not find God. No natural exercise can bring you into vital contact with Him. Unless He utters Himself in you, speeiks His own name in the center of your soul, you will no more know Him than a stone knows the ground upon which it rests in its inertia. "1
It can be seen, as well, in the writings of the middle 
portion of his life, in such works as Life and Holiness. 
("If we are called by God to holiness of life, and 
if holiness of life is beyond our natural power to 
achieve (which it certainly is), then it follows 
that God Himself must give us the light, the strength, 
and the courage to fulfill the task he requires of 
us.")^, and New Seeds of Contemplation ("And so the 
contemplation of which I speak is a religious and 
transcendent gift. It is not something to which we 
can attain alone, by Intellectual effort, by perfecting 
our natural powers...It is not the fruit of our own 
efforts*")^, and it can be seen, also, in some of the 
last pieces he wrote. "The New Testament," he wrote 
in Contemplative Prayer, "does not offer us techniques
^Seeds of Contemplation, pp. 31f# 
^life and Holiness, pp. lOf,
% ew Seeds of Contemplation, p. 4*
336
and expedients:, it tells us to turn to God, to 
depend on Ills grace, to realize that the Spirit is 
given to us, wholly, in Christ."^
These almost arbitrarily selected examples 
suffice to show, first of all, that the so-called 
Protestant Principle, is a factor throughout Merton's 
life as a;writer, and secordly, that Merton's 
terminology and emphasis have a number of points of 
affinity with classical Protestantism# In the examples 
quoted above one can see an interest in various themes 
that are dear to Protestantism: The Word of God spoken
to the depths of man, God's call, dependence on Grace, 
and the mediation of Grace through Christ. Not only, 
therefore, is there a basic agreement between Tillich 
and Merton on this point, there is a basic agreement 
between I^ 3erton and the even more critical emphases of 
orthodox Protestantism. Occasionally Merton expressed 
that Protestantism stressed its critical principle 
"too much" ' but nonetheless he insisted that it needed
oto be seen "very clearly, because it is very important."
^Contemplative Prayer, p. 48.
^"Building Gommrunity on God's Love," Sisters Today 42 (December, 1970), No* 4, p. 187# Bernard Martin, in Paul Tillich* s Doctrine of Man (London: Nisbet, 1966!) makes a much more emphatic criticism of Protestantism, and especially Tillich's 'cavalier* rejection of the possibility of self-salvation, (p. 177) Ntertin is a rabbi and writes from his own perspective.
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Generally speaking, wherever Merton discusses what 
he refers to as "Promethean Theology," he is emphasizing 
the same critical point that Tillich makes in the name 
of the Protestant Principle, Promethean theology is, 
according to Merton, the expression of a relationship 
between man and God in which man strives to win liis 
salvation from God; in which man and God are seen as 
in total opposition, and in which man is able both to 
express his opposition and to have the possibility of 
overcoming that opposition by his own efforts. Merton 
totally repudiates such a theology, either when it 
stands as a system in itself, or when it becomes an 
element within the mainslaream of Christian thought.^ 
According to Tillich's terminology, whenever he does 
so, Merton stands within the "protestant" tradition.
The second statement that is to be made at this 
point is that although Merton and Tillich write from 
the perspectives of different traditions, one Catholic 
monasticism and the other Protestant intellectualism, 
and although they employ somewhat different uses of 
language, they nevertheless share a common understanding 
of the essential meaning of the mystical experience.
It has been shown that Merton, under the influence of 
the Catholic mystical tradition, can speak of mysticism
^See above, pp. 9&f, 244, 257.
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in terms of union between God and man, a union in 
which distinctions are minimized if not totally 
overcome.^ Tillich, on the other hand, although he 
can speak of mystical union, usually saves the word 
"union" for a description of the restoration of 
the union between essence and existence within man, 
and speaks of the mystical relationship with God in 
terms of "felt presence" or "immediacy* " These two 
positions are complementary, and the difference is 
primarily one of emphasis* This can be seen by making 
a four-step examination of the mys in which Merton 
qualifies the meaning of the word "union" and showing 
how these qualifications coincide with various aspects 
of Tillich*s theology* These steps, which will be 
examined in detail shortly are as followsî first of 
all, it can be shown how both Tillich and Merton talk 
about the necessity and possibility of transcending 
the subjeot-object scheme of reality* Secondly, it 
can be shown how in Merton*s instance, that within 
the idea of union there is no implication of a 
mysticism of total absorption, a type of mysticism in 
which the centred-self would be considered to be 
destroyed* Thiis coincides with Tillich* s insistence
^See above, pp. 268-274, 281-2831.
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that for authentic existence there is the necessity 
of balancing the tension between the poles of 
individualisation and participation. Third, both 
Tillich and Merton speak of the knowledge of God as 
"participatory" and this concept is a part of what 
Merton means by union. Finally, Merton can speak of 
mystical union as "existential communion," a phrase 
that lends itself to a comparison with the entire 
thrust of Tillich*s theological stance. These four 
areas will now be examined in more detail to show 
their relevance in indicating the general agreement 
of these two thinkers.
Both Tillich and Merton speak of the necessity 
for and the possibility of transcending the subjeot- 
object scheme of ordinary knowledge. As we have seen, 
for Merton, union with God is a union of love, and 
love requires a passing beyond a relationship in 
which subject and object are clearly distinct.^ 
Whenever love is "a mere subject-objact relationship,pit is not real love at all." Love is concerned to 
encounter the beloved not as object but as another
^See above, pp. 268-274. 
disputed Questions, p. 102.
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subject.
"Love brings us into a relationship with an objectively existing reality, but because it is love it is able to bridge the gap between subject and object and commune in the subjectivity of the loved one. Only love can effect this kind of union and give this kind of knowledge-by-identity with the beloved..."i
This type of relationship, Merton thinks, is essential 
to all forms of love, let it is most essential to 
the relationship between man and God. "For it is 
above all," he continues, "in our relationship with 
God that love, considered as a subject-object relation­
ship, is utterly out of the question."^ The essence 
of contemplative prayer is that, in man's union with 
God, the division between subject and object disappears. 
If it does not, then actual union with God has not 
occurred. One cannot enter into union with God,
Merton thinks, as long as God is considered to be an 
object standing over and against man, and man is seen 
as able to have particular experiences of God's 
presence.
^Disputed Questions, p. 103* 
Zibid.. p. 104.
341
Similarly, throughout his writings, Tillich
emphasized the need to break away from a strict
dichotomy between subject and object.^ As has been
seen, mysticism, or the ecstatic moment is, for him,
the receiving of a mystery, and mystery precedes 
2that dichotomy. To be confronted by God is to be 
confronted by that which is beyond subject and object. 
The God who is seen in terms of the subject-object 
structure of being "ceases to be the God who is 
really God." Tillich thinks that the classical 
mystical tradition, in trying "to overcome the 
objectifying scheme by an ecstatic union of man and 
God" has a lesson for all theology; "Theology always 
must remember that in speaking of God it makes an 
object of that which precedes the subjeot-object 
structure and that, therefore, it must include in its 
speaking of God the aclmowledgement that it cannot
^Tillich recognizes, along with Merton (see
above, pp. 2?0f, especially fn. 2 on p. 271. that Rene Descartes is the philosopher who epitomizes the sharp distinction between subject and object, and in this regard Tillich insists that Descartes be over-ruled. Of. Theology of Culture, p. 151; Per­spectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protestant Theology, p. 120; What is Religion?. pp. 128f,(It is one of the more delightful incongruities of Tillich that he named his son. Rene Descartes Tillich.) On objectivity and personal involvement in science see Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (London, SOM, 1966), pp. 176-194.
2see above p. 331.
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1make God an object," Tillich insists that the
difference between subjectivity and objectivity
is overcome in terms like "ultimate, unconditional,2infinite and absolute," This is what St. Paul means, 
Tillich thinks, when he writes (Romans 6) that successful 
prayer is not possible without God as Spirit praying 
within us. "The same experience expressed in abstract 
language is the disappearance of the ordinary subjeot- 
object scheme in the experience of the ultimate, the 
unconditional."^ Therefore, Tillich asserts that 
when a person is in the midst of a genuine ecstatic 
moment, such a transcendence is experienced, and in 
making this kind of assertion, he is in full agreement 
with Mertons; "In the meditative act (which can, in 
some moments become contemplation) the cognitive subject 
and its object, the mystery of the holy, are united."^
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 191.
^Dynamics of Faith, p. 11,
^Loo. Git. Of. the discussion of Augustinian immediacy in Theology of Culture, p. 25. Schelling must be cited as one of the direct sources for Tillich's understanding of this concept. In Mysticism and Guilt- Consciousness (1912) he quotes Schelling: "The divineis never a mere object of knowledge. God is either genuinely unknown, or he is at the same time the subject and object of knowledge." Tillich comments, "This is perfect mysticism." (Mysticism and Guilt-Gonscious- ness. p. 75) The reference can be found in Vol. VI of F.W.J* Schelling, Samtliche Werke. ed. K.F.A. Schelling, Stuttgart, 1856-1861.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 215.
343
Furthermore, both men are agreed in asserting that 
without this transcendence, essential life is not 
possible* Merton called men to live at the level of 
the true self rather than the false self, at the 
level in which the self is in union with the Ground 
of its Being. And Tillich quite succinctly states, 
"Unambiguous life is impossible whenever the subjeot- 
object scheme is unbroken.
But Tillich issues a warning. The transcendence 
of the subjeot-object scheme must be seen in accordance 
with the Protestant Principle. Mot only is it the 
result of God's action, but it also must be seen as 
occurring within the limits of man's finitude and 
is thereby in need of qualifications. Although 
mysticism transcends the subjeot-object scheme of 
man's finite structure "for this very reason it is 
in danger of annihilating the centered self, the subject 
of the ecstatic experience of the Spirit."^ VJhereas 
the subjeot-object scheme can be transcended, the 
self cannot be annihilated. îfeerever nysticism speaks 
of total annihilation of the self, as it does in 
certain forms of Eastern mysticism, Tillich sees 
difficulties. Yet he states that Christian mysticism
bbld.. p. 81. 
%bld.. pp. 152f.
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has avoided this danger.^ Merton, writing as a 
proponent of the Christian mystical tradition, confirms 
Tillich's point* He does not acknowledge that nysticism 
of union with God is the same as a mysticism of ab­
sorption* Union with God and the transcending of the 
subject-objeet scheme does not mean the annihilation 
of the human self. He asserts that wherever Christian 
mystical writings, including his own, tend to speak 
in terms of the dissolution of the self, such writings 
must be seen as ^mbolic statements and must be read 
with great caution. The true self, Merton believes, 
is not annihilated or totally absorbed by God when it 
enters into union with Him. Rather, it is driven to 
its depths and enters into union with God in such a 
way that God and man remain "metaphysically distinct" 
while paradoxically becoming "one Spirit." That 
which is dissolved is the superficial ego or the false 
self, and Merton's distinction between these two forms 
of the self must be remembered in any discussion of 
his theology of mysticism. In the context of the two 
selves it can be said that the self is aimlhilated, 
when self is seen in its superficial aspect. But the
^Loc. Cit.
^See above, p. 286.
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true self remains and, in fact, becomes existentially
real. Therefore, Merton uses cautious language: in
union with God the self only "seems" to disappear and
undergoes only an "apparent" destruction.^ Tillich
indicates a similar understanding when he refers to
St. Bernard's example of a drop of wine being poured
into a cup of water. The wine remains wine and is
therefore not lost, yet it is no longer "self- 
2centered." The subjeot-object scheme is transcended, 
but individuation is not destroyed. VJhat is destroyed 
is the Individual's self-under standing which places 
himself over and against that which is other than 
self. The self, as such, is not obliterated. Subjects 
and objects remain, but their relationship is radically 
redefined. This is very important, Tillich thinks, 
since there can be no real love (or no real hate) 
without a distinction between subject and object.
"Now love presupposes a differentiation between the 
subject and the object of love. Even in imagining 
eternal life or eternal fulfillment, this differentiation
^See above, p. 274*
2Ultimate Concern, p. 140. See Bernard of Clairvaux, De Diligendo Deo. Chapter X. Merton refers to the same example in "Transforming Union in St. Bernard and St. John of the Cross," Collectanea. XI 
1, p. 48.
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remains# Therefore, for both Tillich and Merton, 
a mysticism of union in which the subject-object 
scheme is transcended (not destroyed), does not imply 
that by being absorbed into the Godhead the self is 
thereby obliterated. "Unity is not identity," Tillich 
wrote, "An element of separation is presupposed when 
we speak of u n i t y . A n d  Merton wrote that, in the 
mystical encounter "there is not so much a fusion of 
identities as the disappearance of identities."^
A further definition of "union" is shared by 
both Tillich and Merton; that is, union can be 
described in terms of participatory knowledge. Merton 
will speak of man's union with God in terms of par­
ticipation ("Bs senti ally, mystical experience is a 
vivid, conscious participation of our soul and of 
its faculties in the life, knowledge, and love of 
God Himself.")"^, but more often in terms of loving
^Ibid. Of. Systematic Theology, Vol. Ill, p.249; love. Power and Justice, p. 27*.
^Love. Power and Justice, p. lllf. Cf. A History of Christian Thought, p. 63, and Systematic Theology, vol. Ill, p. 48.
^New Seeds of Contemplation, p. 292.
^The Ascent to Truth, p. 16.
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knowledge, or knowledge by identity. "This knowledge 
by identity," he explains, is more than - not contrary 
to - scientific knowledge, or knowledge about certain 
aspects of God's Being, but it is knowledge of unity 
in love:?"
"Conceptual knowledge of religious truth has a definite place in our life, and that place is an important one. Study plays an essential part in the life of prayer. The spiritual life needs strong intellectual foundations. The study of theology is a necessary accompanieraent to a life of meditation. But meditation itself is not 'study* and is not apurely intellectual activity .In meditation we do not seek to know about God as though he were an object like other objects which submit to our scrutiny and can be expressed in clear scientific ideas. We seek to know God himself.....
Merton saw that the major flaw of Fr. PanelouX in 
Camus' The Plague was that his knowledge about God 
far exceeded his personal participation in God himself.^
^The Living Bread, p. 68.
^Contemplative Prayer, p. 98. Of. The Inner Experience, p. 121; in which Merton argued that mystical knowledge is not anti-intellectual, "On the contrary, as Jacques Maritain's Degrees of Knowledge has made clear, the approach to God beyond concepts, in contemplation, means that one must have a conceptual Imowledge beyond which he can goI" See Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge (London; Geoffrey Bless, 1 9 3 ^  pp. 305-357.
oAlbert Camus' The Plague; Introduction and Commentary, pp. 16, 38.
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The knowledge that is obtained through the mystical 
encounter is not information. God is met as "a presence 
and as a meaning" which we apprehend even though we 
may not be able to conceptualize and fully understand*^ 
But simply to have the ability to conceptualize and 
and understand theological statements like Fr. PanelouX 
is not adequate to the full meaning of religious 
knowledge. Religious knowledge is a participation 
in love; "Knowing without love never enters into the 
inner secrets of being. Only love can truly know 
God as He is, for God is love.”^  Merton defended 
Camus* criticisms of the problematic priest, and saw 
the simplicity and humility of Dr. Rieux, in spite of 
his indifference to Paneloux's theologizing, as being 
much more indicative of a true understanding and 
knowledge of God. This understanding of participatory 
knowledge can be found throughout the entire Tillich 
corpus as well as in the writings of Merton. Mystical 
knowledge, for Tillich, is experience by participation,^
^Contemplative Prayer. p. I40.
% o  Man Is An Island, p. I66.
^Gf. Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 50j,; Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 205; Courage to Be, p. 157.
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and knowledge that cannot reach a point of participation 
is truncated. In any genuine act of knowledge the 
subject-object scheme is overcome to some extent, in­
volving a balance between the poles of individuation 
and participation.
"Knowing is a form of union* In every act of knowledge the knower and that which is known are united; the gap between subject and object is overcome. Ihe subject 'grasps* the object, adapts it to itself, and, at the same time, adapts itself to the object. But the union of know­ledge is a peculiar one; it is a union through separation. De­tachment is the condition of cogni­tive union* In order to know, one must »look* at a thing, and, in order to look at a thing, one must be 'at a distance.' Cognitive distance is the presupposition of cognitive union.
There is, in Tillich's terms, unity and estrangement 
in every act of knowledge. But true knowledge must 
include union, and because of this union knowledge 
can be described as something more than simply a 
quantitative filling of the mind with factual informa­
tion. Knowledge can be seen as that which transforms
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 105; Of# The Protestant Era, p. 76.
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and healsParticipatory knowledge is knowledge
of rather than simply knowledge about, but does not
necessarily exclude the possibility of cognitive
knowledge about the object. This coincides with
Merton's insistence that mystical knowledge is not
anti-intellectual but that meditation needs intellectual 
2foundations. Tillich makes the same point: "To
the degree that the subject-object structure is 
overcome," he writes, "observation is replaced by 
participation (which includes observation) and con­
clusion is replaced by insight (which includes con­
clusions)."^ Participatory knowledge is inclusive 
of cognitive knowledge, not opposed to it. The
Ibid.. p. 106; of. Ibid.. p» 114 i» which Tillich speaks of 'intuition* as 'kno^ jing by participation.'Gf. Nhat is Religion? p. 31.
Merton is well aimre, also, of the via negative fsee above, pp. 287ff),, and follows directly in the tradition of Gregory of Kyssa, Dionysius, The Cloud of Unknowing. and John of the Gross when he writes about the pos­sibilities of knowing God through "unknowing." This emphasis is seen throughout îiis life, from his early studies on John of the Gross, e.g. The Ascent to Truth. to his later works on the points of affinity between Christian mysticism and Zen, e.g., Zen and the Birds of Appetite. Tillich does not dwell on this theme, although he sees that it does coincide, and could be the unconscious source, for what he says in The Courage Be on the "God above God," pp. 186-190. See A History of Christian Thought, p. 92* See also abovep.'% TH,~r:-------
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, pp. 271f.
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experiential knowledge of God is essential for 
theology, Tillich insists; it is the medium tlirough 
which the objective sources of theology (which for 
Tillich are the Bible, the history of Christian 
thought, and the histories of religions and culture)^ 
are received*^ Tillich cannot Envision a true theology, 
one which would deal with ultimate concern, without a 
mysticism of union.
One final consideration remains in regard to
various qualifications that can be placed upon Merton*s
understanding of the word "union." It is at this point
that a discussion of Merton's use of the word "existential"
is in order. Contemplation is, for him, more than a
metaphysical exploration of the concept of being. It
is communion with Being-Itself, the "transcendent
fulfillment of existential communion" with the source 
oof all Being. DJhen Merton introduces the word
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, pp. 39-45#
2Ibid.. pp. 50-52. Tillich sees esqjerience as the medium, not as a source, of revelation, ^or a criticism of this point see George H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message (New York: Scribners,
1962), pp^ 24-27# Tavard sees inconsistencies in Tillich's basic assertion and a limitation in so far as Tillich sees experience as being only personal rather than corporate or historical. See also Walter M. Horton, "Tillich's Role in Contemporary Theology" in The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 39#
^The New Man. p. 16. See above, p. 246.
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"existential" into his thought, he implies all the 
qualifications that have previously been discussed# 
"Existential" implies the transcending of the subjeot- 
object dichotomy; it implies the maintenance and safe­
guarding of authentic personhood, and it implies the 
idea of participatory knowledge also# "Existential" 
means involvement rather than detachment; it is 
experiential rather than abstract. Therefore, a 
discussion of the existential nature of i^ysticism 
could have been contained within the foregoing 
discussions. It has, however, been saved until this 
point, not only because of Tillich's reputation as an 
existentialist and because of Merton's explicit ap­
preciation for this philosophy, but because existential­
ism implies that reality is to be found in actual 
existence. To say that the nystical union of man and 
God is existential is to say that it takes place under 
the conditions of existence rather than in an idealised 
world. It is to say, with Merton, that the image of 
God in man becomes known in man's created existence.
It is no longer merely a possibility. It is actualized 1in time and space.
S^ee above, pp. 232-236, 275f, 281-283.
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This is in accord with Tillich's insistence that 
New Being, as seen in Jesus the Christ, is the 
appearance of essence under the conditions of existence. 
Immediate participation in the divine Ground occurs 
within existence. It is concrete and actual. It 
takes place within, rather than outside of, history.
I'Jhen Merton uses the word "existential" to describe 
the union between man and God, he is in agreement 
with Tillich in so far as both men see salvation as 
occurring to man in the present moment rather than in 
some future, and within the ambiguities of existence 
rather than in a state of ideal perfection.
Merton recognized and defended existentialism as 
a philosophy that shared in the same vision of reality 
as mysticism, especially the type of mysticism found 
both within the apophatic tradition of Christianity 
and the non-objective outlook of Zen. He was able 
to see that the existentialist attitude had been a 
part of the historical Cistercian tradition and therefore, 
not foreign to monasticism. For instance, he saw the 
medieval Cistercian Father, Guerric of Igny, as a 
prototype of the existentialist:
^Various points raised in this paragraph will be discussed more fully below in the section on "The Meaning of Christ" and in the conclusion.
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"He (Gùerric) speaks as a kind of existentialist, about the actual ' concrete experience of the person rather than just general abstract principles* That is what existentialist means in the nice sense of the word, the broad senses a thinker who is interested in the validity of personal spiritual experience as a basis, a starting point, by which to judge everything."^
However, on a deeper level than the merely experiential, 
he was more inclined to see existentiali sm as a style 
of thought that had affinities with mysticism and 
could thereby be appreciated by mystics:
"Existentialism is an experience and an attitude, rather than a system of thought. As soon as it begins to present itself as a system, it denies and destroys itself. Non-objective, elusive, concrete, dynamic, always in movement and always seeking to renew itself in the newness of the present situation, genuine existential­ism is, like Zen Buddhism and like apophatic Christian mysticism, hidden in life itself. It cannot be distilled out in verbal formulas."^
The use of existential thinking in theology led to a 
number of admirable qualities; the existential theologian
^"Guerric of Igny's Jester Sermons," Cistercian Studies VIII, (1972), p. 86.
^"The Other Side of Despair: Notes on Christian Existentialism," in Mystics and Zen Masters* p. 258.
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stressed openness, freedom, grace and love rather than
nature and law, and finally, "the most serious claim
to consideration which the existential theologian
can offer is the cogent diagnosis of our trouble,"^
i.e., the reality of the crisis in which man finds
himself in existence. Without making a direct reference
at this point to Tillich’s method of correlation,
Merton obviously has this method in mind. Tillich
saw that theology had a double task; "Theology
formulates the questions implied in human existence,
and theology formulates the answers implied in divine
self-manifestation under the guidance of the questions
2implied in human existence." It was the first part 
of the correlation that Merton cites as the most 
meritorious contribution of existential thought to 
theology.
Like Merton, Tillich wrote about points of affinity 
between existentialism and mysticism, Fq3^ him, 
existentialism was the philosophical counterpart to 
the mystical element in religion. The existentialist 
philosophers "tried to discover the creative realm of 
being which is prior to and beyond the distinction
^Ibid., p. 280 and passim,
^Systematic Theology. Vol. 1, p. 69. (It is true that Tillich is not explicitly mentioned by Merton in this context, but he is mentioned id.thin the article from which we have been quoting.) For a fuller exposition of the role of existentialism in philosophy and theology, see John Maoquarrie, Existential!sm (London; Hutchinson, 1972).
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between objectivity and subjectivity,"^ The ways 
in which Tillich proceeds to describe the mystical 
element in pliilosophical existentialism is reminiscent 
of Merton's distinction between the contemplation of 
being and the union with the Source of being. It also 
indicates that both existentialism and mysticism share 
a basic non-Cartesian approach to epistemology# He 
writes:
"Existential philosophy can be called the attempt to reconquer the meaning of life in 'mystical' terms after it had been lost in ecclesiastical as well as in positivistic terms. It is however necessary to redefine 'Bystical' if we are to apply it to Existential philosophy. In this con­text the term does not indicate a mystical union with the transcendent Absolute; it signifies rather a venture of faith toward union with the depths of life, whether made by an individual or a group. There is more of the Protestant than the Catholic heritage in this kind of 'mysticism* ; but it 5^ mysticism in trying to transcend the estranged 'objectivity' as well as the empty •subjectivity' of the present epoch. Historically spealcing, Existential philosophy attempts to return to a pre-Cartesian attitude, to an attitude in which the sharp gulf between the subjective and the objective 'realms' had not yet been created, and the essence of objectivity could be found in the depths of sub­jectivity - in which God could be ^ best approached through the soul,"
^Theology of Culture, p. 107, 
^Loc, Cit.
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Merton and Tillich approach theology with an appreciation 
for the pointa of affinity between mysticism and 
existentialism. Therefore, Merton is able to utilize 
existential ideas and attitudes in his exposition 
of Christian nysticism, and Tillich is able to show 
the importance of mysticisitt within his theological 
system. For both men, mysticism is the existential 
participation of man in the life of God, It is the 
experiential awareness of God and communion with Him 
as He gives himself to man in His self-revelation.
For both Merton and Tillich, religion is incomplete 
without the mystical element.
1. God as the Ground of Being
Paul Tillich looked to the classical tradition 
of Christianity for his basic definition of God. "In 
classical theology," he wrote, "God is, first of all. 
Being as such. Pens est esse....the power of Being 
in everything that is,"^ Tillich uses this classical 
tradition to form the basis of his own understanding
The Protestant Era, p. 70, On the traditional definition of God see E.L. Mascall's ^  Who Is; A 
Study in Traditional Theism (revised edition), (London; Barton, Longeman and Todd, 1966), Mascall
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of God, Fqp him, ^od is Being-Itself, or alternatively, 
the Ground of Being or the power of Being, His 
chief modification of the classical view is that he 
insisted that, since God is Being—Itself, or the Ground 
of Being, He cannot be a being. If God is thought of 
as a being, it logically follows that He be thought 
of as one being among other beings, and He is thereby 
diminished even though He is considered to be the 
"highest" or the "most perfect" or the "most powerful" 
being. To think of God in this way, Tillich believed, 
undermined His total transcendence. God is totally 
other than all existent beings. Superlatives, when 
used to describe Him, have the opposite effect from 
that which is intended. Rather than elevate Him, they 
actually detract from His aseity. On the other hand, 
to say that God is Being-Itself is to say that God is 
not on a level with beings as such but that He totally 
transcends them. As Being-Itself, God is beyond what 
classical ontology calls the contrast between essential 
and existential being. Difficulties arise, Tillich 
claimed, when God is described either in terms of 
universal essence (which he saw as pantheism) or in
refuses "to pass final judgement" on Tillich's theism but feels it is hardly traditional, p, ix<
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terms of existence. "It is as atheistic to affirm
the existence of God as it is to deny it. God is
Being-itself, not a being.Tillich thought that
the words "God" and "existence" need to be separated
permanently since being consists of both essence and
existence. God, for Tillich, is prior to any split
between the two* Therefore, to speak of his "existence"
in the way that much theology and popular piety does
is confusing and erroneous. Tillich insisted on
speaking about the "reality" or the "actuality" of
God, rather than the "existence" of God. "God does
not exist," he wrote, "He is being-itself beyond
essence and existence. Therefore to argue that God
2exists is to deny him," To argue that God exists 
is to argue that He is not beyond the cleavage between 
essence and existence and tliat therefore He is on a 
level with all other existants. This is to deny His 
utter transcendence. For Tillich, this is a fundamental 
error* "Being-itself infinitely transcends every finite 
being.
^Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 263, 
%bid.. p. 227.
%bid., p. 263,
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At the same time, however, "everything finite 
participates in being-itself and in its infinity*"^ 
Everything that has being participates in but is not 
identical with, Being-itself. Without such participa­
tion things would be either swallowed by nonbeing or 
would never have emerged from nonbeing. Every created 
thing contains within itself the power of being because 
every created thing participates in the infinite power 
of being in a finite way. Hence Tillich, using spatial 
metaphors, refers to God as the ground of being, the 
depth of life itself*
"The name of this infinite and in­exhaustible depth and ground of all being is God. That depth is what the word God means. And if that word has not much meaning for you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without reserva­tion. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget everything traditional that you have learned àbout God, perhaps even that word itself. For if you know that God means depth, you know much about him."*
^Loc. Git.
^The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 57-
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Tillich's use of such spatial terms as "ground"
and "depth" have, of course, symbolic meaning. The
only non-symbolic statement about God is that God is
Being-itself, anything else that is said about God
is said on this basis and by necessity has to be symbolic.^
Tillich defended the symbolic term "the creative and
abysmal ground of being" as being an adequate way of 
2talking about God, and it is this definition of God 
that makes it possible for Tillich to develop a 
theology which has mystical implications:
"Since God is the ground of being, he is the ground of the structure; the structure is grounded in him. He 3^ this structure, and it is impossible to speak about him except in terms of this structure. God must be approached cognitively tlirough the structural elements of being-itself."^
In other words, man can know God by discovering the 
depths of his own being. For Tillich, a segment of
^Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 264; of. Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 10 in which Tillich states that the only non-symbolic statement that can be made about God is that everything we say about God is symbolic.On this see J. Heyifood Thomas, Paul Tillich (London:Corey Kingsgate, 1965), p. 12.
^Ibid., p. 264 for a full treatment of this defense.
^Ibid., p. 264.
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finite reality, since it participates in Being-itself, 
can become the basis for assertions about infinite 
Being-itself. The .anslogjaontis is basic to man's 
search for the ultimate. It gives man the "only 
justification of speaking at all about God."^ Man 
does not attempt to deduce God from natui’e, but, in 
accordance with the Protestant Principle, it is 
through the natural that God reveals himself to man. 
Man himself is the door to the deeper levels of 
reality,^ because the self can point beyond itself
o("In other words, it is self-transcendent").
Tillich distinguished two ways of approaching God; 
one in which estrangement is overcome; the other, 
which he rejected, meets God as a stranger, as one 
alien to himselfs
Ibid.. p.-266, On Tillich's use of the .analogie entis. see Lewis S* Ford, "Tillich and Qhomass The Analogy of Being" in The Journal of Religion 46 (April, 1966), no. 2, pp. 229-245; Kenelm Foster, "Paul Tillich and St. Thomas" in Paul Tillich in Gatholio Thoi^ht. Thomas P. O'Meara and Celestin D. V/eisser (eds.), (London: Barton, Longman and Todd, 1965), pp. 97- 10$; Donald J. Keefe, Op. Cit.. passim; George HacLean, "Symbol and Analogy: Tillich and Thomas" in O'Meara,Op. ^;t., pp. 145-183;; Edward D. O'Connor, "Paul Tillich: An Impression" in O'Meara, Op. C^,, pp.37f; Gustave Weigel, "The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich" in O'Meara, Op. Cit.. pp. 3-24; and "Myth, Symbol and Analogy" Ibid.. pp. 184-196.
Zibld.. p. 70.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 8.
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"In the first way man discovers himself when he discovers God; he discovers something that is identical with himself although it transcends him infinitely, something from which he is estranged, but from which he never has been and never can be separated."^
"Revelation is the manifestation of the ground of
2being for human knowledge." IVhen God reveals himself 
to man, man discovers that which is infinitely distant 
from him while at the same time he discovers that 
which is infinitely close to him. He discovers his 
own ground, the structure of his own being, but discovers 
as well, that this ground and this structure infinitely 
transcend the human self. Therefore Tillich can 
paraphrase both Meister SJckhart and St. Augustine and 
say that God "is nearer to the ego than the ego is to 
itself,"^ and he can quote St. Bonaventure on the 
immediacy of God; "God is most truly present to the 
very soul and immediately knowable."^ He is such 
because he is the very ground of the soul*s being.
^Theology of Culture, p. 10; Systematic Theology. Vol. II,
p. 7.
2Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 10$.
^Ibid.. p. 301; see Eokhart, Sermon 69 in Pfeiffer * s Meister Bckhart (Original 1G$?), ET (London; Watkins, 1924), p. 171; of. Augustine *s Confessions III. 6, iii. See also A History of Christian Thought, p. 24^, in which Tillich shows this understanding in Luther*
^Theology of Culture, p. 13#
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Tillich sides conclusively with what he calls the 
Augustinian-Franciscan school against the Thomists.
"I would say," he addressed a class, "almost un­
ambiguously, that I myself, and my whole theology, 
stand much more in the line of the Augustinians than 
in the Thomistic tradition."^ The Augustinians, he 
argued, saw God as the prius of all knowledge, while 
the Thomists saw God as exterior to man, a res 
singular!ssima (Occam)* It was the Augustinians 
therefore, including Bonaventure, Meister Eokhart 
and Jocob Bohme, who supplied Tillich with a doctrine
of God that had the necessary paradox for a theological
2defense of mysticism.
Like Tillich, Thomas Merton stressed the immediacy 
of God, and like Tillich, he emphasized the point that
3God "is closer to us than we are to ourselves,"
A History of Christian Thought, pp. 104, 111.See also John Herman Randall, Jr., "The Philosophical Legacy of Paul Tillich" in James R. Lyons (ed,). The Intellectual Legacy of Paul Tillich, pp. 34fj and John P. Dourely, Paul Tillich and Bonaventure.
^The difference between the Augustinian and Thoinist schools are spelled out in the essay, "The TVo Types of Philosophy of Religion," {1946}, in Theology of Culture, pp. 10-29. On Bohme, Eokhart, Bonaventure, Bernard of Clairvaiuc and others whom Tillich includes in the "Augustinian" camp see especially A History of Christian Thought, passim. Rollo May in his biography of Tillich, Paulus, (New York: Harper,and Row, 1973), mentions Bohme * s influence on Tillich, pp. 67, 87.
^This statement occurs in many places throughout Merton's writings, among whic'h are No Man Is an Island, pp. 138, 229, and The New Man, pp. 16, 83.
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Although Merton's theological education was decidedly
Thomist, as was all Roman Catholic seminary training
in the 1940s, and although in his early writings he
1was a champion of various Thomistic positions,
he was, like Tillich, principally at one with what
Tillich called the Augustin!an-Franciscan tradition.
He recalled that Dan Walsh, who had taught him
philosophy at Columbia University, was quick to see
his Augustinian tendencies soon after he had converted 
2to Catholicism. This Augustinian!sm remained with 
him all his life, in spite of a grounding and a 
serious interest in scholasticism. E. Glenn Hinson 
argues convincingly that Merton's Augustinian bent was 
hidden during the years in which he was attracted to 
scholasticism but that it reemerged as the years passed
For instance, he argues in The Ascent to Truth, p. 37, that if the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas are rejected by modern philosophy, the fault is with "the complete philosophical confusion that prevails outside the Church" and with intellectuals who suffer from a "powerlessness to think." The fault is not with the arguments themselves. If Merton was familiar with the criticisms of Immanuel Kant and David Hume, he does not let on.
^The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 26$.
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and as Merton's scholastic interests gave way to his
mystical interests. Scholasticism, thinks Hinson,
"ran too much against the grain for one who sought
the intuitive apprehension of reality."^ However,
it was a student of scholasticism, Etienne Gilson,
who in his book The Spirit of Medieval Pliilosophy.
introduced Merton to the possibility of describing
2God in terms of Being, and it is this description 
which served, as it did with Tillich, to provide 
Merton with a doctrine of God upon which he could 
base his mystical theology*
Merton did not define God in a systematic 
theological fashion, as did Tillich, and it would 
be beyond the scope of this study to try to discover 
a clear and precise description of God within his 
many writings. There are numerous ambiguities (as, 
indeed, there must be) in his references to God.
3He can describe God as the Void or the Abyss, but 
he can also say that God is found in the void.^
^"The Catholicizing of Contemplation; Thomas Merton's Place in the Church's Prayer Life," Cistercian Studies X, Nos. 3, 4, (1975), pp. 178f.
^See above, pp. 35f.
^e.g., Ascent to Truth, p. 238; Mystics and Zen Masters, pp. 39f•
e^.g., Contemplative Prayer, p. 32; Cables to theAce, p. 58.
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He can say that God is the Ground of Being,^ but
he can also say that God is found ^  the ground of 
2one's being* He can say that God is "Pure and 
Absolute Being,but he can also say that His 
Being is beyond all beingUltimately, for Merton, 
the Christian idea of God is contained in the three 
words of St, John's epistles: "God is Love,"^ This 
is not intended to contradict his description of 
God as Being, but rather to describe further the 
nature of Being as dynamic rather than static#^
It is the description of God in ontological terms
e.g., Zen and the Birds of Appetite, pp. 10,71; "Blake and the New Theology, " Sëwanee Review 76 (August, 1968), p. 680; "The Significance of the Bhagavad-Gita" in The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton. 
p. 349.
2e.g.. Contemplation in a World of Action, pp.101, 160; Contemplative Prayer, p. 103; Faith and Violence, p. 270; "The Ascetic Mfe, Experience of God and Freedom," p. 64*
3Life and Holiness, p. 95, for example.
^e.g.. The Silent Life, p. 18; "Contemplatives and the Crisis of Faith," p. 271.
^e.g,, The Living Bread, p. 48; "Christian Humanism," p. 229* (In the Introduction to the Japanese edition of Seeds of Contemplation, Merton refers to God as both Pure Being and Pure Love.)
T^he Living Bread, pp. 48-51.
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which Merton sees as the basis for mysticism;
"The thinking and feeling and willing self is not the starting point of all verifiable reality and of all experience. The primal truth, the ground of all being and truth, is in God the Creator of all that is. The starting point of all Christian belief and experience (in this context) is the primal reality of God as Pure Actuality, The 'existence of God* is not something seen as deducible from our conscious aware­ness of our own existence. On the contrary, the experience of the classic Christian mystics is rooted in a metaphysic of being, in which God is intuited as "He Who Is," as the supreme reality, pure Being.
In speaking of God as "Pure Actuality," Merton is 
stressing His transcendence. But, in order for there 
to be a mystical encounter between man and God, God 
must also be seen in terms of immanence, as Merton 
emphasizes when he says, in so many places, that God 
is closer to the person than the person is to himself. 
"How it happens," he ijrote, "that the immanent!st 
approach, wliich sees God as directly and intimately
2en and the Birds of Appetite, p. 26. Of. The Ascent to Truth, pp. 197f, and Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 221. Merton gives a detailed analysis of the various ways in which God as Being has been derived from the word YHVJH in Exodus 3:14 in Seasons of Celebration, pp. 183-203, especially pp. 192-195.
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present In the very ground of our being (while at
the same time infinitely transcendent), is actually
Tmuch closer to the contemplative tradition." The
mystic needs a doctrine of God that does not stress
His transcendence to the neglect of His immanence
but rather, the mystic needs to keep both transcendence
and immanence in balance. "We awaken," Merton
continued, "not only to a realization of the immensity
and majesty of God 'out there* as King and Ruler of
the universe (which He is) but also a more intimate
and more wonderful perception of Him as directly and
2personally present in our o w  being.’* But man's 
union with God in the depths of the self can never 
be seen as a merger or as a blurring of the distinction 
between man and God. God is, and always will be, 
distinct from and totally Other than all parts of his 
creation, including the mystic. To speak of the union 
between man and God is to speak paradoxically. Merton 
rules out pantheism;
^Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 160. 
^Loc. Cit.
370
"On the contrary, there is a distinct conflict in the realization that though in some sense He is more truly ourselves than we are, yet we are not identical with Him, and though He loves us better than we can love our­selves we are opposed to Him, and in opposing Him we oppose our own deepest selves."!
The paradox of the "God Who is at once infinitely 
above us and l&o yet dwells in the depths of our 
b e i n g i s  the paradox that the mystic personally 
experiences. From this personal experience, the 
mystic can malce ontological statements about the 
relationship between God and the entire created 
order. The movement is circular : an ontological
doctrine of God describes the starting place for 
the mystic. God is the prius of all thought*
However, the experience of God in the depths of the 
self malces it possible for man, who has received the 
revelatory action of God in his experience, to begin 
to formulate statements (albeit symbolic, paradoxical 
statements), about God. The mystic, or in Merton's 
view, the monk, is called upon to experience, or to 
Imow through participation, that of which the philosopher 
of religion speaks when he uses terras like "transcendence"
^Ibid.. pp. 160f.
^Thoughts in Solitude, p. 152*
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and "iiamanence." The mystic, unlike the philosopher, 
does not come to truth by way of speculation, but 
since the philosopher, too, can know through par­
ticipation, the philosopher and the mystic need not 
be in different camps. Both can describe the same 
understanding of reality; both can describe the same 
paradox;
"God, says philosophy, is both immanent and transcendent. By His immanence He lives and acts in the metaphysical depths of everything that exists. He is "everywhere." By His transcendence He is so far above all being, that no human and limited concept can contain and exhaust His Being, or even signify it except by analogy. He is so far above all created being that His Being and finite being are not even said to *be* in the same univocal sense. Gom- pared with God, created being 'is not*;,, again, compared with created being,God 'is not.' For He is so far above His creation that the concept of Being, applied to Him, means sometldng basically different from what it means when applied to everytliing else. In this way, God 'is nowhere.'"!
The difference between the monk and the pMlosopher, 
Merton continued, is that the monk is called "to 
enter into this dilemma and this mystery even if he 
is unable to express or even understand the philosopher's 
language. Indeed, thought Merton, the non-philosophical
T^he Silent Life, pp. 17f.
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monk has a less complicated and easier time. To 
experience revelation is challenging enough without 
one's having to try to systematize and explain iti 
Yet, he recognized, as we have seen,^ that within the 
contemplative community, there are those whose vocation 
it is to speak about that which is beyond rational 
discourse. These are the ones who, according to 
Tillich, live "on the boundary," a position wliich can 
be fruitful, but difficult and dangerous as well.^ 
Tillich described himself as one who lived on the 
threshold of a number of boundaries. Merton experienced 
the same tension. To attempt to describe, in adequate 
language, the paradoxes of the transcendent and 
immanent God who is totally beyond and yet totally 
near, is to attempt the impossible. Yet it must be 
attempted, since only through the articulation of 
this paradox can man even begin to have a cognitive 
understanding of that which is really Real.
Tillich and Merton, in so far as they stress the 
immediacy of God, stand together within the Augustinian 
tradition. Merton, in fact, recognized this point
^See above, pp. 247f.
^On the Boundary, p. 13, passim.
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of affinity (although, unlike Tillich, he %fas able 
to find a place for St. Thomas Aquinas within this 
tradition);
"If the truth be told, there is a great deal in common in the psychological and spiritual insight of the Church Fathers and in the psychoanalytically oriented Christian existential think­ing of men like Tillich, himself more influenced than many realized by the Augustinian tradition."!
Merton and Tillich both claimed some of the same 
spiritual fathers; Plotinus, Augustine, Dionysius, 
Bernard, Eokhart and Bohme.^ It is because of this 
shared tradition that both men can recognize and wite 
about the paradox of transcendence and immanence, 
sometimes in language wliich is almost identical, and 
it is to a large extent because of this tradition that 
both men were able to appreciate the centrality of 
mysticism in the Christian experience.
!zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 64.
^Tillich claims others, including Hegel, Schelling and Schleiermacher in his camp, whereas Merton claims specific indebtedness to Gregory of Kyssa, the school of St. Victor, and John of the Gross, among others. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to claim that these two thinkers shared totally in the same tradition.
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Tillich and Merton agree, also, upon the adequacy 
of the equation of God and Being, although Merton does not 
insist, as does Tillich, on the impossibility of 
speaking of God as a being.! Nevertheless, Merton 
insisted as strongly as did Tillich about the dangers 
of thinking of God as an Object within the subject- 
objeot structure of knowledge. If God is seen as 
object, he inevitably "dies." "God as object is not 
only a mere abstract concept, but one which contains 
so many internal contradictions that it becomes entirely 
nonnegotiable except when it is hardened into an idol 
that is maintained in existence by a sheer act of 
w i ll . M e r t o n insisted that such a "Holy Object" 
must be destroyed, and he interpreted John of the 
Gross* hostility to visions and the Zen Masters* 
saying, "If you meet the Buddha, kill him," as warnings 
against the tendency to objectify God.^ Merton* s stress 
on the dangers of turning God into an idol is as 
dominant and as pervasive a part of his thought as 
Tillich's Protestant Principle or his insistance that
!cf. % e  Ascent to Truth, pp. 197f, where God is referred to as "the.Absolute Being," a term that Tillich would reject.
2Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 23*
2lbid.. p. 77.
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God is not a being is a part of his*
Two further points deserve brief mention. First 
of all, Merton and Tillich agreed in so far as they 
saw Being as that wliich overcomes non-being, although 
whereas Wliich bases much of his discussion about God 
upon this point! there are only occasional, yet 
explicit, mentions of this idea in Merton's writings.^ 
Secondly, both Tillich and Merton are agreed (as 
against the process theologians) that Being proceeds 
and is superior to becoming. Tillich saw that the 
term "being" comprised both becoming and rest,^ and 
Merton (who saw himself as having "an incurable case 
of metaphysics"), felt that "the activity of becoming 
is considerably less alive and dynamic than the act 
of Being.
^e.g., Systematic Theology. Vol. I, pp. 207-209; The Courage to Be. pp. 32-36.
^Gf. Thoughts in Solitude. p. 86; New Seeds of Contemplation, p. 34; The New Man, pp. 104ff.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 273; cf. Charles Hartshorns*s response to this in "Tillich's Doctrine of God" in Kegley and Bretall (eds.). The Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 164-195#
Blake and the New Theology," pp. 679f.
376
Hence it can be seen that Tillich and Merton 
share what is, for the most part, a coamon doctrine 
of God* Merton has not, of course, received the 
careful and thorough critical attention on this point 
that Tillich has received, because, unlike Tillich, 
his is neither an original nor a systematic restatement 
of this doctrine, and furthermore, it does not stand 
as one of the unique contributions which he has made 
to contemporary theology. It has been necessary 
however, to indicate the points of comparison between 
Merton's understanding of the doctrine of God and 
Tillich's because it is the emphasis on the Ego 
sum qui sum wliich underlies the nystical element 
in the thought of both men.
2. Essence and Existence
Paul Tillich followed in the tradition of the 
Exi stenzphilo sophie as formulated in nineteenth century 
thought in his concern for the meaning of "existence," 
and he followed in the scholastic tradition in affirming 
that a clear and precise distinction between "essence" 
and "existence" was a step toward a more significant
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understanding of existence.! Even within philosophies
that refused to make this distinction, Tillich believed
that the distinction was nonetheless implicit "whenever
the ideal is held against the real, truth against error,
2good against evil." Both terms are, and must remain, 
ambiguous. "Essence" can be seen in both an empirical 
and in an evaluative sense. Both ways are necessary. 
Essence is, first of all, the nature of a thing, or 
the quality in which a thing participates, or a universal, 
or the ousia of a thing. In the second sense, essence 
is that from which a thing has "fallen" and is therefore 
the basis of value judgements, it is "the true and un­
distorted nature of things." These two definitions of 
essence are necessary in order to understand the 
ambiguous nature of existence. Essence can have a 
purely logical character, defining what a thing is, 
and essence can also have an evaluative character, 
expressing that which appears in an imperfect and 
distorted way in that which exists. "Essence empowers 
and judges that wliich exists." Essence gives a thing 
its power of being, and at the same time, it stands
^b.g., Theology of Culture, pp. 80fj cf. The Courage to Be. p. 127.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 224*
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against it*^
"Existence," too, is a word with ambiguities. 
Tillich sees the root meaning of "existence" as coming 
from the Latin exlstere. to stand out. That which 
exists, therefore, stands out of relative non-being 
or mere potentiality. That which exists "is more 
than it is in the state of mere potentiality and 
less than it could be in the power of its essential 
nature." This ambiguity has been approached in 
different ways by different philosophers. Plato, 
thought Tillich, approached it negatively. The good 
is identified with the essential. The medieval 
nominalists, on the other hand, valued existence 
positively. Essence, for them, was "nothing more than 
the reflex of existence in the human mind." Tillich 
maintained that only a mediating position, one which 
he attributed to Aristotle, could be an adequate one. 
Existence, for Christianity, is good. It is the ful­
fillment of creation. Yet Christianity has also been 
aware of the "split between the created goodness of 
things and their distorted existence."^ The Christian
^Ibid.« p. 225} cf. Theology of Culture, pp. 80f. 
^Ibid.. p. 226.
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symbol of "the Fall," in Tillich's interpretation, 
is the mythological expression of the "transition 
from essence to existence."!
The ambiguous nature of existence is maintained,
says Tillich, in so far as the Fall is not a break
between essence and existence, but is an imperfect
fulfillment. The Fall, furthermore, is not an event
in the past - although it is expressed as such in the
necessarily mythological language of religious symbols
- and its meaning has "universal anthropological 
2significance."' It is not about a person called 
Adam; it is about all men in their existential condition, 
It is about the one creature who is able to discover 
that his existence is estranged from his essence; it 
is about the one who is able to recognize that he 
contradicts his essential being in all that he does 
and is cut off from his "potency for goodness.
The Fall is a symbolic way of saying that "man as he 
exists is not what he essentially is and ought to be.
He is estranged from his true being.Tillich
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 33. 
^Loo. Git.
I^bid.. p. 69.
I^bid.. p. 51.
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could speak of this movement in terms of "sin" and 
called for the reinterpretation of the doctrine of 
"original sin." He wished to show that man's 
existential self-estrangement is the root meaning 
of that doctrine. Sin is estrangement.^ But at 
the same time that man is estranged from his true 
being, and therefore in a state of sin, he "is not
2a stranger to his true being, for he belongs to it." 
Tillich is a Platonist in so far as he regards essence 
as being good and as that which stands as the power 
of being and the judge of that which exists. But 
he differs from Platonic idealism in so far as he 
sees goodness as residing not simply in the realm of 
essence, but as the restitution of essence and existence, 
Things hide their true being, they distort their true 
being, but they do not cease to have true being. If 
the true being of a thing is to be discovered, wrote 
Tillich, then
"....it must be discovered under the surface of sense impressions, changing appearance, and unfounded opinions.••
!lbid.« pp. 40-45, 51-53; of. The Boundaries of Our Being, pp. 40-49#
p. 52.
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"The surface must be penetrated, 
the appearance undercut, the 'depth* 
must be reached, namely, the ousia. 
the 'essence* of things, that which 
gives them the power of being...The seemingly real is not unreal, but it 
is deceptive if it is taken to be 
the really real."!
Existential elements and essential elements, in other
words, are ambiguously combined in all beings. The
concrete actuality of being, namely "life," is
neither purely existential nor purely essential. It
is made up of both elements. Essence and existence
are abstractions - necessary abstractions for an 
2analysis of being. In actuality they cannot be 
separated. Existential distortions are as real as 
the essential 'depth* is real, but the really real 
will only be known when essence and existence are 
seen together in a state in which their estrangement 
is overcome.
Thomas Merton did not articulate the difference 
between "essence" and "existence" in the thorough­
going manner of Tillich, although it is certain that 
he was well aware of this distinction since he had an 
intimate knowledge of the literature of both scholasticism
!systematic Theology, Vol. I, pp. Il2f.
G^f. Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 32f,
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and existentialism. It appears occasionally in
his writings, but it is not explicitly developed.^
Nevertheless, although he rarely speaks of "essence"
and "existence" as such, the understanding of being
that this language expresses can be found throughout
Merton's work. The distinction between essence and
existence is an unexpressed concept behind his own
anthropology. For instance, in his interpretation of
the doctrine of the Fall, he expressed the viewpoint
first formulated by Irencx^ us, that in his fallen
state man still maintains the "image" of God but
2has distorted the "likeness." Merton's understanding 
of the distinction between the two terms can be 
interpreted as saying basically the same thing that 
Tillich was saying, that is, man has fallen from a 
state of essence, in which the image of God in man 
was united with the likeness of God, into a state 
of existence in which the likeness of God is distorted.*
!of* Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander. p. 14$f; Zen and the Birds of Appetite, p. 7.
^Gf. The New Men, pp. 37-46; see above pp. 232-
237.
^It will be noted that Tillich held that, in the state of existence, man still maintained the image of God. See Systematic Theology. Vol. II, 
p. 37#
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To speak of "image and likeness" is to speak of
essence; to speak of "distorted likeness" is to speak
of existence. There are examples within the writings
of Thomas Merton that further amplify this point of
affinity with Tillich. Merton recognized that, in
so far as we have a sense of sin (which he saw as a
healthy awareness) and a feeling of guilt (which he
saw as tending to be pathological), we recognize that
we "are alienated from the sources of our life...
that we are not what we ought to be" and "that we
have used our freedom against ourselves and against
God."^ In other words, we recognize, either in a
healthy or in an unhealthy way, that our lives are
distortions of what they ought to be, that we are
separated from our true being. Furthermore, Merton
saw that "the traditional Christian idea of sin,
particularly original sin," had much in common with
2"the modern psychological concept" of alienation.
This is to say, with Tillich, that the doctrine of 
original sin might best be interpreted in terms of 
alienation, or estrangement. Again, both agree that
^The Living Bread, pp. 33f. Of. Tillich's distinction between ontological and pathological anxiety in The Courage to Be.
"^Christian Humanism," p. 227.
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the Christian doctrine of the Fall, i.e., a combination 
of the original Genesis story and the interpretations 
of it in the epistles of St. Paul, is not simply 
the story of an historical (or quasi-historical or 
mythological) figure called Adam, but is a cosmic 
myth which pertains to all of humanity.! Finally, 
both men agree that it is possible to have a 
restoration of essence and existence within time and 
space. This will be discussed later in this chapter 
when we examine what Tillich calls "essentialization," 
a term which he borrows from Schelling and modifies, 
and what Merton calls "divinisation," a term which 
he borrows from the early Greek Fathers. However, 
before essentialization and divinization are discussed 
in detail it is necessary to examine certain areas in 
which the abstract distinction between essence and 
existence can be seen in concrete embodiments. îhis 
includes, first of all, an examination of the meaning 
of human personhood, and secondly, an examination of 
what Christianity claims to be the epitome of person­
hood, the person in whom the restoration of essence
The New !Man« p. 80f, Merton is not as insistent as was Tillich about the nythological nature of the doctrine of the Fall in fcds treatment of the subject in The New Man. It was not his purpose to discuss the possibility or validity of demythologizing. For his appreciation of Bultmann's contribution to biblical studies, see Opening the Bible, pp. 60-62, 75* On 'myth* see the essay, "Mircea Eliade:: A Critical Observer of the Archetypal %th, " The National Catholic Reporter. (August 23, 1967), p. 9*
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and existence has taken place unambiguously, namely, 
the Christ. It will become increasingly clear 
throughout these sections how Tillich's distinction 
between "essence" and "existence" is adequate to 
explain a number of points of Merton's theology. 
Furthermore, it will become clear how man's ethical 
maturity depends upon the healing of estrangement 
between essence and existence, and how this healing 
can be described in terms of mystical experience 
and can be known in the practise of contemplation. 
Hence the distinction between essence and existence 
forms a fundamental, although not always articulated, 
part of the understanding of the relationship between 
mystical prayer and social action in the thought of 
Thomas Merton.
3. The Meaning of "Person"
One can discover Tillich's understanding of the 
meaning of "person" within his discussion of life and 
its ambiguities. Life as the "actuality of being,"!
!systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 12.
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he believed, is a multi-dimensional unity comprising 
the inorganic, the organic, and the psychological and 
the spiritual realms. However, as far as it is humanly 
possible to tell, only man has actualized the spiritual 
dimension, the dimension which Tillich defined 
(borrowing from Hegel) as "the unity of power and 
meaning."! Furthermore, since Tillich accepts that 
man, under the predominence of the dimension of the 
spirit, includes the other dimensions and does not 
contradict them, then the most adequate approach to 
the study of life is the study of human life.
Therefore, one can go to Tillich's exposition of the 
meaning of "life" to discover his understanding of the 
meaning of "person,"
As we have seen, Tillich used "essence" and 
"existence" to define being, but that he considered 
these terms to be abstractions and saw life itself 
as an ambiguous mixture of both;
"Every life process has the ambiguity that the positive and negative elements are mixed in such a way that a definite separation of the negative from the 
positive is impossible; life at every moment is ambiguous."2
!lbid., p. 22.
^Ibid.. p. 34.
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Therefore, he does not analyze the meaning of life
by concentrating on either its essential nature
alone or its existential distortion alone. Rather
in his study of life he tries to discover the
ontological structures of being and how these tend,
within existence, to become distorted. He does this
by concentrating on what he calls the three functions
of life, their polarities, their principles, their
distortions and their manifestations within the
dimension of the spirit, i.e., how they actualize
their meanings. These functions are self-integration,
self-creativity, and self-transcendence. These are
the processes in which potential being becomes
actualized. In each of them, elements of self-identity
are united with elemients of self-alteration. However,
the unity is threatened by existential estrangement,
and therefore, actual life is, even at its best,
ambiguous. There is essential unity coupled with
existential disruption, or at least the threat of
existential disruption. Each of these processes,
when examined, combine to provide a comprehensive under-
1standing of Tillich's analysis of life.
^These processes are discussed first in terms of the ontological structures of being in Systematic Theology. Vol. I, pp. 193-206, then according to their existential distortions in Systematic Theology. Vol.
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The first process to be examined is that of 
seIf-integration. This implies that, in order to 
actualize itself life must move between the poles of 
individualization and participation. One must be 
able to be one*s self, and at the same time one must 
be able to be a part of the lives of others. To be 
a person, one must remain in a state of balance between 
these two poles* To gravitate to the pole of individualiza­
tion results, in simple terms, in one’s failure to become 
anything more than an individual, ’’shut up within 
himself and out off from participation,”^ On the 
other hand, to gravitate to the pole of participation, 
results in the centred-self becoming overwhelmed by 
that which it participates in, and thereby losing its 
own oentredness, A balance must be maintained or 
there will be personal disintegration; either through 
the calcification of the centred-self which would
II, pp, 72-76, Finally they are seen within the ambiguities of life in Systematic Theology, Vol. Ill, pp. 32-117, and in terms of the impact of the Divine Spirit, Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, pp. 173-300, and the Kingdom of God, Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, pp, 411-419# See also The Courage to Be. pp. 86-154# Alexander J. McKelway gives a complete summary in The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich (London: Lutterworth, 19^4), pp. 190ff,
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p, 75#
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inhibit it from growth, which Tillich calls a ’’death
of mere self-identity;”^  or through the weakening and
dispersing of the centred-self to the extent that it
could lose its centredness altogether, or what Tillich
2calls ’’death of mere self-alteration.” However, there 
is a profound ambiguity in all of this. That is 
because ’’the more individualized a being is the 
more he is able to participate.”'^
’The most individualized being is the most unapproachable and the most lonely one* But, at the same time, he has the greatest potentiality of universal participation. He can have communion with his world and eros towards it...He can participate in the universe in all its dimensions . and draw elements of it into himself.”^
In short, in order to participate, one must simul­
taneously be individualized.
Yet there is a definite limit to the ability of 
man to draw all elements of his world into his own 
centre. That limit is the other self. Only in the 
encounter with other selves can the self exist in the 
dimension of the spirit. Only in such an encounter 
can it find a unity of both power and meaning. The
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 36- 
^Loc. Git.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 75* 
Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 35.
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other person defines limits to one’s desire to 
assimilate all of the world into one’s self, and 
’’the experience of this limit is the experience of 
the ought-to-be, the moral imperative.” Tillich 
explains this further:
’’The moral constitution of the self in the dimension of the spirit begins with this experience. Personal life emerges in the encounter of person with person and in no other way. If one can imagine a living being with the psychosomatic structure of man, completely outside any human community, • such a being could not actualize its potential spirit. It would be driven in all directions, limited only by its finitude, but it would not experience the ought-to-be. Therefore, the self­integration of the person as a person occurs in a community, within whidh the continuous mutual encounter of centred self with centred self is possible and actual.”^
In other words, ’’Man becomes man in personal encounters. 
Only by meeting a ’thou* does man realize that he is 
an ’ego. The perfect form of individualization, 
therefore, is called ’’person” and the perfect form of
3participation is called ’’communion.” Persons exist
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 43; of. 
Ibid.. p. 329.
^Love. Powér and Justice, p. 78.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 195•
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only in comunion with other persons, and communities 
are made up of persons. However, it must not he 
forgotten that the person must not lose the "centred­
ness” of the self. This "self-centredness” (by wtiich 
Tillich does not mean "selfislmess”) is the basic 
principle of the process of self-integration. It 
is a metaphor that describes both the quality of the 
indivisibility of the self and its ability to incorporate 
objects into the self. Complete centredness is 
essentially given to man, but it is not actualized 
except when man acts ;fithin the spiritual dimension.
Again, the ought-to-be as discovered through the 
experience of the other person, determines personhood*
For Tillich, the act in which man actualizes his essential 
centredness is the moral act. "Morality is the 
constitutive function of the spirit.^ It creates the 
person, and it does so within the community of other 
persons.
The second process of life that Tillich examines 
is that of self-creativity. Within this process 
the self must move between and maintain a balance 
between the poles of form and dynamics. As in the
Isvstematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 40.
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process of self-integration, here also the self 
moves between self-identity and self-alteration, 
but in this process it does so under the principle 
of growth.
"Ch'owth is dependent on the polar element of dynamics in so far as growth is the process by which a formed reality goes beyond itself to another form which both preserves and transforms the original reality. This process is the way in which life creates itself.”!
"Dynamics,” Tillich explains in his discussion 
of the ontological structures of being, is not some­
thing that is but rather, "is the ^  on, the potentiality 
of being, which is non-being in contrast to things 
that have form, and the power of being in contrast to 
pure non-being. It is essential to life. However, 
it must be seen in interdependence with form. "Self- 
creation of life is always creation of form.”^  But 
growth is more than a continuous series of forms. The 
pole of dynamics means that "every new form is made
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 53- 
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 198. 
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 53.
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possible only by breaking through the limits of an 
old form, There is a risk involved, and that risk 
is that, instead of the creation of a new form, chaos 
could result. Creation implies the risk of destruction, 
and the fear of destruction could result in the inability 
to actualize life by a refusal to take part in the 
process of self-creativity. Chaos, or the fear of chaos, 
can be equally destructive to the principle of growth.
For growth to occur, the poles of dynamics and form 
must be balanced. To gravitate to either pole results 
in distortion. In the face of possible chaos life may 
be pulled in one of two directions: "...life may fall
back to its starting point and resist creation, or it 
may destroy itself in the attempt to reach a new form, 
Only when the dynamic element of life is operative and, 
at the same time, leads to the creation of new form 
rather than to chaos, are the poles in balance. Tillich 
notes numerous examples of the existential ambiguities 
which are the result of this tension both within and 
outside of the spiritual realm. Outside of the spiritual 
realm these ambiguities can be seen, for instance, in 
terms of the ambiguities of labour, of sexuality, of
I^ioc. Git.
%bid., p. 54#
^Ibid.. pp, 55-61
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the "life-instinct” and the "death instinct," and 
of pain and pleasure. Within the realm of the spirit, 
that is in that dimension which is unique to humanity 
and involves the unity of power and meaning, the self- 
creativity of life is expressed in culture. Culture 
is the creation of new forms on the horizontal plane.
Its principle forms of creation are language and the 
technical act. And in this dimension, too, one can 
see numerous ambiguities. "The inherent ambiguity 
of language is that in transforming reality into 
meaning it separates mind and reality."^ Subject 
and object are split, and this creates a whole cluster 
of ambiguities. In the area of technical production 
Tillich sees three basic ambiguities(which we will 
only mention), "the ambiguity of freedom and limitation" 
in technical production, "the ambiguity of means and 
ends," and the. "ambiguity of self and thing.Through 
his discussion of these ambiguities Tillich indicates 
that self-creativity, like self-integration, although 
part of the essence of man, is distorted under the 
conditions of existence.
^Bvstematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 73.
2lbid.. pp. 77-79.
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The third and final life process which Tillich 
defines is that of self-transcendence. lAereas self­
integration could be described as circular (a going 
out from and a return to the self) and self-creativity 
could be seen as horizontal movement, self-transcendence 
is best described under the metaphor of the verticîi*
It is that function of life "in which life drives 
beyond itself as finite life,”^  It is the striving 
toward the sublime, toward infinite and ultimate being.
It is the process in which life tries to free itself
2"from a total bondage to its own finitude." It 
"transcends both the circular line of centredness and
3the horizontal line of growth," and because of this 
"vertical" dimension it is not empirically observable.
It is known "only through the mirror of man’s conscious­
ness" but as such it is expressed and effective in all 
periods of man’s history. The opposite of self-trans­
cendence of life is the profanization of life. This, 
too, although not empirically observable, is known in 
man’s consciousness. To be profane, according to Tillich,
^Ibid.. p. 33. 
%bid.. p. 92. 
^Loc. Git.
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means both "standing outside the body" and "resisting 
self-transcendence. Life then ia meant to be holy.
It is meant to be more than simply that which can be 
observed. It is called to a "greatness" and a "dignity" 
that are qualitative rather than quantitative, and 
this greatness "shows a power of being and meaning 
that makes it a representative of ultimate being and
pmeaning and gives it the dignity of such representation." 
Because life is actualized under the conditions of 
existence this holiness, greatness and dignity are 
distorted. They are mixed with elements of the pro­
fane, the tragic and the small. Life essentially 
represents the ultimate, but in existence it does 
so only ambiguously.
The ambiguities exist as the result of a failure 
on the part of the self to maintain a balance between 
the poles of freedom and destiny. By "destiny" Tillich 
means neither fate nor necessity. "Destiny," as he 
defines it, "points to this situation in which man 
finds himself, facing the world to which, at the same 
time, he belongs.’^  It represents not the opposite of
!Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 93* 
^Loc. Cit.
Vol. I, p. 202.
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freedom (as does the word ’fate’) but represents the 
conditions and limitations of that freedom. Tillich 
insists that man’s freedom is finite. The freedom 
of a person operates effectively ohly when it is in 
a polar relationship with its own destiny. This freedom 
"is experienced as deliberation, decision, and re­
sponsibility. Out of an analysis of these terms 
Tillich further defines destiny;
"Our destiny is that out of which our decisions arise; it is the in­definitely broad basis of our centred selfhood; it is the concreteness of our being which makes all our decisions our decisions...Destiny is not a strange power which determines what shall happen to me. It is myself as given, formed by nature, history, and myself. My destiny is the basis of my freedom; iry freedom participates in shaping my destiny.’’^
The polarity must be maintained. Freedom that departs 
from destiny ends up in tragedy since the limits 
of finitude have been transgressed. But this is 
tragedy, rather than smallness, since it is the 
result of the risk that is inherent in any pursuit
^Ibid.. p. 203.
%bid.. p. 204.
398
of greatness* Only the great can participate in the 
tragic* On the other hand, to gravitate to the pole 
of destiny to the neglect of freedom results in 
smallness and makes the realization of the holiness, 
greatness and dignity of life impossible.^ To 
actualize freedom within the limits of destiny is to 
achieve greatness.
Under the dimension of the spirit, the self- 
transcendence of life is seen as religion, and religion, 
as an existential reality, has ambiguities. Since it 
is the highest expression of the greatness and dignity 
of life, it can become the most profanized, the 
most desecrated* Nevertheless, religion, as the 
manifestation of the self-transcendence of life in 
the dimension of the spirit, is the vehicle for the 
great becoming the holy. In religion, the great is 
called holy because "religion is based on the mani­
festation of the holy itself, the divine ground of
3being." Only when that wliich is great is able to
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, pp. 93f*
%or a full discussion of the ambiguities of religion see Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, pp. 104- 
113.
%bid.. p. 105.
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realize that its greatness depends upon its relation 
to the ultimate can it become holy. Only then can 
it transcend itself beyond tragedy, and even then, 
in so far as it is actualized within existence and 
therefore within relationship to other beings, it 
may still participate in the tragic.^
In summary, it can be said that Tillich defines 
three life-processes: self-integration, self-creativity
and self-transcendence. In self-integration the poles 
to be balanced are those of individualization and 
participation. In self-creativity the poles are those 
of dynamics and form. In self-transcendence the poles 
are those of freedom and destiny.
These three life-processes under the dimension 
of the spirit are manifested as morality, culture, 
and religion. Since Tillich believes that in man 
the spiritual dimension is the dominant one, he there­
fore holds that these three functions are constitutive 
of the full meaning of personhood. Essentially they 
interpenetrate. Culture gives form to morality and 
religion makes morality unconditional. "Tliere is no 
self-transcendence under the dimension of the spirit
^Ibid.. p. 100. Of. the section on the tragic involvement of the Christ, Systematic Theology. Vol. 
II, pp. 151-153.
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without the constitution of the moral self by the
unconditional imperative, and this self-transcendence
cannot take form except witliin the universe of meaning
created in the cultural aot."^ Essentially, the self-
transcendence of life can be seen witliin the other
functions as well. Within the moral act and within
cultural creation life transcends itself in a vertical
dimension* Therefore there is a sense in which self-
transcendence of life cannot be regarded as a function
of life beside the others for it would then have to
be itself transcended. Religion, therefore, "must
first of all be considered as a quality of the other
two functions of the spirit and not as an independent 
2function," However, existentially, morality, culture 
and religion do not interpenetrate. Religion exists 
as a quality in morality and culture, but it also has 
its own independent existence and as such it serves 
a particular function: it serves to point to the
depths of both morality and culture. It serves to 
make morality and culture aware of its ambiguities, 
but religion itself is beset by its own ambiguities.
i^bid.. p. 101.
%bid.. p. 102.
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it is not necessarily aware of its own depths.
Because of this peculiar state in which religion 
finds itself, Tillich insists that the quest for 
unambiguous life must be found both within and outside 
of religions "religion is not the answer to the 
quest for unambiguous life, although the answer can 
only be received through religion."^
Therefore, for Tillich, the person is one Wio 
is under the domination of the dimension of the spirit 
in which he actualizes life’s meanings through morality, 
culture and religion. But, for Tillich, man in 
existence is estranged from his essence. The true 
person would be the one in whom essence is known 
ambiguously in existence and in whom life would actualize 
itself without distortions. The true person, by this 
definition, would be a fiction, for existence necessarily 
distorts essence. The true person would exist only in 
a new creation. In creation as we know it, it would 
be impossible. Nevertheless, in his quest for unambiguous 
life, man attempts the impossible. He seeks to be 
able to actualize the life processes unambiguously, 
achieving perfect balances between the poles of 
individuation and participation, form and dynamics.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 113.
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and freedom and destiny. He seeks the restoration
of essence and existence in numerous ways: through
legalism, asceticism, various forms of mysticism,
as well as sacramental, doctrinal and emotional
attempts at self-salvation.^ All of these fail,
says Tillich, because man is powerless to overcome
estrangement between the finite and the infinite. His
freedom is limited. His powers of self-transcendence
are limited. He is free to transcend himself only
so far without destroying himself. Tillich insists
that "Attempts to overcome estrangement within the
power of one’s estranged existence lead to hard toil
2and tragic failure." Man’s only hope is to seek for 
a new creation, a new being that is beyond the estrange­
ment of essence and existence, and to be jprepared to 
accept that new being when it is revealed to him.
Only through the acceptance of new being, Tillich 
argues, can man find his estrangement healed. Man 
cannot unambiguously balance the polarities of his 
existence, only a new being could possibly do so.
For a full treatment of the various means that man has tried to achieve self-salvation see Systematic Theology. Vol. II, pp. 92-^ 100.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 92.
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The Christian claim according to Tillich’s interpre­
tation, is that Jesus as the Christ is the bearer 
of new being and that, through participation in that 
new being through the impact of the divine Spirit^ 
in the spirit of man, every person can know unambiguous 
life*
"Reconciliation, reunion, resurrection - this is the new creation, the New Being, the new state of things* Do you par­ticipate in it? The message of Christianity is not Christianity, but a new reality,A new state of things has appeared, it still appears; it is hidden and visible, it is there and it is here. Accept it, enter into it, let it grasp you."^
Tillich’s full treatment of the unambiguous union of 
essence and existence will be discussed in the following 
section on the meaning of Christ* In anticipation
In the third volume of his Systematic Theology,Paul Tillich differentiates between the spirit of man and the divine Spirit. The divine Spirit is the unconditional and ultimate which grasps man's spirit and drives him into successful self-transcendence. "Ecstasy," he explained, "is the classical term for this state of being grasped by the Spiritual Presence," See Systematic Theology, Vol. Ill, pp. llSff#. See also Systematic Theology, Vol. Ill, p. 287; "In the Spiritual Presence, man's essential being appears under the conditions of existence, conquering the distortions of existence in the reality of the New Being. This statement is derived from the basic christological assertion that in the Christ the eternal unity of God and man becomes actual under the conditions of existence without being conquered by them,"
2The New Being, Chapter 2; see Boundaries of our Being, p. 170.
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it can be stressed that Tillich, on the one hand, 
insisted on the reality of the New Being in history, 
and on the other hand, insisted that the New Being was 
the result of God's grace and not man's action. The 
Protestant Principle is maintained. Furthermore, 
the presence of the New Being in history is never 
complete, its presence is fragmentary and anticipatory« 
"The New Being is fragmentarily and anticipatorily 
present, but in so far as it is present it is so 
unambiguously. What is impossible for man to 
achieve by his o\m efforts is made possible for him 
by the appearance of the New Being. Nevertheless, 
although man can participate in the New Being and 
thereby participate in unambiguous life, he always 
does so with limitations. lAierever New Being is seen 
in the lives of people or groups it is seen in a 
fragmented manifestation, and it is seen as pointing 
to an ultimate fulfillment. But, at the same time, it 
is unambiguous.
Man participates in New Being in the depths of 
the self. It is beyond the existential distortions 
tlmt can be empirically observed. The really real
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 150.
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is different from the .seemingly real. The surface 
must be penetrated in order to discover the true 
being.^ In one of his sermons Tillich spoke directly 
to this situation in so far as it relates to the 
common problems of everyday life:
"Most of our life continues on the surface. We are enslaved by the routine of our daily lives, in work and pleasure, in business and recreation. We are conquered by innumerable hazards, both good and evil. We are more driven than driving. We do not stop to look at the height above us, or the the depth be­low us. We are always moving forward, although usually in a circle, which finally brings us back to the place from which we first moved. We are in constant motion and never stop to plunge into the depth. We talk and talk and never listen to the voices speaking to our depth and from our depth. We accept ourselves as we appear to ourselves, and do not care what we really are. Like hit-and-run drivers, we injure our souls by the speed with lAiich we move on the surface; and then we rush away, leaving our bleeding souls alone. We miss, therefore, our depth and our true life. And it is only when the picture that we have of ourselves breaks down completely, only when we find ourselves acting against all the expectations we had derived from that picture, and only when an eartlwquake shakes and disrupts the surface of our self-knowledge, that we are willing to look into a deeper level 
of our being.
^See above, pp, 380f,
^The Shaking of Foundations, pp. 55f •
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Thomas Merton's understanding of the nature of
man was expounded at length in the section of his
interpretation of the process of withdrawal.! It
was shown how he interpreted withdrawal as a process
of moving away from the superficial, or "false" self
2to the inner, or "true" self. In that section it 
was shoim how Merton was able to describe the superficial 
self in a variety of ways, but that when he attempted 
to describe the inner self, he conceded that words 
failed him. The experience of the true self was 
ineffable; it remained, like its ground, in the realm 
of mystery. At that point, as has been seen in the 
structure of this thesis, it was useless to continue 
talking about man and necessary to begin to talk 
about the God who was discovered as the Ground of 
one's being.
In making the distinction between the superficial 
self and the inner self which is hidden behind that 
outer self, Merton shows a remarkable similarity to 
the passage from Paul Tillich which has just been 
quoted. Both men speak of surface and depths, and 
speak of the superiority of the depths. Both men
^See above, pp. 215-240,
%erton described this distinction in the novel he wrote before he entered the monastery. See above, pp. 148f for relevant quotations from ^  irgument With the Gestapo.
407
speak of the injuries which man brings upon himself 
by living only at the level of the surface self.
Both men call their fellows to seek the depths of 
their being. Both men realize that it very often 
takes a "shaking of the foundations" before one is, 
as it were, forced to look into the deeper reality 
of the self# And both men agree that the deeper 
reality of the self is, paradoxically, both identical 
with and separate from God# Although Merton*s writings 
are full of very vivid descriptions of the ambiguities 
of life, he did not, however, attempt as systematic 
a description of man's ambiguous situation as did 
Tillich in his exposition of the three life-processes.
It remains to be demonstrated how Tillich's three 
life-processes are not only valid descriptions of 
some of the things that Merton was saying in other 
language, but also, how an analysis of these processes 
is helpful in developing a theology which unites 
nysticism and social ethics.
The self-integration of life, as described by 
Tillich, is possible only when there is a balance 
between the polarities of individualization and 
participation. Merton agreed fully. On the one hand, 
he stressed the importance of the centred-self, and 
on the other hand, he recognised that in order to be 
a person (as distinct from being simply an "individual"), 
one must see himself in relationship with others.
408
For the entire process of one's life to make sense,
Merton wrote, "it must represent a complete integration
of his inner and outer life, or his relation to himself
and to other men,^ For true self-integration, participation
and individualization cannot be separated* Merton
outlined three possible distortions of the process
2of self-integration, and throughout his career as a 
writer he elaborated on these distortions and tried 
to discover the proper balance* The first distortion 
occurs when one insists on loving only himself, which 
would be to gravitate to the pole of individualization*
The second is Wien one loves only the other to the 
neglect of the self, a gravitation to the opposite 
pole* The third distortion would be to say that the 
most effective way of loving one's self is to love 
others* This would be a warped understanding of the 
true balance between individualization and participation.
Gravitation to the pole of individualization was 
seen by Merton as a common approach to life in modern, 
Western civilization. It could be seen in the cult 
of "rugged individualism" in which one affirmed one's 
self \diile denying anything more than superficial,
nMystics and Zen Masters* p. 111.
^See No Man Is An Island* pp. 17f•
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pragmatically based, relationships with others,
relationships grounded in strict and rigid dichotomy
between the subjective self and the other as object.
People who live this way do not know how to be real,
thought Merton. They think that they can find their
true selves by cutting themselves off from others.
However, he wrote, "They do not know that reality is
to be sought not in division but in unity for we are
1'members one of another.'" Individualization confirms 
only one's own self. The subjectivity of the other 
person is not acknowledged and he is seen only as 
an object. This causes any resultant relationship 
to be unbalanced, superficial, and manipulative, 
and thereby injurious to both parties.
Gravitation to the pole of participation is 
equally false. In order fully to participate in the 
life of another one must maintain his centred-self.
If there is no centred-self there can be no true 
community for there can be no "common life" where 
one or both centred-selves are destroyed and where 
persons have been reduced themselves to the state of 
"machines."^ Whenever one participates in another in
^ew Seeds of Contemplation, pp. 47f •
^The Silent Life, p. 105.
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such a way as to destroy his owi self, the result is
an alienated existence. When one "exists purely and
simply for somebody else," and when "the 'center* of
identity is experienced to some extent not in oneself
but in the other,there is not a communion of love,
there is only slavery. "Alienation," Merton said in
one of his lectures, "is the psychological condition
of somebody who is never allowed to be fully himself...
because he is alleys dominated by somebody else * s
ideas or somebody else * s tastes or somebody else * s
saying that this is the way to act and this is the 
2way to see things." To deny one's own self-centredness
is as strongly proscribed by Merton as it is by Tillich.
In order to love another, one must have a self with 
3which he can love.
One can gravitate neither to one pole nor the 
other. A balance must be maintained, but it cannot 
be a balance in wliioh one enters into a kind of a 
compromise, a compromise in which one pole is accepted
^Contemplation in a World of Action, pp. 71, 60. 
^"This is God's Work," pp. 3f.
Wotes on Prayer and Action," p. 3.
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principally to enhance the other. Accordingly one
cannot say that he will love others because by doing
so he knows that he will thereby be enabled to love
himself; nor can one say that he will love himself
because then he will have the possibility of loving
others. One pole cannot be used to serve the other.
One does not first seek inner unity and then, -vribien
that is established, go on to love others.^ Nor
does one do the opposite and seek to love others, and
through that loving, hope to achieve inner unity, for
real love requires a self that can participate in the
2subjectivity of the beloved. One must be an individual 
person and participate in the personhood of others 
simultaneously. One must accept that in order to be 
a person one must be in relationship to others but 
that, paradoxically, in order to be in such a relation­
ship, one must first be a person. Merton stated the 
paradox succinctly; "We cannot love ourselves unless 
we love others, and we cannot love others unless we 
love ourselves. But a selfish love of ourselves makes 
us incapable of loving others."^ We must love
^e.g.. New Seeds of Contemplation, p. 51; Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 209.
2Disputed Questions, p. 103.
^No Man Is An Island, p. 19.
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oiirselves unselfishly. Merton's differentiation 
between "individual" and "person"^ helps make the 
paradox clears man seeks a balance between 
individualization and participation, a balance which 
will create both the "person" and the "community."
Tillich's second life-process is self-creativity,
in lAiich there must be a balance between the polarities
of dynamics and form, and which results in the
cultural act. As we have seen, much of what Merton
wrote was a specific criticism of culture, and a call
for man, as creator of culture, to seek his own
spiritual depths. He was particularly critical of
what Tillich called the two principle forms of the
cultural act, language and technology. He saw language
reduced to propaganda and technology become the basis
for a distorted, dehumanized society. At the same
time he was not against culture or against technology.
He could not be criticised for gravitating to the pole
of form to the exclusion of dynamics, resting in the
form of medieval monasticism as a safeguard against
the risks involved in creativity. First of all, he
was resolved to apply to himself and the monastic life
2any of the criticisms he leveled at the world. He
!see above, p. 215 and passim. 
^See above, pp. 201-215.
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was particularly critical of monasticism when it did 
try to become an escape from a dynandc life.^ Cultural 
activities, especially those of language and technology 
had a place within the monastic life. Although Merton 
was an advocate of silence, he saw silence in a 
dialectical relationship with language. "He who re­
tires into silence," he wote, "does not necessarily 
hate language. Perhaps it is love and respect for 
language which impose silence upon him. The true 
value of silence is known only if one has a true 
respect and appreciation for language.^ Furthermore, 
although he was very critical of the technological 
society, he was not necessarily critical of technology 
in itself;
"I am as ready as the next man to admire the astonishing achievements of technology. Taken by themselves they are magnificent. But taken in the context of unbalance with the other aspects of human existence in the world, the very splendor and rapidity of technological development is a factor of disintegration#"4
^See in particular, the essays in Contemplation in a World of Action.
disputed Questions, p. 195; cf. Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 197.
^e.g.. Thoughts in Solitude, p. 148.
^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 72.
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Far from simply decrying technological achievements, 
Merton believed that the monastery could serve as an 
example for the world* It could show the world the 
proper use of technology, that technology can be used 
to elevate and improve man*s life if it remains sub­
servient to man*8 real interests, that is, interests 
wliich are coincidental with man's true being.^ "Ihe 
monk - who can perfectly well use the latest technology 
on his monastic farm - is there to show that one can 
use technology without placing all his hopes in it 
and vdthout depending on it for ultimate happiness*" 
Merton, then, as one who used language to a very con­
siderable extent, and as one who could see the value 
in a proper use of the technological act, could not 
be seen as one who avoided the dynamic polarity. 
Secondly, Merton himself was both a poet and an artist. 
He was, in other words, one who made particular cultural 
creations. As any analysis of his poetry idll show,
Merton was not afraid to risk familiar forms in an
3attempt to arrive at new forms of expression*
^Ibid.. p. 253.
^Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 230#
^See above, pp. 66, ?6f, 140~l/j,2.
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Nevertheless, in his discussions of the meaning 
of the cultural act, Merton implies that cultural 
creativity will only be balanced in its polarities 
when man has been able to transcend himself, seek 
the ground of his being, and be reunited with the source 
of all creation. Self-creativity as a process in 
and of itself is subservient to the process of self­
transcendence and is discussed in terms of the latter. 
For instance, in an essay on the theology of creativity, 
Merton refers to Tillich and quotes him. It will be 
seen, however, that the dynamics of self-transcendence 
predominate:
"Paul Tillich has clearly seen the dialectic of creativity and destructivity 
which underlies the art of our time, a dialectic which expresses man's alienation from reality. Man is no 
longer able to preserve any depth in his encounter with reality which has 'lost its inner transcendence...its transparency for the eternal.* Struggling to adjust himself to a world which be­comes opaque and replaces God, man tries 
to endow himself with God's ovm cres/fcive power. But in order to do so he has to forget his own limitations, his otm essential reality. He lives in contra­diction i^ ith himself.... It is precisely pride that prevents man from achieving depth, even when he seeks it."l
"%e Catholic and Creativity; Theology of Creativity, " The American Benedictine Review IX, 3 & 4 (September-December, 1960)', pp. 204f • The quotation is from Tillich's Theology of Culture.p. 43*
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Therefore, for both Merton and Tillich, the balance 
between form and dynamics is possible only when man 
is in a proper relationship with the ground of his 
being. Cultural creativity id.ll enliance mankind only 
if it serves man's true interests, not simply his felt 
needs.
The third life-process which Üllich analyses is 
that of self-transcendence. It has already been 
mentioned as underlying Merton's understanding of 
the other two life-processes. Neither unambiguous 
self-integration nor unambiguous self-creativity are 
possible without self-transcendence. It is necessary, 
now, to inspect the points of affinity between Tillich 
and Merton in this operation. Tillich defines the 
polarities encountered in self-transcendence as freedom 
and destiny. Merton says that man is to be elevated 
to his proper state of dignity, he is to be liberated 
from the powers that keep him in subjection and that 
keep him from exercising his freedom.^ But, at the 
same time, man must recognize the limits of his freedom. 
Transgression of those limits results in chaos and 
discord. Man is called to exercise his vocation to be 
a "son of God" and to actualize tliis sonship through
^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 82,
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sharing in God's own "wisdom, power, providence, 
justice and kingship." Yet man is beset by a "fundamental 
temptation" which is to aspire to be "like unto God," 
rather than to be the "son of God." Man can achieve 
his greatness and dignity only through "participation, 
by love, in the life and power and wisdom of God who 
is Love."^ He cannot achieve greatness if he tries 
to disregard his own creaturliness. He cannot deny 
his finitude, his destiny. "Pseudo-mysticism," 
thought Merton, erred in ths.t it centred upon "the 
individual self experienced as without limitations."^
True mysticism, on the other hand, recognized, became 
delighted in, and became secure in humility.^ The 
words "humility" and "nothingness" are frequent ones 
in Merton's vocabulary* Yet they are not negative terms. 
Rather they point to man's contingency, what Merton 
referred to as man's "moral and metaphysical helplessness 
before God."'^  He saw that, in order to be free, men 
must accept and "love" their omi nothingness, but must
1The Power and Meaning of Love, pp. 4f*
^"Symbolism - Communication or Communion?.", p. 347. 
^e.g.. Silence in Heaven, p. 19.
^Thoughts in Solitude, p. 52*
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love it in such a way as not to repudiate anything that 
belongs to man. Man must accept all that is given and 
understand that which is given as constituting the 
limits within which his freedom can function. He 
called for a "clear-sighted recognition and mature 
acceptance of human limitations."^ Only through such 
a recognition could man hope to come to loxow himself 
as he really is, that is, come to Icnow his true self.
And only by knoiylng and living according to the 
true self could man hope to know freedom. Man cannot 
gravitate toward freedom at the expense of his limitations, 
or what Ullich called, his destiny.
At the same time, man must not cling to his 
limitations and refuse to exercise his freedom. As 
a son of God, man is called to freedom; the freedom 
to love without impediment (i.e., the freedom to 
balance individualization and participation), freedom 
from compulsion, freedom in the realm of imagination 
(i.e., the freedom to balance dynamics and form), 
freedom to love what is important, freedom from habit 
and freedom from heedlessness. Just like a freedom 
which refuses to accept its owi limitations can lead
^e.g.. The Silent Life, p. 100*
%or a full discussion of these descriptions of freedom see "The Ascetic Life, Experience of God and 
Freedom."
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to tragedy (it id.ll be recalled that Merton used the 
tragic figure, Prometheus, as a symbol of inauthentic 
freedom), so too can a refusal to be free lead to 
smallness, or to mediocrity, a danger Merton criticized 
in monasticism.^ Freedom itself can be trivialized 
if it is seen simply as a freedom of choice rather 
than as the freedom to be able to respond spontaneously 
with the whole self to reality.^
A person then, must be able to maintain both his 
identity and his freedom.^ Only by recognizing the 
self as it really is can man hope to transcend that 
self in freedom and, paradoxically, only by exercising 
freedom can man hope to recognize his true self. For 
Thomas Merton, the self that is to be transcended is 
the false self, the superficial self which is grounded 
in man's oim ego-conseiousness. The transcendence of 
that self leads to a discovery of the true self, the 
self that one cannot describe but wiiich one can simply 
be.^ To transcend the self is to plunge into the
^^.g., Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 224*
^"The Ascetic Life, Experience of God and Freedom," p. 6lj cf. Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 360.
^Gf. Contemplative Prayer, p. 20.
^Gf. Raids on the Unspeakable, p. 15*
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depths of the self, and in those depths discover one's 
true ground*
Of the three life-processes, the most important 
is self-transcendence* It embraces the others* Religion, 
which Tillich describes as the manifestation of self­
transcendence within the dimension of the spirit, seeks 
not only the depths of man's person, but also the depths 
of his moral acts and his cultural creations* It 
points to the depths or the ultimate in every reality* 
Religion cannot be seen simply as a separate function, 
but both as a separate function and as a function inherent 
within all other functions of life* Furthermore, self- 
transcendence is the process that is most explicitly 
described by mystical theology* Christian mysticism, 
in Merton's interpretation, seeks to transcend the 
superficial ego so that man can recognize his union 
with God in the depths of the self*
Furthermore, it can be argued that in the theology 
of both Tillich and Merton, self-transcendence, of 
the tliree lif e-processes, is the one most central to 
a theology which attempts to show the relationship 
between nysticism and social ethics* Ho ethical act, 
and no creation within society, can be a manifestation 
of the Ultimate without its having transcended itself 
in the vertical dimension* Nevertheless, the development 
of a mystical-ethical theology cannot rely on an 
analysis of this process alone; it also depends to a
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large extent on the process of self-integration. It 
is this process that describes the relationship 
between persons and communities and which therefore 
describes the moral act. An analysis of this process 
provides an understanding of the self that needs to 
be transcended, and the community of persons which 
is the aim and hope of self-transcendence within 
concrete, historical existence. Finally, the process 
of seIf-creativity must be seen in this context. Its 
role in the articulation of a mystical-etliical theology 
is not as central as that of the other processes, but 
nevertheless, it is within culture that, according to 
Tillich, one discovers the "contents" of morality. 
Culture provides "the concrete ideals of personality 
and community and the changing laws of ethical wisdom. 
Although in life, i^ hich is an ambiguous mixture of 
essential and existential elements, religion, morality 
and cultui'G are separated, they are esentially united.^ 
The analysis of the life-processes of which they are 
the spiritual manifestations is basic to a theology 
which hopes to show that iqystical self-transcendence 
is united with a social etliic. Tillich's precise 
analysis, which is implicitly affirmed and developed
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 101*
^See above, pp. 3 9 9ff.
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by Merton, is one which could form the basis of a 
prologomena to a modern ascetical-moral theology.
4. The Meaning of "the Christ"
The abstractions of "essence" and "existence" 
can be given another concrete exemplification by an 
examination of what the Christian faith, in Tillich's 
words, sees as the person in whom essence and existence 
are in perfect union, in whom life is actualized un­
ambiguously, and who is the bearer of New Being, that 
is, in Jesus of Nazareth, proclaimed as the Christ.
Throughout Tillich's theological system there is 
a stress on the importance of the concrete moment in 
the encounter between man and God. Religious experience, 
including mysticism, is alt/ays seen to be very much 
a here-and-now, concrete, aspect of man's existence.
This stress is predicated on the Christian claim 
that the Logos has become flesh. If this claim is so, 
wrote Tillich, "Gliristian theology has received something 
which is absolutely concrete and absolutely universal 
at the same time." Flesh is absolutely concrete; 
the Logos is absolutely universal. He continued,
"No myth, no mystical union, no metaphysical principle.
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no sacred law, has the concreteness of a personal
life*"^ It is, of course, possible to consider that
"the human face of God" (to borrow a pîirase used by
J.A.T. Robinson) is not the only face that God may
have, but in so far as human beings are able to
comprehend and be grasped by God, the revelatory
experience must be both absolutely concrete (if it
is to speak to and grasp man) and absolutely universal
(if it is to be truly of God.) "Priestly and prophetic
theologies can be very concrete," Tillich explained,
"but they lack universality. Mystical and metaphysical
theologies can be very universal, but they lack 
2concreteness." Man cannot fully participate, or be 
in. that which is particular, but only that which is 
absolutely concrete and universal at the same time.
He cannot participate in anything that lacks con­
creteness because of his own existential concreteness; 
he cannot participate ultimately in anything that 
lacks universality, because his participation will 
necessarily be only partial and limited and of no 
ultimate value. Concreteness i-Tithout universality can 
lead only to a reunion with that which is penultimate
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 19. 
^Loc. Git.
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at best; universality without concreteness can only 
lead to a relationship with the ultimate that does 
not transcend the aaabiguities of life. It is 
therefore fundamental that these two elements be 
central in any theology which tries to describe the 
moment of man's reunion with the ground of his being, 
Tillich sees this central motif in the patristic 
doctrine of the Logos; "The Logos doctrine as the 
doctrine of the identity of the absolutely concrete 
with the absolutely universal is not one theological 
doctrine among others; it is the only possible 
foundation of a Christian theology which claims to 
be the theology*"^ Only such a doctrine can speak 
of the moment of ecstasy in which, by being grasped 
by the Spiritual Presence, estrangement between 
existence and essence can be overcome. Only a doctrine 
which gives thorough seriousness to both the concrete 
and the universal, accepting the reality of both and 
accepting the reality of their union as being possible 
within time and space, can answer the questions that 
man poses to himself when he confronts his own 
existence and his own finitude.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 20.
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For humanity, then, it is necessary that the Hew 
Being appear in a personal life. Man cannot participate 
in Hew Being and thereby transcend the paradoxes of 
life, if that Hew Being appears in a sub-personal 
dimension. By participation in that which is personal, 
however, man can participate also in all the other 
dimensions of being. Tillich sees man as a micro­
cosm: "what happens to man happens implicitly to all
realms of life, for in men all levels of being are 
present,the physical, the biological, the 
psychological, as well as the spiritual. Furthermore, 
for man there is nothing as concrete as a personal 
life. It was in order to express this relationship 
between the ultimate and the concrete in a personal 
life that, according to Tillich's interpretation, 
the doctrines of the T'rinity were formulated. Trinitarian 
monotheism is not concerned about how three can be in 
one (wliich for Tillich is an absurdity), it speaks 
instead of qualitative matters rather than quantitative ones. 
"The Trinitarian problem," he states, "is the problem
of the unity between ultimacy and concreteness in the 
2living God." Anything other than a Trinitarian concept
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 139*
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 253#
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of God distorts this unity* Exclusive monotheism,
for instance, develops an abstract transcendence in
which the concrete disappears. This occurs, too, in
mystical monotheism, in which "the element of ultimacy
swallows the element of concreteness."^ The mystical
element of religion needs concreteness if it is to
be at all relevant to mankind. At the other extreme,
polytheism stresses the concrete but does not give
full weight to the ultimate. Only in a Trinitarian
monotheism are the elements of concreteness and
universality united, and this union is understood
as occuring in a personal life, namely, Jesus as the
Christ# In the event of Jesus as the Christ the New
Being is present. That which is totally universal
and ultimate (the Logos) is present under the conditions
of concrete existence (Jesus of Nazareth)• Therefore,
the Christian church, Western Christianity especially,
sees Jesus the Christ as the centre of all religion.
"The Eastern church, when it asserted that the Spirit
proceeds from the Father alone, left open the possibility
of a direct theocentric mysticism...the Western church,
in contrast, insisted upon applying the Ghristocentric
2criterion to all Christian piety..." Tillich, at
^Ibid.. p. 250.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, pp. 158f.
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this point, stands firmly with the West# For him, 
man can know the ultimate only in and through the 
concrete* The Spiritual Presence grasps man in so 
far as he is a participant in the New Being and it is 
in Jesus the Christ that New Being is manifested to 
humanity* He is the one point where existential 
estrangement is conquered and life is actualized 
unambiguously#
This leads Tillich to prefer a "low" Ghristology, 
one which stresses the humanity of Jesus, to a "high" 
Ghristology with its docetic tendencies#^ A high 
Ghristology, in Tillich's mind, has a low value for 
man for "salvation can be derived only from him who 
fully participated in man's existential predicament, 
not from a God wallcing on earth, 'unequal to us in 
all respects.'"2 The Protestant Principle demands a 
low Ghristology, which in actuality is the truly 
"high" Ghristology for it is of salvific value to
^Tillich has been criticized for stressing the humanity of Christ and at the same time depreciating the possibility of historical research into the life of Jesus, and insisting that such research is unnecessary. See Systematic Theology. Vol. II, pp. 116-123# See also Paul Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message, especially pp. 105ff; Bernard Martin, Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Man, pp. 178fj J. Heywood Thomas, Paul Tillich, p. ï§7 of. Paul Tillich: to Appraisal, pp. 87ff;D. Moody Smith, Jr., "The Historical Jesus in Paul Tillich's Ghristology," Journal of Religion 46 (January, 1966), No. 1, Part II, pp. 131-147.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 168#
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mankind* Inhere the medium of revelation is extra­
ordinarily irregular, it yields an individualistic and 
paradoxical religion. The extraordinarily regular 
medium of revelation yields, on the other hand, a 
religion that is social and ethical,^ Tillich's 
theology sides with the extraordinarily regular when 
it stresses the importance of concreteness in the 
mediums of revelation. Everything, thought Tillich,
is potentially a bearer of the Spiritual Presence.
2The entire creation is sacramental* But the final 
and definitive revelation, at least for man, must be 
in a personal life.
This final revelation, according to Tillich, is 
discovered in the Christian understanding of Jesus as 
the Christ. By "final" he does not mean the last 
revelation, but "the decisive, fulfilling, unsurpassable 
revelation, that which is the criterion of all the 
others."^ Jesus as the Christ is, thereby, the standard 
for all revelations. "Every new manifestation of the
^See Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 132. 
osince language transcends reality the "word" can become an ultimately more important medium than things. However Tillich criticized Protestantism for its exclusion of a full appreciation for the sacramental element of religion. See Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, pp. 402f.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 148*
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Spiritual Presence stands under the criterion of his 
manifestation in Jesus as the Christ."^ The task 
of theology is to discover within the revelatory 
situation the criteria which make this revelation of 
Jesus as the Christ the final revelation. Tillich 
says that:
"...a revelation is final if it has the power of negating itself without losing itself. This paradox is based on the fact that every revelation is conditioned by the medium in and through which it appears. The question of the final revelation is the question of a medium of revelation which overcomes its own finite conditions by sacrificing them, and itself with them. He who is the bearer of the final revelation must surrender his finitude - not only his life but also his finite; power and knowledge and perfection. In doing so he affirms that he is the bearer of final revelation (the 'Son of God' in classical terms.) He becomes completely transparent to the mystery he reveals. But, in order to be able to surrender himself completely, he must possess himself completely. And only he can possess - and therefore surrender - himself completely who is united with the ground of his being and meaning without separation and disruption. In the picture of Jesus as the Christ we have the picture of a man who possesses these qualities, a man who, therefore, can be called the medium of final revelation."2
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 158.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 148.
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Jesus refused to claim ultimacy for his finite nature.
The disciples wanted to make him into an idol, but
he refused. The Gross is the end of Jesusolatry.
Jesus is the Christ in that he is willing to sacrifice
Jesus. Idolatrous powers are conquered in the Cross.
"For us," wrote Tillich, "this means that in following
him we are liberated from the authority of everything
finite in him...Only as the crucified is he 'grace
and truth* and not l a w . H i s  death is the final
manifestation of his transparency to the ultimate.
"Christian theology can affirm that finality of the
revelation in Jesus as the Christ only on this basis.
The claim of anything finite to be final in its own 
2right is demonic." Jesus is the final revelation 
because of two things; his unity with the ground of 
his being and meaning, i.e., God, and his willingness 
to sacrifice everything rather than exploit this unity 
for his own advantage. His disciples wanted to see
the finite Jesus as ultimate. At Caesarea Philipi 
Simon Peter recognized and accepted Jesus as the 
Christ. But at this point Jesus realized that in 
order for him to be the Christ he had to be crucified
^Ibid.. p. 149.
^Loc* Git.
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(Matthew 16). "He who is the Christ has to die for 
his acceptance of the title 'Christ,'"^ He turns to 
Jerusalem to die and rebukes Peter harshly for his 
insistence that Jesus be other than the one who is 
willing to sacrifice everything within him which is 
finite.
Participation in the New Being as revealed in 
Jesus as the Christ indicates that, because the divine 
manifestation was manifest in the cross of the Christ, 
man cannot understand salvation as a removal of the 
essential necessity of suffering. Tillich rejects 
substitutionary theories of the atonement. "God 
participates in the suffering of existential estrange­
ment," he wrote, "but his suffering is not a substitute 
for the suffering of the creature....Not substitution,
but free participation, is the character of the divine 
2suffering." For one to participate in New Being 
through the ecstatic moment is, by the very nature of 
the divine self-manifestation, to participate in the 
suffering of existential reality. Any attempt to 
escape the necessity of suffering is a distortion of 
New Being.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 112,
^Ibid.. p. 203.
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Accordingly, Tillich understands the Resurrection 
as the narrative of the overcoming of the negativities 
implied in the death of Jesus;
"The negativity which is overcome in the Resurrection is that of the disappearance of him whose being was the New Being, It is the overcoming of his disappearance from present experience and his consequent transition into the past except for the limits of memory#,,..In an ecstatic experience the concrete picture of Jesus of Nazareth becomes indissolubly united id.th the reality of the New Being. He is present wherever the New Being is present. Death was not able to push him into the past."!
He is eternally the bearer of the New Being, eternally 
the medium of God's final revelation. In his willing­
ness to sacrifice his finitude to the possibility of 
total non-being, Jesus as the Christ becomes the moment 
of essentialization. The existential and the essential 
are reunited. It is a dialectical movement. Jesus 
as the Christ is united with his ground of being and 
in this unity he is able to sacrifice the finite elements 
of himself. But only by being able to sacrifice those 
elements is it true to say that he is at one with the 
ground of his being. He is the ecstatic moment of 
human history; the kairos# But he is such only for
llbid.. p. 181.
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those who accept him. The revelation of Jesus as 
the Ghi’ist is final in that it is the kairos which 
provides the criterion by which all other kairoi 
are judged.
"The fact that the kairoi-experienoes belong to the history of the churches, and that the 'great kairos.* the appearance of the centre of history, is again and again re-experienced tlirough relative 'kairoi. * in which the Kingdom of God manifests itself in a particular breakthrough, is decisive for our consideration. The relation of the one kairos to the kairoi is the relation of the criterion to that which stands under the criterion and the relation of the source of power to that which is nourished by the source of power. Kairoi have oochrred and are occurring in all preparatory and receiving moments in the church latent and manifest...But every moment which claims to be Spiritual must be tested.and the criterion is the 'great kairos. Ill
For Tillich, Jesus as the Christ is universal 
revelation and is valid for all mankind, for all 
history, and because of the microcosmic nature of
Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 395* Of*The Protestant Era, p. 53, in which Tillich differentiates between the unique and the universal kairos. which is the appearing of Jesus as the Christ, kairos in a general sense, which is every turning point in history in which the eternal judges and transforms the temporal, and kairos in a special sense, which is the coming of a new theonomy to an old, autonomous culture. Here, and in Tjto Religious Situation, Tillich sees the special kairos as being discovered in the rejection of the capitalistic world view by the Existentialists and the Religious Socialists. See below pp. 593ff,
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personhood, for the universe. But "the final revelation, 
is correlative."^ The objective side is seen in 
"miracle," namely in Jesus as the bearer of New Being, 
and the subjective side is seen in the ecstatic moment 
in which Jesus is accepted as the Christ.
The acceptance of the kairos is the ecstatic 
moment. It is a matter of vision, not an object of 
analysis and calculation. "It is not a matter of 
detached observation but of involved experience."^ 
Observation, analysis and calculation are not to be 
excluded from the concept of vision, but they serve 
only to enrich the vision* The experience of the 
kairos is not produced by observation and analysis.
The kairos is known by the impact of the Spirit. The 
dialectical nature of the Protestant Principle is 
maintained. One Imows the kairos through ecstatic 
acceptance which is brought about by the Spiritual 
Presence of Him who reveals Himself in the kairos. 
"Wherever the various kairoi occur, since they are in 
themselves the presence of the divine Spirit, man 
can commit himself totally* "There is always New 
Being in history," Tillich wrote, "There is always
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 152.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 395*
435
participation in the transcendent union of 
unambiguous life." However, as was noted earlier, 
"this participation is fragmentary.,.the New Being is 
fragmentarily and anticipatorily present, but in so 
far as it is present it is so unambiguously."
"This distinction between the ambiguous and the fragmentary makes it possible for us to give full affirmation and full commitment to 
the manifestation of the Spiritual Presence while remaining aware of 
the fact that in the very acts of affirmation and commitment the ambiguity of life reappears. 
Awareness of this situation is the decisive criterion for religious maturity, "2
Salvation, Tillich reminds us, is healing (from 
salvus). It is the healing of the rupture between 
man as he is and man as he ought to be. It is what 
happens in the ecstatic moments salvation is es­
sentialization. It is man becoming a new creature, 
participating in the New Being that has been 
manifested fully and perfectly in Jesus the Christ. 
He is the centre of the mystical experience. But
^Ibid,. pp. 149f. See above p. 4.04.
p. 150.
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healing, salvation, and mysticism can never be limited 
to him:
"In some degree all men participate in the healing power of the New Being... But no men are totally healed, not even those who have encountered the healing power as it appears in Jesus as the Christ (who) is the ultimate criterion of every healing and every saving process... therefore, wherever there is saving power in mankind, it must be judged by the saving power in Jesus as the Christ."^
Christianity can be universalistic without being 
syncretistlc. Everything is founded on the ultimate 
criterion which the Christian sees in Jesus as the 
Christ. This understanding of Jesus is, for Tillich, 
the basic contribution of Christianity to eoumeiilcal 
dialogue; "the revelatory event upon which Christianity 
is based has a critical and transforming power for all 
religions."^ For the Christian there can be mystical 
experiences outside of the cognitive knowledge of Jesus 
as the Christ; however what Christianity has to offer 
all forms of religion, including the Bçrstical element in 
all religions, is the one, unique criterion under which 
all of creation is judged and redeemed. The norm of
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, pp. 193f*
^Christianity and the Encounter of the World 
Religions, pp. 53f> see also pp. 36f.
é
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all religious experience, according to the theological 
thought of Paul Tillich, is the appearance of the New 
Being, the essential man under the conditions of 
existence, as manifested once and for all who are 
open to accepting him as the Christ, in Jesus of 
Nazareth, Mystical experience is an authentic ex­
perience of God only in so far as one participates in 
New Being, whether or not one is specifically aware 
of this participation, for only by a participation in 
New Being, which appears in history because of God's 
action, is unambiguous union with the ground of being 
possible#
Merton's Ghristology is centred around the 
comparison of Adam, the natural man, and Christ,
"the new Adam, the spiritual head of regenerated and 
spiritualized humanity.Adam is the representative 
of the superficial self, made in the image of God 
but fallen from the "likeness." In Adam the image 
of God in man is still present but is unactualized, 
it remains hidden and unknown. In Christ, the second 
Adam, the image of God which is distorted in man is
The New Man. p. 79* For the detailed treatment of Merton's Ghristology see above pp. 276-287.What is attempted here is simply a summary of that exposition.
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restored to a state of imlty with the likeness of 
God bringing the full and nndistorted image of God 
into a temporal and spatial manifestation. The 
Christ is manifested in Jesus, but also, for Merton, 
the Incarnation of God in man incorporates "the whole 
economy of Redemption which flowed from it."^ Christ 
is God loiown in existence, brought to earth, manifested 
to his creation. Jesus is proclaimed to be the Christ 
because in him we can see the restitution of image 
and likeness. In him we can find the true man, the 
true being, because the centre of his personhood was 
not his own ego-consciousness but God, the Ground of 
Being, His cross is a challenge to all humanity since 
it reveals to men the true nature of their being.
It is also the source of power, enablir^ man to 
participate in this new life, because in the same way 
mankiW shared in the fallen humanity of Adam, it 
shares as well in the glorified humanity of Jesus.
All mankind, simply by virtue of its humanity, is a 
potential representative of Christ, Because of the 
union of man and God in Jesus, and because he himself 
was human, the reunion between man and God is implicit
^The Ascent to Truth, p. 312, Also quoted
above, p. 276,
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in the humanity of each person. Merton speaks of a 
natural union with God, based on our participation 
in Adam, and a supernatural union based on our 
participation in the humanity of Christ. The 
difference is awareness. Jesus reveals to us what is 
ours all along. The ground of our being is made 
visible to us, we are shown who we really are. And 
because of the new awareness of our reality, we are 
able to live and act and create as new creatures.
We discover ourselves in Christ, and conversely, 
we discover Chi'ist in ourselves. Hence, there is 
a Ghristocentrism to Merton’s mysticism. The 
discovery of God in the self is made possible by 
the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. For Merton 
this is the central claim of the Biblet
"That the inner truth of man and of human existence is revealed in a certain kind of event. This event has the nature of Kairos. crisis or Judge­ment, Challenged by a direct historical intervention of God (which may be doubtful and obscure but is none the less decisive), man can respond with the engagement of his deepest freedom, or he can evade the encounter by various specious excuses. If the encounter is evaded, man's freedom is not vindicated but is mortgaged and forfeited. (But the confrontation can be renewed in other circumstances. One may get another chancel) When the encounter is real and complete, a new kind of relationship is established between our own freedom and that ultimate Freedom and Spirit; the God who is Love and who is also the ’Lord of History.’ At the same time a new
relationship with other men comes into beings instead of living for ourselves we live for them* Ideally speaking, if we all lived in this kind of altruistic concern and en­gagement, human history would culminate in an ephiphany of God in man. Mankind would visibly be ’Christ.
If one responds to the encounter with God’s self­
manifestation in a %fay which accepts and incorporates 
it, it I'Jill lead to "divinisation." But, because the 
central manifestation of God has occurred in a human 
life, to be divinized is, at the same time, to be 
humanized. To discover God in the depths of the 
self is to discover one’s own deepest reality. To 
be united with God and to live in Him is to live 
human life in its truest, deepest, most perfect sense.
Tillich rejects certain of the terms that Merton 
feels free to use* In regard to the Christ, Tillich 
principally rejects talk about divine and human "natures." 
"Nature" when applied to man is ambiguous; when applied 
to God, Tillich believed it was simply wrong.^ 
Nevertheless, in spite of tliis discrepancy in the 
use of important theological terms, much of what
Opening the Bible, pp. 73f. (Merton capitalized this entire passage except for that which is in parenthesis.)
^See especially Systematic Theology, Vol. II,p. 164.
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Tillich and Merton say about the Christ is similar* 
Merton i^s not attempting to create a new theological 
system, nor was he often witing for an audience 
which was interested in theological or philosophical 
precision. Therefore, he m s  willing and able to use 
uncritically terms that he inherited from the main­
stream of Christian tradition, whereas Tillich’s 
overall purpose demanded that he malce clear and precise 
distinctions between various terms, rejecting some 
and accepting others* The different theological 
language should not, however, obscure the very close 
points of affinity in the Gliristologies of these two 
men.
These points of affinity are obvious, in spite 
of the use of different theological language. In 
speaîd.ng of "image and likeness" Merton, it has been 
argued, means very much what Tillich does when he 
uses the terms "essence and existence."^ It follows 
therefore, that when Merton speaks of Jesus as the 
one who restores the union between image and likeness, 
he is speaking similarly to Tillich when he says that 
he who is the bearer of New Being conquers the gap 
between essence and existence*^ Both men use the
^See above, pp. 38lff,
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 136.
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Pauline symbol of new being, or new creation, or new 
man, and both see that it is because this New Being 
is revealed to man in a human life that man is sub­
sequently able to participate in it. Both are 
able to recognize Jesus as the Christ because he was 
the one who was able to sacrifice his superficial ego, 
or in Tillich’s language, the elements of finitude, 
so that his true being - or the image of God, or the 
New Being - could be perfectly seen under the conditions 
of existence. Both see that in Jesus there was no 
estrangement between essence and existence, between 
God and man. Both see the Cross of Christ as a 
challenge to man and, at the same time, a source of 
power. That is to say that in the Gross man sees a 
picture of what he is supposed to be - the ought-to- 
be of human life - and at the same time, by 
participation in the Gross tlirough faith and love,^
Space does not permit a detailed discussion of the meanings of the words "faith" and "love" in the thought of both Tillich and Merton. Tillich dedicated a book to the question of faith (Dynamics of Faith) in which he rejects the idea of faith as being "an act of knowledge that has a low degree of evidence," (p. 31) and defines it instead as "the state of being ultimately concerned." (p. 4) lu Gvstematic Theology. Vol. Ill, he writes, "Faith is the state of being grasped by the Spiritual Presence and opened to the transcendent unity of unambiguous life...being grasped by the New Being as it is manifest in Jesus as the Christ.” (p. 139) There is also, he says, "obedience in faith" which is "the act of keeping ourselves open to the Spiritual Presence which has grasped us and
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he discovers that he participates also in New 
Being and is able to live according to his true 
being and know unambiguous life* Both apply the 
word "kairos" to Jesus# Merton is not as specific 
on this point as is Tillich. However he implies 
what Tillich states specifically; Jesus as the
opened us." (p. I4I) Merton defines faith in a number of ways. In The Ascent to Truth he can call it "a simple assent to authority proposing a truth to be believed in." (p. 211) Later, however, he expanded this in a direction which would bring him closer to Tillich. "Faith is not merely the acquiedence of the mind in certain truths* it is the gift of our whole being to Truth itself, to the Word of God." (Life and Holiness, p. 92] Faith "is the willingness to sacrifice every other value rather than the basic value of truth and life in Christ." (Life and Holiness, p. 99) It is "a total, unswerving acceptance of the person of Christ as a source of salvifio power and of new life." (Life and Holiness, p. 92) This last statement, in Tillich’s terms, is to say that faith is the act of maldng Jesus the Glirist one’s ultimate concern. Love, in this context, refers to the love man can have for God and for the appearance of the Christ. Tillich uses the terms libido ("the movement of that which is lower in power and meaning to that which is higher") as the principle means of describing this love. (Systematic Theology Vol. I, pp. 311ff.) (Agape, which is love "in spite of" cannot be used in quite the same way.) "Basically, however, one’s love to God is of the nature of eros." (Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 312.) (Cf. Merton’s The Living Bread, p. 49, in which he sees an element of eros in all human love.) Merton generally speaks of the love of man for God as the act in which the gap between subject and object is bridged (Disputed Questions, p. I04) as a union of wills (The New Man, p. lOé), and as an opening of one’s heart to Christ (A Conference on Rcayer," p. 452). In so far as this love of man for God is seen in terms of a longing, or a hope, it is similar to Tillich’s idea, kîhen it is spoken of in terms of a union which is already effected.
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Christ is the final and determinitive kairos. the one 
by which all other kairoi are defined and judged.^ 
Finally both men seem nnperterbed by the inability 
of historical criticism to give definitive assurances 
about the historical Jesus of Nazareth. Any one of 
these many points of affinity could be discussed at 
length. However, the intention of this thesis would 
make such a detailed treatment superfluous; it is not 
pertinent to develop a detailed understanding of their 
common Ghristologies. We will limit our discussion 
at this point, therefore, to the relationship between 
Ghristology and mysticism in their thought. In the 
next section we will examine the relationship between 
Merton’s understanding of "divinization" and Tillich’s 
understanding of "essentialization."
Tillich would insist (and Merton would not at all disagree) that the union is possible only because of God’s initiative in love. Merton knew that God’s love "is the very root of our being" and that we can love only in so far as we "live...on this level of love." ("A Conference on Prayer," p. 452.)
^See for example, Merton’s discussion of Christ as Judge in Seasons of Celebration, pp. 1^ 2^ 755 his treatment of how the awareness of Christ implies awareness of kairos and choice in the context of history in "The Historical Consciousness," pp. 2-3, and the discussion of the meaning of eschatology in Raids on the Unspeakable, p. 75.
445
Tillich and Merton both claim a Christocentric 
basis for mysticism, and both agree that this basis 
in no way negates the possibility of mystical 
experience or the reception of revelation outside 
of an explicitly Christian context. In discovering 
how these two thinkers see a necessary relationship 
between Christ and mysticism while at the same 
time expand their interpretation of this basis to 
a universalistic degree, we will encounter different 
language, different usage of traditional theological 
concepts, and different emphases*. But we will 
discover a fundamental,similarity and sympathy in 
their appreciation and understanding. The similarity 
is, to a large extent, derived from their sharing of 
a common tradition. Thomas Merton, to be sure, found 
much of his basic understanding of mysticism within 
the Cistercian tradition of its famous Father, St. 
Bernard. Tillich, too, had a deep respect for St. 
Bernard’s contribution to mystical theology* "Bernard 
is the most eminent representative of Christian
Merton wrote numerous studies of St. Bernard, many of which have been mentioned or quoted in this work. He also ivrote a popular study of the Cistercian saint, The Last of the Fathers (Londons 
Hollis and Carter, 1954)♦
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mysticism," he said, and on the specifics of a
Christ-centred mysticismhe saw Bernard as the one
Father who explicitly and definitively made the
connection between Christ and ii^sticisDu For
Tillich, Bernard was the "baptizing father"? the
one who baptized mysticism and made it a concrete
mysticism of love.^ Furthermore, as we have mentioned,
both men share in their appreciation for numerous
other figures in the history of n^stieism, both
2Christian and non-Christian* Nevertheless, in 
spite of their shared heritage, both men approached 
the relationship from different perspectives.
For Tillich the mystical or ecstatic moment was 
the moment of correlation between the act of 
revelation and the act of acceptance. It was the 
moment in which revelation was received and participated 
in, the moment in which one participated in New Being, 
the moment in which "the Spirit takes the personal 
centre into the universal centre."^ But the New 
Being is manifested in Jesus as the Christ; his being
History of Christian Thought, p. 173.
^See above, p. 373,
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 286.
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1is the New Being. VJherever there is New Being, 
the being of Jesus as the Christ is present:
"He ’is the Spirit* and we ’Imow him now* only because he is the Spirit. In this way the concrete individual life of the man Jesus of Nazareth is raised above transitoriness into the eternal presence of God as Spirit.
In other words, to have a genuine mystical experience 
is to participate in New Being and New Being can never 
be separated from New Being which became Imovm to 
man perfectly and unambiguously in Jesus seen as 
the Christ.
Jesus as the Ciirist is the centre of mysticism 
because, for Tillich, there can be no mystical union 
of man and God except through a mediator who is, 
at once, both absolutely concrete and absolutely 
universal. Without the picture of Jesus as the 
Christ, concreteness would be lost, and man would 
be unable to find himself united with God since 
man cannot participate in that which is not concrete.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, pp. iSlff.
2Ibid.. p. 181; of. Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 156; also. The Shaking of the Foundations, pp. 131f.
^Cf. Ibid♦. p. 131f on Tillich’s use of the concreteness of the "picture" of Jesus as the Christ as the creative power through an analogia imaginis in spite of historical scepticism.
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Salvation which does not occur both in and tlirough 
history interprets the New Being as the negation of
beings, not as a personal, social, historical 
transformation of reality*^ For Tillich, myst: 
could only be baptized if it was concrete, and
pJesus as the Christ makes the ultimate concrete.
Tillich also sees Jesus as the Christ as the 
centre of all religious experience in so far as he 
is the criterion by which all religious experiences 
are judged. He is God’s final and definitive self­
manifestation. "Therefore," concludes Tillich, 
"wherever there is saving power in mankind, it must 
be judged by the saving power in Jesus as the Christ. 
He is "the keystone in the arch of Spiritual mani­
festations in History."
"The event ’Jesus as the Christ* is unique but not isolated....It is the qualitative centre in a process which
^Ibid.. p. 101; cf. Ctoistianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, p. 88.
%ee A History of Christian Thought, p. 63 and Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 107f.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 194*
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proceeds from an indefinite future which we call, symbolically, the beginning and the end of history.
If the event of Jesus as the Christ, an event
which includes both revelation (Jesus) and acceptance
(the proclamation that he is the Christ) is both
unique but not isolated, this opens the way for a
universalistic interpretation of the Christ. Tillich
is able to do tiiis by accepting a Logos-Christology
as well as a Spirit-Gliristology. That which was
absolutely universal in the picture of Jesus as the
Christ was the Logos, "the rational structure of
reality which the mind can grasp and according to
2which it can shape reality." Therefore, wherever 
man’s subjective reason grasps the objective rationality 
of the universe, he has an experience of the logos 
structure of reality, and this same Logos became flesh
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 156; of.Ibid., pp. 388ff for a further treatment of Christ as the centre of history. In Ultimate Concern Tillich gives a precise summary of what he means by the "uniqueness" of Jesuss There is "...lack of any scar that would show an estrangement from God...sacrifice of his finitude...and utter humility." (p. 156) See also, Systematic Theology. Vol. II, pp. 144ff. This is criticized by Martin (^. Cit., pp. l?8f) in which he accuses Tillich of picking and choosing the attributes of Jesus.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 86.
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in Jesus the Christ.^ Wherever man faces Logos, 
he implicitly faces Ohrist* Tillich also is able 
to base a universal!stic idea of Christ on lois 
understanding of the nature of faith. He defines 
faith as "the state of being grasped by the Spiritual 
Presence and opened to the transcendent unity of un­
ambiguous life" or, in Gliristological terms, "being 
grasped by the New Being as it is manifest in Jesus 
as the Christ."^ Tillich insists that this definition 
of faith, although specifically Christian, is universally 
valid. Finally, Tillich insists that revelation 
occurs elsewhere besides the appearance of Jesus as 
the Christ;
"There is a history of revelation, the centre of which is the event Jesus the Christ; but the centre is not without a line which leads to it (preparatory revelation) and a line which leads from it (receiving revelation). Further, we have asserted that where there is revelation, there is salvation. Revelation is not information about divine things; it is the ecstatic manifestation of the Ground of Being in events, persons, and things.Such manifestations have shaking, transforming, healing power. They
^Bee Systematic Theology,Vol. II, p. 109f.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 139; seeabove p. 442, (fn).
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are saving events in which the power of the New Being is present. It is present in a preparatory way, fragmentarily, and is open to demonic distortion. But it is present and heals where it is seriously accepted.
To reject the idea of universalism, Tillich 
felt, inevitably forces one into a position where he 
must describe "the eternal destiny of the individual 
either as being everlastingly condemned or as being 
everlastingly saved." But such a doctrine, he saw, 
had "demonic implications; it introduces an eternal 
split into God himself," If Tillich had to choose 
between "the doctrine of an absolutely opposite 
eternal destiny of individuals" and a doctrine of 
universalism, he would unhesitatingly choose the 
latter "in view of both the self-manifestation of 
God and the nature of man.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 192f.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 434* It will be noted that much of what Tillich says about mysticism can be seen in his early thesis on Schelling’s philosophy. For example: "Christianity creates communion with theGod who became man in Christ, but who at the same time annulled himself as an individual and selfishness in him­self. This inner dialectical movement, from the incarnate to the crucified to the exalted - from Jesus through the Christ to the Spirit - Constitutes the essence of Christ­ianity. In this living systol and diastole the contra­diction is conquered through grace and that identity is fashioned which included guilt-consciousness overcome within itself. The principle of mysticism triumphs, but not in the form of mysticism, but rather as personal
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Thomas Merton believed that Christianity is 
"the greatest of all ir^stical religions,"^ and that 
"Christian Prayer is obviously centered in the Person 
of J e s u s . T h i s  emphasis can be discovered, not only 
in his early writings, but even in M s  treatment of 
Zen Buddhism. Ohrist, he felt, could provide certain 
forms of Zen with the "center" which it needs; he 
even is able to find traces of Trinitarian structures
3within Zen. Perhaps Merton over simplified the com­
plexities of Eastern thoughtf and was almost too ready 
to accept a basic affinity between Christian and
communion that overcomes contradiction; it is ’the religion of the Spirit and of freedom#”’ Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in Schelling’s Philosophical Development, p. 125. As stated earlier, see above, p. 5# fn. 2. David Hopper demonstrates how this early work of Tillich’s forms the basis of much of his theological system.Bee Tillich; A Theological Portrait (Philadelphia; Lippincott, 19^7, Chapters IV and V.,
^"Christ the Way," p. 147.
^"The Humanity of Christ in Monastic Prayer,"p. 1.
%ysties and Zen Masters, pp. 40, 42. Cf. Tillich’s Systematic Theology. Vol. I, pp. 276-279 in which he speaks of trinitarian principles within ontology as a "preparation" for the Trinitarian dogma of Christianity.
^As Mclnerny (Op. |M^., p. 95) suggests.
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Eastern mysticism, nevertheless, the important thing 
was that he wanted to see Christ at the centre of 
all forms of mysticism, Merton was sure that in the 
same way that Augustine could accept and use Plotinus, 
Aquinas could accept Aristotle and Averroes, and 
Teilhard de Chardin could use Marx and Enggl s, so 
too, could he consort with Eastern philosophers.^
In so far as he \^ as able to see Christ in Zen, it 
was because his own basic understanding of mysticism 
had been derived from a tradition which interpreted 
mysticism as a Christ-centred phenomenon. He ex­
plicitly felt that the apophatic nature of the 
mystical theology of St. John of the Gross and 
St. Gregory of Nyssa was secondary to their under­
standing of the Christs "Their supraconceptual 
experience of God cannot in fact be achieved without 
Christ." he said, "Vîhat is more it cannot even be 
arrived at without a concept of Christ as the 
Incarnate Word of God. This is essential to Cliristian 
mysticism." These n^ rstics of the apophatic school, 
he insisted, did not leave "Christ outside the gates
^e.g., T ^  Way of Chuang T%u. p. 11.
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of their own contemplative Eden,and in no way did 
Merton want to propose a mysticism that did not have 
Christ at its centre.
Merton explained the Christocentric nature of 
mysticism in what amounts to two fundamental ways. 
First and foremost, he bases the possibility of man’s 
return to God upon man’s oneness with the human 
nature of Christ, and secondly, as we have already 
mentioned, Christ opens man’s awareness to his own 
inner reality. In other words, Christ is both the 
source of grace by which union with God is effected, 
and an exemplar of our own true being. Union with 
God is possible because, in sharing in the humanity 
of Jesus, we share also in his divinity since his 
humanity and his divinity, although separate, cannot 
be divided. Following in a strict Ghalcedonian 
orthodoxy, Merton insists that the two "natures" 
are concretely united in the Person of Christ. In 
mystical contemplation, man shares in the Person of 
Christ, not simply in one nature. The object of
The Ascent to Truth, p. 243. Merton recognized that Teresa of Avila tended to think of corporal!ty as a possible hindrance to prayer. He thinks that she got around this by concentrating on the Resurrected Body of Christ. Molinos is cited as one who maintained that Christ’s humanity was a hindrance. See "The Humanity of Christ in Monastic Prayer," pp. 1-3.
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Christian prayer is "union with the Father, through 
the Person of the Son, by the Holy Spirit."^ He 
concluded;
"The Patristic tradition distinguishes the humanity and divinity of Christ, not in order to separate but in order to unite them, because the Christ of monastic contemplation is neither the divinity alone nor the humanity alone, but the unity of the two natures in One Person."^
By sharing in the humanity of Jesus Christ, we 
share as well in the totality of his Person. Since 
he is the perfect likeness of the divine Image,it 
is through him alone that man can be restored to what 
is essentially his, namely, union with God. We are 
united with Jesus through our humanity, but inasmuch 
as he is united ivith the Father, through him we are 
united a3.so. It is then, in union with Clirist, that 
we become aware of our true nature, our true telos. 
for in Jesus Christ we have the eæmplar of both our 
o\m spiritual being and of Spiritual perfection.^
p. 3.
^"The Humanity of Christ in Monastic Prayer,"
^Ibid.. p. 26f.
3The Mew Man. p. 84; see above pp. 2?6ff.
^Loc. Git.
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We cannot find God without Christ; it is Christ 
who malces God laiown to us. "The Word was made 
Flesh...this truth is the foundation stone of our 
monastic life. It is not just a truth which we Imow 
and periodically meditate on. It is a truth which 
we must live by.
Paul Tillich did not feel bound by the Christo- 
logical formulations of Ghaloedon, although he saw 
that these did, in fact, preserve the substantial 
truth about "both the'Christ-character and the 
Jesus-character of the event of Jesus as the Christ,"
pin spite of "very inadequate conceptual tools." He 
stated his Ghristology differently, perhaps even 
inadequately.^ Nevertheless, Tillich and Merton were 
emphasizing a very similar truths Jesus the Christ 
is the centre of any reunion between man and God
^"Seeking God," Sponsa Regis 27 (January, 1957), No. 5, p. 118.
^See Systematic Theology. Vol. II, pp. 164-167.
^Tavard (Op. Git.) thinks Tillich is incompatible with Chalcedon (pp. 124, 132) and errs both in a 
"■f Sabb'ellian (p. 119) and Nestorian (pp. 129, 131) and even a possible Docetic (p. 131 - the humanity of Jesus really does; not count for much) direction. In the Introduction to Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, Tillich disregards any criticism which faults him for attempting to go beyond the language of Ghalcedon, 
(p. 5).
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because he combined within himself both the 
absolutely universal, or the Logos, or the divine 
nature, with the absolutely concrete, or the Flesh, 
or the human nature. Tillich’s Clirist has universal 
significance; so does Merton’s. He wrote:
"For in becoming man, God became not only Jesus Christ but also potentially every man and woman that ever existed. In Christ, God became not only ’this’ man, but also, in a broader and more mystical sense, yet no less truly,’ every man. *
But Tillich sees the final revelation in Jesus as 
the Christ in correlation with man’s acceptance of 
him. Merton continues the passage just quoted:
"The presence of God in His world as its Creator depends on no one but Him. His presence in the wrld as Man de­pends, in some measure, upon men. Not that we can do anything to change the mystery of the Incarnation in itself: but we are able to decide whether we ourselves, and that portion of the world wliich is ours, shall become aware of His presence, consecrated by it, and transfigured in its light.
Therefore, both Tillich and Merton see the Christ as 
potentially co-extensive with all manlcind, indeed
%ew Seeds of Contemplation. pp. 294f. 
^Loc. Git.
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with all creation, but unambiguously actualized ohly
where man is able to recognize and accept the Christ
wherever he is manifested, and chiefly, finally and
definitively, in Jesus.
Merton has witten that the state of man, and in
fact, of all creation, should be one of "transparency."^
However, in the fallen state, transparency has been
marred by shadows. Mhat should be transparent is
now opaque. Using similar language, Tillich explicitly
states that Jesus was the one %fho was the final
(i.e., definitive) manifestation of transparency to 
2the divine mystery. It is this idea of transparency 
which is used by both men as a metaphor to explain 
the concept of the universal Christ.
Gf. Bread in the Wilderness, pp. 60f; "A Life Free From Care," pp. 222f; New Seeds of Contem­plation. pp. 189, 264.
^Systematic Theolo<^y. Vol. I, pp. 14-91 • Tillich accepted Lewis Ford’s criticism that the word "transparent" implied that the vehicle for revelation lent something new to the revelation. Tillich revised his metaphor and suggested that "translueency" would be better terminology. See "Rejoinder," in The Journal of Religion 4§ (January, 1966), No. 1,Part II, pp. 187f. Since, however, Tillich used "transparency" in the bulk of his writings, this thesis will continue to use that word but attention must be drawn to the way in which Tillich, in his last year, redefined the meaning of the word.
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Tillich, in accord with the Protestant Principle, 
will not ascribe the quality of "holiness" to any 
created being unless he first makes a fundamental 
qualification. Things are not holy in themselves, 
they are holy only in so far as they point beyond 
themselves to the ultimate;
"In this sense one can speak of Holy Scriptures, holy communities, holy acts, holy offices, holy persons. These predicates mean that all these realities are more than they are in their immediate finite appearance. They are self-transcendent, or, seen from the side of that to which they transcend - the holy - they are translucent toward it. This holiness is not their moral or cognitive or even religious quality but their power of pointing beyond themselves."
Accordingly, Tillich is only able to accept that idea 
of saints id.thin the idea of transparency. The 
Protestant Principle rejects a state of perfection 
that denies the parados of justification. "There are 
no Protestant saints," Tillich proclaimed, "or, more
precisely, no saints under the criterion of the
oProtestant Principle." In union with all of humani 
"saints are justified sinners," never anything else,
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 105.
^Ibid.. p. 252.
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Protestantism, however, can accept "representations 
of the impact of the %)iritual Presence on man."
It can find "representatives of the power of New 
Being in the religious as well as the secular realm, 
not as a particular grade of sanctity, hut as 
representatives and symbols of that in which all 
participate who are grasped by the Spirit."*^ With 
these qualifications, Tillich is able to speak of 
saints;
"The Spiritual Community is the Community of Spiritual personalities, i.e., of personalities who are grasped by the Spiritual Presence and who are unambiguously, though fragmentarily, determined by it.In this sense the Spiritual Gommimity is the community of saints. The state of saintliness is the state of transparency toward the divine ground of being; it is the state of being determined by faith and love."^
Or, earlier in his Systematic Theology;
"The term ‘saint* has been misunderstood and distorted; saintliness has been identified with religious or moral per­fection. Protestantism, for these reasons, has finally removed the concept of sainthood from theology and the reality
^Ibid.. p. 253,
^Ibid., p. 231,
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of the saint from religion. But sainthood is not personal reflection. Saints are persons who are transparent for the ground of being which is re­vealed through them and who are able to enter a revelatory constellation as mediums. Their being can become a sign-event for others. This is the truth behind the Catholic practise  ^of demanding miracles from every saint."”
The saint, then, for Tillich, is one who is
transparent toward the ground of being although this
transparency is fragmentary and anticipatory. His
holiness is not a matter of his own possession; he
is holy because he points to that which is holy.
Jesus was the one whose transparency was totally un-
2ambiguous and without distortion. But transparency 
is not limited to him. It can be found wherever one 
has been grasped by the Spiritual Presence, wherever 
one has participated in the manifestation of Hew Being.
Merton, too, even from within the Roman Catholic 
tradition, was able to interpret sainthood in accordance 
with the qualification of the Protestant Principle.
Of course he would not state it in that way; he would 
say, rather, that sainthood had to be seen as qualified 
by humility* "Me id.ll never be without some semi-
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 135.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 153.
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deliberate faults of weakness," he wote, echoing 
Tillich’s understanding that sin is both ontological 
and moral. Furthermore, in agreement i-dth Tillich, 
he saw this weakness as "true even of saints, who 
all retained their frailties and human limitations,"
In the history of Christian monasticism, he discovered, 
this point was not always appreciated. However, he 
himself concluded;
"It is a paradox of monastic history that the superhuman ideal of perfect conquest of all the passions in the present life is a pagan rather than a Christian concept; and therefore is an ideal of ’flesh’ rather than of the ’spirit.’ In Christian sanctity, a certain human wealmess and Imperfection are altogether compatible with the perfect love of God, as long as one acquires humility from the experience of his own wretchedness and thus learns to place an ever more total and perfect trust in the grace of God."I
For Merton, a "saint" was a "sign" or a "sacrament 
of God’s mercy in the w o r l d . H e  is one idio "is 
united to God in the depths of his oi«m being.
He is the one who is transparent for God;
^life and Holiness. p. 151. 
disputed Questions, p. 274.
3Seasons of Celebration, p. 137-
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"The saint, then, seeks not his own glory taut the glory of God*And in order that God may tae glori­fied in all things, the saint wishes himself to tae nothing but a pure instrument of the divine will. He wants himself to tae simply a window tlirough which God's mercy shines on the world.
The saint, accordingly, "strives to tae holy." But 
tay this Merton does not mean that he strives to 
achieve a particular level of perfection. The striving 
for holiness is analogous to Tillich's definition of 
faith as including being opened to the Spiritual 
Presence. The saint strives to be open. He strives 
to live his life in the obedience of faith, which is, 
in Tillich's words, "the act of keeping ourselves
open to the Spiritual Presence which has grasped us
2 ' and opened us." The saint is one who "strives to
practise virtue heriocally, not in order to be knoim 
as a virtuous and holy man, taut in order that the 
goodness of God may never tae obscured by any act of 
his."^ He is one who, because he is aware of his 
vocation to tae transparent, attempts to the best of
1Life and Holiness, p. 24.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 141; see above p. 442, fn, 1.
^Life and Holiness, p. 24; see also the quo­tation from "A Life Eree From Care, " quoted above on page 281.
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his ability to live in such a way as to remove any 
hindrances to that transparency. This does not con­
flict with the Protestant Principle. Merton's in­
sistence on humility coincides with Tillich's in­
sistence on man's need for grace and justification. 
Furthermore, for Merton as well as for Tillich,
"Only the Spirit of God can point out Christ to us."^
The initiative is always with God; man does not create 
the Spiritual Presence, he is transparent to it.
In summary, both men not only agree in that they 
see man as being capable of being transparent toward 
the ground of being, but also in seeing that all men 
have, in Merton's words "an irreplaceable vocation 
to Ghrisf'^or, in Tillich's words, a vocation to be 
a "medium of revelation" and a "bearer of New Being," 
Man's unity with God is eternal; it beceme actualized 
perfectly in Jesus the Glirist, and is seen fragmentarily 
and anticipatorily, but nonetheless unambiguously,
3wherever man is grasped by the Spiritual Presence.
^Bread in the Wilderness, p. 76.
Life Free From Gare," p. 219.
^See ^stematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 28? (quoted above in/fn. 1, p 403;andgp. lÿ^f(quoted above on pages 404 & 435f); and see The New Man, pp. S4-S8, quoted in part above on page 279ff.
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5. Essentialization and Divindzation
Paul Tillich introduced the idea of "essential!za­
tion" in his treatment of the idea of eternal life.
He borrowed the term from Schelling, but expanded its 
meaning. Tillich interpreted Schelling as referring 
to a Platonizing return from existence to essence; 
that in essentialization an existant, elevated into 
eternity, returned to that which it was before its 
fall into existence. The process would be basically 
circular. However, for Tillich, "Such an understanding 
of essentialization would make it into a concept which 
is more adequate to the India-born religions than to 
any of the Israel-born ones. The whole world process 
would not produce anything n e w . T h e  historical 
process would be, in the final analysis, static. The 
processes of life which he defined and analyzed, both 
in their individual and historical aspects, would be 
matters of falling' away from essential unity by a 
participation in existence, and then a subsequent 
return to the original state, Adam would return to 
a state of dreaming innocence. But, for Tillich, this
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 427,
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is; impossible. Adam, having fallen into existence, 
can never again be innocent. This would, if it were 
possible, deny any positive reality to existence, 
Tillich, to be sure, understands existence as a 
state of estrangement, but he refrains from denying 
its positive elements. His re-interpretation of 
essentialization is an attempt to state those positive 
elements of existence and, in so doing, save him 
from making a final leap into a total Platonic idealism, 
He says:;
"...the term 'essentialization* can also mean that the new which has been actualized in time and space adds something to essential being, uniting it with the positive which is created within existence, thus producing the ultimately new, the 'New Being.*,,.,Such thought, however metaphorically and inadequately expressed, gives an infinite weight to every decision and creation in time and space and con­firms the seriousness of what is meant by 'ultimate judgment,' Participation in the eternal life depends on a creative synthesis of a being's essential nature with what it has made of it in its temporal existence. In so far as the negative has maintained possession of it, it is exposed in its negativity and excluded from eternal memory. V/hereas, in so far as the essential has conquered existential distortion its standing is higher in eternal life."^
I^ioc, Git,
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After the negativities implied in existence are 
exposed and negated, existence enhances essence* 
Essentialization should not imply that that which 
appears in existence is either unreal or lacking in 
goodness. Tillich continues, "The conflicts and 
sufferings of nature under the conditions of 
existence and its longing for salvation, of which 
Paul speaks (Romans, Chapter 8), serve the enrichment 
of essential being after the negation of the negative 
in everything that has being.
Essentialization occurs in the ecstatic moment.
In this moment man stands outside liimself in successful 
self-transcendence. In this moment essence and ex­
istence are reunited. But it is a union, not the 
obliteration of existential elements. Man is not 
simply reunited with what ought-to-be, or what used- 
to-be, but his existence adds something to his essence. 
Perhaps what is added is not very much; in the 
actuality of life one may discover that his existence 
is overwhelmingly negative. But whatever positive 
elements that are to be found under the conditions 
of existence, are elevated to form a new creation. 
Essence is enhanced because it has risked non-being 
by its participation in existence, and, at least in
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 432.
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part, it has conquered non-being:
"The Christian assertion of the tragic universality of estrangement implies that every human being turns against his telos. against Eternal Life, at the same time that he aspires to it.This makes the concept of 'essentializa­tion* profoundly dialectical. The telos of man as an individual is determined by the decisions he makes in existence on the basis of the potentialities given to him by destiny. He can waste his potentialities, though not com­pletely, and he can fulfil them, though not totally. Thus, the symbol of ultimate judgement receives a particular seriousness. The exposure of the negative as negative in a person may not leave much positive for Eternal Life. It can be a reduction to smallness; but it can also be an elevation to greatness. It can mean an extreme poverty with respect to fulfilled potentialities, but it can also mean an extreme richness of them, "3-
Tillich sees that essentialization is a matter of
degree: "Small and great, poor and rich, are relative
2valuations." They undercut the absoluteness of such 
religious symbols as "eternal life and eternal death," 
"being lost or being saved," or "heaven and hell 
Essentialization, Tillich feels, strikes a balance 
between on the one hand, the absoluteness of those
^Ibid,. p. 433f. 
^Loc, Git,
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symbols and the seriousness implied in them, and on
the other hand, Origen's doctrine of the "restitution
of everything" in eternity. It strikes this balance
because, Tillich argues, "it emphasizes the despair
of having wasted one's potentialities yet also assures
the elevation of the positive within existence (even
1in the most unfulfilled life) into eternity." It 
is id.thin this context that Tillich chooses the idea 
of universal essentialization over that of what he 
considers to be the "most questionable", form of the 
idea of the absoluteness of eternal damnation or 
salvation, namely, the doctrine of double predestina-
otion. He also sees universal essentialization as 
an answer to "the question of the meaning of distorted 
forms of life - forms which, because of physical, 
biological, psychological, or sociological conditions, 
are unable to reach a fulfillment of their essential 
telos even to a small degree...."^ These forms of 
life are able to participate in Eternal Life because 
of the pole of participation in the process of self­
integration. All creatures are interdependent. The
^Loc. Cit.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, pp. 434-436;also see above p. 45I.
^Ibid.. p. 436.
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weakest oreature participates in the strongest and, 
conversely, "in the essence of the least actualized 
individual, the essences of other individuals and, 
indirectly, of all beings are present." Because 
each individual participates in the other individual, 
essentialization is seen as a process that ultimately 
involves the entire created order. The individual 
is essentialized in union with all beings. There­
fore, the one whose life is unfulfilled is able to 
participate in the essentialization of those who have 
reached a high degree of fulfillment. In the same 
way that the Protestant Principle will not allow for 
any human being to be unambiguously perfect, it will 
not allow an unambiguous imperfection either. In 
some degree, all creation is essentialized.
Within the confines of the ambiguities of life 
the manifestation of this union of essence and 
existence can be seen fragmentarily in faith and 
love, which, under the impact of the Spiritual Presence, 
are the same quality; "...in relation to God,"
Tillich explained, the distinction between faith and 
love disappears. Being grasped by God in faith and
^Loc. Git,
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adhering to him in love is one and the same state 
of creaturely life. It is participation in the 
transcendent unity of unambiguous life."^ Another 
way in which essentialization is manifested in 
temporal existence is in mystical contemplation. 
Contemplation, for Tillich, marks a particular way 
of participating in the reality of the New Being.
2He called it "the stepchild of Protestant worship," 
because of its long neglect in that tradition, but 
saw its vital place in the centre of religious ex­
perience. The response to the impact of the Spirit 
must itself be spiritual, "and that means transcending 
in ecstasy the subject-object scheme of ordinary 
experience." Since words are a part of the ambiguities 
of life, the response to the impact of the Spirit needs 
to transcend even language. Tillich sees the place 
of contemplation as being not only within the experience 
of worsMp, but also within the intellectual tasks of 
theology. A dialectical relationship exists between 
meditation and theology. One ifithout the other is
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 147, 
%bid.. p. 205.
^Loc. Git.
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a distortions
"In the meditative act (which can, in some moments, become contemplation) the cognitive subject and its object, the mystery of the holy, are united. Without such union the theological endeavor remains an analysis of structure without substance; on the other hand, meditation (including con­templative moments) without analysis of its contents and without the con­structive synthesis cannot produce theology. This is the limitation of 'mystical theology.* It can become theology only to the degree that it exercises the discursive function of cognition.
Words must be transcended, yet they must be used, 
however inadequate they may be. Essentialization, 
then, although experienced in temporal life, is 
described only in ambiguous and paradoxical terms. 
Tillich saved his discussion of the idea until the 
end of his system - to his discussion of eternal 
life - and even so, he vaguely referred to these 
considerations as "almost poetic-symbolic,"^
The final "poetic-symbol" that Tillich used to 
describe the ultimate reunion of essence and existence 
is that of "eschatological pan-en-theism." Eternal
llbid.. p. 215.
%bid.. p. 432,
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life does not exist as something separate from 
God, the eternal One. Eternal life, the inner aim 
or telos of all creatures, is life in God. By 
"in" Tillich means three things; the first 
meaning of the "in" in "in God" is that of creative 
origin. "It points to the presence of everything 
that has being in the divine ground of being" in 
the form of potentiality. The second meaning of 
"in" is the "in" of ontological dependence, the 
understanding that all finite things are never mth- 
out divine supporting power. "The third meaning of 
'in* is that it is the *in* of ultimate fulfillment, 
the state of essentialization of all creatures."^ 
Everything comes from the eternal and returns to the 
eternal. All of life is a matter of movement from 
essence and in which the new is created. And, for 
Tillich, in spite of existential estrangement, all 
creation is involved inaprocess that is always, in 
one way or another, "in God."
Thomas Merton explicitly uses the word "divinisa­
tion" or its synonym "deification," to describe the
2healing of the split between God and man. These
llbid.. pp. 449f.
'See above pp. 2S5ff, especially fn. 2 onp. 285.
474
words, or such similar phrases as "to become other 
Christs," or "to become God," occur throughout his 
writings. He finds it a particularly adequate symbol 
since, in his interpretation, it describes "the 
exact opposite of a Promethean exploit." He who seeks 
union with God through participation in the humanity 
and divinity of Christ "is not trying to steal some­
thing from God that God does not want him to have." 
Rather, he accepts "that wliich God has created him 
to receive," namely, "a participation in the life, 
and wisdom, and joy and peace of God Himself."
In Christ man sees his own true being. To participate 
in God through him is not simply a matter of being 
"in God" but also a matter of being in one's self in 
the truest and deepest possible sense. This is the 
two-fold character of divinization; man discovers 
his true self when he discovers "himself to be mystically 
one with God by Whom he has been elevated and trans­
formed."^ Man is elevated "to a level consonant id.th
2his dignity as a son of Ck)d, redeemed by Christ."
He is transformed into the person he really is; not 
the self represented by the superficial ego, but the
^The New Man. pp. 34f.
^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 82.
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self that is seen and knoivn In Christ.
For Merton, man is deified within the dimension 
of the Spirit. The deified man is one whose spirit 
is transformed by* the indwelling presence of the 
Spirit of God. Following St. Thomas Aquinas, Merton 
uses the word "intelligence" to define spirit,^ but 
broadens the definition by describing spirit as 
"the summit of man's nature and the source from which 
his most personal and characteristic and elevated 
activities are derived."^ It is a natural faculty, 
and therefore subject to the conditions of man's 
fallen state. But this natural faculty can be 
transformed by the presence and action of the divine 
Spirit, and when this occurs, man can be said to have 
been deified or divinized. It is no longer simply 
the spirit of man;
"It is the deified or transfigured spirit of man, justified by faith and activated by divine grace, living a life of charity. The actions of this pneuma are strictly our own, and yet at the same time they belong to God."3
The New Man. p. 45. The reference to St. Thomas is given as Lectio. 2 in Gaput. IV, Epistolae ad Hebraeos. from which Merton quotes, "The essence of the soul is one and the same... while its power ...is called the in­telligence."
^Loc. Git.
3lbid., p. 46.
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The divine Spirit grasps man, man does not grasp 
God; deification is the action of God's Spirit 
within man's* But, at the same time, man becomes 
both a "new creature" and remains himself. He is 
not overwhelmed by the Spirit of God; rather, he is 
transformed by the Spirit. Deification does not mean 
annihilation.
The coming of the new Adam brings all who
participate in the reality of his Person into a new
relationship with God, but, for Merton, this new
relationship is a greater one than the one enjoyed
by the first Adam, the "innocent Adam." Since all
men share in Adam's fall, no man is innocent. The
divinized man is not one who is restored to innocence;^
rather, he is one whose reunion with God is based
upon pardon and forgiveness. God reaches out to man
in the midst of his sin, in spite of his sin, and
gives him "the courage to approach Him exactly as 
2we are." Since God accepts man as he is, man is 
man is enabled to see his oi-m goodness in the midst 
of his oim sin. This, for Merton, is a greater gift
^Merton recognized (without comment) that certain mystics within the Christian tradition, particularly the English mystics of the 14th century, did speak of a "return to a primitive state of innocence. " See Mystics and Zen Masters, p. 139*
^The New Man. p. 61.
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than Adam's. Adam was accepted by God in a state 
of innocence; man is accepted by God in spite of his 
state of sin. Furthermore, Adam and his paradise 
are, in typological language, "simply a shadow of 
that substantial reality which is to be actualized 
in Christ, and His Mystical Body."^ The first 
creation is secondary to the new creation, one which 
includes the redemption of all in existence, including 
matter ;
"The recapitualtion of the work of creation sublimated and perfected in Christ is a communion in the divine life, an infusion of the life, and glory, and power and truth of God not only into man's spirit but also, ul­timately, into all the material creation as well. The end is not yet attained, but it is in view in the spiritual vision of the Church who looks forward to the Parousia, when Christ will not only appear on the clouds of heaven in Judgement but will also at the same time shine forth through the transfigured trees and mountains and seas of a world divinized through its participation in the work of His Kingdom.
The idea of divinization, including the 
eschataological note tha4Hts evident in this passage, 
is seen as well in the way Merton re-interprets the
^Ibid.. p. 90. 
^Loc. Cit.
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more psychological metaphor of "final integration."
This term, as we have seen, is borrowed from the Persian 
psychoanalyst, Reza Arasteh, who happened also to be 
a student of Sufi mysticism and who incorporated 
Sufi ideas into his work.^ Merton saw Arasteh's 
process of disintegration, existential moratorium, 
and final integration as an adequate description of 
the meaning of the monastic life. It provides, also, 
a valid pattern for an examination of Merton's life 
and thought, a pattern that was used in an earlier 
chapter of this work. Final integration, the end­
point of the process, can be seen as analogous to 
divinisation. He who has achieved this integration 
is in "a state of transcultural maturity far beyond 
mere social adjustment...He apprehends his life fully 
and wholly from an inner ground that is at once more 
universal than the empirical ego and yet entirely 
his own. He is in a certain sense 'cosmic' and 
'universal man.'" Merton likens this state to St.
Thomas Aquinas' interpretation of the Gifts of the
2Spirit which enable man to act "in a superhuman mode."
^See above pp. 199f. See also, "The Life thatUnifies."
Contemplât!on in a World of Action, p. 211.
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However, Merton felt that an understanding of the 
full meaning of final integration could not be limited 
to the psychological realm; it had to be seen as well 
in its eschatological dimension;
"The rebirth of man and of society on a transcultural level is a rebirth into the transformed and redeemed time, the time of the Kingdom, the time of the Spirit, the time of 'the end.*It means a disintegration of the social and cultural self, the product of merely human history, and the reintegration of that self in Christ, in salvation history, in the mystery of redemption, in the Pentecostal 'new creation**"1
Final integration in the religious dimension is, for
Merton, the recapitualtion of the entirety of creation,
Imown partially and in the vision of hope, but known
wherever man has himself found final integration, or
divinization, through the Spirit of God. To be fully
mature, finally integrated, in such a way that one
incorporates in himself the whole of reality through
a loving participation with its essence, is, in short,
2to become a mystic.
There are a number of parallels between Merton's 
concept of divinization and Tillich's concept of 
essentialization. (Merton, at one point, even refers
Çbid., p. 216.
Life Free From Care," p. 67.
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to "essentiated u n i t y . F i r s t of all, it will be
noted that Merton adheres strongly to the "Protestant
Principle" in his description of divinization. In
the relationship between man and God, God, through
grace, is always the initiator. The deified spirit
is not Promethean. Man steals nothing, he accepts
what has been given to him. Acceptance, it should
be recalled, is a word often used by Tillich, one
in fact for which he is quite well Imoijn. It also
2occurs not infrequently in the Merton corpus.
Secondly, in regard to divinization-essentialization, 
Morton and Tillich have similar approaches to the 
idea of man's spirit and God's Spirit. Although 
Merton does not define the spirit of man x-dth any­
thing like the thoroughness of Tillich, and although 
Tillich would hesitate to use the word "intelligence,"
^The New Man, p. 87.
^See Tillich's sermon, "You Are Accepted," in The Shalcing of the Foundations, pp. 153-163; of.Morality and Beyond, p. 46. Compare these idth the following extracts from Merton; "We must see and accept the mystery of God's love in our oim apparently incon­sequential lives." (The New Man, p. 131.) "The root of Christian love is not the will to love, but the faith that one is loved. The faith that one is loved by God." New Seeds of Contemplation, p. 75; "We must somehow strip ourselves of our greatest illusions about ourselves, frankly recognize in how many ways we are unloveable, descend into the depths of our being until we come to the basic reality that is in us, and learn to see that we are loveable after all, in spite of everytliing Î " No Man Is An Island, p. 197.
481
in a description of spirit,^ nevertheless when Merton 
describes spirit as "the summit of man's nature," 
and the source of his most elevated activities, he 
differs only in language from Tillich's description 
of the spiritual realm as that which incorporates 
all other dimensions of life and in which the unity 
of power and meaning is actualized. Also, Merton's 
portrayal of the presence of the Spirit of God in 
the spirit of man is parallel to the various phrases 
Tillich uses to represent the same relationship; 
being grasped by the Spiritual Presence or by the 
power of the New Being, the impact of the Spiritual 
Presence, and so forth. In the third place, both 
Tillich and Merton agree that the process of 
essentialization-diviniaation opens to man the full­
ness of his own self as well as opening to him a new 
relationship idth God. Merton states that when 
man comes into union with God he comes, as well, to 
be his true self. Tillich says that when essentializa­
tion is effected and essence and existence are reunited, 
man can be said to be "in God" in a new way. In the
^Tillich sided with what he called the Augustinian- Pranciscans rather than lâth the Thomists. The former stressed the primacy of will over intellect.See A History of Ghristian Thought, p. 119.
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fourth place, both Tillich and Merton see this 
process not as a matter of a return to some lost 
state, but as a moving forward into a new state, 
Tillich says that existence, or at least those 
positive elements within the existential domain, 
enhances essence and the new is created. Merton 
sees man's relationship with God based on forgive­
ness as a deeper relationship of love than a re­
lationship based on Adam's pre-fall innocence. The 
two men disagree, therefore, on precisely why 
essentialization-divinization is not a matter of a 
return to a previous state, but both do share an 
understanding that the process is a forward moving 
one, in which the new is created. In the fifth 
place, both men state that the entire created order 
shares in the process. Merton expressly states that 
matter is included. Tillich expressly states that 
even those persons who have been totally unable to 
fulfil their essential telos are able to share in 
essentialization because of their participation in 
the world of those who have been essentialized. 
Furthermore, when Merton speaks of "transcultural" 
rebirth, and when Tillich speaks of self-transcendence 
including and being found within cultural acts, both 
point to a universality of the process of essentializa- 
tion-divinization. In the sixth place, both men see 
that this process is not completed in history and must
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be seen in an eschatological framework. It is Imovm 
in history, surely, but only, in Tillich's words, 
fragmentarily and in anticipation, or in Merton's 
words, in hope or in the vision of the Church*
Finally, it can be noted that both men see that 
essentialization-divinization appear in history 
in the acts of faith and love, and also in mystical 
contemplation.^
Tillich was certainly familiar vjith the concept 
of divinization in the early Church. He discusses it 
explicitly in his lectures on Origen and Athanasius,^ 
and he refers to it as well in a discussion of Meister 
Eokhart, in the context of which he interpreted the 
phrase homoiosis to theou kata to dynaton ("becoming 
similar to God as much as possible" - a phrase which 
he saw as "always quoted in the later ancient world 
as the Platonic definition of telos") as meaning
3"becoming godlike, not God Himself, but godlike."
^Two of these points of affinity i-dll be treated in length later; the idea of universality id.ll be discussed again in the section on the solidarity of humanity, and the idea of niystical contemplation as the place in which the process is Icnown will be mentioned at some length in the final summary.
^See A History of Christian Thought, especially 
pp. 53, 62% 73.
^Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue. pp. 138f.
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Tillich refrained from talking about deification in 
such a way as to appear to endorse an idea in wtiich 
man is seen as becoming God. His understanding of 
the reality of grace and of the Protestant Principle 
kept him from accepting a notion of tran isubstantia­
tion in place of that of transparency. Catholicism 
erred in the direction of Monophysitism, he thought.
It transmuted the finite form into a divine form, 
it elevated tangible reality into the realm of the 
holy, overlooking its finite character. Protestantism, 
on the other hand, he thought, "asserts that grace 
appears through a living Gestalt which remains in 
itself what it is. The divine appears through the 
humanity of the Christ, through the historical 
weakness of the church, through the finite material 
of the sacrament." In short, these things are trans­
parent to the divine reality. "They are forms that 
ai'e, so to speak, selected by grace, that it may 
appear throug|i them; but they are not forms that are 
transmuted by grace so that they may become identical 
mth it." Any identification of finite forms id.th 
grace itself is seen as "demonic hybris." Deification, 
for Tillich, does not mean what it seems to literally
^The Protestant Era, pp. 211f.
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imply. Man does not become God. He can become 
godlike, he can be reunited with God, he may be said 
to be "in" God, but man is always man and is always 
finite; God is always God and is always infinite. 
Tillich does not believe that man becomes God.
But neither does Merton. In spite of a Catholic 
theological background which would accept and use the 
ideas of transubstantiation, and in spite of Merton's 
numerous references to "becoming other Christs," and 
"becoming God," Merton does not mean that man 
literally and ontologically becomes God or is absorbed 
into God. Merton clearly states a qualified idea of 
union. Union is possible between the spiritual sub­
stance of man's soul and the God who is pure Spirit, 
he says. However :
"The only restriction placed upon this union is that a contingent and finite substance can never become one nature and substance irfith the infinite and Absolute Being of God in such a way that everything that belongs to him by nature belongs to us by nature.The metaphysical impossibility of this is evident from the very notion of a substance being "changed into" what is, by nature, unchanging. We cannot 'become God.'
^The Ascent to Truth, pp. 280f.
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Merton's language is unlike Tillich's, and the 
conceptual tools mth which he works are those 
which Tillich rejected as Inadequate; nevertheless, 
the conclusion drawn is identical. To be in union 
mth God is not to say that one has become God,
Merton will, in his typically unsystematic fashion, 
refer to "becoming God, " and in this vray he is open 
to misunderstandings and distortions. Nonetheless, 
he maintained that in the union of God and man, each 
remains "metaphysically distinct" while potentially 
becoming "practically and experientially 'one Spirit.'
Tillich and Merton, therefore, substantially 
agree about the telos of man, although one speaks of 
it in terms of essentialization and the other in terms 
of divinization. Or, in other words, whereas Tillich 
sees maturity as a process that moves from essence to 
existence to essentialization, Merton sees it as a 
process that moves from union with God, to separation 
from God, to reunion with God. Both understandings 
with their differing emphases are pointing to what 
is fundamentally the same reality; man's telos 
"in" God.
^See above p. 286,
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6. Autonoîî^ -Heteronoiny--ïheonoiiy
Man is estranged from his oim essence; he is 
estranged from his own "law." Tillich sees that what 
is truly one's own, his very essence, under the con­
ditions of existential estrangement can appear as if 
it were a "law" which stands over against the self 
and judges it. This is one way in which he interpreted 
St, Paul's evaluation of law: "the law is the expression
of what man essentially is and therefore ought to be, 
but what he actually is not, as the law shows to 
him. Essentialized man, on the other hand, since 
he is united i-zith his oim essential being by the power 
of the divine Spirit, sees that the "law" of his being 
is nothing exterior to him, and in fact does not 
appear as "law" to him at all. The one in whom 
essence and existence are totally unified is the one 
who has fulfilled the law. The ought-to-be actually 
is; the law is recognised as an expression of essential 
reality and that essential reality is knomi in 
existence. "If man were not estranged from himself," 
Tillich explained, "if his essential nature were not
l.,T,Morality and Beyond. p. 48.
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distorted in actual existence, no law would stand 
against him." Furthermore;
"The law is not strange to man. It is natural law. It represents liis true nature from which he is estranged. Every valid ethical commandment is an expression of man's essential re­lationship to himself, to others and to the universe."^
Wherever man lives in a state of essentialiaation 
(which is necessarily fragmentary) his reason, his 
ethics and his culture can be called "theonomous." 
Theonomy is a word that Tillich uses to represent 
the synthesis between autonomy on the one hand, and 
heteronomy on the other hand. Theonomy is able to 
transcend the tensions that exist between these 
other two positions;
"The words 'autonomy, ' 'heteronomy, ' and 'theonoi^ y' answer the question of the nomos or the law of life in three different ways : Autonomy asserts thatman as the bearer of universal reason is the source and measure of culture and religion - that he is his o\m law. Heteronomy asserts that man, being un­able to act according to universal reason, must be subjected to a law, 
strange and superior to him. Theonomy asserts that the superior law is, at
^Love, Power, and Justice, pp. 76f.
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the same time, the imiermost law of man himself, rooted in the divine ground wliich is man's o\m ground; the law of life transcends man, although it is, at the same time, his om."l
Theonomy, then, would unite the unconditional 
meaning and import of a culture or of an ethic with 
the conditioned forms in wliich that culture or ethic 
appears. It unites religion, morality and culture.
On the other hand, both autonomy and heteronomy are 
distortions, A culture which is strictly autonomous 
would be one which would "attempt to create the forms 
of personal and social life without reference to some­
thing ultimate and unconditional, following only the 
demands of theoretical or practical rationality."^ 
Within such an autonomous culture there is the 
implication of a two-fold element; first there is
The Protestant Era, p. 63. "Autonomy" and "Heteronomy" are Kantian terms. "Theonomy" is more distinctly Tillich's contribution to ethics, although the word is not his alone. See, for instance, P.T. Forsyth's use of the term; "The God who rules us in Christ is not a foreign power, Theonomy is not heteronomy. He, our law, becomes also our life.", in "The Evangelical Chiuohes and the Higher Criticism," Contemporary Review. IffiQCyill, (October, 1905), P* 578. See also Emil Brunner's The Divine paperatlve, pp. 4^ff (ET: London: Lutterworth, 1937), in xdiichhe seeks to find theonomy within Kant's autonomy.
^Loc, Git.
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the law, the nomos. which is to be carried out;
secondly there is the self, the autos,which is
asserted. In so far as the nomos malces an unconditioned
demand to be carried out, autonomous culture can
represent sometliing of the unconditional. It can be
an obedience to reason, to the logos structure of
both Blind and reality. Autonomy subjects itself to
the unconditional demand for meaning. But it denies
the unconditional meaning itself. It looks nowhere
1beyond the autos, the self* The counter attitude 
is heteronomy. Its intention is to overcome the 
distortions in autonomy. "It rises against the hybris 
of autonomy, and submits itself to the unconditional 
meaning. A heteronomous culture would be one which 
"substitutes the forms and laws of thinldng and acting 
to authoritative criteria of an ecclesiastical religion 
or a political quasi-religion, even at the price of 
destroying the structures of rationality."^ This 
is its distortion: the submission of the centre of
^e.g., Ibid.. p. 50, and "The Philosophy of Religion," in Wiat is Religion?, pp. 74f.
^"The Philosophy of Religion," in What is Religion?, p. 75.
^The Protestant STa. p. 63.
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one's personality to an outside law results in the
destruction of the centred-self# One would exist
only under the will of a tyrant, perhaps a divine
tyrant, but a tyrant nonetheless,^ Heteronony,
in seeking to overcome the hybris of autonomy ends
up creating its own hybris, Theonomy is the only
possible way to express the proper relationship
between the self and the nomos, **A theonomous
culture," Tillich asserted, "expresses in its
creations an ultimate concern and a transcending
meaning not as something strange but as its own 
2spiritual ground," In other words:
"Theonomy is a condition in which the spiritual and social forms are filled with the import of the Un­conditional as the foundation, meaning, and reality of all forms, aheonomy is the unity of sacred form and spiritual import in a « concrete historical situation,"
Or, even more simply, theonomy is "an autonongr informed 
by a religious substance,"^ Theonomy regards the
^e,g,. Love. Power, and Justice, p, 76.
^The Protestant Era, p. 63,
^"Basic Principles of Religious Socialism," (1923), in Political Expectations, p, 62,
ifeS Boundary.p. 38,
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dignity of both form and substance; autonomy and 
heteronomy do not. Autonomy sacrifices the religious 
substance whereas heteronomy is indifferent to form.
In this way, theonony transcends them both.
Ideally, that is in a state in which essentializa- 
tion is finally and totally actualized, there is a 
complete interpenetration of religion, morality and 
culture. The distinction between these manifestations 
of man's self-actualization, either individually or 
in the historical dimension, are no longer decisive.
In the ideal state "all culture is actualized religion, 
and all religion is actualized as culture."^ Tillich 
himself believed that the most precise statement of 
theonomy was simply this;. "Religion is the substance 
of culture and culture is the form of religion."
But this presupposes the ideal, and under the conditions 
of existence the ideal is seen only partially. Theonomy 
occurs and will continue to occur, but it will never 
be completely victorious. Nor will it be completely 
defeated. "Its victory is always fragmentary because 
of the existential estrangement underlying human 
history, and its defeat is always limited by the fact
^"Basic Principles of Religious Socialism," p. 63. 
^The Protestant Era, p. 63#.
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that human nature is essentially theonomous."^
Neither autonomy nor heteronomy are without 
redeeming elements in Tillich's mind* In so far 
as heteronomy is a reaction against the hybris of 
autonomy it is good. It speaks with an authority 
that claims to represent the depths of reason, culture 
and morality. Its basis is the claim to speak in the 
name of the ground of being, addressing its word to 
an autonony which has lost its depths and is thereby 
disabled and empty. "But as a reaction," Tillich 
concludes, heteronomy "is destructive, denying to 
reason the right of autonomy and destroying its 
structural laws from outside#"^ Tillich prefers autonomy 
to heteronomy in so far as it is closer to the ideal 
of theonomy. This is seen throughout his writings, 
first, in so far as he defines theonomy as "an autonomy 
with a religious substance," secondly, in so far as 
he regards heteronomy as inevitably destroying the 
centred-self, and perhaps most clearly, in the various 
ways he sees autonomy, heteronomy and theonomy occurring 
throughout history. Yet one should not overlook 
Tillich's understanding that heteronomous reactions 
to empty autonomous forms are a necessary movement
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 266.
S^ystematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 94#
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within the dialeotioal between the two extremes.
Nor should one forget that Tillich believed that 
both autonony and heteronomy are distorted and that 
"each goes astray when their theonomous unity is 
broken."^
Here is an example of the way in which Tillich 
sees these operations within history. Out of the 
world of Greek philosophy came...
"...the creation of a new theonomy under Christian influence (Clement and Origen), and the intrusion of heteronomous elements (Athanasius and Augustine). During the Mgh Middle Ages a theonomy (Bonaventura) was realized under the preponderance of heteronomous elements (ihomas). Toward the end of the medieval period heteronomy became all-powerful (Inquisition), partly as a reaction against autonomous ten­dencies in culture and religion (nominalism), and destroyed the medieval theonomy. In the period of Renaissance and Reformation the conflict grew to new intensity. The Renaissance, which showed a theonomous character in its Neo-Platonic beginnings (Cusanus, Ficino), became increasingly autonomous in its later development (Erasmus, Galileo). Conversely, the Reformation, which in its early years united a religious with a cultural em­phasis on autonomy (Luther's reliance on his conscience, and Luther and Zwingli's connection with the humanists), very
^Loo. Git. James Luther Adams agrees that Tillich judges heteronomy more severely than autonomy. See his Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture. Science, and Religion, p. 249*
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soon developed a heteronony which surpassed even that of the later Middle Ages in some respects (Protestant orthodoxy.) In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in spite of some heteronomous remnants and reactions, autonomy won an almost complete victory ... "3.
In this brief historical sketch, a preference for 
autonomy over heteronomy may be discerned. Heteronony 
may be a justified reaction against an en^ty autonoay, 
but its destructive character, its tendency to deny 
reason altogether, is especially criticized. Theonony 
has to fight on two fronts in all periods of history, 
including the present. Tillich wrote at a time when 
he saw the need for a new theonomy in the midst of 
strong manifestations of both autonomy and heteronomy;
"The double fight against an empty autonomy and a destructive heteronomy makes the quest for a new theonony as urgent today as it was at the end of the ancient world. The catastrophe of
^Ibid.. p. 95* Tillich is neither precise nor definitive in his historical analysis at this point. He does not eaqjlain in any detail precisely why Clement is seen as a representative of theonomy and Augustine as heteronomous, for example. It is not the intention of this thesis to criticize Tillich's interpretation of history, but simply to show where, for whatever reasons, Tillich was able to see his abstractions in concrete manifestations. A careful study of Tillich's understandings of myth and cult, and a study of those persons and cultures that he saw to be particularly theonomous would yield a more complete understanding of his interpretation.
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autonomous reason is complete. Neither autonomy nor heteronomy, isolated and in conflict, can give the answer."^
The modern man, thought Tillich, "is the autonomous 
man who has become insecure in his autonomy."^
He no longer has a consistent world view. Neither 
philosophy nor religion provide him with a way in 
which to fulfill his quest for unambiguous life. He 
is not ready to abandon his autonomy, but his autonomy 
is not one in which he feels self-assured and creative, 
"rather he possesses one that leaves him disturbed,
3frustrated and in despair." He can choose to turn 
to various forms of heteronomy. One form which 
Tillich saw as particularly destructive was that of 
National Socialism, a political quasi-religion which 
he interpreted and courageously fought against, as a 
grotesque form of heteronomy. Another heteronomous 
manifestation was the Roman Catholic Church, although 
at one point in his life Tillich saw the possibility 
of embracing it, albeit with reluctance.^ He saw
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 95f•
^The Protestant Era, p. 189#
%bid.. p. 191.
4"Only once did I with any seriousness entertain the idea of becoming a Catholic. In 1933, before the awakening of German Protestantism to the meaning of
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the Roman Catholic Church appealing to man in the 
midst of his broken autonomy to make his last act 
of autonomy the self-surrender to heteronomy. The 
Catholic Church could be very attractive. It alone 
is consistently heteronomous, it alone has an un­
broken tradition and authority, "and it also has a 
strong sense of triumph in the face of...broken 
autonomy. Furthermore, in spite of "an ever harden­
ing crust," the Catholic Church had been able to 
preserve a genuine religious substance. It was a 
heteronomous form of religion but, for Tillich, not 
unambiguously so. It appealed because it correctly 
criticized an empty autonony and because it did pre­
serve a genuine religious substance. But, the man 
who has enjoyed autonony could not easily give it up, 
felt Tillich, because it, too, had its elements of 
dignity and truth; it preserved the dignity of the 
centred-self. In short, modern man urgently needed 
a new, concrete theonomy. Heteronomy was not a
Nazism, I seemed to have only two alternatives; either the Roman Church or a nationalist paganism in Protestant dress. In deciding between these two heteronomies, I would have had to choose Catholicism# I did not have to make that choice because German Protestantism remembered its Christian foundation." On the Boundary, p. 39.
T^he Protestant Era, p. 191,
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legitimate option in the quest for unambiguous life:
"The Protestant principle as derived from the doctrine of justification through faith rejects heteronomy (represented by the doctrine of papal infallibility) as well as a self- complacent autonomy (represented by secular humanism). It demands a self-transcending autonomy, or theonoDîy*"!
Tillich had hoped that Religious Socialism would 
provide German society with its theonomous character, 
and that Pro testant! m  would serve as the vehicle 
for theonomy in the religious sphere# The years 
immediately following the end of the First World 
War were years in which Tillich saw a particular 
kairos# But he also saw that kairos go unfulfilled* 
Religious Socialism failed to capture the imaginations 
of German citizens, and Protestantism remained opaque 
to its own divine ground. Nevertheless, Tillich 
never gave up his quest for theonomy, although it 
has been suggested that he began to see it more and 
more in terms of eschatology or in terms of individual 
fulfillment.^ However, whether in terms of the
^Ibid.. p. xxxi.
^See, for instance, Religious Situation and The Protestant Era, and "Beyond Religious Socialism: How 'My Mind Has Changed in the Last Decade, " The Christian Century IKVI (June 15, 1949), pp. 732-733 and "Existentialism and Religious Socialism," in
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the corporate-historical or in terms of the 
individual, Tillich saw theonomy as the product of 
grace and revelation rather than as the product 
of man's strivings. Transparency to the ground of 
being and the complete self sacrifice of the medium 
of final revelation make it possible for that 
revelatory act to be decisive for the reunion of 
autonomy and heteronomy:
"The first element keeps autonomous reason from losing its depths and from becoming empty and open for demonic intrusions..... The other element of final revelation, the self-sacrifice of the finite medium, keeps heteronomous reason from establishing itself against rational autonomy. "L
The manifestation and acceptance of Jesus as the 
Christ is the event in which theonomy is created* 
"The presence of the divine ground as it is manifest 
in Jesus as the Christ gives a spiritual substance 
to all forms of rational creativity. It gives them
Christianity and Society XV (Winter, 1949-1950), pp. 8-11. David Hopper argues that Tillich's only major shift in his thinking was this move ftom history to the individual as a result of an unful­filled kairos. See Tillich: A Theological Portrait. pp. lOOff. This same observation is found in Leibrecht, Op. Git., pp. 17ff.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 164.
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the dimension of depth.* . Furthermore, Jesus* 
willingness to sacrifice everything finite within 
himself is the explicit act in which heteronomy is 
disavowed* No finite reality can claim ultimacy for 
itself*
The Church, if it is seen as the community in 
which New Being is known, however fragmentarily,
2"is the place where the new theonomy is actual*"
The Church should be the community in which nothing 
is either autonomous or heteronomous but the inte­
gration of the two in a theonomy. However, this is 
not the case. The temptation within the Church, 
both in Protestantism as well as in Catholicism, is 
to yield toward the heteronomous. Even so, the Church 
is never without theonomous forces. From this community 
theonomy should pour into the whole of man's cultural 
and moral life; and it does so, however fragmentarily: 
•Culture is not controlled from outside the Church," 
Tillich said, which would be heteronomy, "nor is it 
left alone so that the community of the New Being 
stands beside it. Culture receives its substance 
and integrating power from the community of the New
^Loo. Pit* 
^Loc. Cit,
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Being, ftom its symbols and its life#"^ This
does not necessarily make that culture more moral
or more creative or intellectually brighter# It
means, rather, that these periods of culture in
wliich theonomy is most evident "are more aware of
the 'depth of reason,* of the ground of autonomy,
and of the uniting centre without wliich spiritual
life becomes shallow, disintegrates, and produces
oa vacuum into which demonic forces may enter."
Therefore, the telos of man includes a quest 
for theonomy, a quest as it were for the awakening 
of the person to the ground of liis being, to his 
essential being, to the "law" which is not over 
against him but which represents his true self.
Since as a person he exists in community, in some 
sort of a balance between the poles of individualiza­
tion and participation, man seeks for theonomy in 
the social as well as the personal realm* He seeks 
for the depths of communal life, he seeks for a 
social ethic that is united with its spiritual ground# 
He seeks for the union of religion, in the sense 
of the state of being grasped by the Spiritual
^Ibid*. p. 165. 
^Loc# Git.
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Presence, and morality, in the sense of the 
"constitution of person as person in the encounter 
with other persons."^ In the theonomous Spiritual 
Community there is no conflict between religion and 
morality. Kant had defended morals against religion, 
and Schleiermacher had defended religion against 
attempts to explain it away in terras only of morals, 
but both were expressing the conflict between religion 
and morals in the sphere of the autonomous-heteronomous. 
In the theonomous Spiritual Community morals and 
religion unite.
This can be seen, first of all, in that the
moral imperative is an unconditional imperative
because in it man finds the expression of his essential
being. Tillioh thought that "Affirming what we
essentially are and being obedient to the moral
2imperative are one and the same act." But why, he 
asks, should we affirm our essential self? Hhy not 
destroy one's self? His answer shows the essential 
union of the moral imperative with the transcendent 
union of man and Gods.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, pp. I68f.
^Ibid.. p. 169.
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"The answer to tliis must be that the person becomes aware of his infinite value or, ontologically expressed, of his belonging to the transcendent union of unambiguous life idiich is the Divine life; this awareness occurs under the impact of the Spiritual Presence, The act of faith and the 'act of accepting the moral imperative's unconditional character are one and 
the same aot,"^
To use other words, (all Tillichian), in the ecstatic 
moment man becomes aware of being in union with God 
who is the Ground of his own being and thereby 
recognizes that he is in union with himself, his 
true self, unambiguously* In this moment he is free 
to actualize the moral imperative, he is free to act 
according to his true being, which is not a being 
existing in isolation from other beings, but is one 
who is truly a person because he is truly a partici­
pant. Therefore, in the ecstatic moment one is in 
touch with the motivating power of social ethics*
"The moral act, the act of personal self-constitution in the encounter 
with other persons, is based on participation in the transcendent union. This participation makes the moral act possible* By its Spiritual 
impact, the proceeding transcendent union creates the actual union of the centred person with itself, the encountered world, and the ground
^Loc. Git.
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of self and world. It is the quality of 'proceeding* that characterizes the Spiritual impact as grace:; and nothing establishes the moral personality and community but the transcendent union which manifests itself in the Spiritual Community as grace."1
In the Spiritual Community, morality is determined 
by grace, not by law. Only when we are estranged 
from our essential being does the moral imperative 
appear to us as law. lAien, however fragmentarily, 
there is a reunion of essence and existence, grace 
triumphs over law. Jesus, Paul and Luther, according 
to Tillich, said that the law is fulfilled only with 
joy, not with resentment and hate. "But joy cannot 
be commanded," he observed:
"The law brings us into a paradoxical situation;. It commands, which means 
that it stands against us- But it commands something which can be done only if it does not stand against us, if we are united with what it commands. Tills is the point where the moral imperative drives towards something which is not command but reality... 
Morality can be maintained only through that which is given and not 
through that which is demanded; in religious terms, through grace and not through law. Without the reunion 
of man with his own essential nature no perfect moral act is possible."2
^Ibid.. pp. I69f.
^Theology of Culture, p. 142.
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In short, only within transcendent union is a 
theonomous ethic possible, and only a theonomous 
ethic will truly serve the needs of man, the need 
to constitute the self in concord with all other 
selves.
Tillich rejects "theological ethics" as a 
"consciously prejudiced ethics." It tends to the 
heteronomous. He prefers, of course, "theonomous 
ethics" a term wliich allows for the autonony of 
ethical investigations and allows as well for the 
dependence of such investigations "on a tradition 
which expresses an ultimate concern, at least in­
directly and unconsciously. Autonomous ethics can
be autonomous only with respect to scholarly method,
1not with readp'ct to its religious substance." He
concludes I
"Theonomous ethics in the full sense of the phrase, therefore, is ethics in which, under the impact of the Spiritual Presence, the religious substance - the experience of an ultimate concern - 
is consciously expressed through the process of free arguing and not through an attempt to determine it. Intentional 
theonomy is heteronoDy and must be re­jected by ethical research. Actual theonomy is autonomous ethics under the Spiritual Presence."^
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 285. 
^Loc. Git.
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Tillich takes with utter seriousness the Johannine 
characterization of the Spirit as like the wind 
that blows wherever it wishes (John 3:3). Autonomy 
cannot give way to heteronoiy, but neither can it 
lose sight of its own divine ground*
Agape, which Tillich calls "the love which 
reunites centred person with centred person,”^ 
contains and transcends the law. In agape, the law 
is accepted and transcended in its form as law. Love 
"does voluntarily what the law commands." But,
Tillich notes, love as the all-embracing law must 
be able to transcend the ambiguities of law. Once 
again, Tillich maintains that essentially love is not 
a law; it is reality. Love is the unconditional 
element in the moral imperative; it is "the unambiguous 
criterion for all ethical judgments"^ and is thereby 
the basis for the moral content, and it is the motivating 
force of morality. Spirit, love and grace are one and 
the same reality; "Spirit is the creative power; love 
is its creation; grace is the effective presence of
^Ibid.. p. 289.
^Loc. Git..
^Ibid.. p. 290,
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love in man. When, through the impact of the divine 
Spirit, man is confronted with the reality that 
dwells in the ground of his being, he is confronted 
with agape, which is not something that he himself 
created or can create as a matter of liis own will*
The love that he encounters in his ground, the love 
that makes morality possible and effective, is a 
creation of the Spiritual Presence. Only through the 
impact of the Spiritual Presence, an impact known 
and accepted in the ecstatic moment, is unambiguous 
moral fulfillment possible.
Thomas Merton did not use the words "autonony," 
"heteronomy" and "theonomy" in the same way that 
Tillich did. In fact, only the first of these words 
is a part of the normal Merton vocabulary. Tillich 
used "autonomy" and "heteronomy" in a way that was 
based on the ethical philosophy of Kant, and adds the 
word "theonomy" to represent a synthesis between the 
two, Merton was not referring to the Kantian usage, 
even implicitly, when he spoke of autonomy, or when 
he discussed the ideas that lie behind "heteronomy" 
and "theonomy." Nevertheless, throughout his writings 
Merton did refer often to the idea of autonomy, to
^Ibid.. p. 292. See also Theology of Culture, 
pp. 133—145 #
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the idea of God as an exterior force standing over 
against man, and the idea of the law of God being 
discovered within the law of the self, and like 
Tillich, he saw ambiguities in the idea of the com­
plete autonomy of man, and saw the idea of an 
authoritarian God as antithetical to the true 
meaning of the Cliristian Gospel. Also, like Tillich, 
he saw the "law" of Ck>d as man's inner and essential 
self. We will look at each of these in turn.
Merton rejected the pole of total autonomy 
as an insufficient basis upon which to make moral 
decisions. On his own, nmn is unable to acliieve those 
things for which he truly longs. An autonomy which 
rests in a total subjectivity defeats itself, in Merton's 
view, because man turned in on himself is inevitably 
destructive. VJhen man regards himself, or his cob>* 
munity, as a self-contained and self-sufficient entity, 
he accentuates the subject-object dichotomy and creates 
a world-view that leads only to strife and unloving­
ness. True humanism, rather than supporting this 
kind of "spurious" autonomy, should attempt to 
extricate man from it instead. A true humanism, one 
which Merton sees in the Church, helps man to see 
that he cannot understand himself as a self-sufficient 
subject within a world of objects without dire 
consequences. It helps make men aware of their
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need for the world, for an "ethical minimum" which 
includes honesty, self-respect, respect for all men, 
and a "minimum of transcendence."^ Without this 
kind of humanism, man runs amuck;
"Man, thinking of himself secretly as a completely free autonomous self, with unlimited possibilities (after all he is taught by his society that this is what he is), finds himself in an impossible predicament. HC is »as a God* and therefore everything is within reach. But it turns out that all that he can successfully reach by his own volition is not quite worth having. V/hat he really seeks and needs - love, an authentic identity, a life that has meaning - cannot be had merely 
by willing and by taking steps to pro­cure them. No amount of ingenuity can *buy* these things - no psychological or sociological manipulation can encom­pass them, no inspirational religious self-help, no ascetic technique, no drug can do the trick. "
"The things we really need," Merton concluded, "come
2to us only as gifts." Complete autonomy is false; 
it has a Promethean element in it* It attempts to 
win that which cannot be won. It fails to understand 
the limits of man's finitude. It attempts to make 
man the final judge of himself and his creations. At 
best this autonomy leads to inevitable frustration;
^aith and Violence, pp. 6gf.
^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander. p. 224#
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at worst it leads to destruction.
When man's autonony is finally seen as the 
shallow, insufficient instrument that it is, there 
is a tendency to turn to the opposite pole* If man 
is not autonomous and is not a law (nomos) to himself 
(autos) » then there must be an outside law to which 
he can turn. Merton describes this tendency to 
authoritarianism, or totalitarianism, in both the 
secular world as well as in the Church. Marxist 
totalitarianism served Merton as a secular example of 
such authoritarianism, and although he did not try 
to see Marxism as the only illustration of tliis 
tendency, nonetheless he saw a reoccurring process 
exemplified in the Marxist ideal: the autonomy of
the individual is rejected, personal freedom is viewed 
with suspicion and intolerance, man makes choices 
only in conformity with the choices made for him by 
others.^ ®ie dignity of the individual person is 
disregarded. Ultimately, in Merton's view, this was 
doomed to failure. Any understanding of authority 
which did not regard the worth of the individual 
person was dismissed as "unrealistic." No authority 
can be a real authority (although it certainly can
S^ee Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 151,
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exert great and continuous power) if it does not 
derive its power from the interaction of persons on 
a common ground of reason* "The authority of the 
strongest," as Merton referred to totalitarian 
authority, "is no authority at all because it has 
no power to elicit the intelligent submission of 
man's inmost personal b e i n g . A n  authority which 
is merely an external complusion is no authority at 
all. However, it was in the realm of religion and 
within the context of the Church that Merton con­
centrated his analysis of and his criticisms of, a 
soul-destroying authoritarianism. He was especially 
critical of false authoritarianism within the monastic 
life, as the essays published in Contemplation in a 
World of Action indicate. The idea of the "Lord 
Abbot vested in pontificalia and graciously offering 
his ring to be kissed for a thirty days' indulgence," 
was strongly rejected, (but not without humour), not 
only because the modern young monk would not accept 
such a figure, but because "such authority never had 
any real inner strength." It was based entirely on 
external sanctions. "What is needed in monasteries," 
Merton suggested, "is a recognition of authority that
S^eeds of Destruction, p. 164,
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is strong with the strength of love and of Gospel 
t r u t h . T h i s  does not exclude the possibility of 
an abbot in the tradition of the Rifle of St. Benedict, 
but it expands the idea of authority in both its 
inner strength and its practical application;
"This authority may be seen perhaps in the rare charismatic teacher, but we will be more practical if we look for it in the believing community, united in Christ, in the humility of Christian love and of the spirit, serving one another in the obedience of faith and gathered round one they have chosen to make the final practical decisions in running their community. Discipline in such a setting is less a matter of personal austerity and will...than of openness to the demands of the Spirit of Love, to the needs of one's brothers and of the community.
Merton saw the Church emerging from a period 
of strong, external authoritarianism, one which 
stressed man's inability to make any decision but the 
one to acquiesfe to the demands of authority; it 
was an attitude that assumed, like all forms of 
totalitarianism, that the wisdom of the collective 
was inherently superior to the wisdom of individuals, 
and that individuals had to surrender their freedom
^Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 110* 
^Loc. Git.
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in order to find even a modiema of salvation. Even 
amid the "brighter strokes" of this world-view, foimd, 
according to Merton, in the thought of Aquinas, Scotus, 
Bonaventure and Dante, and containing "the ground 
work for an optimistic Christian affirmation of 
natural and worldly values in the perspective of an 
eschatological love," there was still too much that 
was "static rather than dynamic, hierarchic, layer 
upon layer, rather than ongoing and self-creating, 
the fulfillment of a predetermined intellectual plan 
rather than the creative project of a free and self- 
building love."^ Merton saw, amid the reforms 
epitomized in the pontificate of Pope John XXIII 
and the work of Vatican II, a new concept of authority 
becoming evident in the life of the Church, and with 
this, a new (or newly rediscovered) idea of grace and 
of the meaning of the "will of God,"
The wrong idea of grace was exemplified by 
Paneloux in Camus* novel, T W  Plague, Merton agreed 
wholeheartedly with Camus* rejecting of tliis 
characterizations "Grace,,,is that which gives one 
the ability to submit to a God who acts like an 
arbitrary tyrant," Such an idea, for Merton, is not
^Ibid,, pp, 146f,
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Christian since it states that "God is essentially
unjust, and to be loved as suchi" This is rejected.
God*8 will is not an arbitrary force "bearing down
2upon us with implacable hostility," and grace is not 
a matter of acquiesence to this external powers
"This is the thing so many Christians refuse to see. They think Christ*s power to deliver us from sin is not a real liberation but an assertion of his own rights over us,*,Grace does not take hold of us as if we were planes or rockets guided by remote control.Yet there is a rather common tendency among spiritual men to imagine them­selves as hollow, empty beings entirely governed and moved by a remote super­natural agency from outside and above themselves. This indeed pays homage to the idea that God is infinitely above man. But it entirely ignores the equally important trutfe of God*s immanence within man."’
Authoritarianism, either in the hierarchical 
structures of ecclesiastical or secular government, 
or within man*s understanding of his relationship 
with God, is essentially Promethean, Prometheus is 
a giant among men either by "the glamour of his
^Albert Camus* The Plague; Introduction and Commentary, p, 37.
% ew Seeds of Contemplation, p, 15,
T^he New Man. pp. 32, 33f •
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adventure," or "by the violence of his self-hate," 
either by his unbridled autonomy or his implicit 
turning to heteronomy. He who needs fire from outside 
himself is a condemned character.^
Merton questioned an idea of God that inordinately 
stressed his transcendence, his total otherness, and 
his designation as "Absolute First Cause," or "Supreme 
Prime Mover." These ideas were not wrong, he insisted, 
but they were less than adequate to describe the 
whole reality of God as he is experienced in existence. 
Not only did such thought suppose a cosmology which 
was pre-Newtonian, but it failed as well to give 
proper attention to God*s immanence. It failed to 
take mystical experience of God into account. Merton 
suggested that monastic theology had to begin to stress 
the immanence of God if it wished to remain true to 
the contemplative experience and remain true as well 
to the Christian historical tradition*
"Now it happens that the immanentist approach, which sees God as directly and intimately present in the very ground of our being (while being 
at the same time infinitely transcendent), is actually much closer to the con­templative tradition."^
I^bid.. p. 23.
C^ontemplation in a World of Action, p. 160,
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An immanent approach to the doctrine of the being of 
God does not necessarily lead to pantheism or a 
blurring of the distinction between man’s being and 
God:
"On the contrary, there is a distinct conflict in the realization that though in some sense He is more truly ourselves than we are, yet we are not identical with Him, and though he loves us better than we can love our­selves we are opposed to Him, and in opposing Him we oppose our own deepest selves.
God’s will, Merton believed, is not exterior to man 
but is planted within man’s own nature, and to say 
this is to say that the law of Love is our nature.^
It is not an external commandj if it were it would 
not be life-creating. Rather, it is a creative 
word which makes man into a new being.^ God's 
mil "is not a force that presses doim on man from 
the outside. It works on man from within himself and 
from within the ontological core of his oimi freedom." 
Continuing this line of thought, Merton wrote:
^Ibid., pp. 160f
^Gf. The New Man. p. 108, and Seasons of Celebration, p. 224,
3cf. Disputed Questions, p. 122.
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"Made free, in the image of God, man’s freedom contains in itself a demand for infinite freedom which can be met only by perfect union with the freedom of God, not only as an external norm, but as the source of our own love* Here philosophical notions of freedom necessarily break down and the perfect freedom of the Christian can be accounted for only by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit*"^
Truth cannot be imposed upon man from outside 
of himself* It cannot violate man’s freedom, for 
man’s freedom is that quality which makes it possible 
to speak of him as being made in the "image" of God* 
ITuth and freedom are inseparable* The truth is within 
man, not exterior to him. It is not, however, to 
be discovered in what Merton calls the superficial 
self; it is discovered only in the depths of the 
true self* When man exists at that level, he is 
able to discover what Tillich called his "essential 
theonomy," and what Merton called, in words very 
similar to Tillich’s, "autonomy by union with God."^ 
And it is this Spirit-filled autonomy that forms the 
basis for man’s moral acts:
C^onjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 329.
T^he New Man. p. 91.
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"Once we enter again into contact with OUT own deepest self, with an ordinate self-love that is inseparable from the love of God and of His truth, we discover that all good develops from within us, growing up from the hidden depths of our being according to the concrete and existential norms laid down by the Spirit Who is given us from God* This mystical spontaneity (which begins with the free option of faith and grows with our growth in charity) sets the tone for our whole moral life* It is the inward pro­mulgation of God’s new law of charity in our hearts*"!
Merton rejects a "spurious" autonomy which is 
grounded in man’s superficial self. Simultaneously 
he adamantly rejects any infringement on man’s 
freedom and hence rejects superficial heteronomy as 
well. lAke Tillich, he ends up with a theonomous 
synthesis, a synthesis known only in the deepest 
levels of man’s being, but one which forms the basis 
for the totality of his actions and liis creations.
He calls for a theonomous understanding of the Church 
as well as of the self, and ultimately for a society 
which can manifest its theonomous essence.
The ramifications of this call for a "theonomy" 
for social ethics is seen throughout Merton’s political 
writings, particularly in his high regard for the
^Ibid.. p* 134» It is to be noted that Merton’s frequent use of the word "charity" is the translation of the Latin caritas which is the Greek agape.
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witness and political action of Gandhi* In Merton’s 
eyes Gandhi was successful, and had a very special 
importance for Christians, in so far as he applied 
"spiritual force to political action. And this 
spiritual force was nothing less than the "ancient 
metaphysic of man, a philosopliical wisdom which is 
common to Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, and 
Christianity: that ’truth is the inner law of our
being.’"2 Or, in other words, Gandhi based his political 
principles on theonomy. Gandhi’s action was at once 
religious and political;
"His whole life, his political action, finally even his death, were nothing but a witness to his commitment. ’IP LOVE IS NOT THE LAW OP OUR BEING THE WHOLE OF MI ARGUMENT FALLS TO PIECES. ’
This, for Merton, was true political action, because 
it was action that arose from man’s inner depths, 
the depths in which he is united with God and in 
which he discovers the law of love as the truth of 
the self rather than as an external command. A 
theonomous society was, therefore, as much a part
Igeeds of Destruction, p* 228.
^Ibid.. p. 231-
3lbid*. p. 234; of, Merton’s Introduction to Gandhi on Non-Violence.
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of Merton’s hope as was a theonomous individual, 
monastery or Church*^
Of course, Merton was not as ready to label 
the Catholic Church heteronomous as Tillich was.
As we have seen, he was quick to recognize abuses 
of authority within the Church, but he was not ready 
to label all such abuses as beréft of theonomous 
elements. Man must be free from external control, 
in Merton’s view, but his ecclesiology allowed him 
to account for positive, necessary and ultimately 
freedom-producing forms of authority within the Church# 
Authority for Merton is like "power" for Tillich.^
It is not necessarily heteronomous:
^George Kilcourse (Incarnation as the Integra­ting Principle in Thomas Merton’s Poetry and Spiri­tuality) doesn’t like Tillich’s phrase, "Religion is the substance of culture; culture is the form of religion," (p. 242) and says that Merton dis­agreed with this stance and saw art and prayer as "distinct" autonomous experiences, (p. 24.3) However, it is the opinion of thi# writer that Kilcourse does not properly understand Tillich, nor does he under­stand Merton’s hope that a Christian poet can, through his art, make an "open declaration of the mercy of God." ("Poetry and Contemplations A Reappraisal,"in A Thomas Merton Reader, p. 450.)Such a hope is a"hope that a poem will reveal some­thing of God, i.e., that it can be theonomous, or that the poem (culture) will be the form of revela­tion (religion). Merton rejected spurious autonomy in all realms of life. That the activity of artistic creation and the activity of prayer are distinctive exercises is not to negate their underlying theono­mous unity.
^e.g.. The definition of power in Love. Power, and Justice, especially pp. 11-13.
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"Since I am a Catholic, I believe, of course, that my Church guarantees for me the highest spiritual freedom.I would not be a Catholic if I did not believe this. I would not be a Catholic if the Church were merely an organization, a collective institution, with rules and laws demanding external conformity from its members. I see the laws of the Church, and all the various ways she exercises her teaching authority and her jurisdiction, as subordinate to the Holy Spirit and to the law of love* I know that my Church does not look like this to those who are outside her; to them the Church acts on a principle of authority but not of freedom. They are mistaken.It is in Christ and in His Spirit that true freedom is found, and the Church is His Body, living by His Spirit."*
It could be that Merton does what Tillich will 
not do, that is, equates • a particular institution 
with the Spiritual Community. On the other hand, 
it is more likely that Merton is able to see the 
theonomous undergirding of the Catholic Church of 
his time in much the same way that Tillich could 
refer to certain eras of church history as theonomous, 
Merton, obviously, was able to recognize and accept 
the depth dimension that he saw in Catholicism, just 
as Tillich was able to see the depth dimension within 
the Protestant Principle. Furthermore, Merton did
C^onjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 89*
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not overlook or underestimate heteronomous features 
within the church; he recognized them and criticized 
them. Yet, he was able to accept the possibility of 
a particular type of authority rising out of theonomy. 
The acceptance of authority did not, for Merton, 
necessarily involve the surrender of his true, 
spiritual autonomy. "But it is right and just," he 
argued, "to accept a rule of authority that obeys 
truth, guarantees men’s rights, and recommends itself 
to free men by its respect for liberty. Super­
ficial and empty autonomy can be sacrificed, he felt, 
and in fact must be sacrificed, if man’s true autonomy 
in the Spirit is to be actualized. Any authority 
which is open to its own theonomous elements, and 
exists to enable others to seek those elements within 
themselves, is an authority that men can avoid only 
at great risk. The ultimate source of all authority, 
for Merton, is God. To give up an empty autonomy in 
order to accept what one hopes will be a theonomous 
authority is not, in Merton’s mind, the giving up of 
freedom or liberty. On the contrary, it can lead to 
true freedom and liberty and enable one to put aside
S^eeds of Destruction, p. 167,
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the superficialities that have heretofore hindered 
his descent into his own depths. In the Spiritual 
Ooimmmity law is not seen as an external force, 
but as an expression of the inner law of one’s 
nature. The Catholic Church, in Merton’s view, 
although it was not perfect, was based on the 
theonomous depths and its authority, although abused, 
represented the true nature of the individual.
Furthermore, Merton recognized that in the unambiguous, 
and perfectly realized Spiritual Community - that is, 
in heaven - law and love are perfectly reconciled.
"The Church must have her structure of law and discipline, 
like any other visible society of men on earth. In 
heaven there will be no law for the elect but God 
Himself, who is Charity. In heaven, obedience will 
be entirely swallowed up in love."^ Merton shares 
Tillich’s eschatological emphasis and his hope for 
the perfect unification of religion and morality. 
Furthermore, when Merton says that "Law is an ex­
pression of that ’justice’ which is the living 
harmony of opposites....the expression of the true 
good which is the inner unity of life itself, the
^’Love and Maturity," p. 47*
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logos which is common to all, he indicated his 
basic affinity with Tillich. Law, when it reflects 
the logos, or when it expresses the balance between 
opposite poles, is not something over and against 
man; it is the expression of his true nature, in­
dividual and communal, and as such it should be 
obeyed, and can be obeyed* It should be obeyed in 
so far as it represents the moral imperative; it 
can be obeyed in so far as the moral imperative re­
presents man’s true being.
Tillich, it was stated earlier, felt that 
Catholicism and Protestantism differed in that 
Catholicism tried to give a specific content to the 
natural law. In general terms his criticism is 
accurate. However, the understanding of natural law 
as expressed in the writings of Merton, is remarkably 
similar to Tillich’s interpretation. Merton did not 
stress the particulars of natural law. His interpre­
tation was broader;
"...the natural law is not merely what is ethically right and fitting for fallen man considered purely in his 
fallen state:: it is the law of his
1"Herakleitos the Obscure," in A Thomas Merton Reader, p. 282.
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nature as it came to M m  from the hand of God, the law imprinted in his nature by the image of God. Every man is made by M s  very nature, in the image of God. Hence the natural law is the law wMch inclines our inmost hearts to conform to the image of God which is in the deepest center of our being, and it also in­clines our hearts to respect and love our neighbor as the image of God. However this concept of nature is only comprehensible when we see that it presupposes grace and calls for grace and as it were sighs aiKJ moans for grace. Actually our contradictions witMn ourselves make us realize that without grace we are lost."*
Tillich, it will be recalled, saw the fulfillment of 
the law in the reunion of essence and existence, and 
thereby saw that the law was perfectly fulfilled in 
Jesus the Christ as the bearer of New Being. Further* 
more, he called upon men to participate in the 
reality of the New Being. Merton concluded the 
paragraph just quoted in this way:
"In a word, then, I want with my Wiole heart to fulfil in myself tMs natural law, in order to fulfil the law of grace to which it leads me. And I want with my whole heart to realize and fulfil my communion of nature with my brother, in order that I may be by that very fact one with him in Christ."2
S^eeds of Destruction, p. 259#
2loc. Git.
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Merton sought his own theonomous depths, and in those 
depths, Merton sought the true and eternal sources 
for the proper relationship with his brother. In 
the theon(mou8 depths in other words, Merton sought 
the source of a social ethic. It is not without 
significance that the paragraph just quoted was from 
a letter Merton wrote to Dorothy Day, one of 
American Catholicism’s most renowned social activists, 
Autonomy and heteronomy cannot yield a truly viable 
social ethic. Only theonomy can.
7. The Solidarity of Mankind
Paul Tillich based his understanding of the 
solidarity of mankind within the context of the 
polarities of the self-integration of the person, 
namely, individualization and participation. It has 
already been shown^ that he believed that a person 
can only become a fully mature person, or a "person­
ality,’• in community with other persons, and that 
this is so because only within the encounter with
^See above pp. 388-391.
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other persons is it possible for one to recognize 
his own limits. The encounter of person with 
person determines the meaning of the person within 
his own finitude and destiny, and this meaning is 
actualized in the moral act. To be in community 
is essential to personality. Even when one is 
separated from the activities of the community he is 
still, essentially, a part of the community.^
"Religious obligation, first of all," Tillich 
once wrote, "includes the practical acknowledgement 
of the unity of all men, expressed in oriental wisdom 
by the assertion that the other is thou."^ This 
practical acknowledgement of man’s ultimate unity 
with all other men is possible only by the theonomous 
impact of the Spiritual Presence. Only when essence 
and existence are no longer estranged is man able 
to recognize his brother as an integral part of himself. 
"Only through the impact of the Spiritual Presence 
is the shell of self-seclusion pierced,"^ and only
Igee Dynamics of Faith, p. 118; cf. The Courage To Be, p. 87*
2The Protestant Era, p. 186,
3Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 278*
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by such an impact is man able to know his own inner 
truth:
"The other person is a stranger, but a stranger only in disguise. Actually his is an estranged part of one’s self. Therefore one’s own humanity can be realized only in reunion with him - a reunion which is also decisive for the realization of his humanity."I
Kon-theonomous solutions to the inherent problems of 
this unity fail. Man attempts to overcome the split 
between subject and object, by gravitating to either 
the pole of total individualization, in which an 
attempt is made to absorb the other into one’s own 
personal centre, or to the pole of total participation, 
in which one surrenders his own personal centre to 
the other. In the first case, however, the centred- 
self of the other is destroyed, and in the second 
case, one's own personal centre is destroyed. Reunion 
of subject and object is not possible by the 
annihilation of one or the other. Only a theonomous 
impact can effectively bring about the reunion; only 
in theonomy can man know the essential truth of him­
self and the other self: "The stranger who is an
^Ibid.. p. 277.
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estranged part of one’s self has ceased to be a 
stranger when he is experienced as coming from the 
same ground as one’s self. T h e  essential unity 
of man with man is such because each individual 
shares the same ground of being with all other in­
dividuals. It is only at the level of this ground 
that essential unity can be realized, and at the 
same time, since all individuals are essentially in 
union, and one cannot truly know himself apart from 
his unity with others, one cannot know the truth of 
his own personhood until he discovers^ the depths of 
his own and his brother’s ground. One can neither 
know liis brother, nor himself, nor their essential 
relationship, without a theonomous awakening.
"In the ordinary encounter of man with man, each appears as an isolated in­dividual* Yet, if we enter the levels of personal existence which have been rediscovered by depth psychology, we encounter the past, the ancestors, the collective unconscious, the living substance in wliich all living beings 
participate. In our search for the ’really real’ we are driven from one level to another to a point where we cannot speak of level any more, where we must ask for that which is the ground of all levels, giving them their
I^bid*, p. 278, Underscoring supplied.
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structure and their power of being
Man discovers, in those depths, that the ground of 
his own levels is identical with the ground of the 
other person’s levels. His own ultimate ground is 
the ground not only of his own reality, but of all
reality, and at the "level" of that ground, he
participates in union with all reality. This ground 
of all being is, for Tillich, what is meant by the 
word "God." In speaking of God as "personal," one
must recognize that this is to say that God is not
simply the "absolute individu^," but that he is the 
"absolute participant" as well. Both terms are 
necessary to describe the reality of God’s "person­
hood," and "this can only mean that both individuali­
zation and participation are rooted in the ground of
the divine life and that God is equally ’near* to
2each of them while transcending them both." The 
bearer of New Being is the one who is in perfect 
unity with God, that is to say,
; perfect unity with his own 
ground. Logically it would follow that he who is 
the bearer of New Being would therefore be one who
^Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, p. 13.
S^ystematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 271.
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is in perfect unity with all others, since all others 
share in that ground. This is precisely what Tillich 
says about Jesus the Christs "Out of his unity with 
God he has unity with those who are separated from him 
and from one another by finite self-relatedness and 
existential self-seclusion."^ Since all men, by the 
impact of the Spiritual Presence, can participate in 
New Being, all men can participate in the reunion 
of those who are existentially separated, that reunion 
which is implicit in New Being, The unity of men 
comes out of man’s unity with God.
The proper understanding of the relationship 
between individualization and participation brought 
about by a theonomous glimpse of the common depths 
results in theonomous morality. When one recognizes 
that he and his neighbor participate in and are sus­
tained by the same ground of being, he recognizes 
also that both he and his neighbor share a common 
destiny. Individual fulfillment and universal ful­
fillment are not separable, or, as we have already 
seen, "in the essence of the least actualized in­
dividual, the essences of other individuals and, in­
directly, of all beings are present."^ Therefore,
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 154.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 436; seeabove p. 469.
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if one person harms another person, he harms himself 
as well.^ To enslave another is to enslave the self.^ 
And ultimately, if one condemns another to eternal 
death, he condemns himself as well, for the eternal 
destiny of the individual cannot be separated from the 
eternal destiny of the community in which he par-
3ticipates.
In one of his sermons, Tillich summarized both 
the philosophical and the moral implications of his 
understanding of God as the ground of being common to 
all creatures:
"There is an ultimate unity of all beings, rooted in the divine life from which they emerge and to which they return. All beings, non-human as well as human, participate in it.And therefore they all participate in each other. And we participate in each other’s having and in each other’s not having. When we become aware of this unity of all beings, something happens to us. The fact that others do not have, changes the character of our having: it undercuts our securityand drives us beyond ourselves, to understand, to give, to share, to help.
llbid.. p. 95.
^Love. Power, and Justice, pp. 77f.
^b.g.. Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 317%Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 436; The Boundariesof Our Being, p. 38.
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The fact that others fall into sin, crime and misery, alters the character of the grace that is given us: itmakes us recognize our own hidden guilt; it shows us that those who suffer for their sins and crime suffer also for us, for we are guilty of their guilt and ought to suffer as they suffer.«I
In short, if one recognizes that the stranger is,
in reality, a part of himself, he will care what
happens to the stranger in his historical context.
Awareness of the common ground of being in God
enables man to transcend his individuality and to
seek for the common good, and to recognize his own
implications in that which is distorted in the
other person as well as in himself. Furthermore,
the doctrine of the solidarity of all mankind, and
the idea of the essentialization of the individual
in unity with all other beings "makes the concept
2of vicarious fulfillment understandable." In so 
far as one man, Jesus the Christ, was united with 
the ground of being, all men are united with the 
ground of being through their participation in him. 
All men can find salvation tlirough one man’s par-
^The Boundaries of our Being, p. 39*
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 436.
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ticipation in the divine. "There is no human 
condition into which the divine presence does not 
penetrate," Tillich preached. "This is what the 
Cross, the most extreme of all human conditions, 
tells us."^ In so far as one man has sinned, we 
are all implicated; in so far as one 'man is reunited 
with God, we are all reunited.
The idea of the solidarity of all mankind is a
2central one in Merton’s thought. References to it 
can be found in all periods of his career. The 
process of salvation was one in which man was not 
only restored to his basic unity with God, but in 
Merton’s view, was one that reestablished the basic 
unity between man and man. The man who is not re­
stored to unity with other men cannot claim to be 
restored to full unity wit)i God: and no one can find
a true reunion with others apart from the reconciling 
action of God. In all of this it is proper to speak 
of re-union and re-establishment. îfen’s solidarity 
with his brother is an original fact of man’s being. 
It is part of the essence of man from which he is 
estranged. "The original solidarity of man, on which
^The Boundaries of Our Being, p. 39* 
2see above pp. 295-299.
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our perfect happiness and fulfilment depend," Merton 
wrote, "was destroyed by sin and man cannot find 
peace and unity within himself, or in society, until 
he is reconciled to God in Christ."^ So, the 
doctrine of the Fall not only symbolizes man's 
estrangement from God, it also speaks of loan's 
estrangement from his brother and from the truth 
of his own self* Furthermore, in as much as sal­
vation restores the unity between man and God and is 
brought about by the action of grace, grace also is 
the restorative agent in man's reunion with his
fellow man* The Spirit of God unites men with God
2and "also unites them to one another in Him*"
This reunion is effected through participation in 
Christ, and, accordingly, whenever Merton says that 
all men are Christ, he is saying that all mankind 
is a unity;
"Therefore when you and I become what we are really meant to be, we will discover not only that we love one one another perfectly but that we are the same Mystical Person, and that we are both living in Christ and Ghrigt in us, and we are all One Christ.
^Basic Principles of Monastic Spirituality, p. 15< 
^The Ascent to Truth, p. 149*
^Seeds of Contemplation, p. 48.
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"When we all reach that perfection of love which is the contemplation of God in His glory, our inalienable personalities, while remaining eternally distinct, will nevertheless combine into One Person so that each one of us will find himself in all the others: and nGod id. 11 be the life and reality of all."
The union that exists between man and God is a
union that cannot be existentially actualized until
2man is made conscious of it. So, too, man needs 
a conscious realization of his basic unity with all 
mankind in order for him to begin to live in such a 
way as to make that union not simply a matter of 
abstraction. Man should not seek to discover or 
create a new unity, but rather, he should seek to 
rediscover the original unity in which he and his 
brother were created. Then, upon that discovery one 
also discovers that the entire world is within the 
deepest recesses of the self, and that through "a 
single metaphysical intuition of being and of goodness 
as such, man can be at one with all existing beings, 
and alienation between man and man, and man and nature
^Ibid.. p. 53.
2see above pp. 280ff.
^The Ascent to Truth, p. 197.
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can be overcome* "VJhen I find the world in my own 
ground, it is impossible for me to be alienated from 
it."^ To become aware of God as the ground of ny 
being is to become aware of the ground of all beings* 
Then, one is able to say that his brother is his 
"other self
Therefore, Merton felt that he could malce various 
political observations based upon his understanding 
of the "connaturality" of mankind. For instance, 
he applied it directly to the Vietnam war, in his 
Introduction to a Vietnamese translation of ^  Man 
Is An Island, and showed how the doctrine of the 
solidarity of mankind not only was violated in that 
particular war, but also how the doctrine demanded 
a response from man, a response that spoke of eventual 
salvation;.
"A selfish life cannot be fruitful.It cannot be true. It contradicts the very nature of man. The dire effect of this contradiction cannot be avoided: where men live selfishly, in quest of brute power and lust and money, they destroy one another. The only way to change such a world is to change the thoughts and the desires of the men
^Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 155.
2e.g., Disputed Questions, p. 102; The Living Bread, p. 141; of. The Wisdom of the Desert, p. 18.
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who live in it. The conditions of onr world are simply an ontward expression of our own thoughts and desires* The misfortune of Vietnam today is that the war there expresses not merely the thoughts and desires of the people of Vietnam but, unfortunately, the inner confusion of men in other nations in different parts of the earth* The sickness of the entire earth is now erupting in Vietnam. But perhaps also the sickness of the entire earth may be cured there.
Or, another example, can be found in his writings 
about the racial conflict in American society. It is 
not enough, thought Merton, to assume that the white 
man and the Negro shared an equal essential dignity, 
nor simply to say that they are brothers* What is 
needed is a concrete acceptance and full realisation 
of "the fact that different races and cultures are
2correlative « They mutually complete one another »"
One race can only know its own truth in relationship 
to another race in just the same way that one man 
can only discover his own essence in relationship to 
another man:
"White calls for black just as black calls for white* Our significance as white men is to be seen entirely in the fact that all men are not white. Until this fact is
^"Preface to the Vietnamese translation of No Man Is ^  Island. " in Thomas Merton on Peace* p* 65.
^Seeds of Destruction, p* 61.
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grasped, we will never realize our true place in the world, and we will never achieve what we are meant to achieve in it. The white man is for the black man;: that is why he is white* The black man is for the white mans that is why he is black.
Merton sees that men must exist in a relationship 
of "correlative responsibility," wliich demands 
that men treat men, not as objects, but as persons 
sharing in the same essence and fulfilling each 
other. Man must recognize a "fruitful sense of 
polarity" with his brother, and in the same way 
that Merton saw a potentially fruitful polarity 
in the relationship between imerican and Vietnamese, 
between white man and black man, so too he saw it 
in the relationship between the monk and the atheist. 
Not only should they treat each other politely, 
Merton wrote, but that they should recognize "that 
they are indeed brothers," and that they share 
common concerns and have ground for fruitful and 
productive dialogue.^ Merton eschewed the facile 
argument that the atheist was really, if only he had
^Loc* Git.
%bid*. pp. 210f.
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the eyes to see, a secret believer,^ but nonetheless, 
believed firmly that all men are essentially one, 
and that unity was made manifest in Jesus Christ 
and that, therefore, all men could be called a part 
of Christ and treated as Christ. "The Christian 
therefore has the obligation to treat every other 
man as Christ Himself, respecting his neighbor's 
life as if it were the life of Christ, his rights 
as if they were the rights of Christ." M d  this is 
so, insisted Merton, even if the neighbor is "unjust, 
wicked, and odious."^ The Christian, because of his 
belief that human nature is identical in all men and 
that that human nature has been and will continue to 
be the vehicle for the incarnation of the Logos, is 
obliged to maintain a relationship of love, justice, 
and "correlative responsibility" with all men, 
accepting differences as fruitful polarities, and 
respecting each man's person as the person of Christ* 
As has been shown, Merton did not see this doctrine 
of the solidarity of all mankind in Christ to be an 
abstraction. For him it was a concrete reality which
^See, for example, "Apologies to an Unbeliever," in Faith and Violence, pp. 205-214.
^Seeds of Destruction, p. 126. An almost identical statement is made in Thomas Merton on Peace.p. 112.
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formed the basis for man's ethical behaviour*
Ethical speculation is grounded in the experience and 
realization of connaturality*^
In a world that was replete with superficial 
pretenses of solidarity, Merton found that it was of 
fundamental importance that there exist, somewhere 
within the total community of men, those who sought 
to discover and live according to the true source of 
solidarity* This he saw as the peculiar vocation of 
the monk, although he by no means limited this vo­
cation to monasticism* He asked his fellow monks 
to become more aware of and sympathetic toward various 
fellow travellers; hippies, those interested in Yoga
and Zen, poets, those involved in the peace movements
2and members of small agrarian communities* He was 
intrigued by such unorthodox manifestations of 
religion as the Shakers, the Cargo-cults, and
3American Indian Religion* Nevertheless, it was the
^Ibld.. p. 257.
^e.g., Contemplation in a World of Action, pp.106f, and The Sign of Jonas, pp. 301f.
Merton's Introduction to Religion in Wood ;A Book of Shaker Furniture by Edward Deeming Andrews and Faith Andrews, Bloomington, IndianaIndiana University Press, 1966, and "The Shakers," Jubilee 11 (January, 1964) : the only published material ofMerton's to date on the Gargo-cults is in The Geography of lograire. On American Indians see "Ishi;A Meditation, " in Thomas Merton on Peace, pp* 248-253, and "The Sacred City,« Catholic Worker 34 (January, 1968), pp* 4-6.
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Christian monastic tradition that provided Merton 
with his own locus for personal and communal maturity. 
His reocourring plea was that monasteries keep from 
being over-run with the superficialities of mass- 
produced culture and the heteronomies of conventional 
religion and morality. As long as there were even a 
very few people seeking the true depths of human 
community, the entire human community was saved from 
total distortion. The monk did not have to produce 
anything; he did not have to be, in îterton's eyes, 
useful or worthwhile in any worldly sense.^ The 
monk for Merton was "useless"; he was a marginal- 
man. But in so far as he was a solitary and in his 
solitude renounced false solidarity for the true
2solidarity grounded in God, he was a universal man.
In becoming one with God he could be, even in his 
solitude, more truly one with his brothers than those 
who, although living in the midst of humanity, were 
divided one from another. But this is possible only 
if the solitary is living "in Christ";
^e.g.. The Silent Life, pp. 9-14, and Con­templation in a World of Action, passim.
^e.g., "The Monk as Marginal Man"; The AsianJournal, pp. 305-308.
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"There is no peace and no reality in an abstract, disinoarnate, gnostic solitude, St. Peter Damian insists that since the Christian hermit is hidden in Jesus Christ he is there­fore most intimately present...to all the rest of the Church. His isolation in solitude unites him more closely in love with all the rest of his brothers in the world.
Whenever one prays, all pray. The solitary, according
to Merton, is one who can still say "Dominus vobiscum"
in his solitude, just as the community can chant the
2psalms with their reocourring singular pronouns.
But prayer - the communion between man and God - is 
of the essence. Without it solidarity loses concrete­
ness. It is prayer that keeps solitude from becoming 
abstract, disinoarnate and gnostic, for it is in 
prayer that one communes with the ground of his being 
and discovers that the ground of his being is the 
ground of all reality, and that being at one with 
his own ground means that he is at one with the ground 
of all others, that he is truly "in love" with them. 
"Those who are one with Christ are also one with 
another. The monk is one who seeks oneness with
^Contemplation in a World of Action, p. 258.
^Loc. Git, and also Bread in the Wilderness, p. 94î*^*THê living Bread, p. xxviii.
3pisputed Questions, p. 112.
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Ghrist, not simply for his own sake, but because 
of the essential solidarity of all mankind, he seeks 
it for the whole world. But he is not alone in the 
quest for life in Christ. Soever is living at that 
deepest level and is restored to unity with God, is 
the saviour of the entire cosmos. He is the one who 
is "holding everything together and keeping the universe 
from falling apart." It matters not if there are only 
a few such persons in the world, whoever they are, 
wherever they are, "they are the ones who keep the 
universe from being destroyed."^ They are the ones 
who, because they are at one with the ground of being, 
live vicariously at that level for all of their 
brothers, and in them all are existentially reunited 
with the source of life.
Put in Tillich's terms, the one who lives in 
Christ is the one who, though the impact of the 
Spiritual Presence, is able to transcend the polarities 
of individualization and participation. Tillich, it 
should be recalled, believed that only the most 
individualized person was capable of entering into 
universal participation.^ Accordingly, Tillich, along
^Seeds of 0ontemplation. pp. 124, 200.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 35> seeabove p. 389.
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with, Merton, was able to see the immense value of 
solitude and withdrawal. He differentiated between 
"essential solitude" and "existential loneliness" 
and, since Spiritual maturity was a matter of 
essentialization, he saw that "a decisive symptom 
of Spiritual maturity is the power to sustain solitude."^ 
But Spiritual maturity is not a matter of achieving 
solitude as an end in itself. Solitude makes par­
ticipation possible:.
"Being alone in essential finitude is an expression of man's complete centred­ness and could be called 'solitude.'It is the condition for the relation to the other one. Only he who is able to have solitude is able to have com­munion. For in solitude man experiences the dimension of the ultimate, the true basis for communion among those who are alone.
Superficial solidarity, the kind of solidarity 
that Merton so often criticized, came under Tillich's 
critical eye as well* Participation with others on 
a basis that fails to seek the common ground of being 
is often very easy, but it is ultimately destructive 
of any worthwhile purpose. This is a danger that
llbid.. p. 249.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 82; cf.Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 189*
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Tillich saw to be especially inherent in ministry.
To minister to another one must participate with and 
in the other* But if the participation is on a 
superficial level, ministry is truncated. Sometimes 
the problem in communication of the Gospel is not so 
much a lack of participation with others but too 
much of the wrong kind of participation:
"Ours is a society which tries with all its means, unconsciously and sometimes even consciously, to standardize every­thing by means of public communication which every moment fills the very air we breathe. So here participation is very easyl In fact, it is so easy that in order to communicate the Gospel we need non-participation. Ministera need withdrawal and retirement from these influences beating upon them every minute,"^
Merton understood the solidarity of mankind from 
his position of withdrawal and retirement. His 
defense of the essential importance of solitude has 
an experiential basis. Tillich, on the contrary, 
lived his entire life in the midst of society. Un­
like Merton, he was no hermit. It is of interest, 
then, to hear the worldly philosopher-theologian 
speak with passion about the same thing of which
^Theology of Culture, p. 206; of. SystematicTheology. Vol. I, p. 189.
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the monk-hermit spoke* What Merton knew from every­
day experience, Tillich learned implicitly in his own 
life "on the boundaries," a life which he described 
as "fruitful" but "difficult and dangerous.That 
the solidarity of humanity can be known, understood 
and actualized in solitude is eloquently and adequately 
stated in one of Tillich's sermons. The content of 
that sermon, if not the language as well, could easily 
be Merton's. The two men were in agreement;
"Now perhaps we can answer a question you may have already asked - how can communion grow out of solitude? We have seen that we can never reach the innermost centre of another being.We are always alone, each for himself.But we can reach it in a movement that rises first to God and then returns from him to the other self. In this way man's aloneness is not removed, but taken into the community with that which the centres of all beings rest, and so into community with all of them. Even love is reborn in solitude. For only in solitude are those who are alone able to reach those from whom they are separated. Only the presence of the eternal can break through the walls that isolate the temporal from the temporal. One hour of solitude may bring us closer to those we love than many hours of communication. We can take them with us to the hills of eternity.
"And perhaps when we ask - what is the innermost nature of solitude? - we should answer ; the presence of the eternal upon
"k)n the Boundary, p. 13.
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the crowded roads of the temporal. It is the experience of being alone but not lonely, in view of the eternal presence that shines through the face of the Christ, and that includes everybody and everything from which we are separated.In the poverty of solitude all riches are present. Let us dare to have solitude to face the eternal, to find others, to see ourselves."^
The contemplative does not take a Plotinian 
flight from the alone to the Alone, but from the
alone to the One in whom all are united. In this way
both Merton and Tillich are able to see the intimate 
relationship between mystical prayer and human com­
munity. To be united to God in the ecstatic moment
of mystical prayer is to be united, at the same time,
to the innermost ground of one's neighbour.
^The Boundaries of Our Being, pp. 22f.
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Conclusion: ^sticism and Social Ethics
"Biblical, classical, and mystical Chi’istianity agree in the assertion that the moral act, in order to be perfect or even possible, must follow from the union of God and man...He who does not participate in the good itself cannot be good.
In this way Paul Tillich succinctly states his 
understanding of the intimate relationship between 
mysticism and ethics; mysticism is an essential in­
gredient of religion; and religion gives the un­
conditional character to the moral imperative.
When a moment of ecstasy occurs and a reunion of 
essence and existence is evidenced, however fragmentarily, 
man is reunited with the ground of his being, which 
is the divine ground in which he and all reality find 
their power of being and their solidarity. All reality 
stems from the same ground. Man's reunion with that 
ground is manifested, according to Tillich, in faith 
and in love, both of which point in the same direction. 
This would not necessarily be so if faith was under­
stood as the acceptance of certain doctrinal state­
ments. However, Tillich does not define faith in this
^Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, pp. 68f.
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way. Faith, for him, is a matter of being ultimately 
concerned, and to be ultimately concerned implies 
love, that is "the desire and urge toward the reunion 
of the separated," He who responds in faith to the 
impact of the Spiritual Presence responds also in 
love, "Faith implies love: love lives in works; in
pthis sense faith is actual in works." When faith 
is seen as ultimate concern, and when love is seen 
as the drive toward reunion, it can be further stated 
that man's existence in relationship to God is always 
an ethical existence, Man becomes one who is ultimately 
concerned about being reunited with his own ground, 
and because he and his brother share the same ground 
of being, he is ultimately concerned about reunion 
with his brother. If man, in a moment of mystical 
ecstasy, discovers his own divine ground, he is 
driven by the nature of what he discovers to a life 
of action. This is expressed in Tillich's oft-repeated 
understanding of participation in truth. One does 
not participate in truth simply by knowing the truth 
or understanding the truth or stating the truth; 
one does the truth. Cognition alone falls short of
^Dynamics of Faith, pp. 113f• 
^Ibid., pp. 115f.
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fall participation. Only by doing the truth does 
one really know the truth, for in doing the truth 
"the gap between the cognitive and the moral is 
conquered."^ To participate in New Being is to live 
a life of active concern for all beings. Tillich 
holds that Jesus the Christ is the final revelation 
and as such is both exemplar and bearer of New Being#
He thereby concludes that one is able to do the truth 
by remaining in Christ for he who is called the Christ 
is he who said, "I am the truth.(John  14:6)
Only in so far as one is able to participate in the 
New Being, the being revealed in Jesus the Christ,
- that is the being in which essence and existence 
are reunited - is one able to know, do, and participate 
in the truth. Only in a theonomous situation in which 
New Being is manifested, is it possible to have an 
ethic that effectively reunites those who are estranged« 
In New Being faith and love are united. "The act of 
faith and the act of accepting the moral imperative's 
unconditional character are one and the same act."^
%orality and Beyond, p. 54.
^The Boundaries of Our Being, pp. 204f.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 169.
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Or, put in another way, Tillich says that "faith 
is the state of being grasped by the transcendent 
unity of unambiguous life" and that this faith 
"embodies love as the state of being taken into 
that transcendent u n i t y . F a i t h  precedes love 
.only logically; experientially they are always to­
gether s.
"Faith without love is a continuation of estrangement and an ambiguous act of religious self-transcendence. Love without faith is an ambiguous reunion of the separated without the criterion and power of the transcendent union.
Therefore Tillich can state that in his under­
standing of theology, "The ethical element is a 
necessary - and often predominant - element in every 
theological statement.Although, as we have seen, 
he rejects the validity of a "theological ethic" 
because of its heteronomous implications, he sees 
that in as much as theology points to the theonomous 
element in morality and culture, as well as in 
religion, "every theological statement has ethical
llbid.. p. 137.
^Ibid., pp. 137f.
^Systematic Theology. Vol. I, p. 36.
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implications."^ The mystical and the ethical are 
inseparable. The mystical moment necessarily results 
in ethical activity, unless, of course, demonic 
distortions within the ambiguities of life so pervert 
the reception of God's revelatory act as to make its 
manifestations fall short of the criterion of Jesus 
the Christ. Even so, in spite of existential dis­
tortions, the ethical and the mystical interpenetrate, 
although existential distortions can cause ambiguities.
If, however, a mystical experience is a genuine en­
counter with the divine ground, no matter how fragmentary, 
it is unmnbiguous, and as such it results in ethical 
activity. The manifestation of the Spiritual Presence 
within existence is faith and love, and the love that 
is manifested is the drive toward reunion, not only 
with God, but also with His entire creation.
In the mystical experience unambiguous self- 
actualization of life occurs. The polarities that 
are only ambiguously balanced under the conditions of 
existence find their fulfillment. The poles of in­
dividualization and participation are transcended 
and man finds the centre of his self in community with 
others. The poles of dynamics and form are transcended
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 284. Seeabove, pp. $05f.
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and man finds constructive growth to be a reality.
The poles of freedom and destiny are transcended and 
man is able to transcend himself without losing the 
reality of himself.
However, this process always takes place both 
within the community and within history, and within 
these processes the community, as well as the personality, 
is actualized. All the life processes occur in what 
Tillich calls "bearers of history,either individuals 
or groups. The mystical experience may happen to a 
single individual in his solitude, but since he is 
a part of mankind, it is not something that he can 
claim to possess for himself. Revelation may be 
received by the individual, but it is not his. It 
is for others. "No individual receives revelation 
for himself," Tillich explained, "It is for his group, 
and implicitly for all groups, for mankind as a whole.
The essentialization of man is not to be seen apart 
from its occurtSnce within a community, nor apart 
from its occuimnce within history, even though these 
occufignces are fragmentary and anticipate the final 
transhistorical essentialization. History is moving
pp. 329-333.
^Systematic ïheoloay. Vol. I, p. I4I.
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toward a goal, a telos. the symbol for which is the 
Kingdom of God* The inner-historical, inner-communal 
nature of the process of the self-actualization is 
not without its own ambiguities; nevertheless the aim 
is that of a "kingdom," that is, a community of per­
sons. The aim of each individual act of self-integra- 
tion or essentialization is a universal aim. Within 
its historical context, therefore, Tillich says;
"There is still self-integration but not as an end in itself; self-integration under the historical dimension serves the drive toward universal and total integra­tion. There is still self-creativity, but not for the sake of particular crea­tions; self-creativity under the historical dimension serves the drive toward that which is universally and totally new.And there is still self-transcendence, but not toward a particular sublimity;., self-transcendence under the historical dimension serves the drive toward ful­fillment through all the processes of life not withstanding the fact that while it runs toward the ultimate it remains bound to the preliminary, and in running toward fulfillment it defeats fulfillment It does not escape the ambiguities of life by striving in all processes toward unambiguous life."^
VJhere, because of the impact of the Spirit, the 
ambiguities of life are overcome fragmentarily, the 
universal implications of every single act of self-
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, pp. 353f.
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actualization are present*
In another context Tillich differentiated be­
tween technical, mystical and historical realism. 
Technical reason as he defines it, goes beyond the 
here-and-now as it seeks to discover relationships 
between means and ends;: mystical realism goes be­
yond the here-and-now in its search for essence. 
Historical realism seeks the transcendent within 
the here-and-now, it seeks for the essence under the 
conditions of existence. Therefore, in Tillich's 
thought, historical realism is superior to, and in­
corporates, the others.
"Historical realism transcends technological, as well as mystical, realism. Its decisive character is conscious of the present situation, of the 'here and now.* It sees the power of being, in the depth of 'our historical situation.* It is con- temporeaneous, and in this it differs from the technological as well as the mystical, idea of reality."^
Technical reason, in other words, is analogous to 
autonouys it fails to take "the depth dimension" 
into consideration. I^stical realism is analogous 
to heteronomy in as much as it sees the depth
^The Protestant Era, p. 81.
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dimension as totally distinct from the here-and- 
now* Historical realism is analogous to theonomy;. 
it seeks the depths within that which is given. 
Mysticism, then, can only be realistic in the fullest 
sense if it does not divorce itself from historical, 
concrete situations. Contemporaneity is basic to a 
realistic approach to life* That which is eternal is 
to be found in the immediate moment, in the eternal 
now (a phrase Tillich borrowed from Melster Eckhart), 
and such a discovery is the mystical element of 
religious experience. The mystical is never separated 
from the historical without its becoming distorted 
and unrealistic. It is one with the historical in 
two senses: first it is such in so far as history is
the place in which the divine Spirit is encountered, 
and secondly it is one with history in so far as man 
exists in a community which has a telos. namely, 
unambiguous essentialization and universal salvation.
As has been remarked, existence under the impact 
of the Spiritual Presence in the historical dimension 
is symbolized by the phrase "the Kingdom of God,"
In the same way that the Spiritual Presence was used 
to answer the questions implied in the ambiguities of 
the existential life of man, so "Kingdom of God" 
is the symbol that Tillich uses to answer questions 
implied in the ambiguities of history. Unlike the 
Eastern symbol of Nirvana, with which Tillich contrasts
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it, the symbol of the Kingdom of God has four 
particular connotations. It is political, social, 
personalistic, and universal. The political con­
notation includes the idea that the Kingdom of God 
is both a realm in history and also the ruling 
activity of God. The social connotation includes 
the ideas of peace and justice and elevates all 
utopian schemes by the addition of the words "Of God."^ 
In the personal!stic connotation Tillich sees the 
Kingdom of God as giving eternal meaning to the 
individual person. This is in contrast to those 
symbols "in which the return to the ultimate identity 
is the aim of existence," and the individuality of 
the person is annihilated. For Tillich "the trans­
historical aim towards which history runs is not the
extinction but the fulfillment of humanity in every 
2human individual," The universal connotation means 
that the Kingdom of God is not simply a kingdom of 
men, but that it involves life in all its dimensions.
It is within the context of the Kingdom of God 
that Tillich sees the final conquest of the ambiguities 
of life. Within history we find the ambiguities of
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 383* 
^Loc. Git.
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life conquered only fragmentarily. The symbol of the 
Kingdom of God incorporates both the historical 
dimension and the hope for its eschatological ful­
fillment, The telos of all creation is the Kingdom 
of God in which there will be unambiguous self­
integration, with the poles of individualization and 
participation in perfect unity; unambiguous self- 
creativity, with the poles of dynamics and form united 
in the divine creativity; and unambiguous self-transcen­
dence, with the poles of freedom and destiny united 
in the divine freedom which is identical with the 
divine destiny. Therefore, morality, culture and 
religion will come to an end. Morality will come 
to an end because the ought-to-be will be reality.
Culture will come to an end because theoria and praxis 
will be united and the truth will be done. Religion 
will come to an end in that God will be all in all.
There is no temple in the heavenly city.^
In the very last lecture Tillich delivered, he 
spoke of the whole history of religions as "a fight 
for the Religion of the Concrete Spirit.Christianity's
^Ibid.. pp. 429f.
^The Future of Religions. (New York; Harper and Row, 1966), p. 88.
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unique contribution to that history is the picture of 
Jesus as the Oiirist, the final victor in the struggle 
between God and the demonic distortions within re­
ligion. %4henever religion in any of its forms turns 
away from the Concrete Spirit it becomes a demonic 
distortion of the eschatological direction of history.
The Spirit is known in incarnation, and a mysticism 
which views concîjete reality as a deception from which 
we must be saved in order to enter into a timeless 
contemplation of the Absolute, is a false and futile 
exercise. But such a mysticism is not Christian 
mysticism in Tillich's view. "One should remember," 
he reminded his readers, "that it was a mystic (Ütinger), 
who formulated all this when he said that 'corporality 
(becoming body) is the end of the ways of God.'"^
For the Christian mystic there is no withdrawal from 
involvement in the struggles, pains, and joys of 
history, since the Christian nystic is one who recognizes 
that the Spirit who has encountered him is the Concrete 
Spirit. Also, because of his encounter with the 
Ground of all being, the mystic recognizes that man 
is essentially a part of every other man who has ever
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 214.
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lived or whoever will live#^ To deny the other 
is to deny one's self. The Christian nystio, further­
more, avoids a nysticism in which history is so mis­
understood as to be rendered meaningless. What 
Tillich calls "non-historical interpretations of 
history” lead to a religion in which one lives 
reasonably and acts honorably within history, but 
in which there is "no impulse to transform history 
in the direction of universal humanity and justice."^
If the essentiality of the finite and the concrete is 
denied, ethics become peripheral. Only theonomy, in 
which the depths of the ground are discovered within 
given, concrete reality, leads to agape. Non-historical 
types of mystici^ can lead to compassion, even very 
noble compassion, but compassion lacks agape. Tillich 
defined compassion as "a state in which he -ràio does 
not suffer under his own conditions may suffer by
3identification with another who suffers." But agape 
("the love which reunites centred person with centred
^On the practise of praying for the dead as a statement of solidarity see Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 446.
^Ohristianlty and the Encounter of the World Religions, p. 71.
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person")^ goes beyond this; agape includes "the will 
to transform the other one, either directly, or 
indirectly by transforming the sociological and
ppsychological structures by which he is conditioned."
It leads to a willingness to accept the unacceptable 
and to try to transform it. This is possible only 
when the idea of the solidarity of man is seen in 
terms of participation rather than identity. In the 
idea of identity, the individual centred selves are 
swallowed up in one another; in the idea of par­
ticipation, the individual identities are maintained, 
but differences are transcended under the impact of 
the Spiritual Presence. "One can say, in considerably 
condensed form, that participation leads to agape, 
identity to compassion."^ If one considers himself 
to be identical with his brother he can have compassion, 
But only if he can see himself and his brother as 
separate entities participating in the divine Ground 
which is Love, can there be the possibility of one 
seeking to transform the situation in wliich the other
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 289, See above p. 506.
^Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, p. 71.
^Loc. Git.
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is suffering. Theonoiaous ethics, in other words, 
seek not only to share in a common ground, but seek 
as well to discover something new within the con­
ditions of existence. Theonoiaous ethics do not 
regard existence as negative, but as the locus for that 
which is new, as the place in which essence can be­
come actualized. Theonoiaous ethics seeks a new 
creation.
Some ecstasies can drive persons away from 
reality, but one must be careful to distinguish be­
tween true ecstasy and self-intoxication. Tillich 
insists that "not everything that calls itself ecstasy 
is an experience of the really real. An ecstasy 
that drives us away from reality and the demands of 
the present is destructive, and, if it pretends to be 
holy, it is demonic.However, in the same way 
that a person should not confuse a false ecstasy 
and a true one, one should not confuse the essence 
of society with its existential distortions. Tillich 
wrote in the midst of a society that tended to stress 
the gap between subject and object, and in its in­
sistence on objectivity, tended to depersonalization.
In this situation Tillich insisted on both the im-
^The Protestant ^ra. p. 90.
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portance of maintaining the centred-self and the 
need for that centred-self to seek salvation for the 
entire community. As we have already seen, solitude 
was regarded as a fundamental means of maintaining 
the centred-self. But solitude was for the sake 
of the community; withdrawal implied a subsequent 
return:
«The person as a person can preserve himself only by a partial nonparticipa­tion in the objectifying structures of technical society. But he can with­draw even partially only if he has a place to which to withdraw. And this place is the New Reality to which the Christian message points, which tran­scends Christianity as well as non- Christianity, which is anticipated everywhere in history, and which has found its criterion in the picture of Jesus as the Christ. But the place of the withdrawal is at the same time, the starting point for the attack on the technical society and its power of de­personalization.
Christian action depends on man’s withdrawal to 
Christ, the New Being. "Only out of the ground of 
the personal can the personal be saved," Tillich said. 
"Only those who withdraw from action can receive the
ppower to act,"
^"The Person in a Technical Society," in Social Ethics, ed* Gibson Winter, L^ondon; SGM, 1968), pp. 135f.
%bid.. p. 138.
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Two poles, then, must be balanced* Man must 
withdraw from society and seek the ground of being; 
but he must return from his place of withdrawal and 
not allow himself to be tempted by a selfish, false, 
ecstasy. Ihere must be withdrawal from existential 
distortions, but there can be no withdrawal from 
history. Not even the monk or the hermit can separate 
himself from history::
"Nobody who uses language is outside history, and nobody can withdraw from it. The monk and the hermit, who try to cut all social and political ties, are dependent on the history they want to avoid, and further, they influence the historical movement from which they try to separate themselves."^
There is no withdrawal from history; there may 
only appear to be such a withdrawal. But there can 
be, and needs to be, a withdrawal from a belief that 
existential distortions are, in fact, manifestations 
of the essential» The Protestant Principle insists 
that man not make an equation between what is and 
what ought-to-be. Under the conditions of existence 
there will necessarily be distortions. Finite reality 
can not be equated with the infinite. Therefore, the 
Protestant Principle demands a withdrawal from a
^Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, p. 369.
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false understanding of reality, a. withdrawal from 
any attitude that fails to seek the unconditional 
in the midst of the conditioned* It demands a with­
drawal from strict autonomy or strict heteronomyj it 
demands a withdrawal theonomy*
The theonomous experience is the mystical ex­
perience* It is the moment in which man finds 
reality transparent to its own divine ground. It is 
the moment in which he finds himself reunited with 
that ground, and inasmuch as his ground is the same 
ground in which all reality finds its power of being, 
it is the moment in which he becomes aware of the 
solidarity of all creation* In discovering the 
divine made transparent in îiis own reality, man dis­
covers that to be at one with God is to be at one 
m t h  the sufferings of the world. To participate 
in God is to participate in that Reality which, in 
the Gross of Christ, participated fully in the 
totality of human suffering. To participate in God 
is to participate with Him in the historical situation. 
To avoid history and to avoid community is to avoid 
the very essence of one’s own self and, ultimately, 
to avoid God. The call to withdrawal is a call to 
the mystical experience of God and the mystical 
experience of God is a call to seek for the world’s 
transformation and essentialization in and through 
Christ, the New Being.
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In an earlier chapter it was demonstrated how the 
process of withdrawal from existential distortions, 
experience of essential reality, and a subsequent 
return from the place of withdrawal explained the 
relationship between Thomas Merton’s life as a 
contemplative monk and his direct involvement in the 
political and social issues of his own times.^ Both 
explicitly in his \-jritings and implicitly in his life, 
the nature of the relationship between mysticism and 
social ethics is demonstrated* Stated as briefly as 
possible that relationship can be said to be based on 
the understanding that effective ethical behaviour is 
impossible apart from the reunion of God and man*
In that reunion man is not simply reunited with the 
divine Being as One who is "totally Other," but 
he is united with the divine Being who is the ground 
of all beings. He is united, therefore, with his 
own ground, and in that reunion, discovers that he 
and all mankind, indeed all creation, share a 
solidarity because they share in the same divine ground. 
One withdraws from surface reality only in order to 
experience reunion with that ground, and that experience 
drives one to a life of active love, an existential 
expression of the essential unity of all beings in 
the divine ground*
.^See above pp. 290-321*
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This summary of Merton’s mystical-ethical theology 
bears remarkable similarity to what we have just seen 
to be Tillich’s understanding of the mystical-ethical 
relationsliip* Although it would be repetitious and 
superfluous to give a detailed analysis of their 
respective theologies - this has been done tliroughout 
this chapter - it remains for us to indicate two 
specific points of affinity in their thought. The 
first point is in regard to the unity of faith and 
love; the second concerns history and the Kingdom 
of God. An analysis of these two points, along with 
occasional references to other ideas that they hold 
in common, will indicate that these two men offer 
interpretations of the relationship between mysticism 
and social ethics that are substantially the same.
Tillich held that faith implied love. They were 
both manifestations of participation in the New Being; 
faith was seen as the state of being grasped by the 
Spiritual Presence and love was seen as the state 
of being taken into the transcendent unity created 
by the New Being. Both were experienced together; 
one without the other is the expression of a 
spiritual experience that has not been able to over­
come the ambiguities of life. One vjithout the other 
is the sign of a demonic distortion of the impact of 
the Spirit.
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This close relationship between faith and love 
is a feature of Merton’s thought as well as Tillich’s* 
Faith for Merton, as for Tillich, has a logical 
priority. "Sanctity is not constituted only by 
good works or even by moral heroism," he wrote, "but 
first of all by ontological union with God ’in Christ.’" 
Virtues and good works "remain secondary to our new 
being. Or, again, you cannot gather figs from 
thistles. "Hence, what matters above all is not 
this or that observance, this or that set of ethical 
practices, but our renewal, our ’new creation’ in 
Christ." However, this is not all. "It is also a 
life in which, drawn to union with God in Christ by 
the Holy Spirit, we strive to express our love and 
our new being by acts of virtue."^ If we are to love, 
we must first be united with God by faith. "It is 
faith that opens my heart to Christ and His Spirit, 
that He may work in me."^
Merton did not define faith as "ultimate concern" 
as did Tillich.^ Nevertheless, he insisted as strongly 
as Tillich did that love had to be based on faith, or
^"Christ, the Way," p. I46; cf. Life and Holiness. pp. 70f.
Zibid.. p. U7.
^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander. p. 170.
^In the one extant letter from Merton to Tillich in the Bellarmine College archives, Merton discusses
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put in different terras, on acceptance of New Being. 
Morality that has not sought its depths in God is 
not, for Merton, a morality that can unambiguously 
define itself in terms of love. The old man - 
man in the Adamic nature - has fallen from the state 
in which he is capable of love. Only man who has 
become a new creation in the New Adam is able to 
love. "No work of mine can be called ’love* in the 
Christian sense, unless it comes from Christ,"^ he 
said. It is to be noted that although Merton was 
highly respected by numerous activists in the 
American churches, he himself made a sharp differentia­
tion between what he called "activism" and "Christian 
action." The first he saw as a flurry of activity 
that was doomed to failure because of its failure 
to seek its divine ground. The latter, on the contrary, 
was seen as action that finds its basis upon one’s 
reunion with the divine ground and therefore \m.s not
the understanding of faith as "ultimate concern." The stipulations of the Merton Legacy Trust do not allow quotations to be made from this letter, how­ever, a summation of Merton’s position is that he can accept faith as "ultimate concern" in terms of "Power of being" and as an expression of Christian hope. Merton, therefore, did not reject the idea of faith as "ultimate concern," although it was not an expression he used himself.
^Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 170.
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only efficacious, but was also an unconditional 
imperative. "l#at is needed now," Merton wrote 
in the midst of the moral crisis of the 1960*s,
"is the Christian who manifests the truth of the
1Gospel in social action, with or without explanation." 
Yet, he warned, there was a new Christian conscious­
ness emerging, and this new consciousness was being 
felt within Catholicism for the first time with 
impelling force. It was one which concerned itself 
"less and less with God as present in being (in his 
creation) and more and more with God’s word as 
summons to action."^ To regard God’s word as a summons 
was not an idea that Merton wished to repudiate; 
rather he insisted that it was a dangerously one­
sided understanding of the point of contact between 
man and God. It was dangerous, he felt, in that he 
could see it leading only to futile activism, and 
not to responsible, reforming Christian action. A 
theology that insists on repudiating anything that 
resembles the "metaphysical" or the "Hellenic" or the 
"oQTstical" would end up being too vague and subjective. 
"In theory it is excitingly charismatic;" Merton wrote.
^Thomas Merton on Peace, p. 222.
^2en and the Birds of Appetite, p. 28.
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"in practise it is sometimes strangely capricious."^
It "eschews well-defined and concrete forms" and 
identifies itself with an undefined activity. In 
Tillich’s terms it stressed dynamics at the expense 
of form. As an alternative to this activist theology, 
Merton, like 'Tillich, did not advocate a "mere re- 
affirmation of the ancient static and classic positions." 
The old metaphysics would neither be accepted by the 
majority of modern men, nor would it necessarily be 
adequate. Nevertheless, again like Tillich, Merton 
felt that any theology that had lost its ontological 
and its mystical grounding would result in an activism 
which would be active indeed, but which would never 
be able to come to grips with the radical nature of 
the problems facing both individuals and societies*
A theology which failed to plunge to its ontological 
depths, Merton felt, would never lead to an ethic that 
would be able to get beyond the level of superficial 
behaviour. It should be noted at this point that 
Merton’s reaction against the antimystical, activist 
theology that he encountered in the I960’s is very 
similar to Tillich’s reaction against the moralism of
^Ibid.. p. 29.
^Loc. Git.
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the Ritschlian school of theology with its rejection
of the mystical and its reduction of religion to the
status of ethic * s helpmate.^
Merton occasionally used the terra "eucharistie
morality" to describe an ethic that was based upon
one’s discovery of his own true being as grounded in
Christ. Ethical behaviour, he said, should be based
neither on "the cold obligation of an impersonal 2law," nor should it be based on a desire to reap a 
reward.^ Man does not need to act in a Promethean 
way, trying to wrench from God that which has already 
been given to man by God’s ot«i act of love. Rather, 
etliics should be based solely on a response to what 
God has freely given to man, namely, reunion of man 
and God in Christ. Acts of virtue and good works are, 
for Merton, done not in order to achieve that reunion • 
which in any case would be impossible - but out of 
gratitude for the reunion that God has already es­
tablished. Merton, therefore, called men to become
Gee Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill, pp. 204, 257; and. Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protestant Theology, pp. 215-223.
^life and Holiness, p. 82.
^See the advice Merton gave to a papal Volunteer going to Brazil to mistrust "even unconscious ex­pectations of reward." 'Seeds of Destruction, p. 237; cf. Thoughts in Solitude, p. 44.
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aware of that union, and then to base a morality
on a response of thanlcsgiving (hence "eucharistie"
morality) to God rather than on the specious attempt
to win favour or rewards.^ A response-centred morality
is a morality which finds its true basis in faith,
not in works - in the prius of God’s action, not in
man's. True morality, for both Merton and Tillich,
stemmed not from man's efforts, but from the appearance
of, and response to. New Being.
The appearance of New Being is accepted through
faith and, at the same time, is manifested in love.
"One cannot be justified by a faith that does not
do the works of love," Merton wrote, "for love is the
2mtness and evidence of ’new being* in Christ."
This statement is reminiscent of Tillich’s position 
that faith and love cannot be separated essentially; 
both are aspects of the same response to the impact 
of the Spiritual Presence. Tillich summarized this 
point when he said that the truth is to be done.
Merton makes much the same point; man is called to 
act upon the truth that he has received in faith:
^8ee Life and Holiness, pp. 82f; "Christ the Way," p. I5O; Seasons of Celebration, pp. 144f*
Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, p. 170.
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"It is not merely by thinking about the mysteries of faith that we can enter into them. We must dedicate our freedom to the course which they point out to us as the will of God.#. It is only by acting upon the truths of faith, conforming our lives to their consequences, that we can come to make them oxir possession."^
Man can share fully in the life of Christ, and there­
fore in the truth of Clirist, "not by figuring it out 
but by living as he did."^ Merton can speak about 
acting "truths" and about acting the "truth." In 
the one case he implies that doctrinal statements 
are not meant merely to be propositions to which 
man responds simply by the use of the intellect, 
but are to be incorporated into the totality of one’s 
life, and in the other case he implies that to 
participate and abide "in Christ" one must be ready 
to do the will of God, which is, specifically, to love 
one another.^ The truth must be Icnown and acted upon; 
and that truth is love, Merton was convinced that 
in the I960’s the most effective way to preach the 
Christian Gospel was tlirough action. This was not
^The New Man, pp. 131f•
^Opening the Bible, p. 69.
3e.g., life and Holiness, pp. 157f.
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an inappropriate thought for a man who had t^en a 
vow of silence. Merton believed that silence was 
necessary in order to preserve the purity of language 
and in order to continue to allow words to reveal 
their meanings. In a culture that was ihpundated 
with noise, actions could indeed speak louder than 
words. The world to which Merton addressed his re­
marks on Christian social action was "an irreligious 
world in which the Christian message has been re­
peated over and over until it has come to seem empty 
of all inteligible content.. . Therefore, the m y  
to persuade and enlighten the world, cannot simply be 
through the use of more words: the world had such
a plethora of words that it was increasingly difficult 
to separate truth from propaganda, events from pseudo­
events. Therefore, while maintaining his belief that 
"the words of the Gospel still objectively retain all 
the force and freshness of their original life,"
Merton increasingly called Christians to speak by 
their actions, not merely by their mrds. "No matter 
how lucid, how persuasive, how logical, how profound 
our theological and spiritual statements may be, 
they are often wasted on anyone who does not already
^Thomas Merton on Peace, p. 222,
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1think as we do," Merton wrote. The Christian cannot 
afford the luxury of performing his apologetic and 
evangelical task simply through the use of the spoken 
or %'jritten word. Faith, for Merton, implied loving 
action; and although words were the essential and 
necessary means of articulating the various interpre­
tations of the faith, they fell short of love. Faith 
implied love, and love implied action not words. In 
this way Merton could be supportive of activism within 
his own Church, while constantly and consistently 
warning those involved in action never to lose sight 
of their spiritual ground.
It is obvious, then, at least by implication, 
that Merton considered contemplation as a discipline 
that could never be divorced from the historical di­
mension. However, one need not rely only on this 
implicit understanding. Merton made numerous explicit 
statements concerning his conception of the precise 
relationship between the contemplative and the historic 
situation, and not surprisingly, these statements are 
consistent with the rest of Merton's thought, and 
coincide in general terms with Paul Tillich’s approach
^Loo. Git. See also "Events and Pseudo-Events," in Faith and Violence, pp. 145-164•
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to history and the Kingdom of God. Like Tillich, 
Merton saw the possibilities of various kairoi in 
his o\TO historical situation. Tillich looked for 
the kairos in the time immediately after the first 
World War, a time, he felt, when Germany and the 
world could begin anew to build a peaceful world. 
Merton saw the kairos in the midst of the civil 
rights movement of the I960's, a time when men of 
all races could begin anew to live in brotherhood* 
Tillich saw the kairos within the context of theonomy; 
Merton saw it in the context of contemplation;
"Awareness of Christ implies...some awareness of history, not in the abstract academic sense, but in the concrete: an awareness of the crisis of our times in relation to Christ's plan for the salvation of man. A Ohristian con­sciousness is therefore a special kind of historical consciousness:, an awareness of the kairos (the providential time of crisis and judgment) and of choice....a choice made in the context of historic crisis.
The "special" kind of historical consciousness is a 
consciousness which is aware of the depths of history, 
one which is not overwhelmed by images, myths, super­
stitions and idelogies, but one which is able to
^"The Historical Consciousness," in Contemplative Review I (May, 1968), pp. 2f.
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discern the worlcings of God in the midst of the 
events of the times. "Contemplatives," he wrote, 
"’should have a genuine and deep historical con­
sciousness, since Christ is in fact manifesting 
Himself in the critical conflicts of our time."^
As a contemplative, Merton considered that it was 
his vocation to share with the world the special 
perspective that belonged to the contemplative,
"the viewpoint of one who is not directly engaged 
in the struggles and controversies of the world,"
and thereby "hope to get a better view of the whole
2problem and mystery of man. " The contemplative s ’ 
viewpoint is only one viewpoint; it does not intend 
to negate the viewpoints of others, but to compliment 
them;
"A contemplative will, then, concern himself with the same problems as other people, but he vâll try to get to the spiritual and metaphysical roots of these problems - not by analysis but by simplicity.
He can never divorce himself from history and from 
the needs of persons within history. However, Merton
^Loc. Cit.
%aith and Violence, p. I46. 
%bid.. p. 147.
1
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saw his own relationship to history as a dialectical 
ones there is a simultaneous Yes and No* It is 
"at once acceptance and reversal*" It is never a 
matter of an acquiescence to the manipulations of 
the power of politicians, it is never a "supine 
acceptance of a secularist mystique on its own terms. 
Nor is it a rejection of history for some sort of 
non-historical ideal. Reversal of history and 
acceptance of history in Merton’s thought must be 
understood within the context of his differentiation 
between the false, superficial world, and the true, 
divinely-grounded world. Within that context it can 
be seen that Merton is willing to accept history 
(as the locus of God’s self-manifestations) and 
reverse history (to turn it away from its existential 
distortions) simultaneously. As he explained :
"The reversal comes from within history accepted, in its often shattering reality, as the focus of salvation and epiphany. It is not that the world of Auschwitz, Vietnam and the Bomb has to be 
cursed and repudiated as the devil’s own territory. That very world has to be accepted as the terrain of love not in the condemnation of evil but 
in its forgiveness: and this is
^Ibid.. p. 258.
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certainly not mi easy truth when we confront the enormity of evili"^
The nystic should not yield to the over-present 
temptation of spiritual pride. He should not fall 
prey to "a certain false nysticism which likes to 
gloat over the prospect of a Last Judgement in which 
the whole history of mankind will fall into oblivion 
under the anathema of an enraged God."^ Such a view 
of the eschaton is contrary to Merton's theology on 
two fundamental points, namely, his doctrine of man 
and his understanding of God. In the first place, 
since Merton sees man as essentially united to all 
men, to see history as condemned means to see one's 
self as condemned as well. In the second place, the 
solidarity of men is the gift of God and the presence 
of God in the life of men. Therefore, to condemn all 
of history is to show a fundamental inconsistency in 
God, On both these points Merton is very reminiscent 
of Tillich, who, as we have seen,^ thinks it impossible 
for one to participate existentially in the condemnation 
of another and who also resists any attempt to intro­
duce an eternal split in the Godhead. For Merton,
^Loc. Git.
^The Living Bread, p. 152. 
^See above pp. 451, 4&9f.
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the Earousia is not the condemnation but "the 
clarification and vindication of human history."
It will not destroy history but fulfill it "explain­
ing everything that was not clear, showing how all 
things worked together for the good of Ohriat and 
fulfilled the purposes of the Father."^ Therefore, 
since history is the place where God is at work, 
to speak of man's union with God is to imply that 
man is united with Him in His historical activity.
The message of the Bible, Merton said, was a message 
of salvation to "the poor, the burdened, the oppressed, 
the underprivileged," It was a call to man "to act 
as God's collaborator in setting up a definitive 
kingdom of justice and peace," in which the oppressed 
would find their essential dignity as persons made 
in the image of God appreciated and expressed within 
the structures of society. Merton accepts what he 
interprets to be St. Paul's "mystical view of history" 
as "the power of the Spirit 'driving* the redeemed to
accomplish an historic destiny of uniting all mankind
2in peace and reconciliation." If the mystical
^The Living Bread, pp. l$2f.
^Opening the Bible, p. 41# Merton makes ex­plicit reference to I Corinthians 3:9; Gollossians 1:39; Philippians 4:13; Ephesians 1:9-13, 15-23.
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experience of God opens man to his own redemption, 
he is driven, as one redeemed, to seek the re­
demption of all mankind, in the concrete, historical, 
existential milieu. The goal is the Kingdom of God; 
and Merton, like Tillich, did not see that ICingdom 
as an entity separate and apart from the existential, 
fallen world. It is always concrete; to spealc about 
the full manifestation of the Kingdom of God is not 
to speak of an abstract immortality;
"Sschatology is the vision of a totally new and final reality, a cosmic re­versal that brings ultimate meaning and salvation to the fallen world. That reality is, in effect, the total inte­gration of God and man in Christ - that is to say, in concrete and communal mankind united not by politics but by mercy."!
Tillich, as we have seen, referred to the Kingdom 
of God as political, social, personalistic and 
universal. A review of what he meant by these terms 
will indicate the closeness of his views to those 
of Merton’s. The Kingdom is in history, it includes 
peace and justice, it gives meaning to the individual 
person, and includes the whole of the created order* 
Merton concurs with Tillich on each of these points.
!"Blake and the New Theology," p. 680f; cf, "A Life Free From Care," p. 225.
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We have demonstrated how he regards eschatology as 
inner-historical, how he sees historical destiny as 
a society of "peace and reconciliation," how he sees 
redemption of the person as his unambiguous existential 
expression of the image of God, and how salvation is 
seen as the restoration of the entire cosmos, not 
simply one realm within the cosmos.^ Contemplation, 
therefore, according to both Merton and Tillich, was 
neither an escape from the rigors of historical ex­
istence, nor a denial of its essential reality; for 
both men the contemplative or mystical life was the 
place from which one could begin to cooperate with 
God in His redeeming activity within the concrete 
realm of historical existence.
There are other indications of Merton and Tillich’s 
basic agreement on the issue of the relationship be­
tween mysticism and social ethics. Tillich, in some 
of his earliest writings on religion, disagreed with 
the tendency to define two basic types of religion as 
the mystical and the prophetic. As we have seen, he 
saw that the oystical element was essential to all 
forms of religion, and defined the basic tendencies 
of religion in terms of the sacramental and the
^See above p. 477,
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"theocratic*"^ Merton, too, saw the "oversimplified"
nature of the distinction between the nystical and the
prophetic, and insisted that the contemplative and
2prophetic vocations belong together* Both men, too, 
spoke of the points of difference and points of 
similarity between the Buddhist concept of Nirvana 
and its ethic of compassion and the Christian faith, 
although Merton tended to be more willing and less 
hesitant than Tillich to accept and to stress the 
similarities between the two traditions, pointing out, 
for instance, what he considered to be a basic agree­
ment between the ethical implications of the Buddhist 
idea of Nirvana and the Christian idea of kenosis*^ 
But these points of affinity between Merton and 
Tillich are almost incidental. The basic consistency 
between their two positions has already been outlined 
in detail, not only in this section, but throughout
!See Religionsphilosoohie in What is Religion?, pp* 89-90; and also Theology of Culture, pp. 192- 196. Friedrich Heller’s Prayer (eTî- London; Oxford University Press, 1932), Chapter IV, is the classic statement of the division of the types of religion into the "mystical," and the "prophetic." See above p. 8f.
^See "This is God’s Work," p. 7, in which Heiler is mentioned. See also "Renewal in Monastic Educa­tion," p. 248, and Faith and Violence, p. 67.
^On Tillich, see above pp. 56lf. On Merton see Zen and the Birds of Appetite, especially p. 86.
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this chapter, and can be summarized by saying that 
both men advocated a morality based on love rather 
than one based on obedience or duty. This would 
be a trivial observation were it not for some key 
words that these men introduce into their discussions. 
As early as 1922 Tillich wrote: "In social ethics,
it is the new mysticism of love now stirring every­
where that signifies a theonomous overcoming of the 
autonomous ethical forms without a relapse into.... 
heteronomy.., His use of the words "mysticism" 
and "theonomous" to qualify the word "love" points 
to the same truth that Merton insisted upon, namely, 
"love is impossible without freedom," and that freedom
is impossible without "existential communion with God,
2in the Risen Christ."
Ethics, to be truly effective, must be based 
upon love. Love, to be real, must be based upon 
freedom. Freedom, .to be real, must be based upon 
one's undistorted, essential nature. One's essential 
nature must be based upon ultimate reality.
^"On the Idea of a Theology of Culture," in Vjhat is Religion?, p. 172.
^The New Man, p. 133.
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Ultimate reality is known in the mystical 
moment. In that moment one discovers that his own 
essential nature is grounded in the Ultimate. In 
the mystical moment he is aware that the essential 
nature of all reality is grounded in the same ground 
in which he discovered his own true self. In that 
moment he is free to love, because he is aware of the 
true nature of all his relationships, he is aware of 
the true nature of himself, and he is aware of the 
unconditional demand to actualize himself and his 
community. In that ground he discovers the self­
manifestation of God, the criterion for which is the 
final and definitive revelation of God, Jesus the 
Christ; it is he who is the New Being, the one in 
whom essence is Imown under the conditions of existence, 
the one who is perfectly transparent to the divine 
ground. He is man’s perfect exemplar. But he is 
more. In so far as all men share in the same divine 
ground to which he is transparent, all men share in 
the essentialization that is evident in him. He 
is therefore both exemplar and saviour. Existential 
communion with God is in and through the Chi'ist.
Hence, the terms "mysticism," "theonomous," 
and "existential communion" qualify and define what 
Tillich and Merton agree in considering the fundamental 
nature of both religion and ethics. Mysticism is an 
essential ingredient of religion; and religion gives
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the unconditional character to the moral imperative. 
Wÿsticism and all ethical behaviour, including social 
ethics, are intimately related: mysticism seeks the
substance of ethics, and ethics expresses in existential 
form that which mysticism discovers, namely, the 
divine agape.
589
EPILOGUE
The theology which is foimd both explicitly 
and implicitly within the writings of Thomas Merton 
has been compared with that of Paul Tillich and numerous 
points of affinity have been discovered and elucidated.
In addition to these theological similarities, there 
are also a number of similarities in the actual lives 
of these two men, even though they basically differ. 
Merton was a monk and an ascetic5 Tillich was neither. 
Unlike Merton, Tillich was a theologian who was im­
mersed in the secular world, both in its theoretical 
philosophies and in its way of life. Nevertheless, 
it is not difficult to find, throughout Tillich's 
works, a considerable number of references to monasticism 
and asceticism, not all of them negative. In so far 
as monasticism regards itself as superior to other 
Christian life styles, Tillich is critical.^ (And 
so is Merton.) But Tillich is also appreciative of 
the contribution that monasticism has offered to 
Christian history. He saw the eai'ly monastic theologians
^See especially, Systematic Theology. Vol. Ill,pp. I66f.
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as forerunners of "the method of correlation."
They attempted to show how the Christ is the answer 
to the questions implied in existence, especially 
in terms of human psychology. They "analysed them­
selves and the members of their small community so 
penetratingly that there are few present-day insights 
into the human predicament wiaich they did not 
anticipate. Furthermore, Tillich's sermon, "Holy 
Waste," could very well stand as a defense of 
monasticism:
"Has not Protestantism lost a great deal by losing the wasteful self­surrender of the saints and the DQTstics? Are we not in danger of a religious and moral utilitarianism which always asks for the reasonablepurpose...?"2
^Systematic Theology. Vol. II, p. 30. Keefe implies that the monastic tradition and Tillich's method are related when he explicitly relates the method of correlation to Augustinianism, and sees "the quintessence of Augustinianism.,,an entire theological tradition,..encapsulated in (Systematic Theology)." Keefe, Thomism and the Ontological Theology, of Paul TilliclT (leiden : E.J. Brill,1971), p. 1.
^The Boundaries of Our Being, pp. 187f. Rollo May records how Tillich, when very ill, was asked how he could cope with not being able to do anything. He replied, "It's not bad at all...I can lie here hour after hour and just W .  " May, Paulus. p* 34#
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This does not differ at all from Merton's idea of the 
monk as the raarginal-man, who, in a utilitarian world, 
demonstrates that there are other dimensions to 
man's being. Furthermore, Tillich was able to accept 
asceticism if it did not attempt to negate the 
reality of the concrete. Such an "ontological" 
asceticism is rejected on the basis of the Protestant 
Principles "there is no Spirituality which is based 
on the negation of matter, because God as creator is 
equally near the material and the Spiritual."^ 
Nevertheless, the "asceticism of self-discipline" 
is accepted; and although Tillich ascribes it to "the 
Jex'dsh and Protestant spheres," in particular Paul 
and Calvin, his description of this type of asceticism 
describes what Merton meant by withdrawal: "It pre­
supposes the fallen state of reality and the will to 
resist the temptation coming from many things which 
in themselves are not bad." Tillich concludes that 
"no humanity is possible v/ithout elements of this kind 
of asceticism.Therefore, although Merton was the
:, Vol. Ill, p. 224.
2loc. Git.; Morality and Beyond, p. 36, and Dynamics of Faith, p. 61. However, in The Courage To Be (pp. 4f)> Tillich describes as Aristotelian a type of asceticism which could also describe Merton: "Courage is the af­firmation of one's essential nature, one's inner aim or entelechy, but it is an affirmation which has in itself the character of 'in spite of.' It includes the possible and, in some cases, the unavoidable sacrifice of elements which,also belong to one's being but which, if not sacrificed, would prevent us from reaching our actual fulfillment."
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the monk and practised his own version of Cistercian 
asceticism (he liked beerl), and Tillich was not 
particularly kno\-ai for any ascetical tendencies in 
his own life,^ the differences between the two men 
are not at all absolute. Both could appreciate the 
other's way of life.
There are a number of actual similarities in the 
two men's lives, and although most of them are of no 
great moment, they are of interest. Both men were 
interested in art and interested in the relationship 
between art and theology or spirituality.^ Both men 
were specifically recognized for their contributions 
to the cause of world peace. In 1962c Tillich received 
the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade,^ and one 
year later Merton was the first recipient of the Pax 
Medal avreirded by the Catholic Peace Fellowship.^
^For a defence of Tillich's controversial "life­style" see John J. Carey, "Morality and Beyond; Tillich's Ethics in Life and Death," in Tillich Studies:-1975. pp. 104-115.
^On Merton's interest in Art see abovep, 27; of. Tillich's On the Boundary, p. 29 for an account of Tillich's similar appreciation for Italian mosaics*
^Tillich's acceptance address is in The Future of Religions, pp. 52-63..
4Merton's acceptance address is in Thomas Merton 
on Peace, pp. 257f.
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Both men published essays in Fromm's War Within Man.
Both became famous within the American milieu, although 
neither was American by birth. Finally, however, 
there is one point of affinity in their lives that is 
more than superficial. Both men recognized a par­
ticular kairos. and both called their fellow man to 
respond to that kairos* Both saw the kairos pass, 
were disappointed, and their disappointnent played a 
role in their subsequent writings.
As we have seen, Tillich saw the moment of kairos 
immediately after World War I, and saw his hopes for 
that kairos destroyed with Hitler's rise to power in 
1933. The German Church as well as the nation chose 
a grotesque and ultimately inhuman heteronomy rather 
than the possibility of a new theonomy.^ Thomas Merton 
saw the kairos in the civil rights movement in America, 
and he too expressed great disappointment when it 
proved to be unfulfilled. He wondered if Christians 
were able to recognize their kairos. "Is it possible,» 
he asked, "that when the majority of Christians be­
come aware that 'the time has come' for a decisive 
and urgent commitment, that time has, in fact, already 
run out?" Merton immediately answered his own question,
^See above p. 489,
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and his answer was an expression not only of dis­
appointment, but fear for the future;
"There can be no question now that the time for a certain kind of crucial Christian decision in America has come and gone. In 1962, and finally in 1963, there were 'moments of i^uth' which have now passed, and the scene is becoming one of d^kness, anarchy and moral collapse."^
According to the theories of both Leibrecht and 
Hopper,^ the unfulfilled kairos wrought a change 
in Tillich's emphasis. He started writing not so 
much about the social and cultural implications of 
morality as he wrote about how the individual could 
survive in a meaningless and directionless world.
In 1949 Tillich wrote;
"Instead of a creative kairos, I see a vacuum which can be made creative only if it is accepted and endured and, re­jecting all kinds of premature solutions, is transformed into a deepening 'sacred vè6d' of waiting."3
^"Religion and Race in the United States," in Faith and Violence, p. I3O; also in The New Black- friars 46 (January, 1965), p. 218.
2see above p. 493  ^fp. 2.
^"Beyond Religious Sooialism," Sie Christian Century LXVI (June 15, 1949), p. 733.
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And within a few years he published one of his most 
well-known and seminal books, The Courage To Be. 
a book that emphasized individual survival in a 
chaotic world*
The unfulfilled kairos wrought a change in Merton's 
emphasis, too. Not only did he enter the hermitage 
on a full-time basis in 1965, a movement not without 
its Jeremiah-like prophetic symbolism, he also de­
clared that he would cease to write about world events.^ 
Of course, he did not. In the same way that 
Tillich could say that although Religious Socialism 
was frustrated and destroyed as a programme by 
historical events, still as a prophetic message 
"there is nothing 'beyond religious socialism.'
"In spite of some unavoidable disappointments,"
Tillich reflected, "politics remained, and will always 
remain, an important factor in kqt theological and 
philosophical thought*"^ Merton too was disappointed 
but not silenced by the unfulfilled kairos. The same
^See "Events and Pseudo-Events," in Faith and Violence, p. 145.
^"Autobiographical Reflections by Paul Tillich," in The Theology of Paul Tillich, edited by Kegley and Bretal, p. 13.
2lbid.. p. 19.
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essay that announced his intention to remain silent 
was one in which Merton gave a long and profound 
critique of the failure of communication in a 
technological society that prides itself on mass- 
comraunication skills. He did not remain silent.
However, for the remaining years of his life, his 
emphasis was focused more on the solitary, detached, 
■holistic viewpoint of the contemplative, and the 
contribution that such a viewpoint can make in the 
world, rather than on specific events in political 
affairs. It is this recognition of a kairos (or 
what was hoped to be a kairos) and the subsequent 
personal sense of disappointment at its unfulfillment 
which marks the most important point of similarity in 
the lives of Tillich and Merton. It is an indication 
that both men's similarity in the theological realm 
can be seen as well in the realm of personal experience. 
These men thought in much the same way in regard to 
the relationship between mysticism and social concern, 
and they reacted in much the same way when they dis­
covered that what they saw as truth %fas rejected by 
the world to which they spoke. They were both dis­
appointed, but neither of them allowed that disappoint­
ment to curtail their prophetic messages; the messages 
themselves did not change, only the emphasis did.
As was mentioned earlier, Merton has never 
received a penetrating and detailed theological
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analysis and critique,^ Perhaps he never id.ll. He 
was not a theologian by vocation; rather he was a 
monk who used theological language to explain facets 
of the monastic and contemplative life. In Merton 
one finds an experiential,ascetical and monastic 
theology rather than the work of a systematic 
theologian. In him one is exposed to the stream 
of consciousness of an intelligent, if not brilliant, 
monk. Since he did not produce a systematic theology, 
he has not been criticized as if he had. Most 
criticisms of Merton that are not criticisms of 
particular stances he took in regard to current 
political events are criticisms of either his way of 
life or the style of his writings. They are not, for 
the most part, criticisms of the speculative theology 
which forms the basis of his thinking. Therefore, we
2discover that he is criticized for being unsystematic 
and unoriginal,^ or defended as an essayist^ with his
^See above pp. Ilf,
^by Baker, Og;. Git.. p. 34? Jean LeGlerq in his Introduction to Contemplation in a World of Action, p# xiv; and Mclnerny, Git., p. 85.
^by Bridges, Op. Cit.. p. 69.
^by Voight, Op. Git., p. 118.
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own particular original synthesis.^ He is criticized
2 3for being too prolific, hurried in his writings, and
for being too over-simplified in his social and political
commentary.^ Some saw traces of arrogance in his
5writings, especially in The Seven Storey Mountain, 
and at least one critic thought that he was an ego­
centric hypocrite, the cloistered monk who "enjoyed 
flattery and French cooking," and who, while "meditating 
on the ultimate emptiness... .was remarkably full of 
h i m s e l f . O n  the other hand, Merton had his defenders,
by Hinson, "The Catholicizing of Contemplation," p. 174-5 8,%id Kelly, Op. Cit., p. 266: "He was an original thinker in the sense that his insights were strictly his own."
^by Marco Pallis, "Thomas Merton: 1915-19 6^ "in Studies in Comparative Religions (Summer, 1969), p. 138; Mclnerny, Op. Git., p. l6.
^Mclnerny, Op. Git., p. 17.
^by Baker, Git., p. 113; Alice Mayhew,"Merton Against Himself," Commonweal 91, (October 17,1969), p. 73; Kelly, Op. Git,, pp. 76, 255.
^e.g., Harvey Cox in The Seduction of the Spirit (New York; Touchstone, Simon and Schuster, 1973;, p. 110, and Monica Furlong, Travelling In (Londons Hodder and Stoughton, 1971), paperback edition 1973, p. 95. Cox also criticized Merton for his anti-city stance. Op. Cit., pp. 68, 83. (Merton had once publicly stated that he had not read The Secular City and did not intend to. See McDonnell, "An Interview T'/ith Thomas Merton," p. 34.) See above p. 130.
^Robert Evett, "A Worldly Monk in Search of Truth," Star News. (Wasliington, D.G., August 5, 1973).
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if not his disciples* Eldridge Cleaver, the American
black militant leader, was so moved by the description
of life in Harlem that Merton had written in his
autobiography that he quoted the man he called
"Brother Merton" in his lectures to fellow Black
Muslims.?" The Berrigan brothers, leaders within the
anti-Vietnamese War movement, looked to Merton as
2their spiritual leader and fellow traveller. So
did numerous civil rights leaders. His poetry was 
appreciated by highly acclaimed poets and critics,^ 
and his social commentary was praised by other observers 
of the American political and social scene.^ His
^Cleaver, Soul on Ice: (New York: Ramparts(Dell), 1968), pp. 43ff* See above p. 43.
^See "Daniel Berrigan on Thomas Merton," in The Thomas Merton Life Center Newsletter (April,1973), pp. 6-11, as well as poems by Daniel Berrigan in Continuum (Summer, 1969).
^For instance, Merton regularly published for Katallagete. a journal of Southern Baptist churchmen interested in Civil Rights.
^See Robert Lowell, "The Verses of Thomas Merton," Commonweal XLII (June, 1945), pp. 240-242; Mark Van Dor en, "Thomas Merton," America 120 (January, 1969), pp. 21f.
^See Martin Marty, "To: Thomas Merton. Re:Your Prophecy." National Catholic Reporter (August 30,1967), pp. 6f:: "Recently I have had occasion toreread the book (i.e.. Seeds of Destruction). Wliat bothers me now is the degree of accuracy in your pre­dictions and prophecies in general,,.How it seems to me you were 'telling it as it is' and maybe 'as it
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understanding of the relationship between Zen and 
the Christian mystical tradition was acclaimed by 
D.T. Suzuki,^ the Buddhist scholar, and by no less 
a leader of Eastern religions than the Dalai Lama who 
is quoted to have said to Merton, "You have made me 
at last understand Christianity.But none of these 
evaluations, either positive or negative, reach the 
level of scholarly, theological criticism; they re­
main comments on his person, his style, and his 
effect, A detailed theological critique of Thomas 
Merton's thought has yet to be attempted.
There are good reasons to believe that Merton's 
influence will continue to increase in the coming 
years. There are still volumes of unpublished materials
will be.* (Earlier Marty had criticized Merton for being too pessimistic.)
found Dr. Suzuki at his cheerful best. He said that on the day before my visit Father Thomas Merton had come to see him, and he spoke with great warmth of his unusually deep insight into Zen. He gave me an article on Zen by Father Merton to read, published a short time before in Continuum, saying, "There is more true understanding of Zen in this article than anything I have ever read by a Western writer." Mr. Lunsford Yandell, quoted by Christmas Humphreys in the Forward to Merton's "The Zen Revival" (London: The Buddhist Society, no date), no pagination.Also, see above p. I93,
^Quoted by Pallis, Op. Cit., p. I46. For Merton's description of his visit to the Dalai Lama see The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton, pp. 100-102, passim.
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in the Thomas Merton Archives. There are hundreds 
of hours of taped lectures which will inevitably be 
edited and published. There is no reason to disagree 
with Mclnerny's assessment that Merton will never be 
known for one principal work (although The Seven 
Storey Mountain, perhaps regretably, will continue to 
be his best known work) or even many particular writings, 
but will be known and appreciated by "the total impact 
of his life and thought."^ Mclnerny compares him, 
in this respect, to Ralph Waldo Emerson who continues 
to have a significant place in American letters although 
he is not famous for any one or more particular books. 
Merton, like Emerson, was an essayist, and as more 
and more essays or informal lectures are published, 
his reputation should become increasingly enhanced.
He was a charismatic, lively and witty author who, 
in a world that is experiencing the impelling need 
for a constructive social ethic at the same time that 
it is experiencing a renewed interest in both Mystik 
and Mystizismus. emerges as one who most explicitly 
formed a bridge between mysticism and social ethics.
The contemplative monk who counseled the Berrigans 
and Joan Baez as well as Jacques Maritain and the
^Mclnerny, Op. Git.. p. 123.
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Dalai Lama is certain to have a continuing appeal. 
Therefore, it is important that his theology be 
criticized as well as expounded. Furthermore, if 
Robert L. Heilbroner is even remotely accurate in his 
prognosis of the future of civilisation, the theology 
of a man of Merton's scope needs elucidation. 
Heilbroner, an economist, suspects "that a major force 
for the lu’ansformation of a business civilization 
will be a new religious orientation."^ This new type 
of religion, he hopes, will be able to overcome the 
extreme individualism of "business civilization," - 
an individualism which he feels is ultimately and 
universally destructive. In another article he 
particularly cited monasticism as a model for social 
change:
"Yet, when I take the measure of the changes that must be accomplished, both within the underdeveloped world and in the industrialized nations,I cannot find a plausible alternative to the ideal-type of a monastery - a tightly disciplined, ascetic religious order - as the model to which the evolving societies of the world will gradually approximate."2
^Heilbroner, "Collapse of a Civilisation,"The Observer Review (London; December 28, 1975), p. 15#
^Heilbroner, "Learning to Live with the Future," The Observer (London; December 29, 1974), P# 13#
603
Therefore, because of his basic monastic orientation, 
Merton's role in the future development of civilization 
should be particularly important (at least in 
Heilbroner*s perspective). Also, Merton's grounding 
of social ethics in the solidarity of mankind appeals 
to Heilbroner's statement on ethics: "Indeed, the
generalized capability of identification is the soil 
in which are rooted all possibilities of morality."^ 
Therefore, if this one economist is even partially 
correct in his assessment of what is necessary for 
mankind to survive, Merton's wisdom has three points 
in its favour: it is religious, it is monastic, and
it grounds morality in the "capability of identification," 
But Heilbroner is not the only economic prognosticator 
whose vision implies the continuing importance of a 
Mertonian wisdom. E.P. Schumacher, in his popular 
book. Small is Beautiful, echoes the kind of solution 
that Merton presented to his readers;
"Everywhere people ask;. 'Vftiat can I actually do?' The answer is as simple as it is disconcerting: we can, eachof us, work to put our own inner house 
in order. The guidance we need for this work cannot be found in science or technology, the value of which
^Heilbroner, Inquiry Into the Human Prospect (New York; W.W. Norton, 1975)7 P*
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utterly depends on the ends they serve; but it can still be found in the traditional wisdom of mankind."^
In an age when economists speak of religion, monasticism 
and putting one's inner house in order, it is certain 
that a man like Thomas Merton will have continuing if 
not increasing influence. And when influential 
psychologists like Abraham H. Maslow can speak of 
life's "peak-experiences" as "transient states of 
absolute Being" in the midst of becoming, and can 
say that "self-actualization involves both contem­
plation and action necessarily."^ a detailed and 
thorough investigation of Merton's theological thought 
is an important contribution that theological scholar­
ship can contribute to the modern quest for survival 
in the midst of a depersonalizing, technological world, 
The intention of this paper has been to elucidate 
and expound that theology and to indicate how Tillich's 
theology helps to reveal the systematic basis of 
Merton's thought. The comparison with the theology 
of Paul Tillich serves also to point to one way in
^Schumacher, Small is Beautiful; A Study of Economics as if People Mattered. (London: Blond and Briggs, 1973), p. 279.
%laslow. Toward a Psychology of Being (Second Edition) (New York: Von Nostrant Reinhold, 1968),pp. 154, 117.
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which Merton’s thought can be evaluated. Although 
Merton’s thought has yet to receive detailed criticism, 
Tillich's most certainly has. Therefore, in so far 
as Merton is in agreement with Tillich, the critical 
discussions of the works of the latter can also be 
used to help understand the former. It has been the 
purpose of the last chapter of tliis paper to indicate 
that such an approach is a valid one; that the various 
discussions of Tillich's theology can also be applied 
to Merton's theology in so far as the two men agree. 
This paper has not proposed to make the actual 
application of these critiques to Merton, but rather 
to show that such an approach is possible, valid, 
and worthwhile. Any one of the points raised in that 
chapter can be studied and criticized in more detail, 
and the criticisms that have been made over the years 
against Tillich's ontology, anthropology, Ghristology 
and ethics can be reexamined to see where and how they 
may also apply to Merton.
The criticisms of Tillich's theology, therefore, 
provide a way to begin a critique of Merton. But the 
reverse can also be true: Merton provides a new way
in which Tillich can be understood. Merton is a living 
example of many things of which Tillich wrote in his 
theology. He was a man who sought to experience the 
ground of his being, and \Aio sought to experience unity 
with God and unity with mankind in that ground. He
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was a man who sought to transcend the polarities which 
Tillich elucidated. In trying to be both an individual 
and a participant Merton ended up in the paradoxical 
situation of being a hermit who drank coffee with 
famous people. In his attempt to unite dynamics and 
form, he tried to express poetically that which he 
felt to be beyond the possibilities of language. In 
his endeavour to balance the polarities of freedom 
and destiny he sought his own inner freedom within 
the limits of the structures which he had accepted as 
representing his destiny. He was a man, according to 
his biographer, "both uninlnbited and strictly disciplined. 
He was, therefore, a man in whom the Tillichian pro­
cess of self-actualization was a fragmentary, an­
ticipatory, but nonetheless unambiguous reality. He 
was a man who possessed, in short, the courage to be.
And he interpreted that courage, and his own being, 
as a gift given to him by God, loiown unambiguously in 
Christ, and internalized through the Spirit in the 
ecstatic moment of mystical contemplation.
Although it has been the purpose of this paper 
to indicate ways in which to understand Merton through 
the theology of Tillich, perhaps an unintended result
^John Howard Griffin, "In Search of ThomasMerton," p. 20.
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of this study has been to provide an understanding 
of Tillich through the life of Merton. If so, it 
should come as good news to at least one of Tillich's 
critics. Van Harvey, who considered himself to be 
numbered among the "unhappy lovers" of Tillich, those 
who admired Tillich’s creativity but who did not 
have "the least idea of how to go about appropriating 
his vision and making it our own."^ It is hoped that 
Thomas Merton can provide Van Harvey and other unhappy 
lovers of Tillich with an answer. Here is at least 
one way of going about appropriating that vision.
Finally, it can be implied that if Merton is to 
enjoy a continued influence, Tillich may very well 
have a similar influence. In the days when the 
"death of God" theology was popular, and metaphysics 
was in bad favour, it did not seem so. Tillich him­
self wondered if he was "so soon on the dustbin of 
history." As far as he could tell, he had been
passed by. Dietrich Bonhoeffer had said about the 
same thing twenty years earlier: Tillich was out of
date. He wrote to Bethge, "Tillich set out to
^Van A. Harvey, a review of Tillich's Systematic Theology.Vol. Ill, in Theology Today XXI, (October,1964) , p. 382.
^Quoted in Ved Mehta, Git. « p. 58.
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interpret the evolution of the world itself -
against its will - in a religious sense, to give it
its whole shape through religion. That was very
courageous of him, but the world unseated him and
went on by itself..."^
Perhaps that is so. But the "world come of
age" may do well to listen again to see if it had
not, perhaps, unseated him too quickly. It has been
questioned, and ivill continue to be questioned,
whether the ontology upon which he developed his
system will actually support an historically-oriented
ethic of social reform - whether or not the approach
to theology which he advocated could, in fact, make
2a difference in the world. However, a similar 
theology with a strong orientation to ontology gave 
rise to an ethic of social change in Merton.
His life and witness become, as it were, a pragmatic 
vindication of his o\m theology since his theoretical 
ethic, his personal ethic, and his social ethic were 
so interpenetrating and of one piece. Therefore, in 
so far as it has been shoim that there are similarities
^Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison. (ET: London: SCM," 1953), pp. 147.
^e.g., N.H.G. Robinson, Op. Git., p. 287, and A.G.B. Woollard, Progress; A Ghristian Doctrine?. 
p. 34.
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between the theology of Merton and the theology 
of Tillich, it follows that Merton’s life is a 
pragmatic vindication of Tillich's theology as 
well as his own, Tillich spoke the same Yes to the 
necessity for social concern .that Merton spoke, and 
he spoke a similar No to the No that Merton spoke 
to an activism that had lost touch with the ground 
of its being and meaning, Leibrecht saw this in 
Tillich when he x«*ote;
"Though he had powerfully asserted his religious concern for culture and social action in Europe, where cultural relativism had spread among the theologians, he found that in the new country he had to warn against and say No to the confidence of an easy confusion of human and divine spirit in much of American theology.Too often religion seemed on the verge of being totally absorbed by etiiics, social action and other con­cerns. Having incessantly demanded action from his quietist brethren in Germany, Tillich found himself speak­ing out in America agains active Maa’tha in favor of contemplative Mary, who, after all, had chosen 'the better part.' Activism is not religion and sometimes it is the demand of the hour to wait. If American theology has learned one basic lesson from Reinhold Niebuhr, that despite all, man is a sinner, it has learned another basic lesson from Tillich; God is ultimate concern, and confusing Him with other concerns, even the best-intended ones, will mean disaster for theology, culture and politics.
^Leibrecht, Git., p. 20; cf above pp. 305f on the same dialectic in Merton's apologetic thrust.
610
For Tillich, as well as for Merton, one's 
ultimate concern does not detract from the penultimate 
ones. On the contrary; to be so involved in the 
penultimate that one loses sight of the divine depths 
is a futile and uneonstractive involvement - it is 
as if one were not involved at all. This is the 
message of both Tillich and Merton, After Vietnam 
and Watergate and the plethora of governmental and 
business scandals, one wonders whether this message 
is actually out of date*
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APPENDIX
Some Representative Poems of Thomas Merton
FOR m  BROTHER;REPORTED MISSING IN ACTION, 1943
Sweet brother, if I do not sleep My eyes are flowers for your tomb;And if I cannot eat my bread,
Uy fasts shall live like willows where you died.If in the heat I find no water for my thirst.My thirst shall turn to springs for you, poor traveller,
IVhere, in what desolate and smokey country,Lies your poor body, lost and dead?And in what landscape of disaster Has your unhappy spirit lost its road?
Come, in my labor find a resting place And in my sorrow lay your head.Or rather take my life and blood And buy yourself a better bed - Or take ny breath and talce death And buy yourself a better rest.
When all the men of war are shot And flags have fallen into dust.Your cross and mine shall tell men still Christ died on each, for both of us.
For in the wreckage of your April Clirist lies slain,And Christ weeps in the ruins of ray spring:The money of l#ose tears shall fall Into your weak and friendless hand,And buy you back to your own land:
The silence on Vîhose tears shall fall Like bells upon your alien tomb.Hear them and come; they call you home.
THIRTY POEMS
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LANDSCAPE
A Personage is seen Leaning upon a cushion Printed with cornflowers.
A Child appears Holding up a pencil.
"This is a picture(Says the Child to the Personage)Of the vortex,"
"Draw it your own way,"Says the Personage.
(Music is heard Pure in the island windows Sea-music on the Child's Interminable shore, his coral home.)
Behind a blue mountain Covered with chickenfoot trees,The molten sun appears,A heavy, painted flower.
A Personage is seen Leaning upon the mountain With the sun in one hand And a pencil in the other.
"This is a picture(Says the Personage to the Child)Of the begining of the world."
"Or of its end!" cries the Child Hiding himself in the cushions.
A Woman appearsLeaning upon the Child's shoulder. He looks up again.
"This is my Mother(Says the Child to the Personage)Older than the moon."
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(Grecian horses are heard Returning from the foam Of the pure island*s windows,And the Child * s horizons.)
Mother is a world (Says the Child to the Personage) Printed with gillyflowers.”
"Paint her your own way”(Says the Personage to the Child). And, lifting up his;- pencil,He crosses out the sun.
THE STRANGE ISLANDS
ELEGY FOR JAMES THÜRBER
Thurber, they have come, the secret bearers,At the right time, though fools seem to have won. Business and generals survive you At least for one brief day.
Humor is now totally abolished.The great dogs of nineteen sixty one Are nothing to laugh at.
Leave us, good friend. Leave our awful celebration With pity and relief.You are not called to solemnize with us Our final madness.
You have not been invited to hear The last words of everybody.
mmLEMS OF A SEASON OF FURY
DRY PLACES
No cars go byI-ftiere dogs are barking at the desert.Yet it is not twenty years since many lampsShed their juices in this one time townAnd stores grew big lights, like oranges and pears.
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Now not one lame miner Sits on the rotten verandah.Works in the irons where Judas* shadow dwells.Yet I could hew a city From the side of their hill,
0 deep stone covert where the duskIs full of lighted beastsAnd the mad stars preach wars without end;l'Alose bushes and grasses live without water,There the skinny father of hate rolls in his dustAnd if the wind shift one leafThe dead jump up and bark for their ghosts;Their dry bones want our penniless souls.
Bones, go back to your baskets.Get your fingers out of my clean skin.Rest in your rainless death until your own souls Gome back in the appointed way and sort out from your remains.
We who are still alive will wring a few green bladesFrom the floor of this valleyThough ploughs abhor your metal and your clay.Rather than starve with you in rocks without oasis,
We will get up and work your loam Until some prayer or some lean sentence Bleeds like the quickest root they ever cut.
For we cannot forget the legend of the world's childhoodOr the track to the dogwood valleyAnd Adam our Father's old grass farmWherein they gave the animals namesAnd loiew Christ was promised first without scarsWhen all God's larks called out to HimIn their wild orchard.
THE TEARS OF THE BLIND LIONS
SOLEMN MUSIC
Use your numbered lineTo describe constellationsHunter and CapricornAnd heavenly BearsAmid Sanctus soundsAnd transportsThe golden fury of wires
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The lighted yearsOf distant spaceAre all made humanBy modes of musicThe questioning vox humanaThe disciplines of chant
Take your compassesTo measure flightExpanding silencesAnd pay attentionTo the stillness of the endOr the beginningSanctusThe abyss of brass The sapphire orchestra
Bear the hot Well-fired shot Roaring out Of the cool dark
And go to meetIn the wet estranged countryThe midnight expressBringing Plato, Prophets, Milton, Blake, The nine daughters of memory
But use your own numbered lineTo go dov/n aloneInto the night skyHand over handAnd dig it like a mine.
GABLES TO THE AGE
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